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Abstract of Thesis
Privatisation is a central theme in discussions over the transition process of 
previously centrally planned economies (PCPE). This study examines the 
developments in privatisation in Azerbaijan, one o f the last republics of the FSU 
to embark upon the road of privatisation. The aim o f research was to obtain first 
hand information on the privatisation process and to construct a qualitative, 
contextual picture of the power struggle over property rights.
Part one establishes a theoretical framework under which privatisation in 
PCPEs can be evaluated. It establishes that privatisation can be seen as an 
instrument to build up a sound system of enterprise control and initiate industrial 
restructuring, and thus enhance static and dynamic efficiency. The success and 
effectiveness o f this tool is dependent on various factors, especially (1) the 
evolution o f institutional preconditions, i.e. the development o f the political, legal, 
and financial framework and other fundamental institutions of a market 
environment; (2) the question of the power of the state, i.e. is it a strong state, with 
agenda-setting power, or a weak state, susceptible to counterproductive rent- 
seeking activities of insiders; (3) the proposed methods o f privatisation; (4) the 
process of contracting for property rights. By applying the theories of privatisation 
in PCPEs developed in the first part, the second provides an account of the Azeri 
privatisation process and its likely effect on static and dynamic efficiency placing 
special emphasis on institutional preconditions. Because o f the nature of the 
proposed research, especially in grasping the institutional dimensions of 
Azerbaijan's transition, intensive fieldwork was regarded as part of an appropriate 
research design. The analysis is based on original Azeri documents and archival 
records, transcripts of almost 127 hours of interviews, and extensive field visits 
carried out between December 1993 and February 1995.
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9Terms o f transliteration
The Azeri1 has been transliterated according to the system developed by Allworth 
(1971:307) used by most libraries.
Table 1-1: Transliteration of Azeri
Alphabet Transliteration Alphabet Transliteration Alphabet Transliteration
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Geographical features
Azerbaijan is situated in the eastern Transcaucasia on the western shore of the 
Caspian Sea. The republic shares borders with the Russian Federation and Georgia 
to the north, Turkey and Iran to the south, Armenia to the west and covers an area 
o f 86,6oo sq. km, including the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic (5,500 sq. 
km) and the Nagorno-Karabakh region (4,400 sq. km). The landscape consists of 
coastal lowlands and basin of the Kura and Araxes rivers in the east and south­
east, and the mountains in the north at the Daghestan border with Mount 
Basardysy of the Greater Caucasus range rising to 4,466m and in the west near the 
Georgian and Armenian borders (Lesser Caucasus), with peaks in the far west of 
the Karabakh rising to 3,581 m. The capital, Baku, is located on the south side of
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the Apsheron Peninsula with its natural harbour being the best of the Caspian. The 
nine different climate zones of Azerbaijan allow a variety of agricultural 
production including wheat, grapes, tea, cotton, figs and pomegranates, mulberry 
trees, saffron, and forest products. Important natural minerals include oil, natural 
gas, zinc, lead, iron and copper ores, bauxite, salt and building materials.
Azerbaijan has a population of 7.4 million (1994), with 53% living in 
urban areas. There are 65 towns, including 8 with more than 50,000 inhabitants. 
Half o f the urban population lives in Baku (1.7 million), Ganje2 (0.3 million) and 
Sumgait (0.3 million). Azerbaijan is a multi-ethnic society with more than 90 
nations and ethnic groups in the country.
Due to the state of undeclared war with Armenia over the Nagorno- 
Karabakh region since 1988, according to official sources 20,000 Azeris have 
been killed and 4,400 have been taken prisoner or hostage, with many others being 
wounded and huge areas devastated. In mid-1994 a cease-fire was negotiated. 
However, 20% of Azerbaijan remained under Armenian occupation. Almost 1 
million people (13% of the population) have become refugees or displaced 
persons.
1 The language o f  the Turks o f  Azerbaijan is called  by S oviet sources “Azerbaijani” and 
by som e W estern sources “Azeri” . In the fo llow ing, the term “A zeri” w ill be used for the 
language and the population, as it is used in Azerbaijan itself,
“ Ganje w as called  Elizavetpol in tsarist tim es and Kirovobad from the m id-1930s until 
January 1990.
C
as
pi
an
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Table 1-2: Basic information on Azerbaijan
Area 86,600 sq. km
Population 7,430,700 (1994 census), 55% urban.
85,4% Azeris, 4% Russians, 2% Armenians, 9,6% 
others.
Capital Baku
Language Azeri (official)
Life expectancy 71 years (m67/f75) (1993)
Infant mortality 2.8% (1993)
Religion Islam (mostly Shiite Ithna sect; some Sunni Hanafi 
school).
Illiteracy rate 4% (1992)
GNP US$ 5424 million (1993)
GDP US$ 4992 million (1993)
GDP per capita USS 730 (1993)
Imports USS 241 mill. (1993)
Exports U S$351 mill. (1993)
Currency Manat (USS 1 = AzM 4182 on 29 December 1994)
Rate o f inflation (retail prices) 1788% (end o f 1994)
Foreign debts US$ 35.5 (1993)
Minimum wage AzM 2000 (since 16.6.1994)
Unemployment 27% (Dec. 1992)
Employment structure Industry: 13%
Agriculture: 39%
Construction: 7%
Transport and communication: 7% 
Education: culture and art: 14% 
General administration: 2%
Declaration o f independence 30.08.1991
Political system The parliament is the highest legislature. The 
President o f the Republic is directly elected. The 
constitution enacted in 1978 is still in place. 
However, a new constitution has been under 
discussion since 1992.
President Heydar Aliev
INTRODUCTION
Privatisation has been the buzz-word in the discussions over the transition process 
of previously centrally planned economies (PCPEs).3 It has been declared the 
ultimate panacea at the micro-economic level for the prevailing economic crisis 
and was set at the top of the agenda of policy ‘advice’ directives of IMF, World 
Bank, and other Western consultants. Built on the belief o f the superiority of 
private ownership, underpinned by rather shallow analytical and empirical support 
o f mainly the Austrian School and the Property Rights School, ambitious and 
overoptimistic mass privatisation programmes were launched for the privatisation 
of the entire economy in the shortest time, regardless o f sector and enterprise 
specificities, and overall institutional obstacles of the respective economies.4 Eight 
years into the debate the naive optimism of most o f the crusaders for privatisation 
has faded. However, privatisation has still remained a priority on the agenda of 
many PCPEs.
This study examines the developments in privatisation in Azerbaijan, one 
o f the last republics of the FSU to embark upon the road of privatisation. 
Azerbaijan is better known for its conflict with the neighbouring state Armenia. 
At the same time, its petroleum resources and strategic location on the Caspian 
Sea have attracted substantial interest of the international business community, 
with multinational oil companies at the forefront, and o f neighbouring states 
concerned about the implications of Azerbaijan’s successful transition from a 
Soviet republic to a sovereign state in control of its own resources and foreign 
policy.
3 T he author intentionally refrained from using the standard term ‘transitional countries’, 
as it im plies a progression from planned to market econom y. C onsidering the uncertainty 
over the transition process, the author m aintains that the transition from a planned 
econom y can fo llow  many paths with no clear destination. H ence the less pre-emptive 
u se o fP C P E .
4 Institutions are defined as formal arrangements, such as the legal framework, the 
banking and financing system , the tax system , the labour market, and less intangible 
attitudes, routines and norms o f  behaviour which m ake out the context in which  
econ om ic behaviour takes place.
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The aim o f the underlying research was to obtain first hand information on 
the privatisation process and to construct a qualitative, contextual picture of the 
power struggle over property rights. The study provides for the first time a 
comprehensive account of the Azeri privatisation process and its likely effect on 
static and dynamic efficiency placing special emphasis on institutional 
preconditions. Because of the nature of the proposed research, especially the aim 
of grasping the institutional environment, intensive fieldwork was regarded as part 
o f an appropriate research design. Qualitative research techniques are often 
ridiculed as unreliable, subjective and ‘unscientific5 (cf. Piore 1983: 76; Downey 
and Ireland 1983). However, the popularity of qualitative methods and 
‘methodological marriages5 has increased (cf. Silverman 1993: 20-29; Warwick 
1993a; Whyte and Alberti 1993).5 Considering the volatile environment of PCPEs 
characterised through rapid change and moreover considering the scarcity of 
reliable quantitative data, a qualitative approach seems justified for the chosen 
research object. The analysis is based on original Azeri documents and archival 
records, which have not been available to academia before, transcripts of almost 
127 hours of interviews, and extensive field visits carried out between December 
1993 and February 1995.
Contrary to the bulk o f literature which equates private ownership with 
efficiency and hence sees privatisation as the only path leading to the latter, the 
following analysis establishes privatisation as merely an instrument of industrial 
policy to build up a sound system of enterprise control and initiate industrial 
restructuring, and thus enhance static and dynamic efficiency. Various factors are 
identified on which the success and effectiveness of this tool depends and thus 
which have to be considered, most eminently, (1) the evolution o f institutional 
preconditions, i.e. the development of the political, legal, and financial framework 
and other fundamental institutions of a market environment; (2) the question of
5 Piore (1983) stresses the benefits o f  qualitative research techniques for econom ics. The 
sign ificance for organisational study is pointed out by D ow net and Ireland (1983), 
M ailing (1983), M intzberg (1983), Pettigrew  (1983), Salancik (1983), and W ebb and 
W eick (1983). There is an abundant literature on qualitative research techniques. See, for 
exam ple B erg (1989), Burgess (1990), Strauss (1987), Strauss and Corbin (1990), 
Silverm an (1993), Patton (1990), and Van M aanen (1983a; 1983b).
15
the power of the state, i.e. is it a strong state, with agenda-setting power, or a weak 
state, susceptible to counterproductive rent-seeking activities of insiders; (3) the 
proposed methods of privatisation; (4) the process o f contracting for property 
rights.
The analysis focuses on Targe privatisation’, defined here as establishing 
private ownership in industrial enterprises. Privatisation in agriculture involves 
separate issues of agrarian reform and will be therefore not considered here. 
‘Small privatisation’, i.e. the sale of little workshops, catering outlets, shops, etc., 
involves often only the mere sale of commercial properties and thus is less 
interesting out of the perspective of enhancing efficiency.
The thesis is organised in two parts. Part one is concerned with the theory 
of privatisation in PCPEs. The drawn conclusions have not only implications for 
the debate in Azerbaijan, but also for the debate elsewhere in PCPEs. As most of 
the literature is based on the assumption o f the superiority of private ownership 
and evolves around technicalities of the privatisation process, the thesis starts off 
with a critical evaluation of some theoretical underpinnings of this assumption. 
The analysis reveals the latter as unsustainable. Thus in the reminder of the first 
part, it is tried to establish an alternative theoretical framework under which 
privatisation in PCPEs can be evaluated. First determinants of enterprise 
efficiency in PCPEs are identified. In a further step the very definition of property 
rights and their formation is scrutinised and privatisation as proposed institutional 
change is set in the context of the evolving complex process of contracting. 
Chapter three provides a thorough evaluation o f methods of privatisation which 
have been proposed for PCPEs and which have, to varying degrees, been 
implemented. It presents a transaction cost framework to assess privatisation 
methods in PCPEs.
In part two the developed theories are applied in the context of Azerbaijan. 
The fourth chapter assesses the institutional background in which the privatisation 
process is set. As major determinants are identified (1) the political and (2) 
economic conditions, (3) the development o f the legal framework of economic 
activity and (4) the financial infrastructure, and (5) the ability of the state to 
impose privatisation. Chapter five assesses the legal framework of privatisation,
16
the role o f the State Privatisation Committee (ASPC) and the 1994 draft 
privatisation programme. The objectives of the chapter are (1) to discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of the chosen approach, and possible remedies, (2) to 
assess the powers of the body responsible for privatisation, and (3) to assess the 
possible consequences of privatisation on static and dynamic efficiency. Chapter 
six presents quantitative and empirical evidence on attitudes, perceptions, and 
expectations around privatisation in Azerbaijan. Incorporating the previous 
analysis, the final chapter looks at privatisation in the context of the overall 
contracting process.
The study on privatisation in Azerbaijan covers the period 1991-1994.
PART ONE
18
1. W hy privatise?
Introduction
Privatisation, or "the general process of involving the private sector in the 
ownership or operation of state-owned enterprises" (Lee and Nellis, 1990: 1), has 
been a central theme amongst politicians and economists for more than a decade, 
both in the industrialised countries as well as in the developing world. Motives for 
privatisation stressed by proponents of privatisation include poor economic 
performance o f public enterprises, the public sector deficit, and the more general 
over-extension of the role of the state.1 No doubt, political motives have played a 
central role in many privatisations.2 In developing countries the emphasis of 
economic reform on privatisation has been partly due to the imperatives of 
structural adjustment. International financial institutions exercise considerable 
pressure, and privatisation is one of their conditions for assistance.3 Privatisation, 
however, has gained a new dimension after the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
other centrally planned economies in Eastern and Central Europe.
In the context o f PCPEs, privatisation is seen as a vital component o f the 
envisaged systemic transition to a market economy.4 It is aimed at:
shifting] the balance in the ownership structure away from the dominance 
of the state sector towards predominantly private ownership and control, 
thus providing the critical mass of private ownership required for the 
effective functioning of the market economy (Sood, 1991: 102).
However, in scrutinising the theoretical literature on privatisation in 
previously centrally planned economies, and in examining the evidence of fierce 
power struggles between various interest groups in the countries concerned, it
1 S ee  for exam ple, Baum ol (1980), M acA voy et al. (1989 ), Roll (1982), Vernon and 
Aharoni (1 9 9 1 ) and V ickers and Yarrow (1988).
2 For exam ple, see Fine (1990: 113-120; 138-172) for political m otives behind the British 
privatisation programme.
3 For a detailed analysis o f  the conditionally o f  international assistance and its 
im plications, see A vram ovic (1988).
4 See for exam ple, A ghion and Burgess (1992:8), A sh, Hare, and Canning (1994), Hare 
(1991 :5 ), Hinds (1992:13), Kirchner (1992:4), Kornai (1992:155).
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becomes quite apparent that privatisation is promoted primarily out of political 
motives (cf. Major 1993; Stiglitz 1993: 187).5 It is regarded as a political strategy 
to weaken the power structure o f the old elite in the state enterprises and the 
ministries responsible for these enterprises. As such, it is not aimed simply at 
transfer of ownership, but at a fundamental change in the underlying attitudes, 
behaviour and motives of economic agents. The unquestioned belief in the 
superiority of private ownership is an effective means for these advocates of 
privatisation who want to induce a rapid systemic change and ensure that the 
process of overall change is irreversible (cf. Major 1993: 53). At the same time, as 
the discussion of 'spontaneous privatisation' and 'insider control' have shown, 
privatisation can be equally seen as a strategy of the nomenklatura6 to enhance 
their position.7 For those to whom enhancing economic efficiency is the goal, 
these purely political strategies are hardly helpful.
This chapter examines different theoretical frameworks within which 
privatisation has been understood. Most proponents of privatisation claim that it 
enhances economic efficiency, associating efficiency with private ownership. The 
theoretical underpinnings of the belief in the superiority of private ownership are, 
however, meagre. General equilibrium analysis, as the principal paradigm of 
microeconomic theory, is indifferent towards the distribution of ownership 
between public and private sectors.
5 M ajor (1993: 2) puts it as fo llow s,
[..] all the supportive arguments for privatisation o f state owned property that are 
based on 'pure’ economic rationality considerations, such as the gains in economic 
efficiency by privatisation, or the superiority o f private ownership over state 
ownership as regards flexibility, perpetual innovation and technical progress, rank as 
secondary in Eastern European political debates.
6 The term originates from the party-nominated list o f  candidates for key appointm ents in 
the econom ic system , termed ‘nomenklatura’ (cf. Gregory and Stuart 1994: 186).
7 For a more detailed d iscussion  o f  problems o f  spontaneous privatisation, see for
exam ple, Brabant (1992: 205), Frydman and Rapaczynski (1993 and 1994: 12f.), Johnson 
and Kroll (1991 and 1995), M aggs (1992), N agy (1991), Radygin (1995: 27-32), 
Staniszkis (1991), Szalai (1991), and V oszk a (1991 and 1992). See also, section 3.2. For 
an exam ination o f  issues o f  insider control, see sections 2 .1 .2  and 3,1.
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One important exposition of the belief in the superiority of private
* Sownership is put forward in the socialist calculation debate by the Austrian 
School9. Although the argument is carried out on the systemic level and is a 
corollary o f the broader debate on planned vs. market economy, it does address the 
issue o f whether private ownership is more efficient than public ownership. The 
proponents o f private ownership and hence privatisation derive their ammunition 
mainly from the arguments of the Austrian School (cf. Fine 1990: 113-120; 
Brabant 1992: 14; Rowthorn and Chang 1993: 57; Winiecki 1993: 134-7).
Another theoretical framework within which the superiority of private 
ownership has been understood is property rights theory.10 This strand of New 
Institutional Economics extends neo-classical theoiy by the penalty/reward 
structure o f property and contractual rights, and the consideration of positive 
transactions costs.
For an understanding and assessment o f privatisation, a knowledge of the 
underlying theoretical frameworks is extremely important. Thus, this chapter 
examines the theoretical underpinnings o f the belief in the superiority of private 
ownership. The views of the Austrian school will be outlined and critically 
assessed in the first section. The second section examines the role of private 
ownership in property rights theory.
§
There is ex ten sive literature on the socia list calculation debate. For a good summary o f  
the debate as w ell as a bibliography, see  Vaughn (1980 ). For more recent 
reinterpretations o f  the debate, see Lavoie (1985), Murrell (1983 ) and R ichter (1992).
} For an exp osition  o f  the v iew s o f  the Austrian school see Dolan (1976), Littlechild  
(1978 ), M oss (1 9 7 6 ), O 'Driscoll (1977), Shand (1980 ), Spadaro (1978), and W hite 
(1977).
10 For an orthodox survey o f  the theory o f  property rights, see Furubotn and Pejovich  
(1972 ), and Furubotn and Richter (1991: 1-32). For treatment w ithin an institutional 
tradition, see D eA lessi (1980; 1983), Eggertsson (1990) and W illiam son (1985; 1990). 
For a more right-w ing approach, see Buchanan (1986). Pejovich (1990 ) and W iniecki 
(1993: 133-165) have applied property rights theory to econom ies in transition. W hilst 
Pejovich fo cu ses on the com parative system  level, W in iecki’s analysis is pitched at the 
enterprise level. Both approaches are intended as a rationale for privatisation. However, 
W iniecki's com parative analysis o f  various forms o f  enterprise ow nership is set within  
the market system , so that his line o f  reasoning for previously centrally planned 
econom ies is seriously flawed. His argument that private ow nership increases x- 
effic ien cy  is heavily  based on the d iscipline im posed by the capital market and the 
market for m anagers. Sim ilarly the contribution o f  Pejovich's com parative system s 
analysis as a rationale for privatisation in econom ies in transition is debatable.
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1.1 The rCalculation Debater all over again
In the socialist calculation debate Mises raised the argument o f whether an 
efficient allocation would be possible in an economic system without private 
ownership of the means of production (Mises 1920: 104). Mises claimed that 
money prices determined in a market context were necessary for rational 
economic calculation (1920: 89-104). He argues that, without trade of capital 
goods, factor prices for capital could not be determined, and without these the 
contribution o f each productive factor could not be evaluated. Thus resources 
would not flow freely to their most highly valued use (ibid.). Mises concluded that 
without private ownership of means of production, prices could not be adequately 
determined, and without the price system, resources could not be allocated 
efficiently.
Socialist economists11 took Mises' challenge seriously, especially Oskar 
Lange in his famous article "On the Economic Theory o f Socialism". Lange 
(1938) constructed a Walrasian general equilibrium model within which the 
central planning board substitutes for (or is) the Walrasian auctioneer. In his 
model the planning board sets prices for goods and factors of production (Lange 
1938: 85-86). The factory managers follow the rule of profit maximisation by 
minimising average costs and by producing an output level at which marginal 
costs are equated to "shadow" prices (Lange 1938: 82-84). The central planning 
board adjusts prices in response to any supply and demand surpluses or shortages 
that might result (Lange 1938: 91-94). Thus the whole process simulates, by trial- 
and-error, the Walrasian tatonnement process. In equilibrium, the Pareto-efficient 
criterion could be met by a socialist as well as a capitalist economy. Lange's 
conclusion established that standard theory of perfect competition has in itself 
nothing to do with the private or public ownership of the means of production.12
Mises and Hayek rejected the Walrasian model mainly on three grounds (a) 
the information, and (b) the incentive problems in the model and (c) the dynamic 
adaptability to changing economic circumstances i. e. that flexibility, perpetual
11 The socia list side o f  the debate w as put forth m ost em inently by D ickinson  (1939),
Lerner (1937  and 1944), and Taylor (1938).
12
Lange's m odel w as also form alised by Arrow and H urwicz (1960: 34-104).
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innovation and technical progress, were not considered in Lange's model. Hence 
the Austrian criticism of Lange's model was essentially the same as that levelled at 
neo-classical models, namely it could not capture enough important features of the 
real world to make it applicable.
The problem with the state "imitating the market", they argued, was that 
the ex ante prices established by the central planning organisation could never 
convey accurate information regarding the true opportunity costs associated with 
resource use (Lavoie 1985: 147). An enormous amount of detailed, specific 
information would be required to determine "equilibrium prices", i.e. at a macro­
level, information about supply and demand of all goods; and at a micro-level, 
resource supply and technology, in order to determine the least cost combination 
and the optimal level of output. Even if this information could be made available, 
it would only be forthcoming at huge transaction costs.
Whilst Lange's model operates under the assumption o f perfect availability 
and communication of price information and general absence of transaction costs, 
Hayek stresses in his argument around dispersed knowledge that the information 
required is not given, but is subject to continuous discovery. Moreover the 
necessary knowledge is divided between various economic agents (Hayek 1940: 
140)13. Hayek regards it as a question of the discovery and communication of 
knowledge at a disaggregated level. The latter in its totality would not be available 
to the central planning organisation. Because o f its idiosyncratic attributes, 
knowledge could not be used efficiently by a central planning organisation in the 
absence o f the competitive process of a market system. For it would be through 
this process o f entrepreneurial action and counter-action and resulting market 
prices that the dispersed knowledge would be discovered and utilised effectively.
Market prices in Hayek's framework are not parameters. They are the 
unique and timely results of numerous transactions by individuals guided by their 
individual access to, and forms of, knowledge. Thus, in turn, the price system 
serves in Hayek's framework as a means to collect and co-ordinate the dispersed 
knowledge into a systematic whole (Lavoie 1985: 123-124). Hayek regards the
13 For a good presentation o f  the Hayekian know ledge problem , see Lavoie (1985).
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decentralised co-ordination through the price system as an evolutionary 'miracle' 
and as superior to central planning.
However, in order to get the market mechanism working, which according 
to Hayek generates the economically necessary knowledge, individual incentives 
would have to be structured. This again could only happen if property were 
privately owned.
Both Mises and Hayek regard the functioning o f the price formation 
process as inseparably linked to the rivalry of private entrepreneurs:
[..] it is not possible to divorce the market and its functions in regard to the 
formulation of prices from the working of a society which is based on 
private property in the means of production. (Mises 1936: 137)
They stress the crucial role of incentives:
The motive force of the whole process which gives rise to market prices 
for the factors of production is the ceaseless search on the part of 
capitalists and entrepreneurs to maximise their profits [..] Without these 
private owners the market loses the mainspring that sets it in motion and 
keeps it in operation. (Mises 1936: 137-138)
The lack of incentives would prevent 'as-if owners representing 
departments within the central planning organisation from behaving in the same 
way as real owners (Mises 1936: 518-520). Thus, whilst the 'daily business 
routine' could be efficiently reproduced by planner-managers, the roles of 
entrepreneur, investor and speculator would be inseparable from private 
ownership, as speculators and investors would have a direct incentive through 
"exposing] their own wealth, their own destiny [..]".(Mises 1949: 709)
Ideally, Hayek states, the economic decision should be made by those who 
are directly affected by the gains and losses (1940: 140-1). Thus he regarded the 
system of planner-managers, in which these managers do not bear the full wealth 
effects o f their decisions, as a 'pure illusion' (Hayek [1935], 1948: 176).
The Austrian answer to the debate about efficient allocation and price 
determination, respectively, is not the static approach of a Walrasian general 
equilibrium model, but a dynamic one focusing on the rapidly changing conditions 
of entrepreneurial action and counteraction (Mises 1949: 244-245).
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The Austrians perceive the success of the economic system as inseparably 
intertwined with competition and the incentives attached to private property.(Cf. 
Kirzner 1984) The main concern of Mises and Hayek is the dynamic of the 
capitalist system which they perceive as a process o f perpetual innovation through 
the pursuit o f (temporary) monopoly profits. These are ground down by 
competition, the guarantee of efficiency. Competition is then not a means of 
reaching a static equilibrium but rather upsets the economic system for the sake of 
perpetual innovation and technical progress.
In contrast to the neo-classical analysis, the Austrian approach emphasises 
dynamism and imbalances, rather than being confined to a limited static context of 
full and efficient allocation of resources. Thereby, the Austrians address the 
important issues of technical progress and innovation.
Another achievement of the Austrian School is the recognition of the 
problems o f limited and asymmetric information and o f knowledge transmission. 
With his dispersed knowledge theory, Hayek incorporates the social process of 
knowledge transmission into economic analysis.
However, the virtue of introducing the issues involved does not guarantee 
the proposition of the Austrian school that private ownership is superior to public 
ownership. It is open to several objections. First o f all, whilst dealing in depth 
with the costs and problems of bureaucratic co-ordination, the Austrians view the 
market as an all-embracing remedy. They largely ignore the full range of failures 
o f the market mechanism, i.e. the provision o f public goods, non-competitive 
markets and externalities, whether these derive from static or dynamic 
considerations. Because o f their assumption o f self-perpetuating competitive 
markets they downplay the problem of monopolies and monopolistic behaviour. 
Competition through open exit and entry to the sector concerned is regarded as the 
guarantee o f efficiency. In this context sunk costs are neglected, and no 
differentiation is made between natural and artificial monopolies. This view of 
monopolies is particularly difficult in the context o f previously centrally planned 
economies where the problem of monopolies is most urgent (cf. Snyder 1993). 
Thus the Austrian school fails to balance market against government failures.
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A second important criticism is that in their discussion of the incentives 
given by private ownership, the Austrians have a rather naive concept of the 
'classic firm', where the full wealth effects of the decisions he/she takes accrue to 
the owner-manager. The reality is that in most modern private firms, ownership 
and control rights are separated, and agents are making decisions on behalf of the 
owners and not only in 'daily business routine1 matters. The resultant principal- 
agent problems in privately owned firms, due to imperfect and asymmetric 
information,14 are thus comparable to those in publicly owned firms. They are 
inadequately taken into account.
Third, the Austrians idealise the owner-manager and they over-estimate the 
incentives for the long-term development of their enterprises. When owners 
manage, their short-term private consumption interests might interfere with the 
need for reinvestment of revenues for long-term growth. This is particularly a 
problem in previously centrally planned economies, where the economic agents 
feel the need even more to make up for foregone consumption. A historical 
example is how British industrial enterprises, despite comparative advantages, 
failed to keep up with their German and American competitors in the decades 
before World War I and after. Chandler (1993) names as one reason the fact that 
British enterprises were largely still managed by their owners. In contrast, German 
and American enterprises had more sophisticated managerial structures with 
salaried managers - often with little equity in the enterprises - making critical 
investment and operating decisions (ibid. 315-19). Historical evidence suggests 
that, for the long-term efficiency of enterprises, skilled entrepreneurism and 
corporate governance outweigh the value of the incentives attached to ownership.
Fourth, the problem of dispersed knowledge has greater implications for 
optimum firm size than for ownership (cf. Rowthorn and Chang 1993: 57-8). The 
difficulty of dispersed knowledge arises in both public enterprise management as 
well as in the management o f large private enterprises. Rowthorn and Chang
(1993) look at large organisations, both private and public, and take into account
14 For review s, as w ell as further references to principal-agent problem s see  Jensen and 
M eckling (1976), and Stiglitz (1987).
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informational advantages and disadvantages of scale and scope in both production 
and distribution. They conclude that, the real issue is the determination of:
the ideal mix of decentralized and centralized forms of knowledge 
utilization - that is, between spontaneous interaction among independent 
units through the market and hierarchical interaction within one 
organization, (ibid.: 58)
Fifth, productive entrepreneurship, i.e. ’’the capability required to 
continuously upgrade and improve product structure, enhance the quality and 
availability o f goods and services, adopt and adapt frontier technologies and reach 
new markets" (Kozul-Wright 1992: 18), is simply presumed to be available. 
Neither its origin nor its evolution is adequately explained, except for the 
unconvincing reference to individual motivation based on envy and greed or other 
natural propensities. Entrepreneurship and 'organisational capabilities' (Chandler 
1993) have to be acquired and constantly adapted in a long process of learning-by- 
doing. This process of learning develops transferable knowledge, which can be 
used also in other firms as well as through product- and process-specific skills. 
The development of knowledge and skills is inseparable from their organisational 
setting, involving worker participation and general co-operation within the 
organisation. Moreover, it is inseparably intertwined with the overall institutional 
framework in which individual and collective economic activity takes place. 
Especially in the context of an institutional hiatus in the previously centrally 
planned economies, it becomes quite apparent that special emphasis has to be 
given to the fostering of productive entrepreneurship rather than to the ownership 
issue as such (cf. Chandler 1992 and 1993).
Sixth, the Austrian school exclusively relies on price information, in 
conjunction with the individual motivation given through private ownership, for 
efficient resource allocation. Other sources of information, and channels through 
which these are revealed, are ignored. Some of these are far too complex to be 
detected and processed by the market, most eminently intra-organisational 
processes. Despite opposition to the neo-classical paradigm and a recognition of 
the problem of dispersed knowledge, the Austrian school conceives firms as 
simply functioning in production, exploiting opportunities given through 
asymmetric information. They disregard the importance o f intra-organisational
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processes of utilising information and knowledge held by individual workers and 
networks, which are not owners and which enhance efficiency (cf. Brabant 1993: 
174).
Seventh, competition does not necessarily depend on private ownership. 
Rowthorn and Chang (1993: 58) argue that effective product market competition 
combined with financial discipline of the enterprises involved can generate the 
information necessary regardless of whether there is private or public ownership.
Eighth, there are a number of circumstances in which public are superior to 
private enterprises (cf. Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986; Sappington and Stiglitz 
1987; Shapiro and Willig 1990). Reasons for the establishment and operation of 
public enterprises are particularly brought up and widely discussed in the 
development literature and are also applicable to previously centrally planned 
economies. Those mostly mentioned are the provision o f public goods; incomplete 
and underdeveloped capital markets, which require the state to carry out projects 
which are too large to be financed by the private sector; distributional and equity 
arguments; and macro-economic considerations like mitigating high levels of 
unemployment (cf. Chang and Singh 1993). In the previously centrally planned 
economies special attention should be placed upon the problem of profound 
uncertainty and institutional instability and its consequences for private 
investment in long range projects. In all these countries massive industrial 
restructuring efforts13 are required in order to continue the operation of existing 
enterprises, establish new enterprises and raise efficiency in the long-run. It is 
questionable whether private investors have enough faith in the future, and 
whether adequate funds for investment can be raised under the present conditions 
of complete uncertainty due to the political and economic crises in most of these 
countries. The high levels of capital flight and the prevalent short-termism of
13 The m assive industrial restructuring effort w hich has to be undertaken can be 
illustrated for exam ple by the shares o f  output in industries with negative value-added at 
quality-adjusted world prices calculated by Hughes and Hare (1992a  and b). These were 
in 1989 for Bulgaria 50.8 %, for C zechoslovakia 34.8  %, for Hungary 34 .6  %,  for Poland
8.4 % and for the U SSR  22.3 %. See also, for exam ple, G ates, M ilgrom , and Roberts
(1994), Hesp (1994 ), Mann (1991), Prasnikar , Svejnar, and K linedinst ( (1992) and 
Richet (1993).
28
private investment in many of these countries seems to indicate otherwise.16 A 
classic exposition of this argument is given by Kaldor (1980: 6-7):
[..] when public investment is part of a national plan it is possible to take 
into account all kinds of criss-cross effects (or indirect effects) which 
would not be possible with private investment. Keynes once said that in 
the face of complete uncertainty investors generally rely on a convention 
that the future will be just like the present, and for that reason 'the effects 
of the existing situation enter, in a sense disproportionately, into the 
formation of long term expectations'. Hence capacity is only likely to be 
created in so far as its use appears to be profitable at the existing state of 
incomes which are generated in production, the additional production 
generated in the future by the sum of the investment decisions of the 
present will itself increase the demand of commodities in comparison with 
the present level - a factor which private investors cannot take into 
account (or can do so only imperfectly) since they take their decisions 
independently of each other. Investment by public enterprises, on the other 
hand, can take the comprehensive effect of all investments into account in 
judging the social profitability of any particular investment project. It 
should be noted, however, that a state plan is capable of doing this even 
when the investment is undertaken by private enterprises, as the Japanese 
example shows. What is required is that there should be a fairly 
comprehensive state investment plan for industrial development, and the 
state should be capable of giving effect to this plan, though the 
'administrative guidance' of the privately-owned firms - provided that, as 
in Japan, these are native and not foreign-owned firms.
Ninth, the Austrian school's belief in the co-ordination through unfettered 
markets ignores that perfectly competitive markets are fictional and the 
assumption o f the purely individualistic acting homo-economicus is unrealistic. 
Under the real-life conditions of the previously centrally planned economies, it is 
hardly foreseeable that pure individualism will both maximise community welfare 
and forestall social conflict. The underlying libertarian philosophy of the Austrian 
school is particularly damaging if it is used as the sole guideline to foster an 
environment conducive to change (cf. Brabant 1993: 175).
Tenth, the Austrian school takes the functioning o f markets, i.e. their 
capability to co-ordinate self-interested individual actions, as almost naturally
16 See for exam ple, Financial Tim es, June 27, 1994 p. I-VIII.
29
given*17 They neglect that markets themselves are a set o f socially constructed 
institutions, which enforce competition and limit the set o f possible actions of 
individual and collective economic agents (cf. Kregel 1990: 47)l8. Institutions 
such as the legal framework, the banking and financing system, the tax system, the 
labour market, and less intangible attitudes, routines and norms of behaviour 
define the context in which economic behaviour takes place. The co-ordination of 
economic decisions and their outcome depend entirely on the configuration of 
these institutions. In the context of previously centrally planned economies, the 
main emphasis has to be given to the conscious rearing o f an adequate 
institutional framework. This will have to take into account the institutional 
legacies which vary from country to country. Under the existing conditions of 
profound uncertainty and institutional instability, the promotion of pure 
individualism and, the reliance on evolutionary change preached by the Austrian 
school will reinforce rent-seeking behaviour, resulting in redistributive strategies 
and destruction of resources.
1.2 Property Rights Theory and Private Ownership
The analytical framework of the property rights theory is often used when positing 
the favourable role o f private ownership, hence justifying privatisation. Thus, the 
following questions will be considered; how private ownership is supposed to
17 The Austrian school, most prominently Hayek, v iew s the market as an institution 
grown through centuries o f  evolution (Hayek 1944). He rejects 'constructivist 
rationalism' (H ayek 1979), i.e. the idea o f  conscious learning and intentional change o f  
institutions. He sticks c lo se ly  to his analogy o f  the b iological evolution  characterised by
the lack o f  con scious planning (cf. Chang 1994: 73).
18
For a fuller d iscussion  o f  the role o f  institutions, see  H odgson (1988 ), Matthews 
( 1986 ) and North (1990).
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generate a more efficient outcome19 and what problems are there in applying the 
framework to economies in transition.
Contrary to the Austrian school, the property rights school remains within 
the neo-classical tradition. Its contribution extends the neo-classical theory by the 
penalty/reward structure o f property and contracting rights and consideration of 
positive transaction costs. The central proposition of property rights theory is that:
[..] the content o f  property rights a ffects the a llo ca tio n  and use o f  
resou rces in sp ec ific  predictable w ays. (Furubotn and P ejov ich  1972: 
1139)
The value of a physical commodity is determined by the bundle of rights 
attached to it, which itself consists of a mix of components (Demsetz 1967: 347; 
Furubotn and Pejovich 1972: 1139). The sum of these rights is defined as property 
rights. The right of ownership as one category o f the general concept of property 
rights contains
(i) the right to use an asset (usu s), (ii)  the right to capture ben efits from  
that a sse t (usus fructus), ( iii)  the right to ch an ge its form  and substance  
(ab u su s), and (iv ) the right to transfer all or so m e o f  the rights sp ec ified  
under (i), (ii)  and (iii)  to others at a m utually  agreed  upon price. (P ejovich  
1990: 28)
As in the Austrian School, private ownership rights, and especially their 
exclusivity and transferability, are regarded as the essential source of incentives 
for efficient resource allocation. Pejovich (1990: 42) propounds almost as a 
principle:
B oth  the right o f  ow nersh ip  and contractual freed om  gen erate incentives  
for u tility -seek in g  individuals to identify , n ego tia te , and execu te  
contractual agreem ents that [,.] tend to m o v e resou rces to their h ighest- 
va lu ed  uses.
19 The property rights theory is mainly concerned with x -effic ien cy , in terms o f  "slack" 
due to w astage or managerial incom petence. It w idely  n eglects the problem s o f  allocative 
in efficien cies due to exploitation o f  market power, public good s and externalities and 
distributional equity. Private ownership rights and contractual freedom  are alm ost 
axiom atically  seen as guarantors o f  a llocative e ffic ien cy  (Pejovich  1990: 35-43). The 
property rights school has drawn upon the C oase theorem  (C oase 1960) and its 
continuing debate about advantages o f  private and state co-ordination o f  the 
internalisation o f  external effects. M ost interesting are the gam e-theoretic exam inations 
o f  the C oase-theorem , which consider transaction and inform ation costs (Cf. Arrow  
1978; Farrell 1987; M yerson and Satterthwaite 1983).
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Pejovich argues that the penalty/re ward system created through the owner- 
manager bearing the full wealth1 effects for their entrepreneurial decisions, is not 
given for public officials, as they would neither bear the entire cost nor enjoy the 
full benefits resulting from their actions (1990: 33).
In their residual claimant theory,20 Alchian and Demsetz (1972) attempt to 
justify the classic capitalist firm with its owner-manager exercising full ownership 
rights.21 Their departure point is the problem of 'metering' individual productivity 
and reward in team production. They propose as a solution that someone 
specialises as a monitor22 to make sure that the members o f the team work 
efficiently, i.e. minimise ’shirking' (op.cit.: 778). In order to overcome the problem 
of 'who will monitor the monitor' an additional incentive in the form of the 
residual claimant status has to be made to the monitor (op.cit.: 782).23 It is 
assumed that only private ownership can give the incentive to the 'monitor' to take 
a maximum monitoring effort and hence guarantee efficiency o f team production. 
The residual claimant theory is generally put forward to posit the superiority of 
private over public ownership.
Proponents o f the property rights school generally propose that managers 
of state-owned enterprises have weaker incentives than owner-managers. They 
claim "soft budget constraints" and the problem of self-seeking agents would 
make public enterprises more x-inefficient than private ones:
Private enterprises are subject to the discipline of the market and must 
respond to market signals to survive. Managers of public firms, on the
20 A lchian and D em setz (1972) have produced the m ost w id ely  known variant o f  the 
residual claim ant theory. For other variations see D eA lessi (1 9 8 2 ) and Grossman and
Hart (1986 ).
21 The bundle o f  rights contains: "1) to be a residual claim ant; 2 ) to observe input 
behaviour; 3) to be the central party com m on to all contracts with inputs; 4) to alter the 
m em bership o f  the team; and 5) to sell these rights" (A lchian  and D em setz 1972: 783).
2 i
~ A lchian and D em setz (1972: 782) use ‘the term m onitor to connote several activities in 
addition to its disciplinary connotations. It connotes m easuring output performance, 
apportioning rewards, observing the input behaviour o f  inputs as m eans o f  detecting or 
estim ating their marginal productivity and giving assignm ents or instructions in what to 
do and how  to do it. It also includes,[..] authority to term inate or revise contracts’.
23 One variation o f  the residual claimant theory is that the m em ber o f  the team should be 
made ow ner w ho contributes the highest asset sp ec ific ity  (cf. D eA lessi 1982: 194; 
Grossm an and Hart 1986). Another variation suggests that the m em ber w hose activity is 
m ost d ifficu lt to evaluate should becom e owner (cf. H olm strom  and Tirole 1989: 73-74).
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other hand, are less constrained by market considerations, and find it 
easier to obtain subsidies and mask utility-maximizing behaviour under 
the guise of fulfilling other social goals. Indeed, public enterprises, for 
long periods endowed with politically influential clients, can survive for 
long time periods, and their managers prosper, even in the presence of 
persistent losses. (DeAlessi 1982: 205-6)
DeAlessi (1969; 1973; 1980) argues that the non-transferability of 
ownership rights of public enterprises impedes the public at large from 
specialising in this activity, and hence their incentives to monitor the managers are 
reduced." According to DeAlessi managers of both public and private enterprises 
increase their utility through expanding the resources under their supervision.25 
And even if  the principals (the public) as owner of the enterprises seek to monitor 
their agents (the bureaucrat-managers), the costs o f doing so would be 
prohibitively high due to imperfect and asymmetric information (DeAlessi 1982: 
205).26
In short, the property rights theory recognises that ownership influences 
and determines the behaviour of economic agents. Proponents of the theory stress 
that private property rights give essential incentives for efficient economic 
behaviour. They understand production as more than a purely engineering process. 
They are aware of conflicts between individual economic agents in production and 
of the problems of self-seeking individuals, and imperfect and asymmetric 
information. Thus, the property rights theory is a noteworthy enhancement to the 
traditional neo-classical analysis where ownership is irrelevant in the efficient 
allocation o f scarce resources. However, the proposition that private ownership 
generates a more efficient outcome can be criticised on the following grounds.
24 One related argument is that o f  Aristotle proposing that com m on property would not 
be regarded as 'belonging to us all1 but as 'belonging to no on e1. Thus unless in this case  
the enterprise w ould be owned as private property, it w ould be neglected.
2s D eA lessi (1 969) m entions bureaucratic lobbying, interest groups' pressure and 
cam ouflaging relatively unproductive investm ent projects through unrealistically low  
discount rates as w ays o f  managerial self-aggrandisem ent.
26 D eA lessi (1 969) perceives enterprises producing non-m arketable goods as particularly 
under danger o f  this kind o f  managerial discretion. Public sector defence through 
m onitoring w ould 'fail for the use o f  benefit-cost data to ju stify  the ranking o f  
nonm arketable investm ents may best be view ed  as an ex  post rationalisation o f  the 
ranking yie lded  by the decision maker's preference function as constrained by his 
opportunity set'(op .c it.: 15).
First, the property rights theory is built on the assumption that the only significant 
motivation for efficient economic behaviour is material self-interest, given 
through private ownership rights. Rowthorn and Chang (1993: 56-57) argue that 
the very existence and enforcement of a property rights system depends on a 
functioning moral value system, as 'otherwise the enforcement costs would be 
prohibitively high' (ibid.). With rising division o f labour within industrial 
organisations, the number of individuals with significant discretion increases as 
well. An indomitable monitoring task would arise if  all these organisational 
participants acted out of pure material self-interest. In fact many other motivations 
play a role in their behaviour, e.g. organisational loyalty,27 work ethic, moral 
convictions, delight in work and job satisfaction. The property rights theory 
reduces the motivation of a holder of the ownership rights to the aspect of material 
self-interest, and overlooks the motivation o f those involved in the production 
process. The wide range of theoretical and empirical literature on managerial and 
worker motivation is entirely neglected.
Second, the question of ownership has in some industries implications for 
these managerial and worker motivations. Public ownership can infuse 'an ethic of 
public service' in some industries, particularly in those producing public goods 
(Fine 1990: 127). This notion of provision o f collectively beneficial services in 
public enterprises can create additional incentives and motivation for employees.29 
The whole approach to production in a 'public service' enterprise is different to a 
private profit maximising enterprise. Moreover, objectives like job creation, infant
27 On the role o f  organisational loyalty, see Hirschman (1 9 7 0 ) and Sim on (1991).
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" There is extensive theoretical and em pirical literature w hich  deals with individuals 
w ithin organisations in terms o f  their beliefs, values and their relations with one another. 
W ithout cla im ing to be exhaustive som e important references are m entioned below . The 
human relationship approach, based on the fam ous Hawthorne experim ents (1924-1932)  
at the W estern Electric Company in Am erica is one o f  the theories, concentrating upon 
the peop le dim ension and their interrelation w ithin organisations (cf. M ayo 1971; 
R oethlisberger and D ickson 1939). See Herzberg (1 9 6 6 ) on the m otivation and 'hygiene' 
or 'm aintenance' factor. See M cGregor (1960 ) on the im portance o f  the style o f  
m anagem ent on the operation o f  an organisation. See Argyris (1957 ) on the importance 
o f  self-actualisation; Homans (1950) on individual behaviour in social groups; Dawson  
(1 9 8 8 ) on the role o f  professional groups; and Schein  (1 9 8 7 ) and Handy (1985) on 
organisational culture.
29 See for exam ple Kakabadse (1982), who exam ines culture in a social service  
department.
34
industry protection, restructuring and the pursuit of R&D, can be better targeted in 
public than private enterprises. Objectives, attitudes, incentives and motivation 
would be altered and abandoned in case of privatisation and the shift towards the 
exclusive goal of profit maximisation. The concept o f national industries could 
have positive connotations for economies in transition, with their attributes of 
adverse macroeconomic conditions, instability, uncertainty, and requirement of 
sacrifices and initiatives. Managers and workers might be more motivated to 
undergo and participate in the huge restructuring processes and be more inclined 
to make sacrifices for the future of national industries and national benefit, rather 
than for the benefit of private owners.30
Third, proponents of the property rights theory stress the susceptibility of 
public enterprises to soft budget constraints. However, large private enterprises are 
as much subject to soft budget constraints, due to state intervention, e.g. direct and 
indirect subsidies, and restrictions on entry. Stiglitz points out that soft budget 
constraints can also arise from the financial system, providing examples from the 
United States (Stiglitz, 1993: 190). He stresses the problem of inter-firm credits as 
a further source of soft budget constraints as particularly serious in previously 
centrally planned economies. He has doubts about the effectiveness of 
privatisation as a means to impose hard budget constraints:
[..] privatisation is no panacea, no protection against protection and 
subsidies. What privatisation does is to increase the "transactions cost", to 
use the fashionable phrase, of obtaining government subsidies and 
government protection from competition. (Stiglitz, 1993: 187)
Soft budget constraints are also a phenomenon inherent in vertically and 
horizontally integrated enterprises. Given 'bounded rationality'31 and imperfect and 
asymmetric information, the determination of internal transfer prices is subject to 
discretion; thus it is open to manipulation. Both manipulated transfer prices and 
other cross subsidies can soften the budget constraints o f individual subsidiaries.
30 Fine (1990: 130) notes that nationalisations occurred h istorically  in the UK after the 
second world war, as a result o f  the unprofitable state o f  these industries and their need 
for large-scale restructuring, which could not be achieved by private owners.
31 On the concept o f  bounded rationality, see Sim on (1982).
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Fourth, the property rights school assumes that property rights can be 
clearly defined and enforced once and for all. However, the very definition of 
property rights is subject to a constant power struggle between different factions in 
society. As such the property rights and their content are continuously changed. 
For example, the relaxation of industrial law, such as dismissals protection 
regulation or the enforcement of environmental protection laws, have immediate 
consequences on the property rights of an enterprise. The process of definition and 
redefinition of property rights is very complex and has to be seen in its social and 
political context. In the setting of previously centrally planned economies the 
power struggle between old and new elite, and subversive elements such as the 
mafia, have to be taken into account. Besides, the commercial and legal 
environment, and the general market infrastructure are either non-existent or veiy 
poorly developed. This includes social welfare provisions like unemployment 
benefit. In previously centrally planned economies, enterprises made extensive 
provision for their employees, e.g. free meals, access to special stores, child care 
and education, health care, social clubs, vacation resorts, and most important, job 
security. The alteration of property rights often has the consequence of 
withdrawing these obligations from the employee. This can lead to severe social 
unrest. Thus, the social acceptability has to be taken into consideration when 
property rights are altered.
Fifth, the residual claimant theory justifies ownership by the classic 
capitalist firm being assigned the role o f the 'specialised monitor', as this would 
give her/him an incentive to put in maximum monitoring effort, hence 
guaranteeing efficiency of the production. The theory assumes that monitoring is 
the key activity which can mitigate inefficiency. However, depending on the 
production process there are other activities which bear significant control, and it 
is equally important to ensure that the corresponding agents do not exploit their
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room for discretion.32 On these grounds, one could argue that any member of the 
team should have a share in the ownership rights o f the firm according to his/her 
importance for overall efficiency (cf. Rowthorn and Chang 1993: 55).
Sixth, the property rights theory points out the problems o f self-seeking 
behaviour, asymmetric and imperfect information and, hence the inability to 
monitor agents thoroughly in public enterprises. However, these problems are a 
result o f the separation of the rights of ownership and control, and they arise 
regardless o f ownership. The majority of modem private firms have widely 
dispersed private ownership with most rights of control and decision delegated to 
professional managers. The problem of self-seeking behaviour in private firms, 
i.e. managers who devote their energies and the firms' resources into entrenching 
themselves, and into promoting their own careers and interests, is widely 
acknowledged (cf. Hannaway 1989; Milgrom and Roberts 1988; Schleifer and 
Vishny 1989). Individual shareholders as well as individuals of the public as 
principals, who are not directly involved in the production process, face the 
problem o f incomplete and asymmetric information in their supervisory efforts.33 
Moreover, even if  all necessary information were available, and, given
32 Barzel (1989: 56-59) suggests that agents should participate in the residual incom e 
according to the de facto control they exercise over the outcom e o f  production. To the 
extent that control is based on idiosyncratic know ledge, one could  interpret Barzel's 
proposition as suggestions that agents should be considered to participate in ownership to  
the degree o f  their idiosyncratic know ledge. Barzel's v iew  does not support the case o f  
the c lassic  capitalist firm with its owner-manager. In his approach ownership does not 
necessarily  have to be given to the main m onitor, but cou ld  be assigned  to a number o f
agents.
3 3 Yarrow (1 9 8 9 ) argues that the principal-agent problem in case o f  public enterprises is 
more severe due to the additional delegation layer, i.e. politicians and bureaucrats acting 
on b eh a lf o f  the public. Self-seeking behaviour o f  politicians and the limits o f  the 
electoral system  as a disciplinary m echanism  w ould cause additional problems. Chang 
and Singh (1993: 52-3) counter convincingly in that: (a) the additional delegation layer 
For a s in g le  or a few  agencies in case o f  a public enterprise m ight be more effective in 
m onitoring managerial behaviour than few er layers for a large group o f  shareholders; (b) 
every large-scale enterprise has m ultiple layers o f  delegation w ithin itself, raising the 
question w hether one layer more or less w ill make such a difference; (c) considering  
em pirical ev id en ce one cannot hold up the general assum ption that every bureaucrat is a 
purely se lf-seek in g  individual.
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shareholders own only a little share, they lack incentives to maximise their 
monitoring efforts.34
Seventh, the argument of the property rights theory, that private ownership 
increases x-efficiency, is heavily based on the discipline imposed by the capital 
market and the market for managers. In the debate over principal-agent problems, 
four mechanisms, which work in conjunction with each other, have been 
identified which are supposed to restrict the managerial discretion of agents in 
privately owned firms.35 Firstly, control is supposed to be imposed by the stock- 
market as described below.36 Given perfect competition on product markets, when 
the performance of a firm becomes unsatisfactory, customers will switch to other 
products. On account of the lower profitability, shareholders will increasingly sell 
their shares, with a subsequent fall in share price, as supply exceeds demand. The 
lower share price could lead to a management shake-up, through new shareholder 
pressure and external take-over threats. This leads to the second disciplinary 
mechanism, external take-overs, which threaten to eliminate unprofitable firms.37 
The third disciplinary mechanism is that o f the manager-employment-market. It is 
assumed that the employability of managers depends crucially on their present 
performance, which is reflected by the share price o f their firms (Pejovich 1990: 
57-64), Consequently managers who aspire to higher paid positions are
34 Chang and Singh (1993: 52) call this problem, analogous to O lson (1965), 'shareholder 
co llec tiv e  action':
That is, when the shareholder group comprises a large number of individuals, no 
individual shareholder will have an incentive to collect relevant information and 
monitor his/her action, because the improved performance is a public good from 
which every shareholder will benefit without paying for it.
35 The principal-agent problem is broadly d iscussed  by various strands o f  the new  
institutional econom ics i.e. the property rights proponents (Cf. A lchian  1969; Alchian  
and D em setz 1972; Furbotn and Pejovich 1972: 1148-1157 M anne, 1965), the principal- 
agent theories (Jensen and M eckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983) and theories on 
opportunistic behaviour (W illiam son 1975; 1985).
36 Pejovich (1990: 61) puts it this way:
Insofar as share prices reflect the present value o f the expected future consequences of 
current managerial policies, market evaluation protects shareholders from a situation 
in which management has less concern for their wealth.
See also  A lch ian  and D em setz (1972: 788) and Furubotn and Pejovich  (1972; 1150).
encouraged to maximise their efforts. Control through creditor financial 
institutions constitutes a further, fourth, disciplinary mechanism.
However, these mechanisms have the following shortcomings. First, the 
stock-market as disciplinary mechanism is based on the assumption of non-captive 
customers and on shareholders effectively monitoring their firms. In case of 
monopolies on the product market, customers cannot simply switch to another 
product, which significantly restricts share prices as performance-indicators (cf. 
Rowthorn and Chang 1993: 56). In previously centrally planned economies the
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majority o f enterprises are monopolies. Effective monitoring by the shareholders 
can be seriously weakened by the problem of 'shareholder collective action'. For 
monitoring by the shareholders can be seriously weakened by the free-rider 
problem and problems of high transaction costs (cf. Alchian 1969: 501; Alchian 
and Demsetz 1972: 788). Moreover, shareholders face the problems of imperfect 
and asymmetric information. As the assumptions of non-captive customers and of 
shareholders effectively monitoring their firms, are highly unrealistic, so is that of 
the effective functioning of stock-markets as a disciplinary mechanism. The 
problem is even aggravated in the context of previously centrally planned 
economies, as stock-markets are either non-existent or newly and poorly 
established.
Second, there is a fierce debate over external take-overs as a selection 
mechanism. Empirical evidence suggests that external take-overs are not confined 
to poor performers, that profitability does not rise after mergers, on average, and 
in case o f increased monopoly power, allocative efficiency is reduced (cf. Chang 
and Singh 1993: 54), Singh (1971) points out that threats o f external take-overs 
may even encourage firms to expand as a defence against take-overs, instead of 
preventing managerial self-aggrandisement. The disciplinary mechanism of take­
overs is irrelevant in the context of previously centrally planned economies due to 
severely underdeveloped capital markets, as are the two remaining mechanisms.
7^
For a m ore detailed discussion o f  the take-over m echanism , see  Firth (1979; 1980), 
Grossm an and Hart (1980), Manne (1965), M eeks (1977 ), and Singh (1971).
■to
On the consequences o f  m onopolisation see for exam ple, Nevvbery and Kattuman 
(1992 ), and Snyder (1993).
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Financial institutions are underdeveloped in previously centrally planned 
economies, and the majority are state-owned. Moreover, political considerations 
may dominate lending policies, which limits the effectivity of financial institutions 
as supervisor of their borrowers.
Concluding remarks
This chapter has looked at the theoretical underpinnings o f the justification for 
privatisation. Two major theoretical frameworks were analysed within which the 
advantageous role o f private ownership has been understood. It is apparent, that 
neither the Austrian school nor proponents of the property rights school provide a 
general case for the superiority of private ownership. The Austrian school posits 
the favourable role o f private ownership only by discarding as irrelevant or leaving 
unconsidered those arguments that contradict their case. In particular, in correctly 
emphasising the dynamic and informational aspects o f the economy, the well- 
known static inefficiencies of the market system are incorrectly set aside. Further, 
it is also erroneously presumed that disaggregated and individualised pursuit of 
advantage is superior to state intervention merely by virtue of introducing the 
problems o f dynamism and imperfect information. In addition, the relevance of 
their general and ideal propositions to the functioning o f specific economies in 
different historical periods and circumstances is itself open to question.
The property rights theory stresses the role of the penalty/reward system set 
up by private ownership for the efficient behaviour o f the manager-owner, thereby 
ignoring the motivation of employees, other than as narrowly conceived utility 
maximisers. However, in the more common case o f separation of the rights of 
ownership and control the theory builds on the discipline imposed by the capital 
market and the market for managers. As clarified above, there are strong 
theoretical and empirical reasons which suggest that these mechanisms may not 
work as specified. Hence the whole line o f reasoning is seriously flawed. 
Additionally, their transferability to the setting of previously centrally planned 
economies is debatable, considering the mere absence or poor development of 
capital markets and their supporting institutions in most of the countries 
concerned. Furthermore, little understanding is shown for the complex process of
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definition and redefinition of property rights within their social and political 
context.
As conventional economic theory seems to be unable to give any 
justification for why privatisation is supposed to enhance economic efficiency, the 
question will now be examined within the framework o f  political economy.
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2. Privatisation: the path to enhanced efficiency? 
Introduction
In the last chapter, a critical assessment was made o f the economic analysis which 
supports the belief in the superiority of private ownership. It was argued that the 
theoretical underpinnings of such a belief are unsatisfactory. This chapter will 
examine whether a justification for privatisation can be realised within the 
framework o f political economy. Aware o f the sheer amplitude o f concepts 
assigned under the rubric o f political economy, the analysis will be confined to the 
concept o f the budget constraint and that o f structural change. This approach was 
also taken by Rowthorn and Chang (1993). However, here it is extended and 
specifically directed towards privatisation in the context o f PCPEs and especially 
Azerbaijan. The concept of the budget constraint is often employed in the context 
of PCPEs.
In order to emphasise the long-term perspective which has to be taken in 
an environment requiring extensive restructuring, a distinction will be made 
between static and dynamic efficiency. The discussion on enterprise efficiency and 
privatisation often only considers the static perspective, which is inadequate for 
the volatile environment of PCPEs in which all parameters are bound to change.
In a further step this chapter deals with the process o f definition and 
redefinition of property rights, also termed as contracting by the literature on 
institutional change (cf. Libecap 1993: 4). The analysis draws upon Libecap
(1993), who analysed different property rights solutions to common pool problems 
encountered in exploiting natural resources in the United States. Plere Libecap’s 
analytical framework is adapted and extended to suit the context o f privatisation 
issues in PCPEs. A major deficiency of the debate on privatisation in PCPEs is 
that the actual contracting for the proposed institutional change is widely ignored.1 
The following contribution tries to remedy this deficit.
1 For an analysis o f  the contracting process in Azerbaijan, see  chapter seven.
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Finally, motives and goals are often blurred in the debate over privatisation 
in PCPEs. This can lead to conflicts and inconsistencies. The chapter tries to shed 
some light on this issue.
The first section examines institutional conditions responsible for soft 
budget constraints. The hypothesis is proposed, that the softness of the budget 
constraint is due to (a) a system of political control based on patronage;2 and (b) 
the lack o f appropriate corporate governance systems. The second section looks at 
aspects of structural change, placing emphasis on industrial restructuring. The 
third section considers the origins of property institutions and institutional change. 
The final section deals with inconsistencies and conflicts between different 
motives and goals of privatisation in PCPEs.
2.1 Static efficiency: budget constraint
2.1.1 W hat is the soft budget constraint?
The concept o f "soft budget constraint" was coined by Kornai (1980) to explain 
the static inefficiency of enterprises in centrally planned economies. It occupies a 
key role in his analysis of shortage (1980: 299-322; 1986: 3-30).3 The latter 
focuses on the institutional structure of the society and ultimately links the 
permanent resource shortage of centrally planned economies directly to the social 
ownership o f the means of production with its entrenched system o f patronage.
2 Patronage and clientelism  are understood as interchangeable (cf. W illerton 1992: 
2 4 9 n l) .
3 In Kornai's 'Econom ics o f  Shortage' (1980), the production side o f  the econom y is 
exam ined, describ ing seller markets with shortage and buyer markets with surplus. The 
production in different econom ic system s is described as a problem o f  linear 
program m ing w ith system  specific constraints (ibid.: 2 3 ). Three constraints are 
distinguished: the resource constraint, the demand constraint and the budget constraint 
(ibid.: 23 -26). W hilst the resource constraint is given  by the environm ent o f  the 
econom ic system , the two other constraints are determ ined by the institutions o f  the 
econ om ic system . A ccording to these constraints Kornai d efin es socia list econom ic  
system s as ‘resource constrained system s’ and capitalist econ om ic system s as ‘demand 
constrained system s’ (ibid. 26-30).
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For his purpose Kornai adopts the concept o f the budget constraint as used 
in individual utility maximisation of neo-classical household theory (1980: 4). The 
budget constraint o f an economic agent is given by his/her liquid and illiquid 
financial assets and it limits his/her expenditure in each period. Economic agents 
facing hard budget constraints have to finance their expenditures through their 
receipts and their stock of assets and bear full financial responsibility for their 
decisions. However, if  economic agents can expect that expenditures exceeding 
their limits will be covered by subsidies or loans without their being bankrupted, 
they can lack costs- and rentability-consciousness and give way to self­
aggrandisement. In other words their budget constraint becomes soft. A soft 
budget constraint reduces incentives for efficiency created through, e.g. the threat 
of bankruptcy or unemployment. Newbeiy (1990: 8) puts it thus:
There are few penalties for poor performance, and few rewards for good
p erform an ce.
According to Kornai (1980: 311-314), the classic soviet type centrally 
planned economy faces soft budget constraints, i.e. lack o f financial discipline, 
whilst the capitalist economies of the UK and the USA in the previous century are 
examples o f the other extreme, i.e. economies exposed to hard budget constraints.
Kornai (1980: 562) considers soft budget constraints as inherent to the 
centrally planned system. He describes the consequence of soft budget constraints 
on the centrally planned economy as follows: management o f firms are assumed to 
have a tendency towards expansion, as a bigger budget boosts their status (cf. 
1980: 23, 61-63). Moreover, they face unpredictable future constraints, and high 
penalties are attached to an inability to meet physical targets. Thus their demand 
on resources (investments, labour, material inputs) under soft budget constraints is 
unlimited. Because o f administrative prices firms do not adjust to the changes in 
relative prices, i.e. they lack costs- and rentability-consciousness. The function of 
money is reduced to a passive unit o f account (1980: 306-309, 323-336; 1986: 9- 
11). The price system has no allocative function (1980: 323-376, 513-529). In an 
economy under a soft budget constraint there is the tendency to hoard goods, and 
shortages are reproduced accordingly: "shortage breeds shortage" (1980: 286).
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The role o f the soft budget constraint in the explanation o f shortage has 
been debated in a more general discussion of whether they also exist in capitalism 
without necessarily causing shortages. Thus, the concept o f soft budget constraints 
seems to be more able to explain inefficiency than shortage (cf. Gomulka 1986: 
73-90; Hare 1989: 49-81). However, a detailed discussion o f Komai's analysis of 
shortage and its validity is beyond the scope of this work. The aim of this section 
is to analyse the conditions under which soft budget constraints arise. Thus, in the 
following, the soft budget constraint will be understood as a non-binding budget 
constraint which creates a disincentive to economise on resources, i.e. lack of 
financial discipline. It will be analysed mainly in the context o f previously 
centrally planned economies.
There are several institutional conditions responsible for the existence of a 
soft budget constraint for enterprises, in conjunction or on their own (cf. Kornai 
1980: 302-307; 1986: 5-6). First, administrative determination of output prices 
and production quantities can strengthen the bargaining position o f enterprises 
towards the central planning commission concerning the budget softness. 
Moreover, both administrative prices and quantities and implicit input subsidies 
(e.g. low energy prices) distort any decision making on production based on cost 
analysis and hence limit financial discipline. In most previously centrally planned 
economies most prices were ultimately liberalised except for essential consumer 
goods and services and energy prices. In Azerbaijan controls on most prices 
(except for prices o f some services, some foodstuff, medicine, and energy) were 
lifted in January 1992, in line with the CIS-wide policy o f  price liberalisation.4
Second, high and growing direct subsidies to enterprises were a key 
problem of centrally planned economies and constitute another indicator of soft
4 On the quantification o f  im plicit subsidies through low  energy prices in Eastern Europe, 
see H ughes and Hare (1992).
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budget constraints.3 It is argued that in most cases there is no reasonable economic 
nor social justification for these subsidies and that well-organised political 
influences o f heavy industry and the military-industrial complex play an important 
role in their arrangement (cf. Welfens 1992: 60-62). However, for the 
confirmation o f this argument it is necessary to analyse data and information at a 
more disaggregated level than the mere volume o f direct subsidies. The 
justification for subsidies has to be judged by the objectives o f the underlying 
policy and the possible policy alternatives for reaching the goals intended by 
granting these subsidies. As far as the budget softness is concerned, the granting 
of subsidies is not so much the problem as the "lack o f a 'normative' or legally 
binding set of rules, and the consequent need to consider each case on its merits 
and engage in bilateral bargaining" (Newbery 1990: 8). If  the allocation of 
subsidies is arbitrary and open to political manipulation, enterprises are under no 
pressure to improve performance, as they expect to be bailed out by the state when 
they fail. Their budget constraint is soft. In the adjustment process, the persistence 
of this kind o f budget softness constitutes a particularly grave problem. Forward-
3 H olzm ann (1991 ) exposes the budgetary subsidies o f  som e Central and Eastern 
European econom ies:
Country' 1980 1985 1988 1989
B ulgaria 1 13.3 11.9 19.1 17.8
2 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.6
3 12.1 10,5 17.5 16.2
4 4 .2 5.3 8 .3 C 3.0
CSFR 1 8.7 11.8 13.0 16.1
2 2.3 5.5 5.8 7 .7
3 19 .8a 6,3 7.2 8.3
4 9 .0 b 1.9 2.5 1.8
Hungary 1 9 .7 b 17.1 14.0 12.6
2 5 .0 b 7.1 5.7 7 .2
3 28 .7 9 .9 8.2 5 ,4
4 9 .8 5 .4 5.6 4 .0
Poland 1 18.9 16.5 17.0 17.1
2 6 .7 7.3 9 .0 7 .4
3 19.5 a 9 .2 7.9 9.8
4 1 .4a 3.6 2.2 1.2
1 budgetary sub sid ies relative to GDP
2 con sum er sub sid ies relative to G DP
3 su b sid ie s  to enterprises relative to G D P
4 su b sid ie s  for foreign trade relative to G D P
a 1981 estim ate  
b 1982 estim ate  
c 1987 estim ate  
Source: H olzm ann (1 9 9 1 )
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looking SOEs and newly developing private enterprises are deprived of necessary 
funds, whilst resources are allocated to ensure the survival of inefficient adjusters.
In 1991 budgetary subsidies to enterprises and financial institutions in 
Azerbaijan comprised 1,541.2 million roubles and constituted 14.5 per cent of the 
total budgetary expenditure (IMF 1993: 68). The Minister of Finance was 
unwilling to give any information on budgetary subsidies to enterprises. 
According to the interviews held by the author with employees of the Cabinet of 
Ministers, the Ministry of Economics and several enterprises and corporations 
(April 1994), most enterprises do not receive any direct subsidies. However, credit 
at negative real interest rates is available for many enterprises.
One has to note, however, that softening o f budget constraints through 
direct subsidies is prevalent in capitalist economies. The state in market 
economies often subsidises public as well as private companies or protects them 
from adverse shocks in light of social, distributional or environmental objectives. 
In many cases, state assistance is attained through various interest group pressures. 
Some o f these subsidies are justified on welfare grounds, although alternative 
means o f achieving the political objectives might lead to a socially superior 
outcome. In case of 'regulatory-capture' private enterprises themselves might 
capture the state regulatory agency to obtain soft subsidies and protection.6 As 
already mentioned, soft budget constraints can be also a problem in highly 
vertically and horizontally integrated enterprises in advanced capitalist economies 
regardless o f ownership. Individual subsidiaries' budget constraints might be 
softened through favourable internal transfer prices and cross subsidies from other 
subsidiaries. Bounded rationality (Simon 1982) and imperfect and asymmetric 
information within such big organisations are causes o f such internal soft budget 
constraints.
Third, softness of the budget constraint can also be caused through 
discretionary administration of taxation. Discretion may arise through
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manipulation (e.g. inflating costs or hiding profits), complete evasion and 
corruption. Needless to say, the poorly developed institutional environment of 
previously centrally planned economies lacks information and control mechanisms 
and a legal framework to deal with tax evaders and corruption, and hence offers a 
perfect arena for all kind of tax fraud. Most tax administrations are newly 
established and tax codes are still only in the earliest stages o f development.7
According to officials in the state tax inspectorate in Azerbaijan (March
1994), complete tax avoidance occurs only in small (i.e. five and less employees) 
private businesses (e.g. shops). However, 68 per cent of all taxable enterprises 
were at the time in tax arrears with on-going controversies over the extent of their 
tax debts.
Fourth, soft budget constraints can also arise from the financial system. 
This is the case both in previously centrally planned as well as in advanced 
capitalist economies.8 The availability of credit, often at negative real interest 
rates, and in many cases granted arbitrarily, is regarded as most important 
determinant o f soft budget constraints (cf. Raiser 1993: 258). 'Creditor passivity', 
i.e. banks reluctant to enforce debt contracts, is regarded as a further explanation 
for soft budget constraints (Begg and Portes 1992: 398).9 There are a number of 
reasons given in the literature for government's and bank's reluctance to curb 
credits to loss-making enterprises.10 First, governments may wish to keep 
inefficient enterprises going because of the vast social consequences of their
6 The term 'Regulatory-capture' was coined by the C hicago sch oo l, m ost notably by 
Stigler (1 9 7 5 ). A  core assumption o f  the theory is that regulation is favourable for 
producers. S tigler (1975: 114) puts it: "regulation is acquired by the industry and 
designed and operated primarily for its benefit". 'Regulatory-capture' arises, when  
producer interest groups obtain subsidies and protection (e.g . entry restrictions) merely 
through their political power, and hence without econom ic or soc ia l justification .
Raiser (1 9 9 3 ) stresses tax deferm ents as an indicator o f  soft budget constraints in the 
transitional Polish  econom y.
S tig litz provides exam ples from the United States for so ft budget constraints due to the 
financial system  (1993: 190). There is extensive theoretical and em pirical literature on 
financial markets and their im perfections in previously centrally planned econom ies. See, 
for exam ple, B egg  and Portes (1993).
9 The term 'creditor passivity' was coined by M itchell (1 9 9 2 ) and adopted for the context 
o f  previously centrally planned econom ies by B egg and Portes (1992).
10 For reasons for 'credit passivity' and allocation o f  credits to bad performers, see, for 
exam ple, R aiser (1993 ), and B egg and Portes (1993).
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closure and the inability to start a necessary restructuring process.11 Secondly, 
institutional imperfections of the banking system make effective monitoring 
impossible and allow credits to be allocated in an arbitrary way, i.e. not 
considering the creditworthiness of enterprises. This is down to personal links 
between enterprise managers and bank directors or outright corruption. In the 
context o f these institutional imperfections, monetary austerity, i.e. high interest 
rates and tight money supply, as demanded by most "stabilisation" programmes, 
might lead to perverse results (cf. Bofinger 1992). Instead of tightening the budget 
constraints o f inefficient enterprises and forcing them to adjust they might 
withhold vital resources for the restructuring process and for newly emerging 
businesses (cf. Raiser 1993).12
Fifth, the problem of inter-enterprise debts is often regarded as a further
source o f soft budget constraints in previously centrally planned economies (cf.
1 ^  *Raiser 1993: 258). Whilst this form of credit was almost non-existent, due to the 
centrally planned allocation system, it has sharply risen in a number of previously 
centrally planned economies.14 One has to note, the sharp rise of inter-enterprise 
debts is partially due to the new direct contact between enterprises, a common 
feature in advanced capitalist economies. In the FSU the breakdown of bank
11 B egg  and Portes (1993: 403-404) suggest that rather than leaving loss-m aking  
enterprises to go to the banks, their losses should be converted into a fiscal claim . Instead 
o f  non-transparent indirect subsidies from the banking sector, exp lic it fiscal subsidies 
should be given  out. They should be confined to an im mutable am ount and granted with  
greater transparency. M oreover, subsidy claim s should be considered in fram ing budget 
projections.
! 2 • *B egg  and Portes (1993) suggest various possib le policies to a lleviate credit market
failures and reform overall credit relations in previously centrally planned econom ies; for 
exam ple se lec tive  credit controls, recapitalising banks and enterprises, and various fiscal 
policy  measures.
13 See R ostow ski (1993) on inter-enterprise debts.
14 A ccord ing to Rostowski (1993) the problem o f  inter-enterprise debts is particularly 
severe in the FSU and Romania compared to the Central European previously centrally  
planned econom ies.
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payments mechanisms is another reason for this rise.13 However, the unavailability 
of reliable disaggregated data on both inter-enterprise and bank debt arrears, 
makes it impossible to evaluate the nature o f the latter, i.e. impossible to 
'distinguish healthy expansion of inter-enterprise debts from the pathological (or 
excessive)' (Rostowski 1993: 150).
In Azerbaijan credit at negative real interest rates is available for many 
enterprises. Several officials interviewed (April 1994) gave the impression, that 
the granting of credits is arbitrary and down to the political bargaining power of 
managers o f enterprises. Moreover, there are neither clear performance 
requirements nor adequate monitoring of the managers attached to these credits.
Sixth, the mere non-existence or relative infancy o f bankruptcy law and 
policy is another cause of prevalent soft budget constraints in previously centrally 
planned economies. The enforcement o f bankruptcy law serves three purposes (cf. 
Gray 1993:1). First, it sets clear and binding rules and procedures for exit of firms. 
Second, it protects creditors and serves as an ultimate means o f debt collection. 
Hence it facilitates flow of credits. Finally, it stimulates the restructuring of 
financially distressed enterprises by specifying reorganisation schemes and 
conciliation procedures between debtors and creditors. The credibility of the 
bankruptcy law is essential for increasing financial discipline and securing viable 
debt collection. The existence and implementation o f bankruptcy law in 
previously centrally planned economies is therefore important for both public and 
newly emerging private enterprises.16 However, bankruptcy policy dealing with 
insolvent public enterprises has to emphasise restructuring and protection of assets 
during this process. Liquidating the bulk of loss-making enterprises would cause 
massive economic, social and political disruption, and is therefore not feasible.
,3 The breakdown of the bank payments mechanisms and the weak new banking system 
leads to long delays in inter-republican as well as republican payments (Rostowski 
1993). Moreover, harsh banking regulations prevent enterprises from withdrawing 
deposits in cash with few specified exceptions. Cash can be withdrawn for the payment 
of wages, but not for the payment of supplies, machinery and equipment. Many 
enterprise managers interviewed in Azerbaijan (1993) complained that although they had 
money on their accounts they could not put it to the best use, as they were not allowed to 
withdraw it. Most suppliers in other republics demand payments in hard currency.
16 For an exposition of first experiences with bankruptcy law and policy in previously 
centrally planned economies, see Mizsei (1993) and Gray (1993).
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Simple transfer o f judicial bankruptcy proceedings from capitalist to previously 
centrally planned economies is not sufficient considering the weak judicial 
systems in the latter. Even if adequate bankruptcy law were adopted, judicial 
bankruptcy proceedings would be impeded by shortage o f judges and qualified 
trustees and liquidators and the poor development o f the legal periphery (e.g. 
contract enforcement, accounting standards and fiduciary liability) and
17underdeveloped capital markets. Moreover, whilst judicial bankruptcy
procedures in capitalist economies constitute an exception and a last resort of debt
collection and reorganisation of financially distressed enterprises, they will have to
be applied to a significant part of enterprises in previously centrally planned
18economies (Gray 1993: 1). Besides bankruptcy law, special schemes and rules 
have to be developed and implemented for out-of-court settlements, as they are 
also likely to become more relevant in the light o f the complexity of the 
restructuring process (cf. Mizsei 1993). In Azerbaijan the adoption of a 
bankruptcy law was still pending by June 1994.
In short, there are a number of institutional conditions responsible for the 
existence o f a soft budget constraint for enterprises. Some are still prevailing from 
the days of central planning. Others have particularly arisen in the transition 
period. In order to harden the budget constraint one has to understand why these 
institutional conditions exist. The above analysis implies that concentration on 
ownership structure per se is not sufficient for the successful hardening of the 
budget constraint. It suggests that the prevailing o f these institutional conditions 
allowing soft budget constraint can be only understood within the context of 
political economy.
17 In late 1991 a strict law was adopted in Hungary, requiring enterprises to file for 
bankruptcy after ninety days o f  insolvency. The result w as a skyrocketing number o f  
bankruptcy filings am ounting to 14,300 enterprises (4 ,400  as reorganisations and 9 ,900  
as liquidations, producing an estim ated one-quarter to one third o f  Hungarian GDP) in 
1992. That the jud icia l system  was not prepared for such a task can be seen in the 
Budapest court, where eight judges were handling about 4 ,000  cases in m id-1992 (Gray 
1993: 3).
I s Gray (1993: 2) remarks that the reason for satisfactorily  functioning judicial 
bankruptcy procedures in advanced market econom ies is that they operate at the margin.
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2.1.2 The Politics of the soft budget constraint
As mentioned above, proponents of privatisation link the existence o f soft budget 
constraints to the lack o f costs- and rentability-consciousness and the tendency for 
self-aggrandisement by public enterprise managers caused by public ownership, 
particularly in the setting of CPEs and PCPEs. On the contrary, here, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: the softness of the budget constraint is due to (a) a system 
of political control based on patronage; and (b) the lack of appropriate corporate 
governance systems.
2.1.2.1 Patronage
Patronage can be defined as informal ties and networks o f "individualised, 
reciprocal, political relations" (Willerton 1992: 6).19 In apolitical system based on 
patronage, leading politicians and bureaucrats - the patrons - are building 
coalitions of proteges and clients enabling them to consolidate their power. In 
return, the patrons incorporate their clients' interests into their policy making. 
Patronage can be in operation from a simple matter like getting a telephone line 
installed fast, and favourable treatment at the dentists, to promotion in 
employment, favourable credits and export licences. Power structures based on 
patronage are not unique to CPEs and PCPEs, Suitable conditions for patronage 
are a weak political opposition, uncertain political career prospects, and 
ineffective legal constraints. Under such institutional conditions, patronage can 
become the main incentive framework of political and economical interaction. 
Patronage should be distinguished from mere corruption, as the latter is mostly 
volatile and unpredictable whilst patronage is a stable system o f informal rules 
and regulations. Patronage can be an effective means o f governance within an 
unstable political environment. Considering the wildly distorted incentive
19 There is extensive literature discussing clientelism . See, for exam ple, Lemarchand and 
Legg (1 9 7 2 ) and Schm idt et al. (1977).
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structures in all aspects of life in most PCPEs, patronage is sometimes the only 
mechanism keeping political and economic systems more or less intact. However, 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. The 
analysis o f patronage shows the sheer magnitude o f institutional deficiencies in 
PCPEs.
The centralised, hierarchical decision-making system of the Soviet Union 
and other CPEs came to depend upon patronage.21 Patronage has outlived the 
centrally planned systems and successfully incorporated new political and 
economic forces. For example, administrative bodies that appear to have no 
further legitimate reasons for their existence, serve to reward political loyalty 
through "clepto-patrimonial" (Bardhan 1990: 5) income generation. The political 
leadership in PCPEs relies on patronage to maintain control.
The budget constraint can be an instrument to maintain 'patron-client 
relationships' between politicians, officials and enterprise managers. It can be 
softened to reward and hardened as a penalty. Similarly, Komai regards the origin 
of the soft budget constraint in the ’paternalistic relationship1 between the state and 
the firms. (Komai, 1980: 562) Although he acknowledges the existence of such 
paternalistic relationships in capitalist systems,22 Komai (1980: 566) considers it 
more prevalent in centrally planned economies, as there would be a direct 
relationship between public ownership and paternalism:
T h e so c ia l ow nersh ip  o f  the m eans o f  p roduction  is accom p an ied  by an 
activ e  role for state p ow er in the econ om y. [..] T h e central authorities take 
resp on sib ility  for the eco n o m ic  situation  and, at the sam e tim e, they w ant 
to use every  instrum ent in the arm oury w h ich  th ey  d eem  u sefu l.
The "breaking of the paternalistic relationship between the state and the 
firm" in order to impose hard budget constraints on the micro-economic level is a
20 O lson (1 9 8 2 ) describes the effects o f  clientelism  on capitalist econom ies.
~ W illerton (1 9 9 2 ) undertook a profound analysis o f  the role o f  patronage networks in 
elite m obility , regim e formation and governance in the F SU  with special em phasis on 
Azerbaijan and Lithuania.
22 Kornai (1980: 566) puts it:
The government has to assume responsibility for the economic situation - and its 
choice is only one between different sets o f targets and instruments for economic 
policy. It is therefore inevitable that sooner or later more or less paternalistic relations 
develop between the firm and the state.
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common aim behind privatisation programmes in previously centrally planned 
economies.23 However, the continuance of patronage relationships and related soft 
budget constraints are not dependent on ownership structure. Private enterprises 
can exert 'clientelisf pressures to soften their budget constraint. It depends on the 
commitment and ability of the state to withstand such 'clientelisf pressures. 
Privatisation may not therefore overcome such patronage relations. Depending on 
implementation, privatisation can even enhance such relationships. This is the 
case if  insider privatisation reinforces rent seeking behaviour, as it widens 
information asymmetries between insiders and the state and strengthens the 
position o f insiders.
A consequence of the disintegration o f CPEs, the resulting power vacuum, 
and inherited and transforming patronage networks is the emergence of insider 
control.24 Aoki (1995: 3) puts it:
The Tendency [towards insider control] is generic, however, in the sense
that it is an evolutionary outcome of communist legacies.
Insider control is defined here as de facto or de jure capture of controlling rights 
by the managers of SOEs, often in conjunction with bureaucrats of institutions 
superior to the enterprises and sometimes with workers 25 Many managers stepped 
into the control vacuum emerging through the disintegration of central power. 
Backed up by patronage their positions became omnipotent. The degree and scope 
of insider control varies across PCPEs and different branches of the economies, 
depending on the state of the industry concerned and a number of institutional 
conditions, most importantly the commitment and ability of the state to curb such 
control and its influence sphere. The establishment o f appropriate corporate 
governance systems should be therefore a major concern o f the attempts to harden 
the budget constraints.
23 See, for exam ple, Estrin (1994), Hinds (1991: 131-134), Kornai (1990: 57-80), Lipton 
and Sachs (1990a: 15 and 127),N uti (1991: 169-170), and Perotti (1994).
24 The process o f  decentralisation o f  econom ic d ecision -p ow er and the em ergence o f  
insider control in CPEs has not been recent but has gradually build up over decades. For 
the problem  o f  insider control in the FSU and in Azerbaijan see section  5.2.3.
25 This defin ition  is in line with Aoki (1995: 3). For a more detailed  d iscussion  o f  insider 
control, see A oki (1995: 7-12), Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994: 141-168), Heinrich
(1994).
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Z 1.2.2 Corporate governance
Corporate governance refers to the mechanisms which ensure control over 
management and all the subordinate layers of decision making in an enterprise.26 
It is vital for safeguarding efficiency, particularly against the multiple layers of 
principal-agent problems present when ownership and management are separated. 
As such the central task of corporate governance is to moderate blatantly self- 
seeking behaviour by agents due to imperfect, and especially asymmetric 
information. Its instruments are incentive schemes, behavioural rules, dispute- 
resolution processes and effective penalties in case of failure - for all agents in a 
corporation from top management all the way down to the factory floor (cf. 
Brabant 1993: 135).27 Within these instruments one can distinguish between 
internal incentives (i.e. internal structures and arrangements between principal and 
agents), and external incentives (i.e. given through the financial system, product 
market competition, labour markets, legal framework, and bankruptcy) (cf. Muir 
and Saba 1995). The issue of corporate governance is crucial regardless of the 
ownership form o f the firm, whether in market economies or in CPEs and PCPEs. 
Effective corporate governance should guarantee financial discipline and, hence, 
hard budget constraints. At the same time, if  sound governance systems are in 
place, enterprises are more likely to attract external funds.
The literature on corporate governance distinguishes between the Anglo- 
American, the German, and the Japanese models. The Anglo-American model is 
based on shareholder sovereignty with competitive capital markets. Problems of x- 
inefficiency -i.e. management slack, incompetence, and moral hazard- are rectified 
by outside shareholders through efficient capital markets, external take-over
26 For a fuller d iscussion  o f  problems o f  corporate governance, see Berle and M eans 
(1932), Faina (1980), Herman (1983), Hopt and Teubner (1985 ), H orovitz (1980), Kester 
(1992 ), M onks and M inow  (1995), Muir and Saba (1995: 17-29), Sandrock and Jager 
(ed s)(1994 ), Stokman, Z iegler and Scott (1985), T heisen  (1987 ), and W illiam son (1963; 
1967; 1979; 1981). For a discussion o f  corporate governance issues in PCPEs, see 
Akamatsu (1 9 9 5 ), A oki (1995), Belyanova and R ozinsky (1995), B erg lo f (1995), Brabant 
(1993: 133-137), Frydinan and Rapaczynski (1994), L itwack (1995), Pohl, Jedrzejczak, 
and Anderson (1 9 9 5 ), Roland (1995), and W ieners (1994).
->7
The organisational literature explored numerous m echanism s o f  control. For a good 
overview , see  Berry, Broadbent and Otley (1995).
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1Qthreats, and the market for managers.' In the German and Japanese models banks 
play a more vital role in corporate governance. In Germany, banks own a 
significant amount of shares of publicly traded corporations and they exercise 
voting rights on behalf of individual shareholders. Banks are also on many 
supervisory boards (Aufsichtsrate). In Japan, banks own 50% of outstanding 
shares o f stock exchange listed companies (Muir and Saba 1995: 87), Banks are 
also heavy involved in companies as creditors. In Japan, the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry o f International Trade and Industry play a very active part in the 
monitoring o f management.29
Existing governance structures in market economies have of course 
developed over long periods of time. Moreover each o f these models requires a 
slightly different set of institutional conditions. This includes accounting standards 
to suit a market economy; robust capital markets; a system of corporate law 
including bankruptcy law and commercial codes; a record of corporate 
performance against which to measure the present actions of management; and 
many other institutions. There is fierce debate about the efficiency of their ’ 
incentive systems, i.e. stock markets, external take-over threats, and manager- 
employment-markets.30 Considering also their historical and cultural connotations 
it is questionable how far such existing corporate-governance rules and 
institutions can be simply transferred to the PCPE context. These existing systems 
will have to be tested for their suitability for PCPEs and whether their minimum 
requirements can be established easily in the foreseeable future. For instance, it is 
unrealistic to opt only for a system which requires appropriately developed capital 
markets, as these obviously cannot be established rapidly.
In the PCPEs, corporate-governance issues are o f particular relevance. 
Without the power to enforce central commands and with the old administrative 
system crumbling, SOEs particularly in the FSU, were left in a control vacuum 
which was filled by insiders. As discussed above, in most PCPEs these insiders
" The shortcom ings o f  this governance m odel w ere already briefly discussed in the 
context o f  principal-agent problems in section 1.2.
29 For a com pact account o f  the A nglo-A m erican, German, and Japanese corporate 
governance m odels, see Muir and Saba (1995: 61-91).
30 S ee  section  1.2 for a more detailed discussion.
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are to varying degrees integrated into patronage networks which consolidate the 
power o f different fractions of the ruling elite. Thus corporate governance 
problems in most branches in PCPEs exceed the principal-agent problems known 
in developed market economies. In its most extreme form, insider control has led 
to wide-ranging ‘spontaneous privatisation’ also known as ‘insider’ or 
‘nomenklatura privatisation’.31 The significance o f insider control for both 
corporate governance issues and privatisation in PCPEs has been only very 
recently recognised by the literature.32 Insider control puts severe constraints on 
the implementation of any project to re-establish effective mechanism for 
enterprise control in PCPEs. The main task is to develop suitable corporate 
governance institutions which are able either to defeat insider control or integrate 
it constructively in the reform process.
It has been argued, that suitable corporate-governance arrangements are 
likely to evolve with time, once privatisation has taken place (cf. Frydman et al. 
1992: 2). However, given the multiplicity of privatisation methods and the 
subsequent ownership structure little can be guaranteed. Moreover, if the creation 
of appropriate mechanisms of enterprise control are left aside with the hope that 
future owners will solve the problem after privatisation, it might be too late to 
save whatever can be salvaged from the state enterprises. Given the uncertainty in 
the light o f general political and economical instabilities, expected privatisation 
and other measures, many insiders are likely to make "tombstone" decisions -
3 1 Spontaneous privatisation can take the fo llow in g  forms: buying out SOEs through a 
co-operative with its own funds, using SO E s’ material and equipm ent for the production 
o f  privately sold  goods and services, diverting resources from SOEs to enterprises in 
m ixed ow nership , setting up different kinds o f  holding com panies with less 
accountability to the state, false bankruptcy and subsequent repurchase o f ‘unprofitable’ 
enterprises, registration o f  a new SOE with subsequent withdrawal o f  the state founder, 
and purchase o f  state assets at reduced prices (Radygin 1995 30-31). There are many 
more such industry and country specific illegal or sem i-legal strategies. For further 
references, see introduction to chapter 1.
On the problem  o f  insider control, see Aoki (1995), B erg lo f (1995), Frydman and 
Rapaczynski (1994: 141-210), Grigoriev (1991), Heinrich (1993  and 1994), and Leitzel 
(1 9 9 5 :9 3 )
57
*!*»
asset stripping, general short-termism, etc.
Hence, prerequisites of corporate control (e.g. accounting practices, 
company laws) should be established without delay. Even if the divestment 
process has begun or is expected soon, a sizeable number of SOEs will remain in 
public hands, whose control is often captured by insiders. These could be 
enterprises and utilities which are traditionally in the public sector or which are 
purposely operated under public control for different reasons, e.g. the reluctance 
and inability o f domestic investors to commit their resources to a tedious and 
uncertain restructuring process. In any case, those enteiprises remaining in the 
public sector will also need new governance mechanisms to be established. These 
mechanisms have to suit the particular institutional conditions given in the 
economy and specific organisation.
Three models of corporate governance have been proposed for PCPEs here 
defined as: (1) the stock market model, which is moulded from the Anglo- 
American mode of corporate governance and external financing (cf. Pohl, 
Jedrzejczak, and Anderson 1995: 3-4), (2) the financial intermediary model, which 
is based on the German and Japanese style o f governance, in which control and 
financing is provided by banks and other financial institutions (cf. Aoki 1995; 
Berglof 1995; Wieners 1994: 157f.),34 and (3) the employee model, in which 
managers and workers take over formal control (Weitzman 1993).
There are very few proponents of a sole market approach - as the first 
model suggests. The stock market model is also widely regarded as ineffective in 
dealing with the problem of insider control (Aoki 1995: 3-4). Banks are regarded 
at least theoretically as able to play an effective monitoring role in the corporate 
governance structure of viable insider dominated firms, both on an arm’s length 
and a control-oriented basis (cf. Aoki 1995; Berglof 1995; Perotti 1994; Roland
33 There has been hardly any em pirical research conducted on the issue o f  asset stripping. 
Predictions can therefore only rely on anecdotal evidence. H ow ever, there is quite a 
com p elling log ic behind the assumption that the degree o f  asset stripping is a function o f  
the prevailing political and econom ic uncertainty.
34 One can distinguish between control oriented and arms length financial control 
system s (Pohl, Jedrzejczak, and Anderson 1995: 7). H ow ever, as argued in B erg lo f
(1995 ), these system s can be seen as com plem entary. A good  d iscussion  o f  different 
m odels o f  bank control is given by W ieners 1994: 157f.)
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1995). However, as already stated above, an effective banking system and its 
complementary institutions will still have to be developed. The third model 
accommodates fully for prevailing insider control. In practice often an eclectic 
approach towards corporate governance is suggested, supporting a simultaneous 
development o f different systems (cf. Aoki 1995; Pohl, Jedrzejczak, and Anderson 
1995: 7).
A first step proposed by the first two models is corporatisation and 
commercialisation, including their legal foundation and prerequisites such as the 
introduction o f new accounting and auditing standards and changes in the 
structure o f organisation. Corporatisation is mostly defined as enterprise reform 
that alters the legal position of a business activity into a joint-stock company or 
similar legal entity according to relevant statutes and decrees. Simultaneously the 
development of the financial system and its complementary institutions are 
proposed.
First experiences with the corporatisation process have shown that it 
cannot be simply introduced off-the-shelf. It is not enough to fulfil formal 
requirements o f the corporatisation legislation, such as holding shareholder 
meetings and establishing a board of directors, if  these are only pro forma and, 
therefore, meaningless. Moreover, preconditions have to be developed in the 
enterprise itself which create transparency, accountability, and the rule of law.
To summarise: effective corporate governance is both important for 
financial discipline and the ability to attract funds. There are various internal and 
external incentive and discipline mechanisms necessary to enforce corporate 
control. Many, e.g. a sound banking system, have still to be developed in PCPEs. 
The concentration on ownership per se fails to address attention to the complexity 
o f institutional arrangements which constitute corporate governance particularly in 
the context o f insider control. Privatisation can be only seen as a tool to assist the 
establishment o f enterprise control. However, the initiation o f appropriate 
corporate governance structures depends on many other institutional conditions, 
one o f them the commitment and ability of the state to provide and maintain the 
legal foundations, e.g. a system o f corporate law including bankruptcy law and 
commercial codes. Without these legal prerequisites it will be difficult to establish
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corporate governance structures regardless o f whether privatisation takes place or 
not.
2.2 Dynamic efficiency: structural change
Dynamic efficiency is here defined as the ability to adapt to a changing 
environment and hence maintaining a long-term efficient allocation of scarce 
resources. This involves, particularly in the context o f PCPEs, intra-enterprise 
restructuring, as well as inter-sectoral reallocation o f scarce resources. A 
precondition o f industrial restructuring in PCPEs is the establishment of effective 
corporate governance, which attracts the external sources o f finance and expertise 
necessary for the purpose of restructuring. The initiation o f industrial restructuring 
is also crucially dependent on whether the state can withstand ciientelist interest to 
impede changes, as discussed below. Thus, these vital issues are inseparably 
intertwined, and the discussion of patronage networks and coiporate governance is 
also o f significance for restructuring. The question addressed is whether dynamic 
efficiency and hence successful industrial restructuring is dependent on an 
enterprise being public or private.
The industrial sector of most PCPEs is characterised through excess 
capacity, low profitability, environmental pollution, and increasing technological 
obsolescence. In the FSU highly vertically integrated industries of gigantic 
plants makes production in the individual republic dependent on deliveries from 
other republics (cf. Leijonhufvud 1993). Due to the political basis of production 
location decisions, uneconomic transport costs arose; the transaction costs remain, 
but the political necessity has perished. The restructuring requirements are 
therefore exacerbated in the newly independent republics o f the FSU. In all PCPEs 
relative prices have changed due to price liberalisation and the termination of 
producer and consumer subsidies. There has also been increasing adjustments of 
prices for resources and raw materials to world market prices. Consumer patterns 
have drastically changed due to import liberalisation. And because of the
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increased foreign competition, upgrading and modernisation of technology has 
become unavoidable in many sectors. There has been a sharp decline in real 
investments, in some PCPEs for almost the last eight years. The outdated 
dominance o f the military-industrial-complex requires fundamental conversion. 
And this list could be endlessly continued and detailed. Generally, all PCPEs face 
crucial restructuring problems which vary according to country and sector. These 
are possibly more important empirical starting points than any analytical or 
ideological predispositions towards public and private enterprise.
Intra-enterprise restructuring requires physical capital changes (e.g. 
streamlining, downsizing, recapitalisation), technology and organisation changes, 
management changes, human resource development, changes in infrastructure 
components, financial restructuring, and changes in products and markets. A very 
important issue in the context of PCPEs is demonopolisation. Inter-sectoral 
restructuring involves identification and development o f promising sub-sectors, 
SME-development, and new enterprise promotion. And o f course, restructuring 
requires skilled and experienced implementers and extensive financial resources.36 
Major state involvement will be unavoidable in PCPEs, given the extent of the 
restructuring required, the massive capital needs without capital markets capable 
of providing them, dearth of foreign investment, and the high costs of expected 
externalities.
Whilst industrial restructuring on an aggregate level might stimulate 
growth and ensure efficient allocation of scarce resources, it can often have an 
long-term negative impact on wealth and income on insiders of the industries 
concerned. Streamlining and downsizing inevitably will lead to diminished asset
35 For a detailed analysis o f  the state o f  the industries in the PCPEs, see EBRD (1995), 
ECE (1995), Hare (1996), Hesp (1994), Hughes and Hare (1 992  and 1994), N ew bery and 
ICattuman (1992), and R ichet (1993).
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value, change in management and employment, the extent of which is dependent 
on the asset specificity of the individual plant. Often, the most prestigious giant 
enterprises are the ones most concerned. The potential threat to powerful vested 
interest groups creates massive resistance to such changes. These powerful 
conservative forces can use the solidity of their above mentioned patronage 
networks to delay or defeat restructuring. The crucial factor is political power 
rather than formal ownership rights. The underlying strength of conservative 
interest groups, no matter whether in private and public enterprises, should not be 
underestimated. Experiences in capitalist economies where supposedly private 
companies were bailed out by state intervention reconfirm this argument.37 As 
mentioned above, depending on the implementation o f privatisation, rent-seeking 
behaviour could be even intensified.
The privatisation of monopolies might not even be desirable pre­
demonopolisation (cf. Carlin and Mayer 1992). The effectiveness of newly 
introduced anti-trust policies is highly questionable. The latter are mostly based on 
a market economy context, but the complementary institutions are mostly missing.
As in the whole privatisation debate, it is difficult to evaluate the 
usefulness o f privatisation for the initiation o f industrial restructuring without 
considering country, sector, and enterprise specific factors. The discussion over 
privatisation o f large enterprises which require a great deal of restructuring is 
often highly hypothetical, as potential buyers who have also the capital for 
restructuring at their disposal, are hardly forthcoming.
36 There is extensive theoretical and em pirical literature on industrial restructuring. For a 
good sum m ary o f  the issues involved, see A tiyas, Dutz, and Frischtak (1992), Bagchi 
(1987 ), Lieberm an (1990), Roe (1984), and Thom as, Rom ijn and Uribe-Echevarria 
(1991). For recent studies o f  the PCPE context, see  A tiyas (1994 ), B egg and Portes 
(1992; 1993), B lasi, Panina and Grachova (1995), Borish, Long, and N oel (1995), Carlin 
and M ayer (1 9 9 2 ), Estrin and Richet (1993), Filatotchev, B uck and W right (1993), Hare
(1996), H illm an and M ilanovic (1992), Hughes and Hare (1992a; 1992b; 1994), Kharas 
(1991 ), M ann (1991 ), N ew bery (1990), R ichet (1 9 9 3 ), Roland (1 9 9 3 ), Schutte (1993)  
Sood (1 9 9 1 ), Traxler and Unger (1994), UNIDO  (1 9 9 3 ) and W ilson  (1995).
37 Rovvthorn and Chang (1993; 62) mention the Chrysler rescue operation in the U SA  and 
the nationalisation o f  the shipbuilding industry in Sw eden.
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2.3 Origins o f property institutions and institutional change
Traditional economic theory neglects the process in which property rights are 
formed and altered. Property rights are treated as exogenous and clearly defined. 
However, such a view is of little use, if the effects and the process of changes in 
property rights are examined, i.e. how the changes can be achieved and whether 
the actual changes are efficient solutions to issues of corporate governance and 
industrial restructuring.
Property rights are defined for the following as social institutions that 
delineate the boundaries of rights on specific assets. There is a bundle of rights 
attached to each asset, e.g. the right to transfer the asset.38 Libecap (1993: 1) 
describes the range of institutions which constitute property rights as following:
Property rights institutions range from formal arrangements, including 
constitutional provisions, statutes, and judicial rulings, to informal 
conventions and customs regarding the allocations and use of property. 
Such institutions critically affect economic behavior and performance. By 
allocating decision-making authority, they also determine who are the 
economic actors in a system and define the distribution of wealth in a 
society.
In the debate about privatisation in PCPEs de facto property rights given 
through informal conventions and customs, are generally ignored.39 This is 
reflected in the top-down design o f most privatisation programmes, which 
authorise a central authority with the task o f privatisation. The underlying 
assumption is that the state holds the control rights of its enterprises. However, in 
reality, insiders have taken over the control of a significant amount of enterprises 
in many PCPEs, and they are unlikely to relinquish them silently.40 Generally, 
sanitised textbook economics neglects the implications o f distributional struggles 
attached to proposals for institutional change. These struggles are less fierce in 
western economies as many institutions are not seriously questioned. To 
understand the implications of institutional change fully for PCPEs, one has to
38 S ee also  section  1.2.
39 E xceptions are Heinrich (1993: 12f) w ho argues that privatisation could be only  
politica lly  accom plished  if  these de facto property rights w ere also  recognised de jure. 
This position  a lso  is taken by Leitzel (1995: 93).
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imagine the reactions of the western industrial elite if  it were seriously threatened 
with loss o f its economic and political power.
So far, the existing rights structure in PCPEs has led to massive economic 
decline, combined with capital destruction and capital flight. The changes in 
relative prices have not led to industrial restructuring and viable corporate 
governance structures and rescue efforts for many industries will be too late. Why 
can the existing property rights structure not easily be replaced with one which is 
more conducive to economic recovery as some proponents of the New 
Institutional Economics suggest would happen? The answer lies with the 
bargaining parties involved, the range of institutional options the latter are facing, 
and the complexity o f factors influencing the calculation of private expected net 
gains from alternative institutional forms. Libecap (1993: 3) puts it:
A s w ith  earlier exam in ations o f  property rights, the in stitu tional analysis  
literature tends to be the m ore op tim istic  o n e , v ie w in g  the d esign  o f  
various govern an ce structures as m a x im iz in g  d ec is io n s  to eco n o m ize  on 
tran saction s costs. A  problem  w ith  su ch  c la im s, h o w ev er , is the general 
fa ilure to sp ec ify  the s ize  o f  the net b en efits a ch ie v ed  from  the adoption o f  
a particu lar institutional form  relative to  the returns offered  by its 
altern atives. T h is failure to id entify  the range o f  institu tional options  
con fron tin g  d ec is io n  m akers and the lik e ly  c o s ts  and b en efits  associated  
w ith  each  on e, m akes it d ifficu lt to eva lu ate  the m a x im iza tio n  cla im s.
Property rights in any economy are the key to the distribution of wealth and 
political power. Any proposed institutional change will lead to complex 
‘contracting’. Contracting is the term used by the literature on institutional change 
for the whole process of bargaining over the assignment o f new property rights 
and the modification and elimination o f existing property rights (cf. Libecap 1993: 
4). Contracting is carried out on two levels:
1. the intra-group level, on which rules and customs regarding the allocation from 
and control over property rights - hence the status o f members - are re­
bargained, e.g. the reshuffling within patronage networks; and
40 On the emergence of insider control see section 2.1.2, and see section 5.3 for a 
discussion of insider control in Azerbaijan.
64
2. the inter-group level, on which institutional changes are disputed between the 
different groups. The latter includes also lobbying, political negotiations and 
adjustments o f the legal framework (cf. Libecap 1993: 4).
Each o f the contracting parties and their individual members tries to maximise or 
minimise his/her gains or losses, respectively. However, their agreement on 
institutional change depends on factors influencing their expected net gains, as the 
latter cannot be fully anticipated.
The outcome of the institutional change is mainly dependent on two 
aspects. The first aspect is whether expected losers can either be defeated outright 
or persuaded into agreement through some kind o f compensation. For example, a 
minister, whose power and income stream (possibly from informal arrangements) 
could be threatened by institutional changes could be persuaded to agree through 
offering another ministry or chair of a committee. Second, and most important, the 
outcome depends on whether important groups expect a private gain out of the 
institutional change.
The contracting process can block institutional change or alter the original 
proposal quite significantly. Thus the ultimate property rights arrangements often 
bear little resemblance with the initial proposal (cf. Libecap 1993: 6). The 
literature on privatisation in PCPEs has widely disregarded this implication of the 
contracting process and thus overoptimistic with its expectations from 
privatisation. Libecap (1993) points out that historically institutional changes, 
which would have led to aggregate economic gains were often blocked as 
influential interest groups feared their political and economic base would be 
undermined.41
Contracting for property rights is an extremely complex process. It is hardly 
possible to calculate the net gains of all institutional options for every single 
contracting party. However, the analysis of the contracting process can be assisted 
by the identification of the contracting parties and the general factors which
41 L ibecap’s analysis is also confirm ed by several historical studies. For exam ple, the 
studies o f  Scheiber (1973), Hughes (1977) and Friedman (1 9 8 5 ) on the role o f  interest 
groups in in fluencing property law and governm ent regulation in nineteenth-century  
A m erica com e to this conclusion. O lson ’s (1982) study on the econom ic developm ent o f  
western econ om ies in the post-W orld War II period supports this v iew .
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influence an agreement to the adjustment o f the property rights structure. Again, 
this is not possible without considering country, sector, and enterprise specific 
factors.
2.4 Conflicting and inconsistent goals
Besides the economic motive of enhancing efficiency, there are other rationales 
behind privatisation in PCPEs.42 Although the aspect o f efficiency remains the 
main focus of this work, possible conflicts and inconsistencies with other motives 
and goals will be shortly evaluated in the following to complete the picture. There 
are various additional rationales behind privatisation, five of which are 
particularly relevant to the context o f PCPEs.
First, one motive for privatisation is to create a capitalist class with 
attitudes, behaviour and motives of economic agents in a market environment. In 
this context, the ‘strengthening of the share-holding culture’ is often stressed (cf. 
Brabant 1992: 156; Dallago 1995: 242-245). However, this ‘popular capitalism’ is 
an unlikely outcome of privatisation in most PCPEs due to the historical and 
institutional conditions in these economies. Besides, the ‘share-holder society’ is 
even a myth in most developed market economies with share-holders constituting 
only 21% of the entire population in Anglo-Saxon countries, 16% in France and a 
mere 5% in Germany (Liener 1993: 26).
Second, another motive for privatisation is to attract foreign investments. 
International and supranational organisations (e.g. IMF and IBRD) often make 
their assistance dependent on progress in the privatisation process. In most PCPEs 
the inflow o f foreign capital so far has been small or negligible.43 This is not 
astonishing, given the wide range of global investment opportunities and the high 
risk due to political and economic instability in most PCPEs.
42 On m otives and goals o f  privatisation in PCPEs, see  Bornstein (1992: 284-285), 
Brabant (1992: 156-160), D allago (1995: 242-251), Dhanji and M ilanovic (1991: 13-18), 
Lavigne (1995: 158-159), and Kilm ister (1995: 90-92).
'*3 There are partial exceptions such as Hungary, the C zech R epublic, and Poland 
(L avigne 1995: 163). However, Lavigne (1995: 164) doubts w hether foreign capital in 
any PCPE exceed s 10-15% o f  total capital endowm ent.
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Third, privatisation is to assist macroeconomic stability, by reducing the 
‘monetary overhang’ whenever savings are large and by providing fiscal revenue 
through the termination of subsidies, disposal o f loss-making activities and 
directly by sales revenues. However, assuming that the sales price equals the 
present value of the foregone net income, the state budget should remain 
unaffected (Mansoor 1988). In most PCPEs the monetary overhang has been 
wiped out and the propensity to save diminished by inflation. And experience has 
shown that privatisation revenues are insufficient. For example, the German 
Treuhand accumulated DM 270 billion in debts with sale receipts only amounting 
to DM 53 billion (Lavigne 1995: 158).
Fourth, the distribution of society’s wealth on an equitable basis is often 
emphasised as a goal of privatisation in PCPEs (cf. Bomstein 1992: 285; Brabant 
1992: 159-160; Perotti 1994: 56; Wieners 1994; 81). Considering the 
contributions made to capital accumulation by the whole society, this might be a 
legitimate plea since equity equability is often discussed as a rationale behind free 
transfer methods.44 However, the realisation of an equitable distribution is very 
unrealistic. Due to imperfect and asymmetric information, insiders will always 
have an advantage especially if  passive minority share-holders are involved. After 
all, those who control the assets, and hence have the discretionary right to decide 
on their use, are the main beneficiaries. This is particularly the case in PCPEs with 
their fragmentary institutional frameworks. A sceptical view o f such an equitable 
privatisation is best represented by Weitzman (1993: 252):
C ap ita lism  is not a fair system  and cap ita lists are not n ice  gu ys, at least not 
at their b u sin ess d ealin gs. W hether inadvertently or as part o f  a prom otion  
strategy, th is central fact has been m a ssiv e ly  ca m o u fla g ed  beh ind  all the 
san itized  talk about transition to a “m arket sy stem ” [..]
N o  m atter h ow  it is accom p lish ed , there is no w a y  that privatisation  is not 
g o in g  to end up w ith  som e unpleasant characters b eco m in g  re la tively  rich 
and so m e virtuous innocents lo sin g  out. T h is is w hat cap ita lism  is all 
about. U nder cap italism , so c ie ty  d oes not attem pt to m icrom anage  
in d iv idu al in com es, b ecause to do that k ills the g o o se  that lays the go lden  
eg g s .
U nder cap ita lism  there is a lot o f  ran d om n ess, resu lting  in m any  
u n d eserv in g  w inners and unjust losers. T he w in n ers in the n ew  system s o f  
E astern Europe are lik ely  to be correlated  w ith  the w in n ers in the old
44 For a detailed discussion of free transfer methods, see section 3.1 and 3.3.
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sy stem s o f  Eastern Europe, becau se there is a s ta tistica lly  sign ifican t, if  
not perfect, correlation  betw een  aggressive  opportunists in both cases, and 
in the end  there is not a w h o le  lot that can be d one about it.
The democratic gesture of equity is often merely a strategy to sell broad 
privatisation (cf. Perotti 1994: 57; Vickers and Yarrow 1988: 121).
Fifth, there is the ideological motive that privatisation should induce a 
rapid systemic change by dismantling the whole centrally planned production 
system and thus ensure that the process of overall change is irreversible (cf. 
Brabant 1992:158; Major 1993:53).
Inconsistencies and conflicts between different motives and goals are 
likely to arise in any privatisation. Priorities have to be set from case to case. 
However, in the context of PCPEs conflicts between different objectives could be 
particularly grave due to the deficiencies in institutional frameworks. First, there 
exists a variety of contradictions between the establishment o f a stable capital 
class and other motives. The most obvious domestic candidates to form this class 
are insiders and their appendages as they hold vital insider information and are 
most experienced with the industrial infrastructure. Moreover, due to the sluggish 
control in recent years, most of them were able to accumulate capital illegally 
through spontaneous privatisation.45 As discussed above, it will hardly be possible 
to neglect the deeply entrenched interests, rights and privileges o f these forces. 
However, there is the danger of perpetuation of patronage relationships between 
the state bureaucracy and these former nomenklatura members who become new 
capitalists and retain soft budget constraints. Enterprises with light restructuring 
obligations and a foreseeable recovery might embark on restructuring. Others 
might rather rely on rent-seeking activities rather than initiate serious 
restructuring.
Second, the emphasis on broad share-ownership is likely to undermine 
sound enterprise control and hence efficiency.46 Dispersed ownership will entail
43 The issue o f  spontaneous privatisation was d iscussed  in section  2 .1 .2 . For the 
consideration o f  insiders in the privatisation process, see also  chapter 3.
46 The issues o f  free transfer o f  shares and sales through capital market operations and 
public offerin g  are discussed in detail in chapter 3.
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insurmountable principal-agent problems in the absence of capital markets, as 
discussed above.
Third, there are conflicts between attracting foreign capital and other 
motives. Foreign investors are more likely to buy enterprises with the least need 
for restructuring, monopoly enterprises, or invest in green-field projects (cf. 
Lavigne 1995: 164). There is much anecdotal evidence about foreign investors 
buying up potential domestic competitors just to close them down. Thus 
restructuring problems will not necessarily be solved. Attempts to de-monopolise 
could be undermined. Moreover, foreign capital is often only attracted through 
offering wide protective measurements (e.g. tariff or tax concessions) which 
would collide with fiscal objectives (Lavigne 1995; 164). Privatisation 
programmes sped up in order to satisfy funding conditions of international and 
supranational organisations might not comply with the motives of restructuring 
and the establishing sound enterprise control.
Fourth, the goal o f high privatisation receipts might in theory withdraw 
resources from restructuring depending what these receipts are used for. However, 
this has hardly arisen.
Fifth, the ideological motive of making the overall change irreversible 
provokes the attitude of privatisation for privatisation’s sake irrespective of its 
consequences for restructuring and corporate governance. The attitude of making 
overall privatisation as the touchstone of economic and political development 
regardless o f sectors, branches and enterprises diverts the discussions and efforts 
from tackling the imminent restructuring needs. Purely ideological decision­
making could end up by squandering valuable resources.
Other examples of contradictions are multiple. The essential point is that 
most PCPEs, which experience massive economic decline, require fundamental 
restructuring in most sectors and lack an institutional framework of a market 
economy. The different objectives of privatisation can conflict quite sharply. The 
designers o f privatisation strategies have to set their priorities and allow trade-offs 
to be made. Ideally this should be at a sector or even a branch or enterprise level.
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Concluding remarks
This chapter analyses the relevance of the ownership structure for enterprise 
efficiency out of the perspective of political economy. Looking at static efficiency 
a variety o f institutional conditions were examined which are responsible for soft 
budget constraints. It was concluded that the existence o f these institutional 
conditions and hence soft budget constraints are due to (a) a system of political 
control based on patronage; and (b) the lack of appropriate corporate governance 
systems. The analysis showed that the exact manner in which soft budget 
constraints arise is extremely complex, reflecting power struggles between various 
political and economical interest groups. Formal ownership per se is hardly central 
for the enhancing o f static efficiency. The increase o f dynamic efficiency and 
hence industrial restructuring in the context o f PCPEs is dependent on the strength 
of conservative forces to resist change regardless o f whether in private or public 
enterprises.
Depending on the implementation, privatisation can be a tool to overcome 
patronage relationships, to help to build up appropriate enterprise control 
mechanisms, and, finally, to initiate industrial restructuring. Various methods of 
privatisation have to be examined for their suitability. Moreover, country, sector, 
and enterprise specific factors comprising the institutional framework have to be 
taken into account. Here it is important to stress that the common tendency to 
regard the PCPE as uniform and force them conveniently under the heading of 
'Eastern European' does not take sufficiently into account the vast differences 
across countries and enterprises. The economies differ profoundly in their 
industrial structure and overall development, the degree o f macroeconomic 
stability, the extent of microeconomic decentralisation, their exposure to 
international trade, and their political stability. Hence generalisations based on 
research from one country cannot be simply extended to others.
A major shortcoming of most of the literature on privatisation in PCPEs is 
to ignore the very definition of property rights and their formation. A privatisation 
proposal camiot be viewed in a vacuum, it has to be understood as proposed 
institutional change which leads to a complex process o f contracting for property 
rights. The outcome o f the latter is central to whether proposed privatisation can
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lead to enhanced efficiency. In this context it is particularly relevant to consider de 
facto property rights of insiders prevailing to different degrees in the economies 
concerned. Insider control is a major problem in most PCPEs. Of paramount 
importance here is the power of the state. Is the state willing and able to 
implement a reform programme conducive to enhanced static and dynamic 
efficiency, or is it weak, susceptible to counterproductive rent-seeking activities of 
insiders?
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3. M ethods of privatisation 
Introduction
In previous chapters, it has been shown that the justification for privatisation on 
purely economic grounds is very limited. This is the case when ownership and 
control rights are separate, especially in the context o f PCPEs. The discussion of 
institutional conditions responsible for insufficient static and dynamic efficiency 
concluded that the emphasis on ownership structure per se is inadequate. It was 
suggested that in the context of CPES and PCPEs the system o f political control 
based on patronage and the lack of appropriate corporate governance generates 
soft budget constraints and enables conservative forces to delay and defeat 
effective industrial restructuring. In this context privatisation can be regarded as 
one means o f squeezing out old patronage networks and marginalising 
conservative forces, o f building up an adequate system o f enterprise control, and 
hence, hardening the budget constraints and opening up the way for restructuring. 
For privatisation to be successful in this way, the economic, political and, above 
all, institutional pre-conditions are o f great significance. Moreover, there are a 
number o f  important issues to consider. These are the questions of to what extent 
insiders have captured control rights over the SOEs which are to be privatised; 
information and valuation problems; and the lack o f experience and expertise of 
privatisation administrators.
The aim o f this chapter is to evaluate methods o f privatisation which have 
been proposed for PCPEs and which have, to varying degrees, been implemented. 
The question is whether the outcomes of the various methods lead to more or less 
static and dynamic efficiency. The other aspect looked at is the transaction costs of 
privatisation. In the literature on privatisation, transaction costs are widely 
neglected (cf. Blanchard et al. 1991; Estrin 1994; Komai 1992; Lipton and Sachs 
1990b; Richet 1993). On the contrary, here, the following hypotheses are
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proposed: (a) privatisation is causing significant transaction costs,1 which vary 
according to the method of privatisation; (b) according to the method of 
implementation privatisation has more or less impact on static and dynamic 
efficiency. The assumptions made are bounded rationality and opportunism of the 
economic agents, imperfect and asymmetric information, and asset specificity (cf. 
Simon 1982; Williamson 1985).2 Moreover, it is assumed that it is a strong policy 
maker who is only following the goal of hardening the budget constraints and 
initiating industrial restructuring in his/her privatisation efforts. With the last 
assumption the problem of conflicting and inconsistent goals as discussed above 
will be avoided.3
The first section begins by providing an analytical framework in which the 
various methods of privatisation are categorised and analysed. The second section 
is concerned with valuation methods which are considered as vital for a successful 
privatisation process. The following three sections are concerned with the various 
methods o f privatisation which are divided into the groups 'free transfer', 'sale', 
and 'divestment of user rights'.
3.1 An analytical framework
Transaction costs and the question of which method o f privatisation will be most 
conducive to efficiency in the enterprises are interrelated. Transaction costs are 
defined as costs incurred for the purpose of defining and redefining property
1 Brucker (1993: 49) also grounded his analysis o f  privatisation m ethods on this 
hypothesis, but w ithout the sam e em phasis on static and dynam ic efficien cy . In his 
analysis he considered the same factors, i.e. (1) allocation-criterion, (2 ) Contract-type, 
(3) E conom ic com petence, (4) Potential capital contributions, (5 ) initial distribution  
costs, (6 ) agency costs, and (6) realignm ent costs.
Brucker (1 9 9 3 ) based his approach on the assum ptions o f  bounded rationality and 
opportunism  o f  the econom ic agents, and asset specificity .
3 See chapter 2.4.
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rights.4 These include costs of (1) information gathering and its processing; (2) 
bargaining and monitoring the assignment o f property rights including the 
definition o f their boundaries; and (3) enforcing the underlying contracts. The 
purpose of privatisation is to enhance efficiency. As stated above, the main 
conditions for static and dynamic efficiency in PCPEs are the break up of 
patronage networks, the adoption of an adequate corporate governance system and 
industrial restructuring. In this context transaction costs comprise defining and 
redefining property rights effectively. The costs of redefining property rights can 
be also regarded as 'realignment-costs' (cf. Demsetz 1966: 65), i.e. costs involved 
in correcting the initial assignment of rightsC The level of costs determines 
whether privatisation is successful. When the costs o f a particular method are high 
it is unlikely that privatisation will be accomplished as proposed.
Particularly in the context of privatisation in the PCPEs it is thought 
appropriate to assume (1) imperfect and asymmetric information (2) bounded 
rationality; (3) opportunism and (4) asset specificity (cf. Brucker 1993: 49-52). 
Concerning the first assumption, insiders and particularly the old management will 
have an information advantage about the status quo o f the enterprises. The 
problem of imperfect and asymmetric information increases with size and degree
4 The concept o f  transaction costs has no agreed definition in the literature. For exam ple, 
C oase (1 9 3 7 ) and D em setz (1968: 35) em phasise in their definition  the costs o f  using  
markets. D ahlm ann (1979: 248), and Picot and D ietl (1990: 178) focu s on control and 
information costs. V uylsteke (1988:139) highlights, in the context o f  privatisation, 
transaction costs as administrative costs, financial restructuring, physical rehabilitation  
and settlem ent o f  em ploym ent claim s. He d istinguishes betw een  transaction costs and 
residual costs. Here, M atthews (1986: 906) w ill be stressed, w ho defines transaction 
costs as:
[..] costs o f  arranging a contract ex  ante and m onitoring and enforcing it ex  post, as 
opposed to production costs, which are the costs o f  execu ting  the contract. 
s Brucker (1993:52 ) points out the sign ificance o f  'realignm ent costs' as part o f  the 
overall transaction costs o f  privatisation.
74
of asset specificity o f enterprises. Accordingly information about the 
implementation of privatisation will be asymmetrical. Concerning the second 
assumption, one can anticipate difficulties in collecting, processing, and 
disseminating information concerning the enterprises to be privatised, the 
potential buyers and beneficiaries, and the implementation o f privatisation. The 
third assumption refers to self-seeking agents who could also employ non-co­
operative behaviour, such as breach of contracts and outright dishonesty. This is 
an assumption which is particularly pertinent in PCPEs given their weak 
institutional frameworks. The fourth assumption implies that physical and human 
assets are bound to specific transactions and will lose value if they are 
redeployed.6 As enterprises are heterogeneous goods, their workers and managers 
require specific knowledge and competence. With increasing asset specificity and 
size o f enterprises, these requirements also intensify. In case of separation of 
ownership and control, rising demand in specific knowledge and competence of 
managers will also lead to increasing agency costs (cf. Brucker 1993: 51).
The following evaluation of privatisation methods can only offer 
qualitative insights into the level of transaction costs. For a more comprehensive 
analysis it would be necessaiy to consider far more firm-specific information, 
concerning the administrative bodies implementing privatisation and who are the 
potential buyers and beneficiaries. Obviously, this lies outside the scope of this 
chapter. However, the following should be noted. First, there are factors discussed 
in the next section under the heading 'valuation', these are (1) firm size, (2) asset 
specificity, (3) branch details, (4) 'political value’ (Frydman and Rapaczynski 
1994: 191), and (5) other firm details. Second, the conditions within the 
administrative bodies regulating privatisation are above all competence of, and
6 A s stated further above, the notion o f  asset sp ec ific ity  is particularly relevant to 
industrial restructuring which has a negative impact on incom e and w ealth in the short- 
run. This is the reason w hy owners are resistant to change. A  change o f  ownership does 
not guarantee a w illin gn ess to change more generally.
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authority given to, the administrators, and the question o f how far they have 
effective control over the objects to be privatised. Third, the economic 
competence o f potential buyers and beneficiaries is o f importance. This includes 
ex post the ownership and control structure in case o f a closely held firm, and 
whether in case o f a joint stock company it is open or closed (cf. Bim, Jones, and 
W eisskopf 1994: 253-255). Moreover, their financial situation is significant, i.e. 
how far they can contribute capital. These last two aspects can only be roughly 
addressed in the following broad analysis.
The factors considered in evaluating the transaction costs of various 
privatisation methods are listed in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1: Evaluation criteria
1. Sale vs. g iv e  away
-) D istribution criteria
3. A dm inistrative costs
4. R ealignm ent costs
5. Contract-type
6. E conom ic com petence
7. Potential capital contributions
S. Insider-control
9. A g en cy  costs
(1) Sale vs. give away
The question whether enterprises should be privatised via sale or 'give away' has 
been hotly debated in the recent literature, with almost general consensus in 
favour o f free transfer methods (cf. Wieners 1994: 67-92). In fact, the discussion 
of this question reflects the present quality o f the whole privatisation debate. For 
the majority of contributors, the ownership question per se is central. Therefore 
they favour any means to speed up the privatisation process regardless of its 
outcome. Privatisation itself seems to have become the surrogate goal of these 
efforts. The effects of a particular privatisation method on enterprise control 
mechanisms, patronage networks and restructuring efforts are hardly considered. 
Practical issues concerning the implementation o f privatisation, e.g. valuation and 
availability of savings, outweigh these more long term considerations. Some have 
recognised the deficiencies of the debate. But the focus is only slowly shifting in 
the on-going discussion from rather practical considerations to the effects of
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privatisation on corporate governance and industrial restructuring (cf. Estrin 1994: 
6).
The arguments in favour of free transfer methods are o f a practical nature 
and often subsumed under 'obstacles to privatisation' (cf. Brabant 1992: 175-201). 
First, most arguments are in line with the so-called 'critical mass' theory (Grosfeld 
and Hare 1991: 131; Roland and Verdier 1992). In the latter it is argued that the 
share o f the private sector in an economy would have to reach a 'critical mass' 
before dynamic and informational advantages of a market economy could arise. 
Therefore a speedy privatisation is supported. However the analysis 
overemphasises the ownership structure and neglects the question of whether a 
formal privatisation can engender desired de facto improvements in static and 
dynamic efficiency.7
Second, one strand of argument is concerned with scarce domestic savings
S * *(cf. Wieners 1994: 67-71). Again the question arises whether a privatisation for 
ideological reasons will lead to the intended effects on governance structure, 
industrial restructuring and above all overcome entrenched patronage networks. 
This is crucial if  the result of privatisation is a large number o f minority share 
holders, a problem which still has to be discussed. Will these minority share 
holders 'convey effective property interests', particularly if  the shares are not 
'considered genuinely valuable and cannot themselves be traded', due to 
undeveloped or non-existent secondary capital markets (Frydman and 
Rapaczynski 1994: 186)? And moreover, what implications will scarce domestic 
savings have for the massive capital requirements for restructuring? A popular
n
Roland and Verdier (1992:9) recognise the problem  o f  abuse in corporate control. In 
order to reduce it, they suggest that 51 per cent o f  all shares o f  an enterprise could be 
held by a core investor and the rest o f  the shares, at m ost 49  per cent, could  be distributed 
to the population. Im plicitly they assum e that the majority o f  these core investors would  
com e from abroad, w hich is highly unlikely for m ost o f  the enterprises, especially  in 
countries like Azerbaijan, as d iscussed elsew here in this thesis.o
The problem  o f  scarce dom estic savings is w id ely  d iscussed , esp ecia lly  in the early 
literature on privatisation in PCPEs (cf. Estrin 1994: 5). See, for exam ple, Blanchard et 
al. (1991: 3 6 f.), Blanchard and Layard (1990: 17), B os (1990: 190), Borensztein and 
Kumar (1991: 304), Brabant (1992: 187-188), Gruszecki and W iniecki (1991: 8 If.), 
Kirchner (1992: 13), M ilanovic (1991: 28), Kluson (1991: 11), and Lewandowski and 
Szom burg (1989: 264). See also chapter 3.4 in this volum e.
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proverb says 'one does not look a gift horse in the mouth'. Here however, it is 
implicitly expected that masses of ready made minority share holders are hurrying 
out to buy their gift horse a set of gold teeth with their last few pennies.
Third, it is argued that free transfers would circumvent valuation problems 
(cf. Bim et al. 1994: 256-257; Wieners 1994: 71). The complex issue o f valuation 
is discussed below. Valuation including inventory assessment is essential for 
industrial restructuring and crime prevention both before and after privatisation. 
Avoidance o f valuation is short-sighted as it loses information necessary for 
industrial restructuring and hence industrial policy. Thus it jeopardises the success 
of privatisation, not to mention the political discontent it would cause in the 
population. Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994: 16) express it as follows:
It might be possible, of course, for the state to convey the title of a 
company to some private party without engaging in an assessment of its 
value, but such a naked transfer, quite apart from the legitimacy problems 
that might arise, would not, by itself, accomplish anything of economic 
significance. The purpose of privatisation [..] is not to transfer title, but to 
initiate a restructuring of enterprises and a rationalisation [..] In order for 
this to take place, someone must evaluate the potential of each enterprise 
to be privatised [..] Only in this way is it possible to decide where best to 
invest the limited resources available for the upgrading of the economy.
Fourth, free transfer methods to the population are favoured for equity 
considerations (cf. Perotti 1994: 56; Wieners 1994: 81). The question of equitable 
division o f benefits, especially if passive minority owners are involved, has 
already been discussed above.9 However, in the following analysis this aspect of 
equity is not considered.10
Wieners (1994: 82-91) detects three strands o f arguments against a 'give 
away'. First, possible inflationary effects are discussed. These result from wealth 
effects on consumption: recipients of shares in companies are thought to consume 
more, as they feel themselves richer. However, given both the low propensity to 
save and the immense uncertainty in the countries concerned, such a wealth effect
9 See section  2 .4 .
10 The dem ocratic gesture o f  equity in proposed mass privatisation programmes reveals 
its hidden rationale when the marketing effects o f  this 'popular capitalism' are 
em phasised: one can better sell privatisation to the broad public, i f  one g ives them the 
im pression that they could participate (cf. Perotti 1994: 57, V ickers and Yarrow 1988: 
1 2 1 ).
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is highly unlikely (cf. Wieners 1994: 83). The other inflationary effect is seen 
through free distributed vouchers being used as a money substitute. A detailed 
presentation o f this argument is beyond the scope of this chapter. However one 
can note Wieners (1994: 88) two counter-arguments: (1) even if vouchers 
stimulate an inflationary effect, they are not the origin o f inflation and (2) there are 
possibilities to limit the fungibility of vouchers.
Second, it is claimed, that free transfer would jeopardise an increase in 
fiscal revenue. The viability of the revenue-generation as motive for privatisation 
was already discussed above.11 Again this aspect is not reconsidered in the 
following.
The third argument is more significant for the following analysis. It claims 
that a free distribution of shares would not initiate the necessary incentive 
structure for private property. Holders of gift-shares would not feel themselves so 
inclined to monitor managers of their enterprises so effectively as those who 
would have bought their own shares (cf. Wieners 1994: 90-91). It is impossible 
either to confirm or to reject this argument on the basis of abstract behavioural 
theory. Nor is it possible in the scope of this chapter to do so without an 
interdisciplinary case-by-case approach, involving disciplines such as psychology 
and ethics. The argument is related to that o f the superiority of private ownership 
because o f its underlying incentive system, which was discussed in chapter 1. 
There, and in the context of corporate governance, matters of 'shareholder 
collective action' and the 'voice option' and minority investors were raised. 
Considering these problems, monitoring is always difficult, whenever control and 
ownership are separate and the latter dispersed. Principal-agent problems will be 
particularly fierce in the environment of most PCPEs without the necessary legal 
framework and law enforcement and other essential institutional preconditions. 
However, one can assume that holders of gift-shares have less authority over 
entrenched interest groups, especially if  ownership is widely dispersed. This is 
dependent on various other factors as discussed below.
11 See section 2.4.
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Whether the choice between sale and give away methods is relevant for the 
intended outcome o f privatisation cannot be answered in the abstract. There are a 
variety o f different free transfer and sale methods. Depending on the distribution 
criteria, including possible conditionality and various other factors, a give away 
method can be superior or vice-versa. However, in conjunction with the other 
factors, it is assumed in the following analysis, that free transfer methods are 
indicative o f weaker corporate governance and/or a resistance towards change.
(2) Distribution criteria
Various criteria can be employed to determine new ownership. In case of sale, the 
simplest criterion is the price that a potential new owner is prepared to pay. 
Multiple distribution criteria are rejected by neo-classical disciples. In their world 
o f perfect competition and its underlying assumptions, the distribution is done 
most efficiently by the price mechanism. The interference o f a state agency and 
the introduction of additional distribution criteria could only lead to the 'risk of 
bureaucratic corruption and regulatory capture' (Maskin 1992: 118). Given the 
weak institutional framework in most PCPEs these risks are always prevalent and 
have to be taken into account. However, the price will not convey a variety of 
information under the assumptions of imperfect and asymmetric information, 
bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity. Indispensable criteria are 
for instance the viability of restructuring and business plans, including financial 
plans. Potential capital contributions need to be examined. If insiders are directly 
considered as buyers or beneficiaries, their previous performance should be 
scrutinised. Without such considerations it is impossible to decide the buyer or 
beneficiary with the best capability. The more complex the criteria the better one 
can influence the possible outcome of privatisation.
The chosen distribution criteria are among the most important factors 
which influence the outcome of the privatisation. They should be central to the
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debate. It is astonishing that there is no discussion over distribution criteria in the 
literature.12
It is clear, that privatisation in the PCPEs is carried out under the worst 
possible conditions. There is an acute lack of competent and non-corrupt 
administrators who have sufficient information and authority to scrutinise 
potential buyers and beneficiaries. Even if a certain degree o f conditionality is 
introduced in the form o f binding contracts, it is questionable whether these can be 
enforced. If these states had not been so weak and captured by various entrenched 
interest groups there would have been no need for privatisation in the first place. 
There is much anecdotal evidence o f major frauds in the privatisation process in 
the former GDR, despite very favourable institutional conditions (cf. Falkner 
1994; Roesler 1995). The assessment of such criteria is unavoidable for an 
effective privatisation. The significance of constructing appropriate criteria cannot 
be overemphasised. It is not in the scope of this work to construct such criteria. 
The complexity of these distribution criteria which can be employed within a 
privatisation method is an advanced indicator of the likely result o f privatisation. 
Therefore, it will be used in the following to evaluate privatisation methods.
(3) Administrative costs
Administrative costs incurred during privatisation comprise all expenses of the 
state privatisation agency and supporting institutions prior to and after 
privatisation.13 Administrative costs continue after the initial distribution as
" M ultip le distribution criteria are used partially in the privatisation process o f  many 
PCPEs, e.g . in the form er G DR (cf. B lom m enstein, G eiger and Hare 1993: 30, Briicker 
1993: 236 -237 ); in the former CSFR  (cf. Frydman et al. 1993a: 79); in Poland ( c f  
Frydman et al. 1993a: 186); in som e tenders m ultiple distribution criteria with social 
connotations (e.g . em ploym ent m aintenance, socia l program m e) in the Russian  
Federation (cf. Frydman et al. 1993b: 61); in the Ukraine ( Frydman et al. 1993b: 119); 
and in Latvia ( Frydman et al. 1993b: 226). V uylsteke (1988:17 , 90-91 , 157-164) gives  
exam ples o f  mandatory procedures and guidelines used in several privatisation processes.
13 In m ost o f  the PCPEs som e kind o f  state privatisation agen cy  has been established. 
The function and authority o f  these m inistries o f  privatisation, or state property funds as 
they are a lso  som etim es called, vary from country to country. S ee Brabant (1992: 171- 
174) for a blueprint o f  a 'state asset m anagem ent agency'. S ee chapter 5 for the 
Azerbaijani privatisation administrative framework.
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information and monitoring costs. The more demanding the required framework 
and competence of administrators of a privatisation method are, the higher the 
administrative costs (e.g. in case of sale of shares through capital market 
operations a stock exchange and all its institutions have to be set up). In the 
following it is assumed that valuation costs arise in any case because of its 
indispensability.
(4) Realignment costs
As stated further above, the goal of privatisation will not be reached after an initial 
distribution o f property rights. In the process of 'realignment' or redistribution of 
property rights costs will arise, which are part of the overall transaction costs.
(5) Contract-type
The contract can be either 'standard' or 'complex' (Brticker 1993: 64). The range of 
specification such as noted in the point distribution criteria obviously varies. The 
more complex a contract the more the future use o f an enterprise can be 
predetermined. It can be expected that contract enforcement will prove difficult 
considering the fragile institutional framework in many PCPEs.
(6) Economic competence
Given asset specificity of enterprises,. owners or their agents require relevant
specific knowledge. Moreover, as discussed above, entrepreneurial 'tacit' 
knowledge is a scarce commodity and cannot be easily acquired by aspiring 
entrepreneurs.14 Levels of economic competence vary. It is difficult to measure in 
advance an entrepreneur's hands-on economic competence. This is possible 
through the experience given by success and failure. However, theoretically, a 
measurement o f economic competence (e.g. managerial track records) could be 
included in the privatisation bargaining process. In the following analysis of 
privatisation methods a factor considered is the inclusion of such a criterion.
14 See section 1.1.
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(7) Potential capital contributions
Scarcity o f savings and the often questionable origin o f  funds available were 
already discussed above. The desired restructuring process should require 
significant capital investment. Therefore a privatisation method should be able to 
consider the financial potential of a buyer or beneficiary.
(8) Insider-control
One o f the declared intentions of privatisation is the break up of patronage 
networks and the establishment of proper corporate governance structures - the 
prerequisites o f hard budget constraints and static and dynamic efficiency. Ideally, 
insider elements should be removed from positions o f control over enterprises.13 
However, as discussed in section 2.3, a complete removal would be hardly 
realistic in a setting o f political instability and weak governments. Often the mere 
attempt would be counter-productive as these powerful interest groups would 
destabilise the political conditions even more and would accelerate 'spontaneous 
privatisation' via asset stripping etc. Thus de facto property rights o f insiders have 
to be taken into account. However, it would be desirable if  initial control and 
ownership are transparent and moreover solely confined to enterprise or even 
plant level. This would be possible only by disrupting the insider-network, thus 
restricting insider-control. In the following, the effects o f the various privatisation 
methods on insiders are assessed.
(9) Agency costs
Wherever ownership and control is separated, owners will face costs arising from 
the delegation o f control rights to managers. Jensen and Meckling (1976: 308) 
define these costs as ‘agency costs’. The latter comprise ‘monitoring costs’ of the 
principal, ‘bonding costs’ o f the agent, and ‘residual loss’ occurring through the 
delegation (ibid.: 308). Agency costs can be regarded as transaction costs, as they 
arise in the process o f reaching the goal of privatisation (cf. Williamson 1990:
,3 For a defin ition  o f  insiders, see section 2 .1.2.1.
67f.).16 Increasing agency costs are created by dispersed ownership and unresolved 
corporate governance issues.
Table 3-2 summarises the methods of privatisation considered in the 
following.17 Often a mixture of methods is used: some shares are given away to 
the broad public, some are retained by the state, some sold etc.
16 Jensen and M eck lin g  (1976: 308) suggest that potential buyers anticipate agency costs 
and include them  in their offer.
17 See also  B lom m enstein , Geiger and H are(1993: 16), Bornstein (1992: 287-300), 
Brabant (1992: 202 -2 2 8 ), Brucker (1993: 61-95), Carlin and M ayer (1992: 3-9), Chilosi 
(1995 ), D aviddi (1995: 11-22), Estrin (1994: 20-27), Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994: 
148-167), L avigne (1995: 155-178), M ilanovic (1992: 50-65), and W ieners (1994: 93- 
156).
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3.2 Issues o f valuation
3.2.1 The role of valuation in a PCPE context
Issues and problems of valuation are fiercely discussed in the privatisation debate 
in PCPEs (cf. CCEET 1991; Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994: 16-20, 196-198; 
Birch 1993; Hulle 1993; Herve 1993; Toltzman 1993). In all PCPEs there is also 
the concern that the nation’s capital stock might be undervalued (c f Kagarlitsky 
1995: 84). Thus, valuation is strongly linked with the question of wealth 
distribution, already discussed above. The issue o f valuation is often regarded as a 
mere obstacle to speedy privatisation. Some authors favour give-away methods so 
that valuation could be avoided (c f Bim et al. 1994: 256-257; Wieners 1994: 71). 
Others argue that valuation could be simply carried out by foreign consultants in 
line with methods used in market economies. However, there are some significant 
deficiencies in this view. First, even in advanced market economies there are no 
standard blueprints for valuation of assets in the context of privatisation.18 
Moreover, valuation methods used in market economies cannot be easily 
transferred to the context of PCPEs. This is due to the absence of reliable 
accounting data and other information, difficulties in determining applicable 
discount rates in the absence of financial markets, the lack o f points of reference 
(i.e. data o f comparable businesses), and- the rapidly changing economic 
environment, to be discussed below. Thus, much insider knowledge and
18 There are basic rules dealing with the valuation o f  property, plant and equipment, e.g. 
in the European Com m unity A rticles 33, 35 and 38 o f  the 4 th D irective o f  25 July 1978 
(H ulle 1993: 71). H ow ever, in m ost member States o f  the European Union, annual 
accounts presented for reporting purposes correspond to those for tax purposes. Thus, 
depreciation rates used do not necessarily reflect the reduction in value o f  the asset. And, 
the book value o f  assets may vary from the business value or the net realisable value. In 
case o f  privatisation, these book values have to be adapted and different business 
valuation m ethods are often used in addition. There is an abundant literature on both 
theory and practice o f  valuation in market econom ies. S ee for exam ple, Ellis and 
W illiam s 1993 and Lee and Finnerty 1990.
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subjective criteria are required, which outside consultants alone will not have. Or 
as Toltzman (1992: 65) puts it:
More than any other place or time in the world, valuations of investment 
opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe is an art, not a science. It 
demands judgmental conclusions requiring not only facts but also 
conceptual knowledge, extensive experience and a high degree of ‘street 
sense’.
Second, as discussed in chapter two, privatisation should have the aim to 
initiate restructuring processes and the introduction o f effective corporate 
governance where this is otherwise cumbersome in the present political setting. 
Due to the absence o f market forces and asymmetric and imperfect information in 
the setting o f PCPEs, an evaluation of the relative potential compared to 
alternative investment opportunities should guide the allocation of scarce 
resources. Factors have to be considered, such as potential product lines, markets, 
required capital expenditures and timing, organisational restructuring including 
the institution o f inventory and administrative controls, competition, inflation etc. 
If such a valuation does not take place before or, at the latest, in conjunction with 
privatisation, time and resources will be wasted.19
Third, as pointed out in chapter two, old patronage networks and 
‘clientelist’ pressure might perpetuate soft budget constraints for non-viable 
wasteful enterprises. Potential owners of the latter might build upon the ‘political 
value’ rather than the ‘economic value’ (Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994: 192) of 
their assets. The valuation process could assist in isolating lion-viable from 
viable capital stock. Assets with ‘political value’ could be dealt with separately. 
Instead o f continuing soft budget constraints through subsidies and other 
privileges these plants or sections could be closed down with an adequate social 
plan to mitigate undue hardship. In many PCPEs it can be expected that clientelist 
pressures will fight off or postpone such closures. However, in the long run, the 
information gathered for the valuation can guide future industrial policy.
19 Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994: 16-20) recognise the relevance o f  valuation for the 
restructuring process.
20 Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994: 192) g ive a steel m ill based in a ‘com pany tow n ’ as 
an exam ple o f  an enterprise with ‘political va lu e’. ‘Political v a lu e’ could be also 
interpreted as ‘rent-seeking potential’.
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Fourth, as discussed before, in most PCPEs the highly centralised 
mechanism o f enterprise control has fiilly disintegrated. With control of the 
ministries withered away, individual managers were left with omnipotent rights o f 
control. It is not surprising that various criminals and Mafia groups have taken the 
opportunity o f the control vacuum to asset strip to an extent which is unknown. 
There is much anecdotal evidence about plants where only a bare shell remained 
and where even the electrical wiring and water pipes were stolen. It is even not too 
farfetched to approximate the economic decline of Azerbaijan by a function 
including the number of truck loads of ‘scrap metal’ crossing the Iranian border. 
However, this kind of information is far too sensitive and life-threatening for the 
academic world. For a state or ruling elite which is committed to industrial 
restructuring and hence economic progress, it is important to regain control and 
challenge asset stripping, if  not already too late. Valuation o f SOEs can help these 
efforts.
To summarise: Valuation in the context of PCPEs should (1) assist the 
allocation o f scarce investment resources, (2) guide future industrial policy, and
(3) bolster against asset stripping. Finally, all the objective elements of valuation, 
which are available in a context of a developed market economies, are only at best 
partially obtainable in PCPEs. Thus, in the latter, subjective elements, which no 
doubt are used in any valuation, have to guide the assessments o f enterprises in the 
transition period. This leaves the questions: (1) what are the strengths and 
weaknesses o f presently used valuation methods, and (2) how can the deficiencies 
of these methods be alleviated?
3.2.2 M ethods of Valuation used in Privatisation in PCPEs
The valuation techniques used can be divided into three groups, which are listed in 
Table 3-3 and assessed below.
Table 3-3: Valuation methods
1. M eth o d s b a sed  on the v a lu a tio n  o f  assets •  N et b o o k  value
•  R ep lacem ent value
•  L iquidation value
2. M eth o d s  b a sed  on  th e  d isco u n ted  fu tu re  cash  
f low
•  P rice-eam in gs m ethod
•  D isco u n ted  cash flo w  m ethod
3. O th e r  m eth o d s •  M arket com parison  m ethod
•  M arket entry m ethod
• R ecent acqu isition  m ethod
(1) Methods based on the valuation o f assets
The most often used valuation methods in PCPEs are based on the net book value, 
i.e. the difference between the value of assets and liabilities derived from 
historical financial statements.21 These historical cost methods bear some crucial 
problems because of the absence of reliable historical financial statements. First, 
the original prices of plant and machinery were administered prices which did not 
necessarily reflect their real value. Rates of depreciation are mostly lower than 
equivalent rates in developed market economies (cf. Jermakowicz and 
Jermakowicz 1993: 15). Historical financial statements in PCPEs are distorted by 
factors such as price controls, subsidies, low interest loans, etc.
Second, accounting rules in a planned economy were designed to monitor 
the fulfilment o f the economic plan. Thus, managers and their superiors in the 
ministries fearing the repercussions of failing the plan would, if possible, provide 
a picture o f at least meeting the plan. As excess funds over the plan would be
21 In Russia the initial price o f  an enterprise for sale by tender or auction or the authorised  
capital o f  a jo in t stock com pany was determined on the basis o f  historical costs. The 
Russian valuation determ ining the initial price o f  the enterprises took  the fo llow in g  
factors into account:
(1) original costs o f  fixed assets less depreciation, minus
(2) the profit and econom ic incentive funds,
(3) current liab ilities and,
(4) value o f  property covered by special privatisation arrangem ents, including social
and other facilities designated to be transferred into state or m unicipal ownership  
(cf. Radygin 1995: 39).
For details on valuation in Azerbaijan, see section 5.2.3. For the Hungarian experience in 
valuation, see  Borda (1993 ), Kerkes (1993), and Toltzman (1 9 9 2 ). For a review  o f  issues  
o f  valuation in Poland, see  Jerm akowicz and Jerm akowicz (1 9 9 3 ) and Jaruga (1993). For 
the C zech and S lovak experience, see Langr (1993). For the German experience, see  
Biener (1993 ), Steiner (1993), and Bracklo (1993).
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taken away, it was often the practice to hide or disguise them (cf. Toltzman 1992: 
63).
Third, in most PCPEs the control mechanisms have gradually broken 
down leaving enterprises in some countries without significant control for even up 
to seven years. This further reduces the reliability of existing historical financial 
statements.
Fourth, not all assets can be valued on the basis o f historical costs. For 
example, in most PCPEs, the enterprises held only the user rights of land. Thus 
land has to be newly valued.22 The valuation of liabilities requires an assessment 
of the soundness o f the enterprises involved. Potential environmental liabilities 
involves another valuation task.
The problems of valuation based on net book value can be avoided with 
methods based on replacement or liquidation value.23 These methods have the 
drawbacks that (1) they are more time-consuming, as all assets have to be newly 
assessed and (2) there are no points of reference, e.g. comparable enterprises, 
liquidations etc. All methods based on valuation o f assets do not reflect 
sufficiently the potential profitability and market value of a business. Hence 
methods based on the valuation of assets are inferior to more future oriented 
methods. However, for some smaller enterprises and those units which have to be 
liquidated methods based on the valuation o f assets can be adequate.
(2) Methods based on the discounted future cash flow
The price-earnings (PE) and the discounted cash flow (DCF) methods are the most 
common techniques of this group. The PE method is based on the estimated 
sustainable earnings of a business and their capitalisation with a PE ratio that 
would be expected in the industry (cf. Birch 1993: 19; Ellis and Williams 1993:
22 This raises the need o f  land valuation criteria. For instance, the location o f  land and its 
im m ediate availability  for construction should be considered (cf. H ulle 1993:73).
->3
R eplacem ent cost valuation assesses the price at w hich assets can be replaced in their 
existing  state. T he liquidation value is the price w hich can be recovered, regardless o f  the 
book value, in case o f  liquidation.
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255-259; Herve 1993: 96).24 However, in the context of PCPEs the determination 
of a comparative PE ratio is arbitrary, because of the absence o f security markets, 
the general lack o f data, and the economic and political uncertainty prevailing.25 
Birch (1993: 19) and Herve (1993: 96) suggest that the PE ratios of comparable 
companies abroad or averages of several countries could be used allowing for a 
risk premium. Some prestigious enterprises could be valued this way. For the 
majority o f enterprises this would be not, however, a solution.
The DCF method focuses the prospective cash flows in the forecast 
period26 which are discounted with a discount factor27 reflecting the expected rate 
of return (cf. Birch 1993: 19-20; Herve 1993: 96; Toltzman 1992: 63-65). The 
prospective cash flows are based on a business plan. The latter should be in any 
case the first step o f any restructuring. This might sound banal. However this was 
not general practice in Azerbaijan. The total value of the enterprises is calculated 
as the sum o f the present value of the net cash flows, together with the residual 
value representing the resale price.
In both methods described the choice of the discount factor or the PE ratio 
respectively, are arbitrary in the context of PCPEs. The focus on cash flows rather 
than earnings might enable the timing o f the return o f investment to be determined 
more accurately (cf. Birch 1993: 19-20) and may be more useful in PCPEs. 
However, which method is more adequate depends again on the specific case. 
Both methods have the advantage that they are future-oriented valuations, 
requiring much consideration concerning the business plans o f  the enterprises. The
24 The price-earnings ratio represents the current market price o f  a com pany share 
divided by the earnings per share (E llis and W illiam s 1993: 255 -2 5 7 ).
Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994: 43) illustrate with an exam ple o f  a valuation carried 
out by a W estern consulting firm in Poland how  high the potential valuation error can be. 
At an arbitrarily set PE ratio o f  3 the value o f  the enterprise w ould  have been U S$17  
m illion, w ith  a potential valuation error o f  U S$8 m illion. If the PE-ratio had been set at 
4, the potential valuation error w ould have been U S$16 m illion, equalling 94 %.
26 Toltzm an (1992: 64) m entions a forecast period o f  at least five  years, w hilst Herve 
(1993: 9 6 ) regards ten to fifteen years as adequate. G iven the uncertain environm ent in 
PCPEs, even  a period o f  five years is d ifficult to predict.
27
The d iscount rate can be risk adjusted. The Capital A sset M odel can be used to 
estim ate the risk adjusted premium (cf. Herve 1993: 96). Herve (1993: 97) suggests that a 
country risk should  be considered as w ell as a com pany sp ec ific  risk. T he latter could be 
approxim ated through an average o f  com parable enterprises abroad.
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preparation o f the latter necessitates the use of subjective elements and the 
participation o f insiders of the enterprises in the valuation.
(3) Other methods
Other methods discussed in the literature are those based on (1) market 
comparison, (2) market entry, and (3) recent acquisitions (cf. Birch 1993: 20-21; 
Herve 1993: 97). The market comparison method values an enterprise using data 
from comparable businesses. Criteria employed, such as earnings, depreciation, 
sales, etc. can be chosen according to sector, branch or specific enterprise. Again 
the problem is availability of data given the lack of developed capital markets. The 
method could be used with small businesses. In certain cases comparative data 
from enterprises abroad could be adjusted (cf. Birch 1993: 21).
The market entry method evaluates the cost o f obtaining the market share 
of an enterprise, e.g. capital and human resource investments, and revenue losses 
during an initial period. The principle of this method should influence the 
valuation o f former monopolistic businesses.
The recent acquisitions method calculates the value o f an enterprise using 
data available from the sale of a similar enterprise. In the PCPE context the lack of 
(information on) comparable cases might be a obstacle. In branches where recent 
acquisitions have taken place, it could serve as a point o f reference. On its own, 
the method lacks analytical power.
This section briefly summarised the strength and weaknesses of the methods 
presently under discussion and use. The choice of valuation method depends also 
to a certain extent on country, sector and enterprise specific factors. However, in 
medium- and large-scale enterprises future-oriented methods involve the 
preparation of a business plan, unless the enterprise is going to be liquidated. In 
practice, often several methods are used (cf. Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994: 41- 
43). The market entry method could for instance be used in addition to other 
methods in certain cases. A detailed analysis of these issues however, is beyond 
the scope o f this work.
92
3.3 Free Transfer
3.3.1 Restitution
The privatisation programmes o f most PCPEs, except for the CIS countries, 
consider restitution to individuals (or their heirs) and to institutions whose 
property was expropriated by the old regimes without compensation.28 There are 
various forms o f restitution possible including restoration of the property, cash 
compensation or compensation through equivalent assets or privatisation 
vouchers.
The moral and political justification for restitution is highly contentious. 
Some regard restitution as integral to the restoration o f  the 'Rechtsstaaf, whilst 
others consider it blatant triumphalism. However, the potential level of transaction 
costs is enoimous and a negative impact can be expected on both static and 
dynamic efficiency. First, the administrative costs of restitution are incalculable. 
Given that the expropriation was in some cases seventy years ago most assets are 
not available in their original form. Legal guidelines are essential to allow for the 
changes o f assets. The identification of former owners or their heirs has proved to 
be very protracted, particularly in the context of competing claims and
* l O  •
manipulated or poorly kept cadastres.' Setting a cut-off date for expropriation 
claims can also be highly contentious. This is the case with Jewish property 
confiscated by the Fascists before and during World War II (cf. Bornstein 1992:
28  *For a m ore detailed analysis o f  restitution see Bornstein (1992: 286 -287 ), Brabant
(1992: 116-119), L avigne (1995: 172), W elfens (1992: 123-124), and Brucker (1993: 89-
92). For a good evaluation o f  the Polish restitution process, see  W aw rzinck (1994: 199-
206). Sinn and Sinn (1991 ) give an assessm ent o f  the initial stages o f  the restitution
process in the form er GDR.
29 Sinn and Sinn (1991: 77-78) g ive an exam ple o f  a m ultiple claim  situation in the 
former G D R  w here four legal claim s exist. The Jewish ow ners o f  a little workshop were 
forced to se ll their property to a local N SD A P  mem ber when they fled  Germany. The 
latter abandoned this property, when he fled to W est Germ any after W orld War II. The 
new G D R  state sold  the workshop to a GDR citizen. In 1972 he w as forced to sell it back 
to the state under the com pulsory sales legislation. Shortly before reunification the 
property w as resold to another GDR citizen under the ex isting  privatisation legislation. 
A ccording to W elfens (1992: 124) 1.3 m illion claim s for restitution w ere already filed by 
the end o f  1991 in the former GDR.
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292; Lavine 1995: 172). In most countries compensation is therefore preferred to 
restitution.30
Second, the legal entitlement as sole distribution-criterion gives no 
indication o f the managerial and financial capabilities o f the newly determined 
owner. It is difficult to introduce additional distribution criteria.
Third, on equity grounds, the only possibility is a standard contract. No 
specifications about the property use can be included in the contract.
Fourth, there is no guarantee that the ownership o f an asset fifty years 
earlier ensures economic competence. Obviously it is often the descendants who 
reclaim ownership. Economic competence is not an inherited ability.
Fifth, similarly one cannot assume that the previous owners will have the 
financial means to inject new capital into the business.31
Sixth, realignment costs can be expected to be high, because the new 
owners (particularly if inherited) often include diverse interest groups. Thus, the 
development o f a business plan or divestment plan is often inhibited. This 
argument is strengthened considering that their share o f the enterprise is 
practically a windfall. Their ability instantly to find a most profitable use is 
therefore questionable. It can be assumed that short-term gains, e.g. asset 
stripping, are preferred to long-term costly restructuring plans with considerable 
uncertainty.
Seventh, although the formal ownership rights are transferred to former 
owners, or more likely their descendants, it is likely that the new owners will not 
immediately have full control over their assets. However, restitution was used in 
Czechoslovakia to recapture control from the old managers (Lavigne 1995: 159).
30 W elfens (1992: 123) describes how  controversial com pensation p olicy  is in the former 
GDR. Individuals w ho cam e to W est Germany from form er German territories as 
refugees received  com pensation for their lost property from  the budget financed  
'Lastenausgleichsfond' (burden-equalisation-fund). Today they can claim  com pensation  
again for their property repaying the nominal amount o f  their original com pensation  
received in the 1950s and 1960.
3  f In G erm any a law w as introduced that former ow ners cou ld  only be physically  
restituted i f  they could  guarantee higher investm ents than any com p eting bidder (W elfens 
1992: 123). O therw ise they are com pensated. H ow ever even this regulation proved to be 
inadequate to hold back previous owners with no investm ent intentions.
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Eighth, agency costs depend on the size of the enterprise and the number of 
owners. Whilst they can be expected to be lower in smaller or medium sized 
enterprises they will be higher with the complexity and size o f the operation.
Ninth, the time consuming restitution procedures impede potential change 
in the enterprises. Unresolved restitution issues will lead to further uncertainty for 
policy makers, potential investors and present workforce and managers. These 
caused delays in reorganisation and restructuring will have a negative impact on 
static and dynamic efficiency.
3.3.2 Free transfer to workforce and/or m anagement
The participation o f workers in ownership and/or control o f their enterprises can 
take various forms. The best known are employee share ownership plans (ESOPs) 
with Mondragon co-operatives as an extreme variant and management buy-out 
(MBO) schemes.32 They can be categorised in several ways. First, one can 
distinguish between the labour-managed enterprise and workers' ownership (cf. 
Brabant 1992: 207; Saldanha 1992: 134). In the former, workers participate 
directly in the running of the enteiprise and the residual income whilst in the latter 
ownership is separate from control.
Second, one can categorise into a non-divisible and individualised-share 
transfer o f the property rights to the workforce (cf. Lewandowski and Szomburg 
1989: 261; Radygin 1995: 20). At an individualised-share transfer, the individual 
worker is awarded with an equal share of the enterprise. At a non-divisible 
transfer the workforce collectively receives the enterprise.
Third, it is important for PCPEs to consider the degree o f control over the 
management that the workforce obtains in the different transfer modes. Milanovic 
(1992: 58) warns that managerial abuses in the process cannot be externally 
controlled:
[..] If  the m anagem ent tightly  controls workers' co u n c ils , it can  ensure - 
through bribery, coerc ion  or m anipulation  o f  in form ation  - that w orkers 
a ccep t a privatisation  proposal favourable to m an agem en t.
3 2 For a detailed  d iscussion  o f  ESOPs and M BOs, see section  3 .4 .2  in this volum e.
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Privatisation through free transfer to the workforce is therefore often rated as an 
unfavourable 'nomenklatura take-over' (Bogetic 1992: 99; Chilosi 1995: 72; 
Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994: 61-62; Mandel 1995: Milanovic 1992: 58; 
Radygin 1995: 77).33 As discussed in the last chapter, many PCPE enterprises 
have been de facto under sole management control in recent years. This was the 
case in Poland and especially in countries of the former USSR, where the 
centralised control mechanisms have been most drastically eroded. It was 
suggested above that these de facto property rights have to be taken into account 
in any privatisation, governance or restructuring decision. However, the bottom 
line is, if  managers and their superior level of nomenklatura cannot be stopped 
from siphoning o ff revenues through asset stripping and illegal sales of raw 
materials and finished products, the enterprise's survival is seriously endangered. 
Moreover, the hardening of budget constraints and the avoidance o f regulatory 
capture will prove to be very difficult, if  patronage networks are not eliminated 
and proper corporate governance structures established. However, the success of 
privatisation through free transfer to the workforce and/or management depends 
on general political and economic parameters and many enterprise-specific 
factors. These are most eminently firm size, technology used, state o f equipment, 
flexibility o f production lines, and accessibility of input and output markets. The 
overall political and economic stability will determine whether managers are 
going to reinvest their illegally accumulated capital in their enterprises or at least 
in the country or rather take a risk-averse strategy by investing it abroad. Another 
very important factor for the success of the workforce/management privatisation is 
in how far the tradability of the individual enterprise shares is restricted. If there 
are no restrictions on outside share sales, the control o f the enterprise is accessible 
to new investors. Moreover, if employees do not lose their shares in the enterprise 
once their employment is terminated, they might support long-term investment 
and restructuring in order to raise dynamic efficiency. A blockage period can be 
introduced, in order to avoid an initial extreme fragmentation o f ownership. The
33 B ogetic (1992: 99) refers to the experience in Poland, w here m ost em p loyee buy-outs 
have been nomenklatura take-overs. M any safeguards to lim it the latter w ere taken in the 
privatisation legislation  particularly o f  Hungary, Bulgaria and R om ania (ibid.: 99).
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latter would be undesirable in the restructuring period in which a strong 
commitment to restructuring and the long-term improvement of corporate 
management and control is required.
In the debate on privatisation, there is a broad rejection of employee 
ownership and particularly labour ownership.34 The criticism is mainly based on 
two lines o f reasoning. First, a free transfer to the employees is regarded as 
inequitable as parts of the population which have also contributed to capital 
accumulation are not considered and employees of poorly-endowed, loss-making 
firms are disadvantaged.31* There is a fear that a privatisation to insiders could be 
perceived as nomenklatura privatisation and cause widespread political discontent 
and resistance to the whole process.36 However, as Estrin (1994: 25) points out 
quite rightly, this is the case with any insider privatisation. Weitzman (1993: 252; 
254) responds that privatisation would be inequitable in any case and that, o f all 
options, 'squatter sovereignty' would be the best:
[..] Any principle of distribution is going to be attacked as unfair, and 
squatter sovereignty seems to me as defensible a general position as can be 
taken. Let those who work the land and the machines own them, at least 
initially.
In order to offset resulting inequalities, Weitzman (1993: 254) suggests the 
creation o f a 'well-managed progressive tax system'. Bogetic (1992: 90) makes an 
important proposition concerning the equity argument, stressing that each 
privatisation scheme can be regarded as unjust and that ex ante perfectly 
egalitarian distribution can turn out to be ex post non-egalitarian (e.g. through 
asymmetric information in trading of shares) 37
Second, labour-managed firms are accused o f a labour-income bias (cf. 
Brabant 1992: 207; Estrin 1994: 25; Wieners 1994: 102). In the case of pure
34 For instance, see Brabant (1992: 207-208), C hilosi (1995: 81), Estrin (1994: 24), 
Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994: 25-26), Kornai (1990: 90), M ilanovic (1992: 58), and 
W ieners (1994: 97).
35 For instance, see Brabant (1992: 208), C hilosi (1995: 81), Frydman and Rapaczynski 
(1994: 25 -2 6 ), Kornai (1990: 90), M ilanovic (1992: 58), and W ieners (1994: 97).
36 Public d iscontent with 'nomenklatura' privatisations has led to m ore state supervision  
in the privatisation process in Hungary and Poland (cf. B ogetic  1992: 99, Estrin 1994: 
25).
37  »T his position is also taken by Heinrich (1994: 49).
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management ownership this is seen as avoidable (Estrin 1994: 25). Moreover, 
employees are assumed to oppose any restructuring leading to a change in the 
status quo (Estrin 1994: 25; Wieners 1994: 104). However, these arguments are 
purely based on assumptions or evidence from the Yugoslav 'contractual' form 
(Saldanha 1992: 138) of self-management, which differs from the type of 
employee-ownership discussed in the context of the recent privatisation campaign 
in PCPEs (cf. Bogetic 1992: 89; Brabant 1992: 207; Saldanha 1992: 138-139).38 
The development o f a labour-wage bias depends also on the tradability of shares 
and the form in which workers participate in profit (cf. Wieners 1994: 102),
*1Q
control and other factors. In Azerbaijan, the majority o f workers have put up 
with irregular and low pay expecting that payment conditions might change once 
the initial transition period is overcome. Similarly, one could hypothesise that 
worker-owners, who are likely to be less mobile than managers, would accept 
broader sacrifices to guarantee the survival o f their enterprises as a continuing 
source o f employment and income. However, these are all speculations which 
strongly depend on general political and economic conditions and firm-specific 
circumstances.40
3 8  •Saldhana (1992: 138-139) identifies four w ays in w hich  the Y ugoslav  contractual form  
o f  self-m anagem ent differs from the theoretical labour-m anagem ent model: 
degree o f  state intervention (i.e . soft budget constraints); 
ex isten ce o f  C o-ordinating m echanism s and m onopolisation; 
dependence o f  d ecision  making on political d ivision  betw een republics; 
link betw een banks and enterprises and the lack o f  financial d iscip line (i.e. soft budget 
constraints).
For a detailed  account o f  the Y ugoslav m odel o f  labour-m anagem ent, see Estrin, M oore 
and Svejnar (1 9 8 8 ), O bradovic and Dunn (1978), and Saldanha (1992).
3) E m p loyees w ho lose their share o f  the enterprise once their em ploym ent is terminated 
m ight have a stronger labour-incom e bias. T hey are m ore likely to prefer short-term  
higher incom e to long-term investm ent with long-term returns.
40 The stated assum ption is not explicable by purely 'rational' econom ic considerations. 
H ow ever, h istorically , it does not seem  to be too far-fetched if  one considers the 
enorm ous sacrifices made in the post-revolution and post-W orld War II period in the 
S oviet U nion, and also in capitalist econom ies such as the restoration period in W est 
Germ any and Japan.
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O f those who are in favour of a free transfer to the workforce, Weitzman 
(1993) presents the most compelling arguments.41 As initial distribution, he 
prefers 'squatter sovereignty' to 'far fetched mutual-fund-like' distribution schemes. 
Weitzman (1993: 262) stresses the 'constructive countercyclical role' of worker- 
ownership in a capitalist economy:
The employee buyout can play a very significant practical role in easing 
the transition from unprofitability to profitability, or, conversely, from 
profitability to unprofitability.
His theory is based on the assumption that worker-owners are more willing 
to accept temporary pay cuts in the transitional period. Through the prevailing 
economic pressures the wage rate remains lower in the worker-owned sector and 
major restructuring can be carried out benefiting from the advantages of initial 
worker-ownership: (1) concentrated ownership; (2) avoidance of '"us vs. them" 
stalemates;42 (3) less likely occurrence o f regulatory capture; (4) greater 
acceptability o f hard budget constraints; and (5) less opportunity for financial 
manipulation (Weitzman 1993: 267). Weitzman stresses that eventually, worker- 
owned enterprises develop into capitalist enterprises. Worker-owners either (1) 
seek other opportunities in the capitalist sector, if the wage-rate plus dividend is 
less than the average wage rate in the economy, or (2) if  the marginal value of 
labour exceeds the average wage rate, outside workers are hired to average wages 
until the two are equal.
In the Russian Federation most small-scale municipal enterprises were 
bought out by their work collectives. Mandel (1995: 38) argues however, that the 
latter were often only fronts for the directors of the enterprises or outsiders 
including Mafia. In the privatisation of medium and large enteiprises, these 
included in the process could opt for one of three modes:
41 W eitzm ann's p lea for workers' ownership w as taken up by m any Russian econom ists in 
the Russian privatisation debate. Proponents o f  this v iew  have been am ongst others A. 
Boiko, V . C herkovets, T. Popova, V . Tarasov, and E. Y asin  (R adygin 1995: 20-22).
n  t ,
“ For effec ts o f  workers' participation on the distribution struggle between capital and 
labour, see  also  Bradley and Gelb (1983: 42).
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(1) Employees receive 25% of the enterprise's equity in preferred, non­
voting shares.43 They additionally can subscribe for 10% of voting 
equity on favourable terms.44 Managers have the option to purchase 
another 5% o f voting equity.45
(2) Employees are given a right to acquire 51% of the voting shares for 1.7 
times the book value (as 1 July 1992).
(3) A workers' committee or the management has to commit itself to carry 
out a privatisation plan giving a guarantee for a certain number of jobs 
and against bankruptcy. After one year, the members o f this committee 
or the management can acquire 20% of the voting shares at face value. 
Additionally, all employees have the right to buy 20% of the voting 
shares at a 30% discount at face value. For various reasons this option 
has rarely been used.46
About three quarters of workers' collectives47 opted for the second option 
(Mandel 1995: 41). However, the effectiveness of workers' control over 
management is doubtful in the Russian context. First, the board of directors is 
made up one representative of the local property fund, one representative of the 
local authorities, the general director, and a representative of the workers 
(regardless o f the proportion of shares held by latter) (cf. Mandel 1995: 40; 
Radygin 1995: 63; Webster et al. 1995a: 29). Thus, workers have only small 
influence on decisions concerning the enterprise. The findings o f a survey carried 
out in 92 newly privatised enterprises in the Russian Federation conclude that the 
control o f managers is limited (Webster et al. 1995a: 29). Mandel (1995) reports a 
case where trade union influence and workers’ influence were defeated by open
43 N on -votin g  shares per em ployee are limited to the equivalent o f  20  minimum monthly 
w ages.
44 The value o f  the voting equity per em ployee are lim ited to the equivalent o f  six  
minimum w ages.
* A dditional voting equity for managers is limited to the equivalent o f  2000  minimum  
w ages.
46 For further details o f  the three privatisation options, see Lieberman and Rahuja (1995: 
14) and Radygin (1995: 123).
47 W orkers’ co llec tives  com prise all em ployees working within a given  enterprise except 
for the top execu tive  level.
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violence. Due to the weakness of the law enforcement agencies, it is difficult to 
combat such incidents.
Second, the block of workers’ shares eroded quickly after the closed 
subscription. Radygin (1995: 77) notes that managers were able to attain 15 to 
25% of the shares through (1) applying for a proportional distribution of shares,
(2) buying out shares of the workforce, (3) buying vouchers at auctions 
(sometimes by using dummy-firms).
Finally, due to lack of funds, employees are not able to acquire further 
shares on secondary markets.
Having looked at the debate on free transfer to the workforce and/or 
management and some empirical evidence, the potential level o f transaction costs 
and impact on both static and dynamic efficiency will be evaluated below. First, 
administrative costs can be expected to be low (cf. Lee 1991: 23). There is a 
readily identifiable group o f buyers and no need to develop capital markets (cf. 
Bogetic 1992: 89). As the political acceptance of such privatisation will be high, 
the whole process can be expected to run more smoothly. Moreover, monitoring 
and information costs will be low as the initial ownership and control structure is 
fairly transparent.
Second, depending on the restrictions imposed on sale, realignment costs 
could be low. Weitzman (1993: 254) highlights 'a well designed system of 
ownership', defining titles and their transfer procedures, as crucial for the success 
of the privatisation process. Transfer procedures do not necessarily require 
sophisticated capital markets, which is a further indicator for low realignment 
costs.
Third, it can be assumed that employees are those who are most familiar 
with internal slacks, technological constraints and hence opportunities for the 
enterprise. Therefore, economic competence of the assigned owners can be 
expected to be high. This, however, is also dependent on the degree of ownership 
participation o f workers and middle management. If the latter are sufficiently 
considered in the ownership structure, there is immense scope for an exemplary 
use of insider knowledge.
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Fourth, potential capital contributions of the workforce can be considered 
to be low. This might be different for some managers, who had the opportunity to 
accumulate considerable capital illegally. Whether a free transfer of the enterprises 
encourages them to reinject these funds is difficult to predict and entirely 
dependent on specific case material.
Fifth, this privatisation mode would clearly and directly benefit insider 
control. However, it depends on the degree of ownership-participation of the 
workforce and middle management in determining how far short-sighted 
opportunistic behaviour can be curbed and possible incompetent or dishonest 
management dislodged. This privatisation method bears an advantage over others 
in its transparency. Whereas in other modes insiders exercise control indirectly, 
here initial control and ownership is transparent and, moreover, solely confined to 
enterprise or even plant level. In other privatisation modes, long appendages of 
industrial nomenklatura, originating from former branch ministries, industrial 
associations and municipalities, and newly emerging bankers and speculators 
participate in control and ownership or are essential to managers' control. Large 
parts o f these 'appendages' only pursue short-sighted opportunistic interests with 
the intention o f plundering the resources o f these enterprises (cf. Kagarlitsky 
1995a: 90-91). This privatisation mode provides some scope to loosen enterprise- 
level or even plant-level management from its nomenklatura-structure. A 
privatisation at plant-level would be preferable to one at enterprise-level in this 
respect. The dispersed plant managers, whose interest would not be homogeneous 
either, would be less powerful as a lobbying group.48 The whole patronage- 
network would be weakened significantly, as formerly united interest groups, 
consisting o f the entire industrial nomenklatura, would be divided.
Sixth, agency costs can be expected to be low. The problem of asymmetric 
information is hardly prevalent (cf. Hansmann 1990: 1768). In case of broader 
worker-participation, control amongst workers will be enhanced and shirking
4 8 D epending on their capital endowm ent, enterprises have d iffering interests in 
restructuring. T h ose w ho have no potential for survival are certainly more interested in 
state su bsid ies and m aintenance o f  the status quo.
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lessened (cf. Caves 1990: 163). Resources set aside for control could be reduced 
(cf. Fusfeld 1983: 769).49
On the whole, a free transfer to workforce and/or management causes 
relatively low transaction costs. The transparency of the mode bears advantages. 
De facto ownership rights are considered. Patronage-networks could be curtailed 
through the division of interests. If the power o f the workforce would be 
increased, control on dishonest or incompetent management could be 
strengthened. Finally, the economic competence o f workforce and managers is 
higher than that o f any other potential owner.
3.3.3 Free transfer to citizens
Mass privatisation, in the form of free distribution o f shares to citizens, has been 
very popular.30 Under this approach, citizens directly receive shares of enterprises, 
or indirectly they receive vouchers or coupons entitling them to swap these for the 
latter. Before enterprises can be privatised in this way, they must undertake a 
process of'corporatisation' in which they are turned into joint-stock companies.
In former Czechoslovakia every citizen over the age o f 18 could buy for an 
administrative fee o f 35 korunas (about US$ 1) coupons entitling them to a total of
4) Bradley and G elb (1983: 62) stress that in Spanish M ondragon-C o-operatives  
m anagers are m ore strictly controlled than in com parable b usin esses.
30 G ive-aw ay schem es in their different variations have taken p lace or are envisioned in 
Arm enia, Belarus, the Czech republic, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, M oldavia, 
Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak R epublic, and the Ukraine. For an 
analysis o f  the C zech  privatisation process see, Carlin and M ayer (1 9 9 2 ), Frydman et al. 
(1993a: 40 -9 4 ), Hrncir (1995), Grosfeld and Hare (1991), M ladek. (1 9 9 4 ), Parker (1993)  
and, Takla (1994). The Polish privatisation process is review ed by Frydman et al. (1993a: 
148-209), G om ulka and Jasinski (1994), Grosfeld (1 9 9 0 ), N uti (1993 , 1995), and 
Poznanski (1993). There is extensive literature on the Russian m ass privatisation process. 
See, for exam ple, Akam atsu (1995), B ell (1995), Bim , Jones, and W eissk op f (1994), 
B oycko, Shleifer, and V ishny (1994), Boycko and Sh leifer (1 9 9 5 ), Chubais and 
V ishnevskaya (1 9 9 4 ), Frydman et al. (1993b: 4-82), G iles and Buxton (1995), H endley  
(1992 ), Lieberman and Rahuja (1995), L issovolik  (1 9 9 5 ), M andel (1995), Radygin 
(1995 ), Sachs (1992 ), Schwartz and N elson  (1995), Sheppard (1 9 9 5 ), V acroux (1995), 
V olgin  and M ilner (1995 ), and W ebster et al. (1995a  and b).
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1,000 'investment points' (Mladek 1994: 146-147).51 The latter were only valid 
when registered. The whole process was controlled by a central computer. 
Participants could either exchange their coupons against shares in the various 
privatisation rounds or they could transfer their investment points to an investment 
fund. Beginning the first round, one share was priced at 33 1/3 investment points 
and a face value o f 1000 korunas. In later rounds the price was changed rather 
arbitrarily by a special committee o f the Federal Finance Ministry (Mladek 
1994:147). In the first 'wave' of coupon-privatisation lasting from March to 
December 1992, 1491 joint-stock companies participated with an average of 67% 
of their shares in the programme (Mladek 1994: 150).52 Whilst in the first four 
months only two million of the eligible 10,5million adults bought their coupons, 
towards the end three-quarters participated (Liebermann and Rahuja 1995: 15-16).
In Poland a mass privatisation programme similar to the Czechoslovakian, 
based on shares in investment funds for citizens, showed little success in its first 
'wave' (Heinrich 1994: 54; 63).33 Of the 182 enterprises designated for the first 
privatisation 'wave' no privatisation was completed by mid 1993. The 'liquidation' 
programme was more significant in the Polish privatisation process.34
In the Russian Federation, vouchers representing federal securities with 
limited validity and a face value of 10,000 roubles55 were distributed to the 
citizens for a fee o f 25 roubles (cf. Rady gin 1995: 58; Lieberman and Rahuja
31 The C zech coupon-privatisation was based on Svejnar (1 9 8 9 ) and refined by Dusan 
Triska, w ho also  designed the software which controlled the programm e (M ladek 1994: 
145).
M ass privatisation via coupons was only one o f  the m ethods used in the 'large' 
privatisation process o f  former C zechoslovakia. Other m ethods used on their own or 
com bined include sa les through auctions and tenders and transfers to m unicipalities, 
pension funds and health care institutions (Frydman et al. 1993a: 80). On the w hole, a 
case-by-case approach w as taken in the former C zechoslovakia.
33 For details on the Polish mass privatisation programme see, for exam ple, Frydman et 
al. (1993a: 194-197).
34 For an exp osition  o f  the Polish privatisation programmes, see  Frydman et al. (1993a: 
148-209), G om ulka and Jasinski (1994), Grosfeld (1990), N uti (1993 , 1995), and 
Poznanski (1993 ).
33 1 0 ,000  roubles equalled two and a h alf bottles o f  vodka by the end o f  the deadline for 
the use o f  the vouchers (M andel 1995: 39).
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1995: 15).56 Vouchers were freely tradable in exchange for money.37 97% of 
voucher were collected by the end of June 1994. From 1 December 1992 till 1 July 
1994 on shares o f 15,779 enterprises were placed in auctions in 86 regions of the 
Russian Federation.58 The minimum of shares which had to be put up for auction 
by law was 29% (Schwartz and Nelson 1995: 65). However, on average only 
18,9% o f total shares were offered on auctions (Radygin 1995: 68). Including the 
shares sold in closed subscription to employees, on average 71% of shares were 
exchanged for vouchers, even though 80% o f shares were required to be sold by 
regulation (Radygin 1995: 69). By the end of the deadline for use o f the vouchers 
104 million vouchers had been exchanged for shares on voucher-auctions, and 40 
million on closed subscription for employees of joint-stock companies (Radygin 
1995: 116).
Large scale privatisation was already planned by Gorbachev's 
administration in 1990.39 One of the initial programmes attempted to transfer SOE 
property rights directly to the Branch ministers (cf. Mandel 1995: 39). However, 
such blatant favouritism of the nomenklatura was politically embarrassing for the 
Yeltsin regime; a regime which came to power promising to 'defend the ordinary 
people against the nomenklatura'. The programme which was actually 
implemented, was designed within the bounds of political feasibility to speed up 
the privatisation process (cf. Lieberman and Ruhuja 1995: 10-12). The strategy
56 V ouchers w ere originally valid from 1 D ecem ber 1992 to 31 D ecem ber 1993. Due to 
delays in the process the deadline was extended to 1 July 1994 (Lieberm an and Rahuja 
1995: 15).
37 W hilst the R ussian vouchers were interchangeable w ith m oney, the C zech coupons 
could on ly  be exchanged against shares. Thus the R ussian variation stands for a short­
term m onetary expansion, w hilst the Czech for an em ission  o f  cash substitute for the 
purchase o f  shares.
£ Q
T h ese 15,779 enterprises hold in total 1.1 trillion roubles authorised capital (in old 
book values) and 16 m illion em ployees (Radygin 1995: 116). A ccord ing to the Russian 
State C om m ittee for the M anagem ent o f  State Property (G K I), there are 212 ,000  small 
(up to 200  em p loyees), 22 ,000  m edium -size (200 -1000  em p loyees), 8 ,700  large (1000-
10,000 em p loyees), and 100 giant (over 10,000 em p loyees) SO Es in the Russian Federal 
R epublic (cf. Radygin 1995: 112).
39 Radygin (1995: 20-26) g ives an account o f  the debates preceding privatisation. 
A dherents o f  the voucher approach were m ainly O. B ogom olov , P. Bunich, P. Filipov, 
M. M alei, L. P iyasheva, G. Popov, and V. Rutgaizer. H ow ever, when it cam e to the 
practical im plem entation o f  the programme, m any o f  its supporters becam e critical 
(R adygin 1995: 26).
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was a compromise between the various interest groups in order to limit public 
protest against privatisation and to preserve the privileges o f the nomenklatura.60 
The outcome was very favourable to the nomenklatura, as described below, 
Radygin (1995: 50) puts it:
[..] w h at w e  have today is a version  o f  turning state property over to 
private hands that is optim al for the nom enklatura; p ractica lly  no 
resp o n sib ility  for property, and an ex cep tio n a lly  thin  lin e separating what 
is from  w hat is not one's ow n.
There are mainly three schemes for packaging the distribution o f shares:
(1) Vouchers fo r  share auctions
In this scheme eligible citizens receive in equal shares some kind of 
"monopoly" money, which entitles them to bid for enterprises on specially 
arranged auctions. A citizen can use all his/her vouchers to bid for shares o f one 
enterprise or can diversify by bidding over a range o f enterprise shares. The 
bidding process establishes a surrogate for a market valuation o f the enterprises, a 
"voucher unit" valuation.61 There are several drawbacks to this procedure, most of 
which are also applicable to the other distribution schemes. First, the effect of 
imperfect and asymmetric information for outsiders increases the problem of 
accurately assessing potential profitability of enterprises. The poorly functioning 
capital markets reinforces these valuation problems. Moreover, severe agency 
problems are already likely due to wide ownership dispersion, an intentional result 
of the voucher-programme (cf. Jensen and Meckling 1976: 315-318).62
Second, accordingly, the value of the vouchers will not necessarily relate 
to the profitability o f enterprises. The price is more dependent on political factors,
60 Frydman and Rapczynski (1994: 5) state that in the C zech context 'company managers 
expected that voucher privatisation w ould lead to a w id e dispersion o f  ownership and 
allow  them  to m aintain control'.
61 Radygin (1995: 60) g ives an exam ple o f  this procedure in the R ussian Federation:
For exam ple, the voucher auction price o f  one share in the B olsh ev ik  factory w as one 
voucher, so  with a market price for the voucher at 6000  roubles a share with a nominal 
value o f  1000 roubles can be valued at 6000 in 'voucher m oney', and the statutory capital 
o f  the com pany is sim ilarly valued at six  tim es the nominal figure.
62 The initial analysis o f  the Russian voucher-privatisation programme is uncertain 
whether the latter led to w ide ownership dispersion (cf. M andel 1995, Radygin 1995).
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inflation, and speculation.63 The Russian voucher prices fluctuated wildly (cf. 
Radygin 1995: 59; Chubais and Vishnevskaya 1994: 96). In different regions of 
the Russian Federation, there were marked variations in the difference between the 
actual voucher price and an estimate of the fixed assets (in historical costs less 
depreciation) of enterprises, which led to further speculative trading (Radygin 
1995: 60-61).64 Moreover, voucher investments in the Russian Federation were 
concentrated on only a few sectors of Russian industry (cf. Radygin 1995: 65). By 
analysing the voucher-valuation as an entity, it becomes clear, that Russian 
industry was undervalued by this process (cf. Lieberman and Rahuja 1995: 22).
Third, most PCPEs are experiencing prolonged bouts of political 
instability. When this is combined with an inadequate legal framework and 
malfunctioning law enforcement agencies, the opportunities for speculative, 
criminal and fraudulent activities increase.63 All privatisation methods can 
experience these problems, but it is particularly prevalent in voucher-privatisation 
schemes, because of the lack of transparency in the transfer o f ownership.
Finally, because of the speculative activities introduced through voucher- 
privatisation, it can be expected that this primary distribution o f ownership rights 
will pass through many privatisation stages until serious investors become 
involved. In the meantime it is very unlikely that proper corporate governance 
structures are established and restructuring is initiated. In all this time enterprises
63 For exam ple, according to Radygin (1995: 59) there w ere specu lative w indfall profits 
made through exp lo itin g  the differences between cash and non-cash rates o f  vouchers.
64 Radygin (1995: 60) points out:
It is essen tia l to note that in only 20%  o f  the regions w ere the values o f  privatisation 
vouchers and fixed  assets estim ated to be balanced. For exam ple, w hile  vouchers 
coverage o f  assets w as only 53% in North, 58%, in Eastern Siberia, 76%  in the Central 
and B lack  Earth area, 78%  in the Far East and 92%  in the P ovo lzh ie  area, in the Urals the 
voucher ex cess  w as 3%, in the N orth-W est 8%, in Northern Siberia 21% , in V olga- 
Vyatka 22% , in the Central Area 25% , and in the Caucasus 67% .
65 Such activ ities are for exam ple the buying up o f  shares through enterprise managers 
them selves through dummy firms. Radygin (1995: 66) quotes as an exam ple the Russian 
Federation's largest motor industry giant, which used 15 dum m y firm s and over 1 million  
vouchers to buy back their ow n shares. Radygin (1995 ) su ggests that state-ow ned funds 
w ere used for these transactions. Other exam ples are that unwanted investors are 
prevented from taking part in voucher auctions. For instance, in som e regions o f  the 
Russian Federation local authorities illegally  suspended voucher-auctions and only  
conducted cash auctions (Radygin 1995: 49-50). Or form ally open voucher auctions were 
held on c losed  industrial territory (Radygin 1995: 66).
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are exposed to severe uncertainty and left without proper control. Many 
enterprises are unlikely to survive this period. Radygin (1995: 79) suggests that in 
the Russian Federation the money privatisation process will create something 
more like an intermediate ownership structure. But even then, this ownership 
structure will be unstable due to political circumstances.66 Estimates range 
between 1.5% (Veteran investment fund) and 6% (Russian State Committee for 
the Management o f State Property) of the population in the Russian Federation, as 
participants in this privatisation process (Radygin ibid.). This is far from the 
ambitious expectations of a popular capitalism.
(2) Shares in operating companies
In this distribution scheme eligible citizens directly receive shares in operating 
companies. This could be in the form of a portfolio o f shares of a variety of 
different companies. Different portfolios could be created with equal book value. 
Bornstein (1992: 295-296) suggests that one possible way o f distribution is to 
create ten different portfolios. The last digit o f the national identity card number 
would determine which portfolio one receives.
This distribution mode would avoid voucher-auction markets and 
speculative dealing with vouchers. At the same it would cause a wider dispersion 
of ownership and it would be more difficult for serious outside investors as well as 
insiders to acquire a controlling block of shares.
(3) Investment trusts and other institutional endowments
In a third mode investment trusts could be set up holding a portfolio of 
shares o f different enterprises. Each eligible citizen could then obtain free shares 
of one investment trust or a portfolio of different investment trusts.
66 Property rights cannot be guaranteed. A  foreign investor w ho acquired two-thirds 
control over the entire aluminium capacity o f  the Russian Federation, lost his/her 20%  
interest in the Krasnoyarsk Alum inium  plant through a d ecision  o f  the local authorities 
(FT 15 Feb 1995).
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Some proposals suggests institutional endowments as a vehicle of privatisation.67 
All schemes comprise three components: (1) enterprises are corporatised, (2) 
shares are issued and distributed in various institutions, (3) shares of these 
institutions in turn are either given or sold to the broader public.68 Proponents of 
such an approach believe in the decentralised market forces o f capital markets. 
They assume that stock markets etc. are likely to develop quickly. There are two 
types o f institutions mainly considered:
(1) Mutual funds are an investment instrument to manage a portfolio of 
stock-exchange securities. As passive investors they do not take a controlling 
interest in their enterprises and do not actively initiate restructuring processes. 
Mutual funds are supposed to exert indirectly discipline on managers by 'voting 
with their feet'. A precondition for their operation are functioning stock markets - 
which are in infant stages in all PCPEs, However, advocates o f this approach 
assume that the latter will develop fast, and it is hoped that mutual funds will 
stimulate this process.
(2) Holding companies have in principle the advantage over mutual funds 
that they exercise direct control over enterprises including active involvement as 
in the initiation o f restructuring and the appointment o f management. Depending 
on the size o f a holding company its shares are intrinsically less risky and 
therefore attractive for small investors. However, in the context o f PCPEs it can 
easily happen that holding companies serve as front organisations for the old 
branch ministry system and its appendages. This is already happening in the FSU 
(cf. Radygin 1995). Thus, there is the danger that soft budget constraints remain 
and that restructuring will not be initiated.
In the Russian Federation two kind of private investment funds emerged 
out o f the voucher privatisation: (1) voucher and (2) non voucher funds.69 These
67 For privatisation proposals suggesting institutional endow m ents see, for exam ple, 
Blanchard et al. (1 9 9 1 ), Bornstein (1992), Dhanji and M ilanovic (1 9 9 1 ), and Frydman 
and R apaczynski (1994).
68 The details o f  schem es differ in the distribution o f  shares and in w hich recipients they 
consider for shares.
69 For details on Russian investm ent trusts, see G iles and Buxton (1 9 9 5 ), Lieberman and 
Rahuja (1995: 17-20), Radygin (1995: 67-710, and V olg in  and M ilner (1995).
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investment funds are operating under the new and therefore weak regulatory 
framework mainly based on the Presidential decree o f 7 October 1992 'On 
Measures to Organise a Market for Securities in the Process of Privatisation of 
State-Owned and Municipal Enterprises' and the Investment Company Law in 
1993 (cf. Lieberman and Rahuja 1995: 17; Radygin 1995: 67). According to this 
legal framework, voucher funds are licensed and regulated by the GKI and non­
voucher ones by the Ministry of Finance. From end 1992 to June 1994 the number 
o f investment funds rose from 34 to 630 (mainly voucher funds) (cf. Lieberman 
and Rahuja 1995: 17; Radygin 1995: 68). In total these funds had acquired 45 
million vouchers and 25 million share holders (Radygin 1995: 68). There are a 
number o f problems in the development of the Russian investment funds which 
are mainly linked to their poor regulation. First, liquidity problems are prevalent, 
because voucher funds are by decree close-ended and secondary markets are 
poorly functioning.70 Thus the shareholders' ability to 'vote with their feet' is 
limited (ibid.).
Second, most funds are involved in heavy speculative activities (cf. 
Radygin 1995: 69; Volgin and Milner 1995: 58-59). Speculative profits were 
made, for example, (1) through the difference between auction and post-auction 
prices, (2) through sale of accumulated vouchers,71 (3) through share buying for 
outside clients (mainly for the management of enterprises who want to acquire 
control over their enterprises) (cf. Radygin 1995: 69).
Third, Volgin and Milner (1995: 60-61) point out that fund managers 
prefer to diversify their activities to real estate trade and more unregulated areas of 
investment and financial services than actual fund managing. Moreover, Radygin 
(1995: 79) points out that a considerable pail of shares held by investment funds is 
still intended for resale. Many investment trusts have no long-term interests in 
their enterprises and, hence, are unlikely to initiate restructuring.
70 Lieberman and Rahuja (1995: 19) report that som e funds have sem i-continuous 
subscription periods and are therefore more open-ended.
A Presidential decree o f  M ay 1993 'On Guaranteeing the R ights o f  C itizens in the 
Course o f  Privatisation' tried to abolish the speculative sale o f  accum ulated vouchers by 
investm ent funds (cf. Radygin 1995: 25).
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Fourth, agency problems apply to the investment trusts themselves due to 
wide dispersion o f ownership. Thus fund managers are likely to pursue their own 
interests. This again is exacerbated by a weak regulatory framework.
Fifth, because of the fragile regulatory framework many fraudulent funds 
emerged, which collected money and vouchers and subsequently disappeared (cf. 
Volgin and Milner (1995: 56).
Sixth, many small investment funds lack expertise and liquidity even to 
cover their overheads (cf. Radygin 1995: 69-70). Both Radygin (1995: 70) and 
Volgin and Milner (1995: 61) predict that many are going to merge; however, the 
majority are going to go bankrupt. The lack of a functioning regulatory framework 
makes the protection of shareholders doubtful.
All in all the potential level of transaction costs are high in these ‘free- 
transfer’ schemes and the impact on both static and dynamic efficiency of the 
enterprises privatised in this way can be expected to be negative. First, 
administrative costs are very high. This is especially the case with the vouchers for 
share auction variant. Practically non-existent capital market and thus the lack of 
essential information concerning the valuation of enterprises for outsiders makes 
investment decisions problematic. The formation o f adequate investment trusts, 
mutual funds, and holding companies can be very time-consuming. As described 
before, there is the danger that the personnel and the structures o f the old branch 
ministries and industrial conglomerates will establish themselves in the new 
holding institutions. Moreover, a sound regulatory framework has to be 
established in order to reduce fraudulent activities and easy manipulation, and 
again illiquidity o f capital markets limits shareholders’ ability 'to  vote with their 
feet’.
Second, the Russian experience has already shown, that even an 
intermediate ownership structure which could already initiate some restructuring 
has not been established especially in many of the larger enterprises after the 
‘mass’ privatisation phase. It could take years before the battles o f redistribution 
over property rights will result in owners with long-term interests in their 
enterprises. The overall political and economic conditions will heavily influence 
this development.
I l l
Third, wide dispersion of ownership and imperfect and asymmetric 
information clearly favours the control of insiders. It is unlikely that small 
investors will be able to exercise control over management. They lack the 
economic competence and are unable to achieve the co-ordination needed to 
monitor management effectively. Poorly functioning capital markets will be not 
able to give reliable information about enterprises. A fragmentary legal framework 
and weak law enforcement agencies, reinforces insider control, as seen in the 
Russian Federation. The variant using intermediaries such as investment funds 
and other institutions will not solve these agency problems. The question arises 
who will monitor the monitors? Both managers of intermediaries such as 
investment funds and of the enterprises themselves will hardly be restraint in their 
actions.
3.4 Sale
3.4.1 Competitive tendering
Discretionary procedures for closed and limited tenders have been particularly 
popular in the privatisation process in the former GDR.72 It is a privatisation 
method which requires a developed and firm legal framework with speedy means 
of contract enforcement and expertise within the privatisation institution. If the 
latter were present, it could be a useful measurement o f industrial policy. 
However, because o f its lack of transparency, the privatisation method requires 
considerable resources for monitoring of the privatisation institution and contract 
enforcement. The advantages and drawbacks will be considered in the following 
within the given framework. First, multiple distribution criteria can be used in 
choosing the potential buyer. These criteria could be attuned to industrial policy in 
different sectors. Relative transparency could be guaranteed if guidelines were set
72 For details on the use o f  closed  or limited tenders in the form er G DR, see Treuhand 
(1991).
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for the procedures o f the privatisation agency and the different criteria were 
clearly shadow-priced.
Second, administrative costs are relatively high as indicated above. The 
assessment o f different proposals and negotiations with the different bidders 
requires competent agents in the privatisation institutions and can be very time- 
consuming. The problem of asymmetric information between insiders and agents 
of the privatisation institution will strengthen the bidding advantage of the insider. 
As multiple criteria are pursued, agents have considerable discretion in their 
assessment and negotiations. Hence, the privatisation institution or any other 
institution involved in the process requires close monitoring. Similarly, successful 
bidders have to be monitored, so that they keep to their agreed commitments and, 
accordingly, contracts have to be enforced.
Third, complex contracts are required which can ensure a favourable 
privatisation outcome. However, their arrangement is more time-consuming and 
they require effective enforcement. In most of the PCPEs the legal framework and 
the law enforcing institutions are still fragile and weak.
Fourth, realignment costs can be expected to be high, as it may be difficult 
to attract alternative bidders again once one initial restructuring plan has been 
unsuccessful and the original form of an enterprise has been changed.
Fifth, the economic competence o f buyers can be assessed in their 
proposals. Thus, distribution should be less of a gamble. Similarly potential 
capital contributions can be assessed prior to the privatisation.
Sixth, depending on the degree of domestic and international publicity and, 
of course, the state of the assets themselves, more outside bidders could be 
attracted. If the tendering was organised competitively, outsiders could participate 
in the process. However, insiders have the advantage o f prior access to 
information. If these insiders can also claim de facto property rights, the likelihood 
of outsider bidders is reduced. In theoiy, multiple distribution criteria could help 
to guarantee a successful outcome of the privatisation process. And if proposals 
and the background o f bidders are carefully scrutinised, fraudulent bids could be 
detected. However, the success of this privatisation method depends on the degree
113
of authority and integrity of the privatisation institution, i.e. whether it can defeat 
pressure from powerful interest groups.
The transaction costs of competitive tendering are relatively high. This is 
due to the essential requirement for competent and honest administrators and a 
well functioning legal framework - a scarce commodity in most PCPEs. This 
privatisation method will lead, at least in countries like Azerbaijan, to an insider 
privatisation. Contractual obligations could, however, ensure the initial stages of 
restructuring.
3.4.2 Em ployee stock ownership plans and management buy-outs
ESOPs are financing schemes to foster employee participation and are also used to
73organise leveraged employee buy-outs. ESOPs originated in the mid-1970s in 
the US and different variants have been introduced in many other countries 
since.74 Ellerman, Vahcic, and Petrin (1991: 292-295) recommend ESOPs for the 
privatisation process in PCPEs.
ESOPs can be financed either through (1) a stock bonus plan or (2) money 
bonus plan trusts; or (3) in case of leveraged ESOPs, credit from financial 
institutions (cf. Bogetic 1992: 9 1).73 A combination o f these means of finance is 
also possible. ESOPs provide for employees to receive securities according to 
their contributions. They are fully or partially paid out when employees retire, 
leave or under circumstances specified in the plan. ESOP-privatisations in PCPEs 
are considered as leveraged employee buy-outs (cf. Wieners 1994: 99).
73 There is ex ten sive  literature on ESOPs. See for exam ple, B ogetic  (1992: 90-94), 
Hansmann (1 9 9 0 ), M onks and Minovv (1995: 253-257), R osen  (1 9 9 0 ) and V uylsteke  
(1 9 8 8 :2 9 -3 4 ).
74 The largest ESOP sector is in the US. One tenth o f  the 10 000 enterprises with ESOP  
in the U SA  are 100 per cent em ployee-ow ned (cf. Hansm ann 1990: 1752). B ogetic  
(1992: 91) sum m arises the goals o f  ESOP legislation in the U S as fo llow s:
(a) to broaden the ownership base of corporate stock,(b) to stimulate capital formation by providing 
more funds for corporate finance, and (c) to stimulate improvements in the performance of participating 
corporations.
75* In case o f  a m oney purchase plan, contributions are paid according to a specific  
contribution schedu le (e.g . ten per cent salary deduction per year). In a stock bonus plan 
the level o f  contribution is determined each year. The contributions are allocated to the 
accounts o f  individual participating em ployees.
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If the trading of the securities is not only restricted to employees, the 
enterprises with ESOPs can evolve into ordinary joint-stock companies. However, 
a blockage period can be introduced, in order to avoid early dilution of the 
employee ownership.
Enterprises with ESOPs are not self-managed. They have a governance 
structure similar to that of a joint-stock-company, though supplementary 
participation in decision-making could be organised through, for example, 
establishment o f committees, delegates of work groups or advisory councils. 
There is also the possibility of creating an extreme case o f ESOP in form of a 
Mondragon co-operative, which is 100 per cent employee-owned and employee- 
managed (Bogetic 1992: 94).76
In an MBO the managers receive the biggest stake in the enterprise. 
However, other employees can also own shares. The often only de jure separation 
of ownership and management is erased; enterprises are managed by their owner- 
managers. In PCPEs, leveraged MBOs mostly take place, financed usually through 
state banks, but also sometimes by private financial institutions.
In most PCPEs, most employee buy-outs and in particular MBOs have
taken place or are planned in the privatisation o f retail and other small service
outlets (cf. Bogetic 1992: 97-100; Daviddi 1995: 13; Sondhof and Stahl 1992: 4- 
*1*18). ESOPs and MBOs are one outcome of competitive tendering and most 
advantages and disadvantages of a free transfer to the workforce and/or 
management, as discussed above, also apply. ESOPs/MBOs differ from free 
transfer methods in essentially three ways. (1) In ESOPs/MBOs a complex
76 "M ondragon co-operative cam e into existence during the 1940s in the town o f  
M ondragon, Spain, in the Basque region o f  G upiszcoa, w hen Jose M aria Arizm endi, a 
local priest, started a sm all technical school for teaching basic industrial sk ills to local 
youth. In 1956 these students created the first M ondragon co-operative. M ondragon has 
sin ce becom e a d iversified  industrial com plex o f  more than 100 sim ilarly organised  
firms, with more than 20 ,000  em ployees. Only two o f  these co-operatives ever went 
bankrupt, com pared with bankruptcy rates for new firms o f  80 percent and 50 percent in 
the U nited States and the United Kingdom , respectively." (B o g etic  1992: 94)
There is an ex ten sive  theoretical and empirical literature on M ondragon co-operatives. 
See for exam ple, Bradley and Gelb (1982, 1983, 1987), T hom as (1 9 8 2 ), Thom as and
Logan (1 9 8 2 ), and W hyte and W hyte (1988).
77 For a detailed  analysis o f  M B O s in the former GDR, see  Kokalj and Hiifner 1994).
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contract can be set up conditioning initial steps o f restructuring, employment 
guarantees etc. (2) Administrative costs will be higher in ESOPs/MBOs, as 
negotiation, information and monitoring costs rise with a complex contract. 
However, costs will not be as high as with competitive tendering as there is a 
limited number of bidders (one for each enterprise), (3) The state receives some 
revenue from the privatisation in ESOPs/MBOs.
Thus, ESOPs and MBOs have relatively low transaction costs and offer 
significant advantages over other privatisation methods in terms o f governance, 
restructuring and curbing of patronage networks.
3.4.3 Sale of shares through capital market operations and public 
offering
The conception o f a stock exchange has a very powerful positive image in PCPEs. 
Stock exchanges are regarded as 'the ultimate symbol o f capitalist maturity' 
(Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994: 60) and believed to be an effective device for 
exercising external control over corporate management. Sale o f shares through 
capital market operations have so far taken place in Poland, most notably the case 
of Prochnik Joint Stock Company (cf, Dabrowski 1993a), and in Hungary where, 
in the case of Ibuz, shares were issued in parallel on the Budapest and Vienna 
stock exchanges (cf. Apathy 1993). The success is questionable so far.78
Proponents o f this privatisation method build their arguments on their 
confidence in the discipline imposed by the capital market, the market of 
corporate control and the market for managers. The enormous agency costs arising 
through the separation of ownership and control are assumed to be diminished 
through four interrelated mechanisms: (1) the capital market, (2) the market for
7 8 A ccord ing to Dabrowski's (1993a: 116) report on the case o f  Prochnik Joint Stock  
C om pany, the W arsaw Stock Exchange is characterised by thin trading and substantial 
volatility . Prochnik w as first privatised via public offering o f  shares and later introduced 
to the stock  exchange. W hilst the share price o f  Prochnik increased in the first w eek  o f  
trading by 12 per cent (exceed in g  the real buying price by alm ost 40 per cent if  paid in 
bonds), it gradually decreased from then on. A s a result it w as suspended a few  times.
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corporate control, i.e. external take-over threads, (3) the manager-employment-
79market, and (4) creditor financial institutions.
The shortcomings o f these mechanisms are well known and need not be 
rehearsed here in detail. In brief, there are four major criticisms: (1) the lack of 
competition on product markets significantly restricts share prices as performance- 
indicators; (2) the problem of 'shareholder collective action' weakens effective 
monitoring; (3) the adequacy of take-overs as a selection mechanism is also 
disputed (cf. Chang and Singh 1993: 54); and most importantly (4) the lack of 
sound capital markets in PCPEs makes stock exchanges as control mechanism 
over corporate management infeasible. The development o f capital markets, 
including the establishment of an infrastructure of financial and legal institutions, 
is a long process which can take decades. The restructuring process in PCPEs 
cannot wait for years. Even if it would be possible to institute capital markets in 
PCPEs in a reasonable time, it is questionable whether the development of stock 
exchanges is desirable for industrial restructuring. First, Frydman and 
Rapaczynski (1994: 61) notes that stock markets feature high liquidity and thus 
easy exit. Rather than investors monitoring and sanctioning management they 
simply withdraw their capital.
Second, the insecurity of managerial, positions, implied by the threat of 
hostile take-overs, encourages short-termism (cf. Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994: 
61). Managers will be reluctant to restructure when their future is uncertain.
Third, the cultural preconceptions o f owning shares is not about 
involvement and commitment in an enterprise. The short-term get-rich-quick 
philosophy is demonstrated by ridiculously high return promises o f  MMM in the
7 9  *The m echanism s and their shortcom ings were already d iscussed  in section  1.2.
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Russian Federation (cf. Kagarlitsky 1995a: 105-114 and Kaser 1995: 46).80 Rather 
than passive shareholding a participatory culture should be promoted. The 
immense restructuring requirements in PCPEs do not leave any space for short- 
termist speculative behaviour.
In public offerings, shares are not sold at a fluctuating price, as in a stock 
market infusion. They are offered either on a fixed price or on a tender basis 
(Vuylsteke 1988: 12).81 In case of oversubscription, some rationing device has to 
be used 82 In case offerings are underwritten, some underwriting capacity has to be 
established. In the setting of PCPEs with practically non-existent capital markets, 
the state would have to retain underwritten shares.
Vuylsteke (1988: 13) identifies four requirements for public offerings: (1) 
current or potential profitability of enterprise; (2) full availability of financial, 
management and other information concerning the enterprise; (3) sufficient 
domestic liquidity; (4) either developed capital markets or 'some structured 
mechanism (including a regulatory body) that can be made to function to reach, 
inform and attract (as well protect) the general investing public' (Vuylsteke 1988: 
13). These requirements are rarely fulfilled in most o f the larger enterprises in
80 M M M , set up by Sergey Mavrodi, is one o f  the many R ussian investm ent com panies 
established sin ce 1992. Kagarlitsky (1995a: 107) describes their operating system  as 
fo llow s:
The com panies w ere operating on the pyramid principle, under w hich  high returns were 
paid to ex istin g  investors out o f  funds contributed by new  on es. A lm ost all the firms told  
tall stories about their investm ent projects, but speculating w ith  their ow n and other 
people's securities remained the only type o f  activity that w as bringing them profits.
M ost o f  these com panies, including M M M , have sin ce gon e out o f  business. The director 
o f  the failed  investm ent com pany M M M  w as partially su ccessfu l in attributing the 
com p any’s co llap se to the government's attempt to prosecute him for blatant tax 
avoidance. M M M 's fam e spread throughout the FSU  due to an aggressive television  
advertising cam paign in soap opera format. The characters in these advertisem ents have 
entered popular con sciousness all over the FSU . Even the four year old Azerbaijani god­
child o f  the author know s all the characters.
81 The fixed  priced route can lead to an oversubscription. In case o f  an offer by tender, 
'the striking price represents the balance between tenders m ade at d ifferent prices and the 
number o f  shares available, with all those w ho have tendered above the striking price 
receiving shares' at that price (V uylsteke 1988: 112). A  variation w ould be to determine 
the price through an auction o f  an initial block o f  shares.
V uylsteke (1988: 112) suggests as a rationing d evice to sca le  dow n the number o f  
shares sold  to each applying party in proportion to total applications.
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PCPEs. First, most o f the larger enterprises require substantial restructuring before 
profitability can be reached. Major restructuring is frequently not even in its initial 
stages.
Secondly, there are problems of valuation, as already discussed in section 
3.3.2. It is almost impossible to obtain a full track record o f past profitability upon 
which future expectations can be based. Moreover, the available historical data 
have little relevance because o f the profoundly changing economic environment. 
An approximate valuation requires insider co-operation. It is unrealistic to expect 
co-operation without any significant benefits for insiders.
Third, scarce private savings limit potential investors to 'nouveau riche' 
and nomenklatura. As Kagarlitsky (1995a: 90-91) impressively demonstrates 
using Russian experience, there has to be great concern that a significant part of 
these groups only take interest in speculating and turning the enterprises into their 
'objects o f consumption'. Their consumer time preferences are short term and they 
have little incentive to initiate and supervise restructuring for prosperity in the 
uncertain future.
Fourth, capital markets are practically non-existent. Nor are there any 
structured mechanisms which could play this co-ordinating function. The MMM 
case in the Russian Federation is only one example which illustrates how 
desperately a functioning regulatory body is needed (cf. Kagarlitsky 1995a: 105- 
114).
Considering that the requirements of privatisation through capital markets 
or public offerings cannot be met, it hardly seems worthwhile to assess the 
transaction costs involved. However, to provide a full picture, in the following, the
0*5
methods will be examined in the given framework. First, the sole distribution- 
criterion is the price and in case of oversubscription in public offerings, rationing. 
The price an investor is prepared to pay fails to indicate the economic competence 
and the potential for further capital contributions. A workforce with a viable 
restructuring proposal might be outbid by members o f the nouveau riche who
8 3 Public offerin gs o f  shares has been partially used in the privatisation processes in 
Hungary and Poland (Daviddi 1995: 12). For a case study, see  for exam ple the exam ple 
o f  the Prochnik Joint Stock Company in Poland (Dabrow ski 1993).
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might intend only the sale of the real estate and dismantling o f the assets of the 
enterprise.
Second, as already indicated above, the administrative costs of a 
privatisation via stock market as well as via public offering are very high. A 
structured mechanism has to be established which implements the marketing and 
sale o f the shares. A competent regulatory body has to be set up to ensure an 
adequate level o f disclosure of performance information o f enterprises, in order to 
safeguard against extreme financial risks of investors. Mutual funds and other 
investment trusts which might become intermediaries between shareholders and 
companies also have to be regulated in order to prevent cases like the MMM 
debacle in the Russian Federation (cf. Kagarlitsky 1995a: 110-114). This is 
particularly relevant for the trading of shares after the initial launch. The setting of 
prices evolves a far more precise valuation. If  the prices are set too low, investors 
are attracted who are only interested in skimming the windfall profits and 
speculation might evolve. It is not desirable for the restructuring process that 
assets change hands quickly and frequently, giving initial purchasers large capital 
gains. Ideally, gains made by investors, should be reinvested in the enterprises 
themselves. In case of too high prices, no investors might be found at all.
Third, the intention behind public offerings is to attract a core investor who 
exercises control over management and initiates the restructuring process. Core 
investors might be found for small- and medium-sized enterprises. However, this 
is less realistic for large enterprises. Moreover, as mentioned before, if the price is 
set lower than the real liquidation value, short-termist opportunistic investors 
might be attracted, which impede the restructuring process rather than set it in 
motion. Due to the inability to accumulate private capital in the FSU legally and 
legitimately, most potential core investors have gained their savings through 
exploiting and subverting state assets and resources.84 Thus, there is no tradition 
and expertise in long-term investment in restructuring projects. It is more likely 
that such investors are more interested in investments with returns faster than most 
of the enterprises requiring heavy restructuring can provide. For the majority of
8 4 An excep tion  is capital accum ulation w hich legally took  p lace in recent years in small 
private agricultural operations and sm all-scale trading.
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the enterprises foreign capital is also unlikely to be forthcoming (Heitger, 
Schrader, and Bode 1992: 143-145). Except for some nostalgic patriotic investors 
from the exile community, foreigners in the FSU are mainly interested in resource 
extraction and monopolistic enterprises. In case of small investors, the more 
dispersed the ownership rights are, the more control remains strongly in insider 
hands. Managers might formally comply with the corporatisation legislation, i.e. 
holding board and shareholder meetings, but with little impact on the decisions 
affecting the operation o f enterprises (cf. Webster et al. 1995a: 28-29). Depending 
on the stake held by investors o f the nomenklatura, nouveau riche, and state 
institutions, old alliances might even be strengthened, and embark on new forms 
of rent-seeking behaviour.
Fourth, agency costs depend on the size and asset specificity of the 
enterprise. The larger the enterprise, the higher they can be expected to be due to 
asymmetric information between owners and managers.
Both the methods o f public offerings and of the sale o f shares through 
capital market operations are not likely to help to establish new effective corporate 
governance structures and launch restructuring. In case o f fragmented ownership, 
insiders will remain in their control positions. Depending on the mix of investors, 
there is even the danger of strengthening old patronage networks and new forms 
o f rent-seeking behaviour.
3.4.4 Public auction
Auctions are particularly recommended for selling petty assets, like retail outlets 
and workshops. They also are an option for selling blocks o f shares. There are 
several variants o f auctions (cf. McAffee and McMillan 1987). The most common 
is the Dutch version, in which the auctioneer starts at a high price and gradually 
reduces the price until someone makes a bid or the floor reservation price is
8S' There is ex ten sive  theoretical and em pirical literature on auctions. See, for exam ple, 
M askin and R iley  (1985), M askin (1992), M cA ffee and M cM illan (1 9 8 7 ), M ilgrom  and 
W eber (1 9 8 5 ), and R iley and Sam uelson (1981).
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or
reached, in which case no sale occurs. The reverse is known as English auction 
(cf. McAffee and McMillan 1987), starting from the floor reservation price. 
Brucker (1993: 69) stresses that the auction itself can assist in determining the 
price and that thus time-consuming valuation can be avoided. However, this 
assumes that truly competitive bidding occurs. For most assets in PCPEs this 
assumption is not realistic, due to a lack of investors. Thus a realistic floor 
reservation price has to be set.
The evaluation o f public auctions is similar to that o f a public offering of 
shares except for administrative costs. Auctions have lower administrative costs 
than public offerings of shares, as bigger units are sold and thus less buyers are 
involved. Moreover, because of the nature of auctions, there is no rationing 
necessary.
3.5 Divestment o f user rights: Leasing
Divestment o f user rights is recommended when full ownership rights cannot be 
transferred for political reasons or when potential buyers do not have sufficient 
funds at their disposal and credit is not available (cf. Vuylsteke 1988: 34-40). This 
mode o f privatisation is more appropriate for sectors and enterprises which do not 
require major restructuring.
Leasing has negative connotations due to its use as a form o f nomenklatura 
privatisation in the former USSR, most notably in the Russian Federation (cf. 
Bim, Jones, and W eisskopf 1993; 1994: 258-260; Radygin 1995: 11-12).87 Lease- 
arrangements are not conducive to long-term rehabilitation and restructuring of 
enterprises, unless they include investment obligations by the lessee. Leasing 
involves high transaction costs and its success depends on the integrity of the 
authority responsible for leases, the lease-agreements themselves and their 
enforcement. First, multiple distribution criteria can be employed in selecting the
86 Dutch auctions w ere used in the privatisation process in form er C zechoslovakia (cf. 
Frydman et al. 1993a: 77-79).
8 7 B etw een 1990 and 1991 20 000 lease enterprises em erged in the U SSR  as a means o f  
escaping from control from above (Radygin 1995: 11-12). One form o f  lease-contract 
included the right to buy-out (ibid.: 12).
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lessee, these include investment and maintenance and repair obligations, 
compensation for capital gains and expenditures, etc. Through such adequate 
criteria determined by the lease-contract the erosion o f the capital stock can be 
limited.
Second, the administrative costs are relatively high. Like most sale 
methods it requires a developed and firm legal framework with speedy means of 
contract enforcement and competence of the authority dealing with lease- 
arrangements. Moreover, due to the degree of discretion this authority possesses, 
firm regulation and control have to be established. There is an inherent problem of 
asymmetric information between the lessee (insider) and the state authority. The 
lessee will not have the incentive to release the information required to determine 
the level o f compensation payments. The problem of asymmetric information 
naturally rises with the complexity of the business to be leased out. This could be 
reduced, if the lessee would be selected by competitive tendering. However, if 
insider bidders can claim de facto property rights, attentive other bidders will 
hardly be forthcoming. A successful lease-arrangement can make a contribution 
towards administrative costs, through the compensation payments of the lessee.
Third, realignment costs occur, if a lessee either fails to meet his/her 
contractual obligations or subvert the lease (e.g. by asset stripping). However, they 
can be kept low if  the leased enterprise is adequately monitored.
Fourth, provided a firm legal framework with effective means of contract 
enforcement is in place, the complex nature of the lease-contract can largely 
decide the future o f an enterprise.
Fifth, economic competence and capital contributions can be insured 
through the multiple distribution criteria used in the selection of the lessee.
Sixth, lease-agreements will be not viable if de facto property rights held 
by insiders are not considered. The degree to which the lessee assumes the full 
commercial risk o f the operation (i.e. hard budget constraints are introduced) 
depends on the lease-contract and the integrity of the authority dealing with the 
leases.
Lease-agreements are flexible and can accommodate specific conditions of 
enterprises, including restructuring plans. Their success depends heavily on the
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institutional framework. Without a strong legal infrastructure, the fulfilment of the 
lessee's obligations cannot be safeguarded. Thus very complex lease-contracts are 
not feasible, because o f the exorbitant transaction costs they would cause.
Concluding remarks
This chapter has tried to evaluate the potential level o f transaction costs and the 
impact o f alternative privatisation methods on both static and dynamic efficiency. 
The results are summarised in Table 3-4. The free transfer o f enterprises to 
employees approach followed by ESOP/MBO, competitive tendering and leasing 
arrangements promise most success in the framework given. Voucher privatisation 
schemes and other free transfers to the public as well as privatisations through 
capital markets and auctions have additional drawbacks. Instead of developing 
responsible entrepreneurs and thus encouraging conditions for the development of 
sound corporate governance and restructuring, they create a culture of 
‘freeloaderdom’. Old and new entrepreneurs engage rather in short-termist 
speculative activities and the exploitation o f loopholes in the legal framework. 
Moreover, in the absence o f an appropriate regulatory framework and properly 
audited, reliable information about enterprises, these newly developing capital 
markets are prone to be subjected to manipulation and outright fraud. Such 
privatisation will lead to a long battle over the distribution o f property rights out 
o f which the nomenklatura is likely to emerge as winners. A lot o f resources will 
be drawn out o f the economy in the form of windfall incomes to the nouveau 
riche. Rather than reinvesting these funds in their unstable economies, which are 
also heavily burdened through political uncertainty, they can choose the way of 
capital flight.
Moreover, as the Russian example has already shown, ex ante expectations 
of an egalitarian share distribution and equal start opportunities for all, do not 
necessarily match the ex post outcome. This could cause deeper political 
dissatisfaction o f the broad group of losers from privatisation and lead to further 
political destabilisation.
However,-it has to be noted that the choice of the method o f privatisation 
depends also on the kind of enterprise. As mentioned before factors like size ,
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factor specificity and other enterprise and sector specific factors play a great role. 
Moreover, the applicability of a method can be different from country to country 
depending on whether the state is strong enough to cany through programmes 
irrespective o f the interests of the nomenklatura.
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4. The point o f departure
Introduction
Part one set up a theoretical framework under which privatisation in PCPEs can be 
evaluated. It has established that privatisation can be understood as a means of 
building up a sound system of enterprise control and o f initiating industrial 
restructuring. The success and effectiveness of this tool, however, are dependent 
on various factors, most eminently: (1) the evolution o f institutional preconditions, 
i.e. the development of the political, legal, and financial framework and more 
fundamental institutions of a market environment; (2) the question of the power of 
the state, i.e. is it a strong state, with agenda-setting power, or a weak state, 
susceptible to counterproductive rent-seeking activities of insiders; (3) on 
proposed methods o f privatisation; and (4) the process o f contracting for property 
rights. By applying the theories of privatisation in PCPEs developed in the first 
part, the second part provides an account of the Azeri privatisation process and its 
likely effect on static and dynamic efficiency placing special emphasis on 
institutional preconditions.
Four sources of evidence were used: (1) documentation: administrative 
documents, laws, proposals, progress reports etc.; (2) archival records: statistics, 
organisational records, telephone and other listings, survey data, etc.; (3) personal 
interviews which were carried out in Azeri language (open-ended as well as in 
structured form);1 and (4) direct observation and participant observation as a 
member of staff at Western University (Baku) . The analysis is based on original
1 On the design  o f  such interviews, see D ouglas (1 9 8 4 ), Foddy (1993), McCracken 
(1 9 8 8 ) and N eijen s (1987).
2 The author has been teaching econom ics and participated in research activities at 
W estern U niversity (Baku) in 1994.
3 D irect observations can often provide additional useful inform ation. Yin (1994: 87) 
points out tw o exam ples:
(1 ) For instance, the condition o f  buildings or work spaces w ill indicate som ething about 
the clim ate or im poverishm ent o f  an organisation; sim ilarly, the location or the 
furnishings o f  a respondent’s o ffice may be one indicator o f  the status o f  the 
respondent w ithin an organisation.
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Azeri documents and archival records collected (many o f them not having been 
available to academia before), transcripts of almost 127 hours of interviews, and 
extensive fieldwork protocols of field visits carried out between December 1993 
and February 1995.4
The research was started by identifying and interviewing key informants.* 
Attempts were made to get the permission o f ‘gatekeepers’ (Peil 1993: 73), where 
possible. However, co-operation with officials in single institutions was not 
forthcoming merely on command from their superiors; it was necessary first to 
gain their confidence and interest in one’s project, which was often very time- 
consuming.6 Data collection in Azerbaijan was mainly impeded by three factors.7 
First, Azeri is the official language since independence. Thus, all official 
documents are in Azeri. However, as this is a recent development, quite a number 
of members o f the elite are not very familiar with many Azeri technical terms. 
Moreover, often direct translations o f technical terms from English into Azeri or 
Russian can distort the meaning. Hence, special care was required to achieve a 
conceptual equivalence of terms in the interviews because of the many languages 
involved.8
Second, the inherited Soviet statistical system might often impress western 
statisticians because of its preference for complete population over sample 
surveys. However, cautious interpretation is necessary because of serious data and 
reporting problems. The national accounting system in Azerbaijan is in the 
process o f being converted to the UN System o f National Accounts. In the
(2) V ery important in a PCPEs context is also the assessm en t o f  the respondent’s and 
his/her fam ily ’s clothes, car, and private house, as th is reflects his/her status and 
corruption. For instance, if  som ebody w ho is on a salary o f  the equivalent o f  U S$20  
wears a R olex  watch and his w ife a Herm es scarf, it is quite evident that he cannot 
have earned the m oney to buy such luxurious item s by honest m eans. On direct and 
participant observation, see Silverm an (1993: 30-58), S tacey  (1969: 50-69), and Y in  
(1994: 86-87).
4 The overall research design has drawn upon Ham el (1 9 9 3 ) and Y in (1981 a and b;
1994).
* On the merits o f  key informants, see Stacey (1969: 47 -48).
6 On the p olitics and ethics o f  field research, see W arwick (1993b ).
See also M iles (1983 ) on d ifficulties o f  qualitative data interpretation and fieldwork.
The problem  o f  language difficulties, especia lly  in m ulti-ethnic countries is pointed out
by Peil (1993: 86); Bulm er (1993a: 11-12) and Bulm er and W arw ick (1993: 152-153).
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meantime and for historical data, there is still uncertainty regarding various 
methodological approaches and the quality of many macroeconomic indicators. A 
detailed discussion of data and reporting problems o f official Azeri statistics is, 
however, beyond the scope of this work.9 Even seemingly ‘straightforward’ data 
were not always available in the form desired and had to be constructed in 
conjunction with a variety of officials.
Finally, officials were very secretive and often contradictory. It required 
sensitivity and caution to interpret their accounts o f developments. This is to a 
certain extent a relict from old Soviet times, and is a necessity in a social and 
economic environment dominated by ‘informal’ rules and regulations.10 
Considering the violent social disintegration, political turmoil, and general 
institutional hiatus in many PCPEs, research conditions are, of course, tough.11
This chapter is concerned with the institutional background of privatisation 
in Azerbaijan. It tries to identify the new environment in which enterprises find 
themselves and their response to the extensive changes occurring. After presenting 
the political setting in which privatisation policy unfolds, the economic 
enviromnent is analysed. Sections three and four are concerned with the legal and 
financial framework of Azerbaijan. The final section raises the sensitive issue of 
the power o f the state, which is vital for the outcome o f any privatisation policy.
Most of the information of the following chapter is based, if  not otherwise 
stated, on the author’s fieldwork and transcripts o f interviews with the 
management and employees of plants, and various institutions.
9 For a m ore detailed discussion o f  the problem s with statistics o f  PCPEs and particularly 
the FSU , see  B lades (1991), CCEET (1992 , 1993c), IM F et al. (1991: 133-169), and 
Treml (1989).
10 Readers w ho are unfamiliar with the political environm ent o f  the FSU , and especially  
the Transcaucasus, w ill have d ifficulty understanding or appreciating secrecy, and the 
generally  com p lex  political and econom ic relationships and intricate patterns o f  
interaction betw een these officials. The political environm ent differs sharply from those 
in the W est.
11 The author could  provide material for many novels and scripts o f  feature film s from 
her exp eriences in Azerbaijan.
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4.1 The political setting
The nature and stability of the political system and the general political setting are 
major determinants of the evolution of the institutional preconditions of economic 
reform. These political determinants vary in the different PCPEs and, thus, have to 
be considered in each analysis of the transition process in any one country. In the 
FSU the political situation has the added factor o f the disintegration and 
emergence o f independent states. These state building processes have been 
overshadowed by the release of ethnic tensions which had been often a direct 
consequence o f cruel ethnic policies of the Stalin period and which had been 
suppressed in the meantime. At the same time these ethnic tensions were often 
used or even instigated by Russia to retain control in the newly independent 
republics under neo-colonial terms. Russia’s desire to retain major influence over 
oil-rich Azerbaijan with its strategic location at the Caspian Sea has left its traces. 
It can be also seen in this very context that key players in the Azeri political arena 
who have been charged with treason have found refuge in Moscow.13 So far 
Azerbaijan has been able to stand up to Russia’s demands; it has remained the 
only former Soviet republic (outside the Baltic States) with no Russian troops on 
its territory. The following analysis o f the political setting can only be brief as a 
fuller account would be beyond the scope of this work.14
The political situation in Azerbaijan in the four years o f its independence 
has been dominated by internal power struggles, decay o f the state apparatus, and 
the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. Between 1991 and 1995, there have been six
12
S ee table 5-2 for dates o f  independence o f  the former S ov iet republics.
13 T his is the case for the former President A yaz M utalibov, the form er D efen ce M inister 
Rahim G aziev, and the former Prime M inister Surat H u sseinov. S ee the corresponding 
footnotes o f  Table 5-1 for their profile.
14 For a good  analysis o f  the historical developm ent o f  Azerbaijan up to 1990, see 
Altstadt (1992). For more recent developm ents, see A ves (1 9 9 3 ), Auch (1992), Fuller 
(1 9 9 4 ), G otz and Halbach (1992), Grobe-H agel (1992), and Hunter (1993). G oltz (1994) 
g ives a personal account o f  the years 1991-1993 out o f  his p erspective as a journalist. 
G oltz has spent alm ost this entire period in Azerbaijan. H e speaks all the relevant 
languages and has been one o f  the only journalists w ho has been on all front-lines and 
made m any direct observations o f  both the political d evelopm ents and the war. Despite 
his non-scholarly approach he can be seen as an authority on the developm ents in 
Azerbaijan over this period.
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acting presidents and several attempted coups. When in m id-1994 a cease-fire 
agreement was reached, the country had to cope with 25% of its territory being 
under Armenian occupation and with one million refugees and displaced persons 
(15% of the population). Table 5-1 gives a compact chronology of selected 
important political events and profiles of key political figures.
A key obstacle to effective institution building and political stability has 
been the failure to establish a legitimate legislative body which could have 
adopted a new constitution which would fundamentally re-distribute power and 
thus open the way for the restructuring o f the whole political framework and 
development o f an appropriate legal framework. Until almost 1996 Azerbaijan did 
not hold parliamentary elections or adopt a new constitution. The old constitution 
of 1978 supplemented by the Declaration of Independence serves as the country’s 
basic law. After the declaration of independence the Parliament of Azerbaijan 
introduced a presidential form of government. This was in fact done through 
renaming the General Secretary of the local Communist Party as ‘President’ and 
turning the General Secretariat, or Aparat, into the Presidential Aparat, the de 
facto executive branch of government.15 The parallel structure to the Aparat, the 
Council o f Ministries took the role o f a Cabinet. Previously it was already de facto 
a redundant institution in the FSU, as it only duplicated the functions already 
undertaken by the Aparat and served merely as the training centre for the party 
structures and no doubt patronage networks.16 Now the cabinet is headed by the 
Prime Minister with his apparatus. The ‘Ali Soviet’, in Russian ‘Verkhovnyi 
Sovyet’, the local equivalent of the Supreme Soviet,17 with its 360 members acts in 
the capacity of parliament and hence as legislative body.18 The 360 members were 
installed in pre-independence days and consist mainly of captains of industry and
15 The general Secretariat o f  the local CP in the old S oviet days took  and im plem ented  
the orders from the Politburo in the Krem lin.
16 See Figure 4-1 for the structure o f  the C ouncil o f  M inistries.
17 For con ven ience the ‘A li S ov iet’ is referred to as the Supreme S oviet or parliament as
it took over the role o f  the latter after independence.
18
It is important to note that in the F SU , de facto both the Supreme S oviet and the local 
legislature had no power. T hey only m et a few  tim es per year to pro form a adopt 
legislation. Thus the new  parliam ents have no experience and tradition in genuine 
legislative procedures.
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local executive leaders (i.e. mayors and governors of the provinces). It is thus 
heavily biased towards “insider” interests. In early 1992 President Mutalibov, 
under pressure from the Azerbaijan Popular Front (AzPF),19 agreed to the 
formation o f  a 50 member National Assembly, the Milli Mejlis, consisting of 
members o f the previous Ali Soviet. This was an effort to give the parliamentary 
opposition a greater weight. However, in times of crisis and important decisions, 
the whole parliament was gathered, which led to confusions and uncertainties over 
the legal status of the decisions made. Due to the Soviet legacies the separation of 
power between legislative and executive branches o f government is blurred. All 
important decisions are taken both by the Presidential Apparat and by the Council 
of Ministers. The Presidential Apparat also has primary responsibility for drafting 
new legislation. In fact all important policy decisions are implemented via 
presidential decree. The government o f Azerbaijan is affected by continuing 
constitutional uncertainties.
The internal power struggles have left the dominance of the old 
nomenklatura unchallenged and stalled any attempt at institutional change. They 
have caused political apathy and wide disillusionment in the population and
19 The A zPF w as a broad nationalist m ovem ent w ith a w id e  spectrum  o f  supporters 
w hich grew  particularly through the Karabagh conflict. Fuller (1994: 3) summarises:
This perceived threat to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity served as the catalyst for 
the awakening o f  a sense o f  national identity, and for the creation in early 1989 o f  
the Azerbaijan Popular Front (AzPF) by a handful o f  intellectuals, among whom  
the 54-year-old oriental historian Abulfaz Echibey was elected chairman o f  the 
Front. Originally conceived as a movement to support CPSU General Secretary 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s much vaunted policies o f  glasnost and perestroika, the 
Front’s programme professed its commitment to ‘humanism, democracy, 
pluralism, internationalism and human rights’, and cited as its aims the creation o f  
a sovereign, constitutionally governed secular Azeri state within the USSR, with 
political and econom ic sovereignty.
There w ere m any different fractions within the m ovem ent and, accordingly, many splits. 
A s with m any o f  these m ovem ents, the loose gathering o f  d ifferent interests later led to 
its dow nfall. H ow ever, the AzPF was the dom inant opposition  force with nation-wide 
structures and sym bolised  to many hope for the future. E lch ib ey’s short presidency and 
its aftermath - w ith all its confirm ed and alleged corruption and co llec tive  skim m ing and 
squandering o f  the nation’s resources - led to a deep and paralytic resignation o f  large 
parts o f  the population. An often occurring remark uttered to the author was ‘After all 
they w ere no better than the others’ m eaning the nom enklatura and conservative forces, 
under w hichever facade they happen to appear.
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stimulated short-term thinking as the general view of the future is pessimistic. 
Virtually a mass exodus has taken place of large parts o f the Jewish community, 
Russians, and Azeri academics, other professionals and nouveau riche.20 This 
again is not a fruitful breeding ground for economic reconstruction. Open political 
conflicts have cooled down under the presidency o f Heydar Aliev,21 the former 
communist party leader of Azerbaijan (1969-1982), subsequent member of the 
Politburo22 in Moscow (1982-1987) and chairman o f the Nakhichevan parliament 
(1991-1993), who poses now as a Muslim, democrat and nationalist.
As mentioned above, the last years have witnessed a decay of the state 
apparatus with far-reaching repercussions for the economy. Virtually all parts of 
the bureaucracy, including the prosecution services and the police are engaged in 
informal income generation, i.e. corruption. Hospitals treat patients only against 
‘informal payments’. Ambulance drivers collect the dead only against payment.23 
In Universities weak students can pass through payments. Payments are even 
common in primary schools. In order to get a position even as primary school 
teacher payment is necessary. Informal payments are required for the repair of the
0^ Em igration w as defin itely an issue on w hich the author w as constantly consulted.
7 j
Heydar A liev  w as born 1923 in Nakhjivan and is no doubt a liv ing legend fed by 
uncountable rumours about his brilliant m em ory and m astery o f  political m anoeuvres. 
B efore he becam e com m unist party leader in Azerbaijan he had clim bed the career ladder 
in the security  organs (KGB and its forerunner N K V D ) up to chairman o f  the KGB in 
Azerbaijan in 1965. In his long tim e (14 years) as First Secretary he w as renowned for 
clam ping dow n on existing  corruption,, m afia circles and patronage networks; however, at 
the sam e tim e establishing his own patronage networks in order to reinforce his own  
power. H e is often  described as being more ob sessed  w ith  personal power than with  
wealth. H is political career in the Central Politburo w as ended when Gorbachev  
succeeded  in gradually forcing him into retirement, and subsequently led to a heavy  
defam ation cam paign in w hich he w as accused o f  corruption and abuse o f  power. In the 
sum m er o f  1990 he returned to Nakhichevan, where he w as elected  chairman o f  the local 
Suprem e S oviet. W hen he took over power in June 1993 there w ere initially rumours that 
he had been involved in the coup o f  H usseinov and that he w as ‘M o sco w ’s m an’. 
H ow ever, in the year to fo llow , it becam e quite apparent that A liev  w as a man o f  his own  
m ission, w ho carefully knew how to m anoeuvre and ach ieve som e political stability. This 
was even  acknow ledged  by his severest critics.77
"" The Politburo consisted o f  ten member from different republican com m unist parties 
and w as the highest organ o f  the S oviet Union. His rise into the Politburo w as an 
absolute sensation  in Turkey, as he w as seen as the first and on ly  ‘Turk’ in the highest 
organ o f  pow er in the FSU.
7 3
In January 1995 it cost the equivalent o f  U S$20, i.e. alm ost 20  tim es the minimum  
w age, to have a deceased taken to the morgue.
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telephone line. Payments can reduce taxes. Export licences can be obtained 
against payment. And the list could be endlessly extended. The situation is widely 
accepted and occasional protests seem to be only uttered if  a bribe above the 
‘going rate’ is demanded. Small- and medium- sized enterprises, whose 
development is heavily propagated by World Bank and EBRD, particularly suffer 
from lack o f influence. As most of these little entrepreneurs lack the right 
connections into the higher political structure, they are exposed to pressures of 
police, tax inspectorate, and prosecution services. Often, as in the case of export 
licences, procedures are complicated as potential gains from bribes are highly 
contested. CM A, Customs Committee, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Material 
Resources, the International Relations Committee, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations are all involved in the export contracts and licence business.24
The Karabagh war which even in its heights was hardly noticeable in the 
capital Baku, has also to be seen in the context o f internal power struggles. Many 
Azeris, as also do foreign observers like Goltz (1994), suggest that the war could 
have been fought more effectively if  its continuation had not been so beneficial to 
large parts o f the establishment. Besides a welcome distraction from ongoing 
redistribution of national wealth, it created a major source o f income. First, money 
could be diverted from secret funds assigned for defence purposes. There are no 
figures available. However the sums estimated are enormous. Second, bribes 
could be expected from arms dealers to officials authorised with the purchase of 
arms and other equipment. Third, the Ministry o f Defence and the police could 
generate bribes from draft dodgers and deserters. It is common knowledge that the
24 In order to alleviate econom ic crime, in the form o f  unrecorded and illegal exports, 
export contracts had to be approved by the M inistry o f  Foreign E conom ic Relations and 
w ere controlled  by the International Relations C om m ittee before goods could be cleared  
by C ustom s. A dditionally, state orders in line w ith  bilateral trade agreem ents and 
required export licences were managed by the M inistry o f  Trade, M inistry o f  Material 
R esources, and the M inistry o f  Foreign Econom ic R elations. U ntil March 1995 there 
have been export licence requirements for all ‘strategic’ good s, w hich constitute alm ost 
80% o f  all exports. There are 36 strategic goods, e.g. oil and petroleum  products, cotton  
and cotton by-products, sulphanol, synthetic rubber, ferrous and non-ferrous metal ore 
and products, alum inium  and aluminium scrap, ceram ic and other construction materials 
etc. L icences w ere issued by the M inistry o f  Foreign E conom ic Relations up to the 
quotas set for each product category by the M inistry o f  Econom y. There were many 
irregularities reported in the issuing o f  licences.
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war was only fought by those without adequate resources and by very few patriots. 
Fourth, there was the business of humanitarian aid. Medical, food, and supplies 
aid could be diverted to the domestic market. Markets in Baku and other towns 
and villages were full with aid products.25 And there were all the relatively well 
paid jobs as drivers, translators, cooks, office administrators, and cleaners with the 
many aid organisations, each of which established their own service apparatus.
2r> G oltz (1994: 454 ) describes the scandal o f  the aid request, personally presented by the 
former Premier and future Foreign M inister Hasan H asanov in N ew  York to the UN  
Secretary General Butros Ghali, for 40 ,000  electric irons for refugee tent camps (i.e. 
U S $ 5 0 0 ,0 0 0  worth o f  m erchandise for the Iranian, Turkish and FSU dom estic markets).
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Table 4-1: Chronology of selected important political events
Date Events
Aug. 1987
Feb. 1988 
Mar. 1988
Petition of the Armenian republic to annex the Nagorno-Karabagh 
Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) which is part o f the Azerbaijan SSR 
since 1923 (Altstadt 1992: 195; Grobe-Hagel 1992: 48-50).26 
First waves of anti-Azeri demonstrations in Erevan and NKAO;27 
Azeris begin to flee from Armenia and N K A O f 
Anti-Armenian riots in Sumgait.29 (32 casualties of which 26 were 
Armenians.) Armenians in Azerbaijan begin to flee to ArmeniaTfl • • *and abroad. Ongoing conflict in the NKAO region. Foimation of 
the AzPF around Elchibey31 with nation-wide structures.
26 A ltstadt (1992: 125-127) provides a com pact chronicle o f  the developm ent o f  the 
N K A O . M any interview ees and G oltz (1994: 8) presented the noteworthy v iew  that 
Stalin set up the association  o f  the N K A O  with Azerbaijan purposely in order to have a 
long-term  lever to ‘distract, divide and rule’. See also, SW B 8 Mar. 1988.
27 TA S 23-28 Feb. 1988, and SW B 24-29 Feb. 1988.
28 SW B 3-4  Mar. 1988. A ccording to Altstadt (1992: 197), beginning 1988, there have 
been 2 0 0 ,0 0 0  A zeris in Armenia.
29 SW B  1-8 Mar 1988, AP 4 Mar. 1988, and TA S 3-4  Mar. 1988.T he population o f  the 
industrial town Sum gait c lose  to Baku consists m anly o f  A zeri refugees w ho had to flee  
from their v illages in Arm enia in the 1940s (cf. Altstadt 1992: 197).
30 G oltz (1994: 7 -8 ) summ arises the repercussions the Nagorno-K arabagh conflict had in 
terms o f  refugees and displaced people as follow s:
But theoretical discussion aside, one is left with the facts on the ground: as a 
direct result o f  Armenian aggression, the number o f  Azeris who have fled their 
homes now [1994] exceeds one million-something like 15% o f  the population as 
a whole.
Nor were all the victims o f  Armenian irredentism Azeris. In 1988, there were 
around 500,000 ethnic Armenian citizens o f  Azerbaijan. The vast majority lived 
in Baku; the minority, around 150,000, lived in [..] NK AO . By 1994, there were 
less than 10,000 Armenians in Baku (most spouses in mixed marriages) and 
150,000 Armenians in Karabakh. The 350,000 from Baku had been sacrificed on 
the altar o f  nationalism, providing the rationale for Karabakh to secede from 
Azerbaijan and attach itself to Armenia-along with a good-sized chunk o f  Azeri 
territory outside Karabakh that had been ethnically cleansed for ease o f  
incorporation.
31 A bu lfez A liev  alias Elchibey (i.e . ‘em issary’, it is his adopted name) was born in 1938 
and is a native Nakhjivani (like Heydar Aliev; however, they are not know ingly relatives. 
A liev  is a v e iy  com m on surname in Azerbaijan. It is the russified  version o f  A lizade). As 
orientalist (like m any o f  Heydar A lievs kinsm en) he worked as lecturer at the Orientalism  
faculty at Baku State University after his return from Egypt, w here he had worked as 
translator at the Soviet-funded A sw an Dam project. H is nationalist and Pan-Turkist 
tendencies (he w as for the promotion o f  the Azeri language at the height o f  the 
R ussification cam paign pushed by the then CP ch ie f  Heydar A liev  in the Breshniev era) 
brought him c lo se  to tw o years in prison. He becam e leader o f  the AzPF. M any Azeris, 
the author spoke to, suggest that he was abused as a figurehead. He becam e president in
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Aug. 1989
Jan. 1990
19-21 Aug. 
1991
20 Aug. 1991 
9 Sept. 1991
8 Dec. 1991
Late Feb. 
1992
Strikes in Baku to press for control over the disputed territory of 
Nagorno-Karabakh.32
“Black January” : bloody communal conflict during the weekend of 
13-14 January 1990 and massive Soviet Army intervention on 20 
January 1990. Altstadt (1992: 213-219) presents evidence for the 
view that Moscow had staged the conflict in order to path the way 
for sending troops to Baku. There is a death toll of up to 150 
(Fuller 1994: 4). Ayaz Nijat ogly Mutalibov is installed as new 
First Secretary o f the Azeri CP.34
Attempted coup by conservative officials while Gorbachev is out 
of Moscow.35
Declaration of Independence of Azerbaijan.
Mutalibov is elected in the presidential polls as CP candidate. The 
election is boycotted by the democratic opposition (Goltz: 1994: 
62). The CP of Azerbaijan is dissolved and the Central Committee 
building becomes de facto the presidency.
Russian Federation, Ukraine and Byelarus formed CIS, stating that 
the Soviet Union ceases to exist.
Khodzhali Massacre36 Mutalibov is made responsible for severe 
negligence, because of lack of support from Baku and his attitude 
towards the use of Ex-Soviet troops and is forced to resign (Goltz 
1994: 185-207).37 Yagub Mamedov is appointed Azerbaijan's-jo
acting president by the Supreme Soviet. However, the ‘power 
ministries’ were given to the ‘opposition’, i.e. defence (Rahim
1992, but w as already forced to resign one year later and w ent into ex ile  Nakhjivan. In 
the aftermath, he w as accused o f  incom petence and w eakness. In long televised  debates 
with a show -trial character, from K G B agent to a lcoholic , there is hardly any name left 
he w as not called . H ow ever, it is noteworthy, that contrary to many o f  his com panions 
and supporters w ho accum ulated sign ificant illicit w ealth  in th is short era and who were 
not touched as badly, neither he nor his fam ily gained any personal wealth out o f  his 
political activities.
32 SW B  22-24  Aug. 1988, TAS 21-23 Aug. 1988, and AP 21-23  A ug. 1988. '
33 This is the v iew  o f  all the A zeris the Author has talked to. S ee also, AP 14-25 Jan 
1990, SW P 14-24 Jan. 1990, and TA S 14-25 Jan. 1990.
34 M utalibov is generally regarded as the representative o f  the conservative forces within  
the CP. He is w id ely  m aligned for his com plicity in the events around the ‘Black  
January’ and regarded as ‘M oscow ’s agent’ (cf. G oltz 1994: 76).
35 K E E 01 A ug. 1992.
36 In the little town bordering Karabakh around 1000 m en, w om en and children were 
brutally slaughtered by Armenians backed by the 36 6 th E x-S ov iet regiment (cf. G oltz  
1994: 173-188). The governm ent is accused o f  severe n eg ligen ce because o f  total lack o f  
support from Baku. See, RTN 1-2 Mar. 1992, and SW B 5 and 9 M ar 1992.
37 See also, RTN 6 Mar. 1992, SW B 9 Mar. 1992 and T A S 9 Mar. 1992.
38 S ee  SW B  9 Mar. 1992. Yagub M am edov w as the form er rector o f  the Baku M edical 
Institute. He w as often nicknamed ‘Dollar Y agub’ as it w as a lleged  that he took bribes 
from students. The Institute is renowned as one o f  the m ost ‘profitable’ in terms o f  
bribes. H ow ever, there are surely very few  in the establishm ent o f  Azerbaijan w ho would  
not deserve the prefix ‘D ollar’. Like M utalibov, he w as a representative o f  the old guard.
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May 1992
7 June 1992
Gaziev)39 internal affairs (Tahir Aliev).
Shusha, the last town held by Azeris in Karabakh, falls almost 
without fight under Rahim Gaziev as defence minister.40 
Mutalibov tries a comeback out is defeated under AzPF pressure.41 
The 1957 born Isa Yunis oglu Gambar 42 becomes acting 
president for three weeks (Goltz 1994: 253-270).
Elchibey is elected president in the presidential polls.43 His 
presidency lasts only for one year and is overshadowed with 
corruption scandals, economic decline, and several military 
defeats.44
39 Rahim G aziev, w ho is a man o f  many faces like so m any o f  the political establishm ent, 
w as AzPF supporter, remained in o ffice  till he w as d ism issed  over corruption scandals on  
8 February 1993 under the E lchibey governm ent. He attempted to take over the television  
station in Baku. G lotz (1994: 206) g ives the fo llow in g  characterisation:
[..] his ministry was marked by more corruption, defeat and defensive, paranoid 
bluster than one could imagine possible-so much so that in retrospect his selection 
as D efence Minster seems almost to have been part o f  a plan to destroy the 
country.
He w as sentenced  to ja il under Heydar A liev  on charges o f  treason and w ent like 
H usseinov and M utalibov into ex ile  in M oscow  .
40 RTN 8 - 1 1  M ay 1992, SW B 10 -13 M ay 1992, and T A S 10 M ay 1992.
41 RTN 14 M ay 1992.
42 Isa Y unis oglu  Gambar originated from Baku and had previously worked at the 
Oriental Institute o f  Azerbaijan. He was a protege o f  E lch ibey and one o f  the founders o f  
the AzPF.
43 RTN 6-10  June 1994, SW B 6-11 June 1994, and TA S 8 and 9 June 1994.
44 Fuller (1994: 8) sum m arises the reasons for the fall o f  the A zPF and Elchibey as 
follow s:
First, AzPF members were appointed to leading posts on the basis o f  their 
impeccable ideological credentials rather than com petence or integrity, and many 
subsequently flaunted their illicitly acquired wealth.
Second, the inefficiency and corruption o f  leading officials compounded the 
process o f  demonstrations. This was accelerated when the Elchibey leadership 
broke o ff  existing ties with Russia, Azerbaijan’s most important trading partner, 
in 1992. Little was done to mitigate the rapid impoverishment o f  much o f  the 
population.
The final, and most crucial, influence was the dismal performance o f  the Azeri 
armed forces o f  large swathes o f  Azeri-populated territory in April 1993.
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June 1993
Mid 1994
October 1994
S u ra t Husseinov45 instigates a coup against the Elchibey 
government from his base in Ganje. H eydar Aliev, was able to use 
the hour o f confusion for his comeback. In Elchibey’s absence he 
was voted ‘acting president’ by the Supreme Soviet and elected 
president in October 1993 in the new presidential polls.
Cease-fire was negotiated. However, 20% of Azerbaijan remained 
under Armenian occupation. Almost 1 million people (13% of the 
population) have become refugees or displaced persons. Since 
1988, according to official sources 20,000 Azeris have been killed 
and 4,400 have been taken prisoner or hostage, with many others 
being wounded and huge areas devastated.
Prime Minister Surat Husseinov flees to Moscow after attempted 
coup could be defeated.___________
45 Born in 1959, Surat H usseinov is a fast riser am ongst the new  generation o f  
politicians, and being native from Ganje, he w as not a natural kinsm an o f  Heydar A liev  
(G anje and N akhichevanis are rivals). H e is said to have acquired quite significant 
financial resources through his position as captain o f  the w o o l industry and his alleged  
m afia-connections and used these resources to finance his private army and build h im self  
up as a warlord. A s recognition for his military efforts in the war he w as appointed  
deputy prime m inister under Elchibey. H ow ever, he w as d ism issed  in disgrace in 
February 1993, w hen rumours o f  his planning a coup against the governm ent becam e 
public. A ccord ing to G olz (1994: 363), as revenge for his d ism issa l, he pulled his brigade 
aw ay from  the frontier along with m ost o f  the heavy equipm ent in the army. After this 
attem pted coup against Elchibey, H usseinov w as made prim e m inister by Heydar A liev  
in an effort by the latter to absorb opposition he w as too w eak  to defeat. H usseinov fled  
to M oscow  after an attempted coup in October 1994.
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Table 4-2: Dates of declarations of independence of fo rm er Union republics
Republic Date
Armenia Aug. 23 1991
AZERBAIJAN Aug. 30 1991
Belarus Aug. 24 1991
Estonia Aug.20 1991
Georgia April 9 1991
Kazakhstan Dec. 16 1991
Kirgizstan Aug.31 1991
Latvia Aug. 20 1991
Lithuania March 11 1990
Moldova Aug. 27 1991
Tajikistan Sept. 9 1991
Turkm enistan Oct. 27 1991
Ukraine Aug. 24 1991
Uzbekistan Aug.31 1991
Source: KEE01 Aug. 1992
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4.2 The economic environment
4.2.1 A brief overview of the Azeri economic performance
Since the late 1980s, the Azeri economy has experienced a severe slump in 
production and demand due to multiple external and internal shocks.46 First, the 
escalation o f the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, as described above, 
caused serious damage to the economy.
Second, the break up o f the Soviet Union led to the abandonment of 
central planning and co-ordination and severe disruptions' o f inter-republican 
relations. Failures in central planning and the intention to keep the republics of the 
FSU interdependent in order to preserve the union, led to extreme degrees of 
specialisation of production and a wide geographical distribution of productive 
capacity within the FSU.47 As transport costs were neglected, raw materials and 
intermediary goods were lugged from the other end o f the SU rather than 
facilitating local content production. Many enterprises received their entire inputs 
from other republics and experienced severe supply bottlenecks when cut off from 
the Soviet economy. The attempt was made to alleviate trade problems by 
maintaining centrally planned trade relationships through a network of bilateral 
trade arrangements with other FSU countries48 The latter specify trade volumes
46 For a m ore com prehensive report o f  the econom ic developm ents in Azerbaijan in 
recent years, see (IM F 1992 - 1995) and World Bank (1993).
47 The degree o f  specialisation  is also reflected in share o f  exports and imports o f  GDP. 
During 1987-90 exports and imports were averaging 46 percent and 37 percent o f  GDP  
respectively  (IM F 1992: 3).
48 B ecause o f  serious data and reporting problem s, trade statistics are not d iscussed here 
in detail. There are no detailed trade data for Azerbaijan availab le for the period before 
1987. Data could  be only derived through the material supply statistics or even only from  
the reports o f  the state material supply enterprises or material supply subdivisions o f  
enterprises. U ntil 1992 the A SSC  reported export and import data in dom estic prices, i.e. 
prices o f  the end-users, including subsidies, taxes, and freight charges. For 1987-1990  
there is an A ll-U nion  series available for ‘trade in roubles at w orld  market prices’ in 
which dom estic prices are adjusted. From 1992 non-FSU data have been  reported in U S$. 
It is questionable w hether FSU trade figures can be revalued according to the dollar 
prices im plicit in non-FSU  countries, as com m odity com p ositions o f  these two are very 
different and there is a lack o f  detailed volum e data. Until 1994 trade data w ere reported
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and prices.49 Due to difficulties in interbank settlements and shortage of hard 
currency and roubles, these trade arrangements were in practice conducted on a 
barter basis. However, trade agreements more often became invalidated, as 
suppliers pushed towards world market prices and, increasingly, in order to 
comply with these agreements, state orders could not be fulfilled. Bilateral trade 
agreements were almost completely dropped at the beginning o f 1995. Due to 
severe supply bottlenecks enterprises increasingly negotiated directly with their 
suppliers. Supplies were also obstructed through conflicts in Georgia beginning in 
1994, and the closing of the northern trade route, in late 1994, due to the conflict 
in Chechnya. This also added to transportation costs as alternative routes had to be 
taken. The lack o f maintenance and investment in infrastructure, i.e. mainly 
railroads and the Caspian Sea fleet, created further bottlenecks.50 On the whole, 
the adoption o f world market prices for raw materials and intermediary goods and 
the adjustments o f costs for transport and energy had an immense negative shock 
impact on Azeri producers.
Third, there have been changes in domestic relative prices due to price 
liberalisation and the ending of most subsidies51 both to producers and consumers 
and the increase in taxes and ‘informal duties’ as discussed above. In January 
1992, almost 80% o f all producer and consumer prices were liberalised, further 
price liberalisations took place in late 1992 and 1993, leaving only bread, energy52 
and public utilities (especially housing and transport) under price control. In
on the basis o f  enterprise surveys, and then on the basis o f  custom s data, w hich should be 
more reliable. The categorisations o f  goods also slightly changed m aking com parisons 
between the years d ifficult. Trade data exclude re-exports, unrecorded imports and 
exports, w hich  are estim ated as quite significant for the years after 1991, and 
humanitarian im ports. R e-exports consist mainly o f  products from  other republics o f  the 
FSU destined for Iran. Unrecorded imports and exports include illega l trade through 
sm uggling and under-invoicing and over-invoicing, im ports o f  the large foreign  
investm ent projects and the oil consortium  investm ents w hich have a duty exem pt status, 
and m ilitary goods.
49 Prices in trade agreem ents were w ell under the world market level.
50 The m ost important m eans o f  transport have been rail and the Caspian sea fleet,
51 A lthough direct subsidies m ight have been curtailed or term inated, enterprises were 
still able to obtain credits at negative real interest rates as d iscussed  b elow .
52 Until 1995 energy prices w ere at 25% o f  the world market level. Prices o f  petrol and 
other oil products rose in early 1995 with the intention to raise them  to world market 
levels.
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October 1991 a new tax system replaced the old Soviet system / The newly 
established State Tax Inspectorate is responsible for tax administration and 
involved in the tax reforms.
Fourth, industry was abruptly exposed to aggressive competition by 
foreign markets, without any preparation- a bumpy if not crash landing. Domestic 
markets for food, pharmaceuticals, consumer durables, construction materials and 
textiles are dominated by foreign imports.54 As discussed below, industrial 
restructuring towards an output structure which meets the new demand patterns 
and competitive environment has not yet taken place. Even slight adjustments in 
the marketing and distribution of goods has not even begun. The quality standards 
of many locally produced goods, like air conditioners and refrigerators, might be 
acceptable to consumers. However due to failures in distribution it is difficult to 
find them.53 Locally produced tea has reportedly rotted in warehouses, whilst the 
whole market, even in tea producing areas, was swamped by Turkish and Iranian 
tea.
Fifth, the capital stock of industry has deteriorated. This is due to reported 
lack o f investments and maintenance. However, it is impossible to quantify the 
decline of investment as no reliable disaggregated data are available. Figure 4-2 
indicates the low investment for 1991 and for 1992 and relatively high levels of 
investment, when compared with the OECD average o f 20.6 percent of GDP in 
1994, in the rest o f the period. These high measured investment levels are neither
33 A  value added tax w as introduced to replace the old turnover and sa les taxes, and a 
progressive incom e tax w as adopted along with an exc ise  tax, a n ew  enterprise profit tax, 
a car ow nership  tax, and royalties for petroleum production. Export and import taxes are 
under constant review . R elevant laws w ere adopted but not im plem ented  until 1995.
34 The author, w ho has lived and worked in Azerbaijan and travelled  ex ten sive ly  within
the country w as often  even  unable to find Azeri substitutes for im ported goods. A gain, as
a sign ificant vo lu m e o f  imported goods remains unrecorded in o ffic ia l trade statistics,
more detailed market research would have to be carried out to quantify the market share
o f  different foreign products in com parison to their A zeri substitutes. The IMF (1995: 6
and 28) confirm s the dom inance o f  foreign export goods, particularly in consum er
durables.
33 The trademarks o f  local products are often underestim ated by foreign  consultants. For
instance, consum ers have som etim es waited for years to acquire a ‘Bakconditionar’, the
locally produced air conditioner, w hose producer is still a m onop oly  w ithin the FSU.
Thus these air conditioners are highly valued.
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reflected in economic growth nor in the information gained from interviews in 
enterprises, ministries, and other authorities.
Figure 4-2: Gross fixed capital formation
i n  p e r c e n t  o f  G D P 56
* Data for 1994 are IMF estimates.
Source: IMF (1995: 40-41).
Sixth, as discussed further below, the crumbling o f controls in the years 
which led to the break-up of the SU and in its aftermath have paved the way to 
far-reaching asset stripping, and theft o f resources and final goods in all branches 
of industry and the economy as a whole, and considerable capital flight. Illegal 
sales of petrol and petroleum products are widely reported and have been 
conducted for years on a systematic and organised way (cf. Goltz 1994: 334-
1,6 Gross fixed  capital form ation =  gross capital form ation - changes in stocks. For a 
definition o f  gross fixed  capital formation and m ethods o f  com pilation, see CCEET  
(1993c: 51-53). Investm ent data have to be judged with caution, due to problem s o f  
definition, accoun ting  (w hich is particularly d ifficult in an inflationary environm ent) and 
coverage. C hanges o f  stocks w ere not considered here, as they are subject to serious 
revaluation d ifficu lties during periods o f  high inflation and other m easurem ent problems. 
Table 4-5 indicates that changes o f  stocks and gross fixed  capital form ation go in the 
sam e direction, w hich  does not com ply with aggregate dem and based investm ent 
theories.
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3 3 5).57 There are three ways of systematic oil theft: (1) underreporting local 
production, (2) over-reporting local consumption, (3) over-reporting refinery fuel 
consumption and loss. Considering that natural gas was the main fuel of domestic 
and industrial end-users until in 1992 when power stations were switched to fuel 
oil, domestic consumption has been extremely high (see Table 4-3 and Table 4-7).
Table 4-3: Refinery production and uses
(in thousand tons)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Total crude refined 21118.0 22022.1 22101.4 21699.6 18395.3 16331.6 15827.0
of which: 12386.0 12702.6 13169.4 13258.0 12603.6 12072.9 11087.0
Azerbaijan crude
Products produced 20262.9 21715.9 21081.5 20799.1 17539.3 15617.6 15192.9
Refinery fuel & loss 855.1 306.2 1019.9 900.5 856 714 634.1
Apparent domestic 7089.5 7501.7 7282.2 7468.8 6895.8 6530.0 7079.1
consumption
Source: IMF (1992: 76)
Under-reporting o f official production figures and illegal sale of final 
manufacturing goods is widely reported. Asset stripping is particularly serious in 
enterprises producing intermediate and final goods which cannot easily be 
illegally sold on.58 Equally, capital flight, e.g. in form o f under-invoicing of 
exports and over-invoicing of imports, is regarded as a serious problem.59 There 
are discussions to grant amnesty to Azeris who are willing to repatriate their 
illegally acquired funds and hence legalise their theft retrospectively. Such a step
s7 For exam ple, R asul Bayram oglu G uliyev, the present speaker o f  parliament, had been
previously first c h ie f  engineer (1971-1980) at the Baku O il R efinery (since 1991
renamed A zn eftyag) and later General Director. H e w as appointed D eputy President o f
the State Oil C om pany under E lchibey in 1992. H e is regarded as the representative for
the oil industry in the establishm ent and is alleged as worth a few  hundred m illion U S $ . 
ss‘ A sset stripping is also  acknow ledged by IMF (1995: 6).
?9 For exam ple, the prelim inary balance o f  payments statem ent for 1992 prepared by IMF 
sta ff and Azeri authorities im plies an unexplained negative residual o f  c lo se  to U S $800  
m illion, as the current account, coupled with identified capital in flow s, is not matched by 
an increase in o ffic ia l foreign exchange reserves (IMF 1993: 5).
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would find broad support in the population and the establishment, as it is hoped 
that it will bring more stability and vital reinvestments.
Triggered by these factors, the Azeri economy suffered a cumulative 
decline in real GDP o f 60 percent between 1990 and 1994. As Table 4-4 shows, 
the cumulative economic decline is far above the average decline in the whole 
FSU (which was 44 percent). Table 4-5 shows a breakdown o f GDP by sector of 
origin and final use.60 Table 4-11 documents the decline in production of selected 
industrial goods, which reveal a cumulative decline between 1989 and 1994 of up 
to 95.7 percent in heavy industry (steel pipes), 94.5 percent decline in oil 
extraction equipment production, 70.3 percent decline in the production of 
airconditioners, and 64.3 percent decline in the production o f cotton fibre.
As Figure 4-3 indicates, the drop in power consumption falls far short of 
the measured fall in GDP.61 The cumulative change o f power consumption in the 
period 1989-94 has been -24.5 whilst the cumulative change in GDP has been - 
59.2. This could be interpreted as an indicator for an overestimation of GDP 
decline in official data. However, electricity consumption is not a reliable proxy 
indicator for changes in real GDP, as (1) there are no data available o f the
60 A s indicated earlier, real sector data in Azerbaijan have to be interpreted with caution, 
due to poor coverage o f  o ffic ia l statistics, low  response ratios to statistical questionnaires 
(as A SSC  has lost its leverage on respondents), and system atic underreporting by 
enterprises to avoid  taxation and to cover up illegal sales and asset stripping. Similarly, 
system atic underreporting can be expected in household surveys. First attempts to 
com pile national accounts according to System  o f  N ational A ccounts (SN A )  
classifications have on ly  been m ade in 1990 in the FSU (cf. C C E E T  1993c; IMF et al. 
1991/1: 133-171). D ue to the break up o f  the Soviet U nion  a full adoption o f  the new  
system  w as delayed  in m ost republics, w hich continued to prepare national accounts 
according to the System  o f  B alances o f  the National Econom y o f  the FSU . In Azerbaijan 
national accounts w ere only prepared according to SN A  standards in 1995. There is a 
lack o f  reliable price statistics. Consum er price indices have on ly  been prepared since
1993. Labour market data are incom plete, and first attempts at a system atic recording o f  
data have on ly  m ade recently (Table 4-6 displays data from  traditional series). There are 
im pressive com p lete population surveys o f  the new ly em erging private sector (m ainly  
shops, service outlets, and restaurants) since 1994, although resp onse raties are low . On 
the w hole, m ethod ologica l changes in Azeri statistics are not w ell docum ented and, 
apparently, even  em p loyees o f  the A SSC  are not always fam iliar w ith  these changes,
61 D ubozi and Pohl (1 9 9 5 ) recom mend electricity consum ption as a proxy indicator for 
changes in real G D P level, due to the discrepancies o f  o ffic ia lly  recorded GDP estim ates. 
Their study indicates that in the CIS countries’ electricity consum ption  has declined far 
less than o ffic ia lly  recorded GDP, w hilst in Eastern Europe the fall in electricity  
consum ption corresponds m ore to the fall in GDP.
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industrial share o f total electricity consumption and domestic consumption has 
remained equal,62 (2) some branches use the same amount o f power for less 
production particularly due to lack of incentives for energy saving, (3) due to 
outdated and badly maintained power stations and the whole electricity system, 
there are reportedly high production losses, and (4) other energy sources of 
industry are not considered.
Figure 4-3: Growth in power consumption and real GDP
( a n n u a l  c h a n g e  i n  p e r c e n t )
0.4
- 0.4
1990 1992 1993 1994
- 3.5
- 7.9
Power con^dmption.-10
-15
-15
-20 uu p  estimates
•21.9
-25
Source: EBRD ( l 995: 182)
Real wages have fallen over several years with an average drop of almost 
60 percent in 1994 (IMF 1995: 10).63 According to IMF (1995: 100) calculations, 
in dollar terms, monthly average wages dropped from about US$17 (1993 
average) to US$8 in January 1995.64 However, average disposable income has 
likely fallen less than real wages as private households were supplementing
6" One could even  assum e that dom estic consum ption has increased, as the unem ployed
and under-em ployed cannot afford to go out and with unchanged electricity  prices, there
is no incentive for energy saving. M oreover, the country w as sw am ped with new  hi-fi
equipm ent and other dom estic electrical goods.
A consum er price index is only available from 1993 (based on a survey o f  1500 low
incom e h ousehold s, conducted in 1993). The consum er price index is based on a basket
o f  1144 products (grouped in nine categories). H ow ever, consum ption  patterns vary
drastically betw een  the 25 locations, w here prices are m onitored. It is questionable how
far the consum er price index is accounting for these drastic variations. There are also
problem s o f  accuracy in data collection.
64 A ccording to calcu lations o f  the author, a fam ily o f  four required in Baku in January
1995 U S $120  ju st to cover the food bill and absolute n ecessities.
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official wages with incomes from work in the informal sector, self-employment 
and permanent dissaving (i.e. selling of flats, consumer durables, and valuables).
Figure 4-4: Real average wage index (Dec. 1990 = 100)
350
300
250
200
150
100
1993 1994
Source: IMF (1995: 51)
Official labour market figures presented in Table 4-6 show for the years 
1990-1994 a cumulative decline in the labour force in industry of only 20.3%. 
However, de facto employment is far lower in industry as stated in the official 
statistics, since short-time working and enforced unpaid ‘holidays5 are reportedly 
quite common. Many workers who are still officially employed by enterprises 
have drifted into the informal sector. The situation is similar in other sectors. 
Unemployment rates can be expected to rise drastically once industrial 
restructuring is more decisively embarked upon.
A zerbaijan's present social safety net will be unable to cushion the impact 
of the massive restructuring ahead or even when ‘savings'65 o f the population 
have been exhausted.66 The post-Soviet safety net consists o f (1) a system of
6:1 Savings include all p ossession s up to a w edding ring.
66 M any Baku pensioners are m oving to Turkmenistan as food  prices are low er there and 
they can survive on their pensions.
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minimum wages67 on the basis of which wages of budget organisations, pensions, 
and social benefits are indexed;68 (2) the Social Protection Fund from which 
pensions and social benefits are paid;69 and (3) the Employment Fund which
7 0covers unemployment benefit and training schemes. Expenditures of both funds 
accounted for 9.8% of GDP in 1992, 8% in 1993, and only 5.9% in 1994 (IMF 
1995: 54).
67 M in im u m  w a g e s  are  b a s e d  o n  th e  c o n su m e r  p r ice  in d e x . H o w e v e r ,  t h e y  s e e m  to  h a v e  
n o  r e la t io n  to  rea l l iv in g  c o s t s ,  a s  th e  C P I is  re la ted  to  o f f i c ia l  p r ic e s  w h ils t  m o s t  o f  th e  
e c o n o m y  is  in fo r m a l. A  s e n io r  m e m b e r  o f  th e  A z e r i p a r lia m e n ta r y  c o m m is s io n  o n  s o c ia l  
p r o te c t io n  i s s u e s  c o u ld  n o t  b e l ie v e  it w h e n  th e  a u th or  in fo r m e d  h im  th a t th e  m in im u m  
w a g e  w a s  A z M  9 0 0  ( th e  e q u iv a le n t  o f  U S $ 1  in M a y  1 9 9 4 )  w h e n  in te r v ie w e d  in M a y
1 9 9 4 . H e  in s is te d  it  h a d  to  b e  a t le a s t  A z M 9 0 0 0 .
Minimum wages (1991-1995)
Date o f  
change
_ _______ B——
before 
April 1991
April
199!
January
1992
July
1992
December
1992
January
1993
November
1993
June
1994
October
1994
M inim um 7 13 3 1 .7 70 25 0 3 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 0
wage: in A zM  
in U S$ 12.68 4.71 2 .7 9 5 ,88 5 .62 6.21 4 .5 4 2 .0 5 1.81
Source: A uth or's research
68 In d e x a tio n  o f  w a g e s  o f  b u d g e t  o r g a n isa t io n s  ( i .e .  n o n - s e l f  su p p o r t in g  e n te r p r ise s  lik e  
g e n e ra l a d m in is tr a t io n  a n d  p u b lic  u t i l it ie s )  w a s  a lrea d y  d is c u s s e d  fr o m  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  
1 9 9 2 . H o w e v e r  th e  la w  o n  ‘W a g e  In d e x a t io n 5, p a sse d  in J a n u a ry  1 9 9 3 , o n ly  b e c a m e  
e f f e c t iv e  in A u g u s t  1 9 9 3 .
69 T h e  S o c ia l  P r o te c t io n  F u n d  c o m p r is e s  th e  fo r m e r  S o c ia l  F u n d  an d  th e  P e n s io n  F u n d . It 
is f in a n c e d  th r o u g h  b o th  th e  p a y r o ll ta x  and  th e  sta te  b u d g e t.
7 0
T h e  E m p lo y m e n t  F u n d  w a s  s e t  up  in O c to b e r  1991  and  is  a d m in is te r e d  b y  th e  M in is tr y  
o f  L a b o u r  and  S o c ia l  P r o te c t io n . It is  fu n d e d  th r o u g h  th e  p a y r o ll  ta x  a n d  th e  s ta te  b u d g e t.
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Table 4-4: Comparative economic growth in PCPEs (percentage changes)
Countries 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Level of real GDP in 1994 
1989 »100
Albania -10 -28 -10 11 7 69
Armen in -7 -II -52 -15 5 36
Azerbaijan -12 -I -23 -23 -21 40
Belarus -3 -1 -10 -12 -20 61
Bulgarin -9 -12 -7 _2 1 74
Croatia -9 -14 -9 -3 1 70
Czccb Republic 0 -14 -6 -1 3 82
Estonia -S -11 -14 -7 -3 64
FYR Mnceiionin -10 -12 -21 -8 -4 55
Georgia -12 -14 -40 -39 -35 18
Hungary -4 -12 -3 -1 3 83
Knzakstnu 0 -13 -13 -12 -25 50
Kyrgyzstan 3 -S -25 -16 -27 45
Latvia 3 -8 •35 -15 2 53
Lithuania -5 -13 -38 -24 2 40
Moldova -2 -18 -29 -I -31 40
Poland -12 -7 3 4 6 93
Romania -6 -13 -9 1 4 78
Russia -A -13 -15 -9 -13 56
Slovak Republic 0 -15 -6 -4 5 81
Slovenia -S -8 -5 1 6 89
Tajikistan -2 -7 -29 -11 -21 46
Turkmenistan 2 -5 -5 -10 -20 66
Ukraine -3 -12 -17 -17 -23 45
Uzbekistan 2 -11 -2 -4 86
FSU* -A -12 -15 -10 -14 56
* A ll countries o f  th e F S U , excep t E stonia, Latvia and Lithuania. E stim ates for real G D P represent w eighted  averages.
Source: E B R D  and ow n  calcu lation s.
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Table 4-5: Gross Domestic Product by sector of origin and final use
(in p e r c e n t  o f  G D P )
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
GDP at current prices 1.5 2 .7 2 4 .1 1 5 7 .1 1 6 7 6 .4
in AzM billion a
GDP in constant prices 1 4 6 6 .0 1 4 5 5 .7 7 1 1 2 6 .8 8 6 6 .4 6 7 6 .7
1990=100 b
Percentage change of - 1 1 .7 -0 .7 - 2 2 .6 -2 3 .1 -2 1 .1
real GDPc
GDP by sector of origin
(in percent of GDP)
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Industry 22 30 31 25 25c
Agriculture 26 39 27 27 30c
Construction 8 8 8 7 4 C
Transport 7 7 4 7 7 C
Other 38 16 30 34 34c
GDP by final use
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Final consumption 69 90 86 97 92c
Gross fixed capital 20 15 5 ' 21 21c
formation
Changes in inventories 6 -11 -24 1 r
Exports 43 59 91 58 58c
Imports 39 53 57 77 71c
Net Exports 5 6 33 -19 -14
11 A S SC  estim ates. E xchange rate unknown. (G D P figures for 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 2  are on ly  available in 
roubles).
b A S S C  estim ates. P rice index unknown. 
c IM F sta ff  estim ates.
Source: A S S C  and IM F (1995: 4 0 -4 1 ).
Ta
bl
e 
4-
6:
 L
ab
ou
r 
m
ar
ke
t
19
94
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
ch
an
ge
CN
-0
.4
-3
.3
-4
.5
-4
.6
1.
7
-5
.2
66
.9
O (N
N
u
m
b
er
74
87
39
98
33
98
25
87
37
4
65
3
89
5
81
0.
9
23
.9
22 to 81
9.
7
19
93
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
ch
an
ge
CN 2.
2
-1
.2
4.
7
6.
3
-7 1
5.
9
98
.1
-1
5.
2
3.
6
N
u
m
b
er
73
99
40
13
35
13
27
10
39
2
64
2
94
4
80
2.
9 
;
22
.9 
j
m
to 80
2.
6
19
92
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 
| 
ch
an
ge
2.
7
-5
.4
-1
8.
5
3.
8
1 1 i t 4.
2
N
u
m
b
er
72
96
39
36
34
36
27
43
37
4
60
3
10
15
69
3
ro
z 77
4.
5
19
91
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
ch
an
ge
-1
.7
4 -2
.2
8.
8
N
u
m
b
er
72
42
38
33
.5
29
01
.1
45
8.
8
97
7.
6 l/~)
cnsfrr-~
0661 71
19
.8
38
99
.0
27
88
.6
 
46
9.
1
89
8.
6 VZZL
19
85
67
05
.7
37
40
.3
26
19
.2
47
4.
1
87
0.
3 °N
inCNVO
T
ot
al
 p
op
u
la
ti
on
P
op
ul
at
io
n 
at 
w
or
k
in
g 
ag
e*
L
ab
ou
r 
fo
rc
e
T
ot
al
 e
m
p
lo
ym
en
t 
of 
w
h
ic
h 
In
d
u
st
ry
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
S
er
vi
ce
s 
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
re
U
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ra
te
R
eg
is
te
re
d 
u
n
em
p
lo
ye
d
B
en
ef
it
 
re
ci
p
ie
n
ts
P
en
si
on
er
s
154
4.2.2 Economic structure
Figure 4-5: Gross Domestic Product by sector of economic activity (1990)
Other
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Transport
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Construction
Agriculture
26%
Source: ASSC
Figure 4-6: Employment by sector of economic activity (1990)
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Although the Azeri economy has experienced early industrialisation due to the oil 
boom at the end o f the last century, the agricultural sector remains the backbone of 
the economy, with 26% share of GDP in 1990 (see Figure 4-5) and a 32% share of 
total employment (see Figure 4-6). Officially production continues to be organised 
in 1160 co-operative farms (the so-called kolkhozes and interkhozes) and 850
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state farms (the so called sovkhozes).71 There are also 220 registered small private 
farms and a significant amount of privately utilised allotments and household 
plots. In practice, both sovkhozes and kolkhozes have disintegrated and their 
resources are utilised for informal production.72 The land reform planned since 
1991 has not been carried out yet. Legislation for its implementation had not been 
prepared by January 1995.73 According to IMF (1995: 4) 57% of fruits and 
vegetables and 80% of domestic meat and milk supplies are already produced 
privately or informally. Similarly, the distributive infrastructure of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Ministry of Trade, and Azerittifak,74 between which the domestic 
food distribution was divided, has deteriorated. Production figures of main crops 
are presented in Figure 4-7. They consist of wheat (mainly grain), cotton, tobacco, 
potatoes, other vegetables, grapes, watermelons, other fruit (mainly pomegranates,
me
apples, and pears), and tea. The official production o f all crops has a declining 
trend. Official meat, fish and dairy products also have a declining trend. Dairy 
products and cereals are mainly imported.76 However, according to officials in the 
Ministry o f Economy, only between 60 and 70 percent o f the demand for meat, 
dairy products, poultry, fish and margarine could be satisfied prior to 
independence and both agricultural production and food processing were key areas 
of concern o f the old regime.
71 B r ie f in g s  b y  s t a f f  o f  th e  C M A  an d  A M E  to  th e  a u th or.
7*7 „
" S o v k h o z e s  a n d  k o lk h o z e s  h a v e  b e e n  r ep o r te d ly  r e la t iv e ly  w e l l - e q u ip p e d ,  a lth o u g h  
m a in te n a n c e  a n d  a s s e t  s tr ip p in g  is  a ls o  a p ro b le m .
73
S e e  a ls o  In tr o d u c t io n  o f  c h a p te r  5.
74
A z e r it t ifa k  is  th e  A z e r i  U n io n  o f  C o n su m e r  S o c ie t ie s .
^  B r ie f in g s  b y  s t a f f  o f  th e  C M A  and  A M E  to  th e  au th or.
76 F rom  T u r k e y , R u s s ia ,  a n d  th e  E u ro p ea n  U n io n , p a r t ia lly  u n d e r  th e  h u m a n ita r ia n  grant 
and loan  p r o g r a m m e s  a c c o r d in g  to  r e sp o n d e n ts .
Fi
gu
re
 
4-
7:
 A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
by 
m
aj
or
 
cr
op
s
in 
th
ou
sa
nd
, 
of 
to
ns
03
T— CO 
CO CM r CD
c  ) CM c  It > U) Ul
CM
H3
Ooo oo o o oo
Tj-
OnOn
-O
"OC
03
03
m
On
On
JO
■oc
03
cdCM
On
ON
in
Q
P i<
T3
'd-
On OW
157
In 1990 Azerbaijan’s industrial sector accounted for 22 percent of GDP 
(see Figure 4-5) and employed 17 percent of the country’s employed labour force. 
As mentioned above, traditionally the oil-related branches have dominated the 
industrial sector.77 Official crude oil production has declined by 27.3% (see Figure 
4-8) between 1989 and 1994, which is less than the decline o f most manufacturing 
products (see Table 4-11). Remaining proven oil reserves are estimated according 
to CMA staff at around 1 billion tons and there are also substantial natural gas 
resources. Unexplored oil and gas resources are also expected to be significant. 
Present oil extraction and processing has been extremely wasteful due to poor 
reservoir management, inefficient production practices, and obsolete equipment in 
both producing wells and refineries. Production causes substantial environmental 
pollution through oil spillage, inappropriate disposal o f formation water, and 
wasteful venting of gas. There is also a problem o f radiation set free in the 
production process which could be reduced by adequate equipment. The Baku 
peninsula in places is infernal with obsolete oil pumps being simply abandoned to 
rot and 7400 hectares contaminated with oil and brine containing heavy metals 
(e.g. chromium, lead and mercury) with serious effects on groundwater.78 Table 4- 
3 indicates that around 4.5 percent of oil is lost in the refinery process. The two 
refineries are characterised by obsolete technology, o f both processing units and 
control systems, and over-capacity. There are plans for modernisation.
77 In 1823 the first paraffin plant in the world w as built p rocessin g  oil extracted in Baku. 
The first oil refinery w as set up in a suburb o f  Baku. The num ber o f  oil w ells  rose from  
nine in 1879 to 1710 around 1900. Based on the oil revenues, other industries were 
established in the second  h a lf o f  the 19th centuiy, including m achine building plants, 
m echanised w orkshops, textile m ills, and tobacco processing plants. B y  1910 Baku 
supplied h a lf  o f  the w orld ’s oil requirement. R evolts o f  the Baku oil workers as early as 
1903 led to the establishm ent o f  the Baku com m une in 1917, the 26  Com m issars o f  
which w ere driven to Turkmenistan and murdered by the British on 20 Septem ber 1918. 
Clara Zetkin the German socia list w rote a colourful report o f  this period in Azerbaijan, 
see Zetkin (1 9 2 6 ). Industrialisation w as furthered in the S ov iet period with strong 
em phasis on petrochem icals and oil production. The im portance o f  Baku industry grew  
during the W orld War II, especia lly  when German troops had already headed as far as 
Grozny. A ccord ing  to offic ia l sources, the Soviet m ilitary effort w as two-thirds fuelled  
with oil from Azerbaijan, and production culm inated in an all tim e high o f  450 ,000  bpd 
in 1941. A t ever>' o ffic ia l dinner the author attended in A zerbaijan, at least 15 m inutes o f  
the speeches and tw o g lasses o f  vodka w ere devoted to the crucial role o f  Azeri oil in 
World W ar II, and that in fact, Azerbaijan had w on the war for the S ov iet Union.
78 B riefings by Azeri environm ental experts to the author.
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Figure 4-8: Crude Oil Production
(in th o u sa n d s  o f  tons)
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Source: CMA
Around 1.4 billion cubic meters of wet gas have been annually vented
7 0offshore. This corresponds to 16.1 percent o f the natural gas requirements of the 
country in 1994. The project to build a new gas compressor station in Bakhar 
leased from the American oil company Pennzoil and a pipeline from the Oil Rocks 
field to capture this otherwise vented gas o f Guneshli has only been completed at 
the beginning o f 1995 - after many complications and almost three years later than 
planned.80 Around 2.4 billion cubic meters of gas are lost through transmission 
and distribution pipeline leakage, i.e. 25.3 percent o f the entire gas requirement in 
1992 (see Table 4-7).
There are quite a few production sharing projects with international oil 
companies in the pipeline. In September 1994 the government signed a production 
sharing contract with a consortium of 11 international oil companies for exploring 
and developing the Azeri, Chirag, and deep water Gunashli fields in the Azeri 
section of the Caspian Sea after three years of negotiations and ‘almost’
79 B riefings by C M A  em p loyees to the author.
80 wG oltz (1994: 3 3 5 ) g ives the Penzoil gas com pression project as an exam ple o f  the state 
o f  corruption in Azerbaijan: projects w hich are not instantly ‘ incom e generating’ in terms 
o f  bribes and other kick-backs for politicians and bureaucrats are difficult to 
operationalise.
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ratifications. The contract involves estimated recoverable reserves of 
approximately 4 billion barrels and US$7.5 billion investment over 15 years.82 
The manufacturing sector is analysed in section 4.2.3.
Azerbaijan’s power generation was reportedly based largely on natural gas 
mainly imported from Turkmenistan.83 These imports were partially due to the 
political rationale o f reinforcing inter-republican dependency and partially due to 
outright central planning failures as transport costs including losses through 
transmission were neglected. With the break up o f the Soviet Union, increasing 
trade complications, and Turkmenistan’s gas price being gradually moved towards 
world market prices, power stations were switched to fuel oil consumption, which 
causes additional inefficiencies in power generation.84 As indicated in Table 4-8, 
Azerbaijan’s economy is highly energy-intensive, even by the standards of the 
FSU. Compared with the unweighted average o f FSU countries, the energy 
intensity o f GDP in 1992 was about 55.8 percent higher and compared with the 
weighted average o f OECD countries, it was close to 10 times higher.
Construction accounted for eight percent o f GDP in 1990 and employed 
about nine percent o f total employment (see Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6). Due to 
lack of investments and foreign competition the construction sector has sharply 
declined since then and only accounts for four percent o f GDP in 1994, Most 
prestigious construction projects are reportedly carried out by Turkish firms. There 
are prospects for the sector once the work on the new pipeline routes has begun.
81 In May 1996 the consortium consisted of BP, with 17.1267 percent, Amoco with 17.01 
percent, SOCAR (State Oil Company of Azerbaijan) with 10 percent, Lukoil (Russian 
State Oil Company) with 10 percent, Unocal with 9.52 percent, Statoil (Norway) with 
8.5633 percent, Itochu (Japan) with 7.45 percent, TPAO (Turkish State Oil Company), 
with 6.75 percent, Exxon with 5 percent, Pennzoil with 4.8175 percent, Ramco with 
2.0825 percent, and DNKL with 1.68 percent. Itochu bought McDermott’s share of 
2.45% and 5% of Pennzoils original share of 9.8175%.
82 See also section 4.3.
83 Seven percent of energy is reportedly generated by hydropower stations mainly at 
Mingeshau and Shamkor. The power station at Mingeshau still consists partially of
equipment originating from reparations from Japan after World War II.
84 Briefings by energy sector employees to the author.
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Table 4-7: Energy balance
1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4
C r u d e  o il
( in  m il l io n s  o f  t o n s )  
P r o d u c t io n " 1 1 .7 1 1 .2 1 0 .3 9 .5
N et trade 4 .2 3 .5 1.4 1.8
Exports 8.3 5.4 1.6 1.8
Imports 4.1 1.9 0 .2
A p p a r e n t  u s e  b 7 .5 7 .7 8 .9 7 .6
N a t u r a l  g a s
( in  b i l l io n s  o f  c u b ic  m e te r s )  
P r o d u c t io n  ( n e t  o f  v e n t i n g ) c 8 .6 7 .8 6 .8 6 .2
N et trade -8 .2 -3 .9 -2 .5 -2 .5
Exports
Imports 8.2 3 .9 2 .5 2.5
L o s s e s 3 .1 2 .4 d a
A p p a r e n t  u s e 1 3 .7 9 .3 9 .3 8 .7
E n e r g y  t r a d e  b a la n c e -3 .1 - 0 .9 - 0 .4
a Production o f  A zeri crude o il.
b A pparent u se  eq u als production plus net imports.
c V ented  gas  is exclu ded .
d N o  data ava ilab le.
e D efin ed  in m illio n  tons o f  o il, w ith  one ton o f  oil eq u alling  1120 cu b ic  m etres o f  gas.
Source: IMF (1 9 9 5 : 6 4 )  and W orld B ank (1993 : 120).
Table 4-8: Comparative energy intensity in the FSU and OECD countries 
(1992)
C o u n try T P E S 7 G D P  ra tio s  
(to n n e s  o il eq u iv a le n t  p er  U SS  
‘0 0 0 )
TPEs® p er  ca p ita  
(to n n e s  o il e q u iv a le n t)
F S U  c o u n tr ie s  b 2 .7 8 4 .7 9
A zer b a ija n 4 .33 3 .6 9
B ela ru s 1.29 3 .7 6
E sto n ia 1.70 4 .7 4
K a zak stan 3 .44 5 .7 4
R u ssia 2 .6 9 7 .2 4
T u rk m en is ta n 3 .0 2 3 .4 5
U k ra in e 2 .98 4 .9 4
U zb ek ista n 3 .7 0 3.11
O E C D  c o u n tr ie s  * 0 .4 0 4 .8 4
C a n a d a 0 .55 7 .8 8
F r a n c e 0 .37 4 .0 3
G e rm a n y 0.41 4 .2 2
Ita ly 0 .3 2 2 .7 5
J a p a n 0 .26 3 .6 3
U n ited  K in g d o m 0.41 3 .7 4
U n ited  S ta te s 0 .43 7 .7 8
Total prim ary en ergy su p p ly  (TPES)
U n w eigh ted  average
W eighted  average o f  all O E C D  countries
Source: E B R D  (1 9 9 5 : 77)
Transport accounted for seven percent of GDP and employed eight percent 
of the labour force (see Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6). The sector is reportedly 
characterised by an inadequate infrastructure and lack o f maintenance. Both rail 
and road networks are focused on Moscow. Conflicts in Georgia beginning in 
J994, and the closing o f the northern trade route, in late 1994, due to the conflict 
in Chechnya, have been a further serious impediment to economic growth and
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development, hindering the flow o f production inputs and output distribution. The 
most important means o f transport have been rail and the Caspian sea fleet. 
Azerbaijan reportedly has a rail network of 2000 km. However, both railways and 
sea fleet are in a destitute situation. There has been practically no maintenance 
except for emergency work. In case of the railways it was reported that theft of 
equipment and installations, which are sold as scrap metal, is quite common.
The service sector including social services, education, culture and art 
have been given high priority in the past employing 34 percent o f the employed 
labour force and a 37 percent share of GDP in 1990 (see Figure 4-5 and Figure 4- 
6). Due to lack o f funding, education and health services are rapidly declining 
with many academics and doctors either emigrating or seeking employment in 
trading (i.e. small shops and operations) and other informal activities.
4.2.3 O verview o f the manufacturing sector
Besides the historically dominant oil industry Azerbaijan has been able to develop 
and maintain a diversified manufacturing sector, which was highly integrated into 
the economy o f the FSU (see Table 4-10 and Table 4-11). As discussed above, the 
main problems of the sector arise from (1) its extreme dependency on raw 
materials and intermediary goods, (2) disruptions in trade due to the conflicts in 
Georgia and Chechnya which led to a closure of trade routes, (3) changes in 
domestic relative prices and adoption of world market prices for raw materials and 
intermediary goods, (4) partially aggressive international competition combined 
with massive changes in consumption patterns all over the FSU, and (5) a largely 
dilapidated and obsolete capital stock which requires urgent upgrading and 
modernisation. Production has slumped in all branches over the last six years (see 
Table 4-11).
Table 4-10 indicates that heavy industry employed 47 percent of the 
industrial workforce and produced 39 percent o f industrial production in 1991 
(under the previous distorted pricing scheme). Heavy industry consists mainly of 
fuel industry (6% of industrial employment) which was already discussed above, 
metallurgy (5% of industrial employment), machine building including electrical
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machinery (26% of industrial employment), and the energy sector (5% of 
industrial employment). Nearly all industrial units of the metallurgical branch are 
organised under the Metalurkia State Company (see Table 4-12). This quasi­
holding structure has taken over the function of the All Union Ministry of Ferrous 
and Non-Ferrous Industries to which all enterprises had been previously
o r
subordinated. ' As Table 4-11 indicates, there has been a sharp decline in all 
products of this industry with steel production amounting only to 5.5 percent and 
steel pipes to 4.3 percent of 1989 output in 1994. Table 4-12 gives a short 
description o f the state and major problems of this company. Gold mining is 
organised under the State concern Azargizil. Industrial units o f the machine 
building and electrical machinery are organised under one state company and eight 
state production unions (see Table 4-18). A few enterprises are independent and 
directly subordinated to the CMA. Table 4-12 delineates the most important 
enterprises: (1) the State company Azarkimyamash, the quasi-holding company of 
the equipment industry for chemical and oil industry, and some o f its plants, (2) 
the most important plants o f the production union Tshinar, (3) the most important 
plants of the ’science-production' association Bakkonditionar, and two 
independent enterprises. As pointed out in Table 4-12, the oil field equipment 
industry used to be quite significant and constitutes the largest concentration of 
this branch after the United States. Production had sharply declined by 1994 with 
output constituting 5.6 percent in the oil equipment industiy and 7.1 percent in the 
pumping equipment industry of 1989 output (see Table 4-11). The air-conditioner 
plant has a monopoly in the FSU. Its official production amounted to 29.7 percent 
of 1989 output in 1994 (see Table 4-11).
The food and beverage industiy employed 14 percent o f the entire 
industrial workforce in 1991 (see Table 4-10). Due to the collapse o f the official 
agrarian sector, production in manufacture of food products and beverages has 
also plummeted. According to employees of the AME the industry satisfies only 
10 percent o f domestic demand. In an attempt to restore production by alleviating 
some of the control deficiencies of the centralised system, there have been a series 
of organisational changes since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which had
" Section 4.3 discusses the present forms of enterprise control in more detail.
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left the entire agricultural sector and the food industry under the control o f the 
Ministry o f Agriculture. The decentralisation of the Ministry and the creation of 
new administrative authorities reflected also the distributional struggle over 
resources (most eminently caviar and cotton) of different parts of the 
nomenklatura o f the agrarian-industrial complex. The industry is presently 
organised under the Ministry o f Agriculture, the state concern “Azarbalig” (fishing 
and fish processing), the state company “Azaryeyintisanaye” (processed food 
products), the state company “Tahil mahsullari dovlat shirkati” (bakery products), 
and the state concern “Azargushsanaye” (poultry). The state concern 
Azaryunsanaye” (wool), tobacco and cotton processing plants are also presently 
classified as belonging to the food processing industry. Figure 4-9 shows the 
present organisation chart. There has been severe criticism o f the fishing and fish 
processing state concern which supervises the Fishing Inspectorate as well as the 
fishing, as it would leave the fish reserves uncontrolled, leading to poaching and 
depletion o f sturgeon (i.e. caviar) and salmon in the Caspian Sea. Thus it is 
suggested that the function o f the Fishing Inspectorate is performed by the 
Ministry for Internal Affairs. The Light Industry State Concern (“khalg uchiin 
mallar konzerni”) would like the cotton processing under its own control. The 
grain milling and milling equipment industry which is reportedly in a very poor 
condition, is suggested to be included in the agricultural sector. Figure 4-10 shows 
the suggested new administrative structure o f the food and beverage industry. 
Organisational changes had not been carried out until February 1995.
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The Light industry employed 24 percent of the total industrial workforce in 
1991 (see Table 4-10). It is organised under the Khalg iichun mallar (people’s 
goods) state concern and includes household goods, textile industiy (i.e. spinning, 
weaving, and finishing o f textiles), and manufacture o f leather and fur products 
(including footwear). The light industiy and the people’s goods industiy 
(producing goods o f local significance, e.g. household goods, toys, etc.) were 
previously under exclusive republican ministerial control, which entailed a 
dependency on the republican budget for investments.86 As the republican budget 
was under a relatively harder budget constraint, these industries were starved of 
investments. According to CMA employees, 65 percent o f the production facilities 
are more than 20 years old. 80 percent of the enterprises are reportedly large (>300 
employees) and 20 percent medium sized (between 51 and 300 employees). After 
the disintegration o f the Soviet Union the Ministry of Light Industry and the 
Ministry of People’s Goods merged and renamed themselves into the ‘People’s 
goods state concern’, otherwise retaining their organisational structure. The textile 
industry accounts for 173 of the 251 industrial units. From 1989 to 1994 the 
production o f cotton fabric has fallen by 64.4 percent, o f silk and wool fabric 15 
percent, and o f knitted wear 75.5 percent (see Table 4-11). Despite the domestic 
production o f  cotton the industiy is highly dependent on inputs from other 
republics. For example, the domestically produced cotton thread is too thick for 
the knitted wear production facilities.
Manufacturing o f wood and paper products, which includes printing, is a 
relatively small industry, employing only 3 percent of total industrial employment. 
There is no local paper industiy. Timber production has fallen by 95.5 percent 
from 1989 to 1994. The industry is organised under the state production union 
Azarmasha.
The chemical industiy employed 6 percent o f total industrial workforce in 
1991 (see Table 4-10). It used to be directly controlled by the All Union Ministry 
of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry and is now organised under the 
State Company Azarkimya. The industry consists of 36 industrial units organised
86 The information of the following section is based on the author’s transcripts of 
interviews with the management and employees of plants, CMA and AME staff.
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in 11 production unions and factories (see Table 4-9). The Production Union 
Kimyasanaye used to produce 95 percent of the sulphanol supply o f the FSU. The 
decline o f production can be seen in Table 4-9 and Table 4-11.
Table 4-9: Capacity of main products of the state company Azarkimya
in th o u sa n d  to n s
P ro d u c tio n  U n io n / P ro d u c t C a p a city 1990 C a p a c ity
u tilisa tio n
1993 C a p a c ity
u tilisa tio n
P ro d u ctio n  U n io n  U z v iis in te r  
Polyethylen 156 4 9 .2 3 1 .5 19.2 12.3
Epoksid 15.4 9.9 64 .3 1.2 7.7
Polyether 10.8 4.3 3 9 .8 0.8 7.4
K alium 110 52.7 4 7 .9 6 .0 5.5
Epichiornidrin 24 13.3 5 5 .4 3 .8 15.8
D ichiorinethan 20 12.6 63 5 .2 26
P ro d u ctio n  U n io n  K im y a sa n a y e  
Sulphanol 143 130.4 9 1 .2 2 3 .3 16.3
Caustic soda 145 106.9 7 3 .7 4 8 .8 33 .7
A lk ilbenzol 30 - - - -
P ro d u ctio n  U n io n  S in te z k a u tsh u k  
Synthetic india rubber and latex 129 85.4 6 6 .2 9.3 7.2
P ro d u ctio n  U n io n  
S u m g a itm a isc h a tk im y a
Synthetic detergents 90.0 83.0 9 2 .2 3 9 .0 43 .3
P ro d u ctio n  U n io n  
A z a rr e z in te k h n ik a
C onveyer belts (0 0 0  item s) 3592 1248 3 4 .7 833 23 .2
B aku tire  fa c to r y  
tiers (0 0 0  item s) 1898 1122 59.1 2 3 4 .3 12.3
S u p e rp h o sp h a te  F a c to r y  
Phosphate fertiliser 214 150 70.1 2 0 .6 9.6
Sulphate acid n/a 4 5 2 .6 - 9 7 .2 -
P lastic  p r o c ess in g  F a c to r y  
P olyethylen  co v er  (0 0 0  tons) 12 6.1 50 .8 3 .2 26 .7
Polyethylen p ipes (0 0 0  tons) 7 1.7 24 .3 0 .23 0.3
B ak u  lo d in  fa c to r y
lodin  (ton) 70 70.3 100 .4 33.1 47.3
Calium iodin (ton) 140 4 9 .8 3 5 .6 33.1 2 3 .6
N ew  io d in b ro m  fa c to r y  in 
N eftsh a la
lodin 2 34 100 4 2 .7 75 32.1
B aku  C h e m ic a l-p h a r m a c e u tic s  
fa c to ry
M edication am pou les (0 0 0 ) n/a 20 6 .2 19
Tablets (0 0 0 ) 105 95 .9 91.3 4 6 .8 44 .6
Source: A zarkim ya State C om pany
The chemical industry is concentrated in Sumgait, which is situated on the 
Apsheron peninsula opposite to Baku and considered the biggest source of
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pollution o f the Caspian Sea.87 Before its decline, according to the Committee of 
Ecology and Environmental Control, the chemical industry emitted 112400 tons of
D O
hazardous substances per year into the atmosphere. Due to lack o f adequate 
purifying facilities for both industrial and domestic sewage the concentration of 
oil products in coastal waters around Sumgait exceed by five times the official 
permissible standards, heavy metals three times, and phenol eight times.89 
Sizeable investments have to be made in environmental protective measurements 
in the industry and most o f the facilities will have to be replaced. Even if the 
whole industiy were completely closed down, massive investments would be 
required to decontaminate the whole area.
Manufacture of building materials had a share o f 6 percent in total 
industrial employment (see Table 4-10). Table 4-11 shows a decline of 85.2 
percent in reinforced concrete and 66.4 in brick production between 1989 and 
1994. The decline is to a large extent due to the situation o f the construction 
sector. However, the quality o f the materials produced is also very poor, so that 
reportedly a lot o f building materials are imported, particularly from Iran and 
Turkey. The industry also does not facilitate domestic resources (e.g. clay) and 
uses inputs from other countries of the FSU. Investments are required in order to 
upgrade the quality o f production combined with utilising o f domestic resources.
87
In several v is its  to the industiy in Sum gait by the author in 1994 there had been always 
a thick acid sm oke over the w hole area, although by then m ost o f  the industries were no
longer even in operation.
88 The em ission  included 8 ,500 tons o f  solid substances, 13,090 tons o f  sulphur dioxide, 
1 1,800 tons o f  nitrous oxide, 42 ,6 0 0  tons o f  hydrocarbons, and 2 3 ,6 0 0  tons o f  carbon
m onoxide.
89 In recent years even  the poor facilities in place for sew age clean in g  w ere not working  
due to d ifficu lties in m aintenance (i.e. spare parts were m issing).
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4.2.4 Foreign investment
The early literature on the transition process in PCPEs awaited foreign capital to 
play a major role in the privatisation process, as foreign investors could provide 
capital, management skills and modern technology necessary for restructuring (cf. 
Mann 1991, Salvatore 1993). However, so far foreign investors have committed 
rather little capital to PCPEs in terms o f world-wide foreign direct investment (cf. 
Lavigne 1.995: 162-165; World Bank 1992). The role foreign investment is going 
to play in the privatisation process in Azerbaijan can be surmised by evaluating 
foreign investment activities so far.
The economic programmes of the recent years in Azerbaijan all had the 
strong intention o f attracting foreign capital (cf. ARNK 1992, 1993; ARMN 
1993). The majority o f interviewees pinned their hopes on foreign investments to 
play a major role in the reconstruction o f the economy. However, although a large 
number o f foreign investors have shown interest, overall foreign investment has 
been low at least until 1994 (see Table 4-13 and Table 4-14). Except for a few 
subsidiaries and representatives with mainly marketing function, foreign investors 
have mainly been active in joint ventures.92 In 1994 there have been 730 registered 
joint ventures with foreign direct investment totalling only US$81.6 million. 33 
percent (US$51.6 million) of total fixed investments were in petroleum-related 
manufacturing (see Table 4-13). Turkish investors have taken the lead both in 
numbers (329 joint ventures with Turkish participation) and capital investment 
(US$53.9 million) (see Table 4-14). Most joint ventures reportedly exist either 
only on paper or were not engaging in manufacturing as they had stated and were 
using tax and import privileges to engage in commercial and intermediary 
activities (see Table 4-17).93 The majority of the 236 operating joint ventures in 
1994 have been small-scale workshops such as bakeries, butcher shops, decorating
'  Briefings by AME employees to the author.
93 The law on ‘Enterprise Profit Tax’ (adopted in February 1992) exempts joint ventures 
with over 30% foreign participation for two years (or for three years if the enterprise is 
located in a mountainous region) from profit tax.
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firms, catering outlets etc. Presently large scale investments can be only expected 
in oil extraction in the form of production sharing with international oil companies 
as mentioned in section 4.2.2 and evaluated below.
The law on ‘the Protection of Foreign Investment* was adopted in January 
1992 in order to attract foreign investors.94 As discussed in Table 4-22 the law has 
several deficiencies. First, the law provides that nationalisation or expropriation of 
foreign property could only be carried out in the event o f ‘damaging popular and 
state concerns5, which leaves room for alternative interpretations. Second, the law 
guarantees that in case of nationalisation or expropriation foreigners are fully 
reimbursed. However, implementation mechanisms are not provided. Third, the 
law prescribes that green field investments have to undergo ecological and health 
and safety assessments. Again, rules and implementation mechanisms are not 
provided.
However, the whole legal framework has to be taken into consideration in 
an assessment o f whether the environment is conducive to foreign investment in 
Azerbaijan.95 A survey on investment legislation in PCPEs by the EBRD rated the 
legislation in Azerbaijan as not very conducive to investment (EBRD 1995: 101- 
117). The assessment of the EBRD (1995: 103) came to the following conclusion 
for Azerbaijan:
Legal rules are limited in scope and impose significant constraints on 
creating investment vehicles, adequate security over assets, or the 
repatriation of profits.
Legal rules are usually unclear and often contradictory and the availability 
of independent legal advice is very limited. The administration of the law 
is substantially deficient (e.g. little confidence in the abilities and 
independence of the courts, no or poorly organised security and land 
registers).
Corruption and unreliability of contracts is the direct result of the legal 
uncertainty. Potential foreign investors questioned about obstacles to foreign 
engagement saw the volatility o f informal payments demanded from various sides 
as a main problem. The present extreme level of corruption in the entire public
94 The law  is evaluated in m ore detail in Table 4-22.
95 For an assessm ent o f  the legal fram ework o f  econom ic activity in Azerbaijan, see 
section 4 .4 .
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administration paired with the unreliability of business practices makes even short 
term cost calculations impossible.96
It is therefore not surprising that foreign investment concentrates on the 
petrol production sharing projects (see section 4.2.2, Figure 4-11, and Table 4-15). 
Figure 4-11 shows the expected production of the AIOC (Azerbaijan International 
Operating Company) Consortium, which is exploring and developing the Azeri, 
Chirag, and deep water Guashli fields in the Azeri section o f the Caspian Sea. The 
state share ranges between 20 percent and 80 percent depending on the world oil 
price development and transport costs (cf. IMF 1995: 77).97
Figure 4-11: Production of the oil consortium
(in  m ill io n s  o f  tons)
Gross productioj
15
State's sta/re (incl. profit tax revenue)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Source: IM F
96 The author’s experiences in publishing can be taken as an illustration o f  the business 
environm ent o f  Azerbaijan: in her function as editor o f  an A zeri research journal the 
author requested quotations from several Azeri publishing houses for the printing o f  the 
journal. It has to be m entioned that none o f  the publishing h ouses offered an official 
price list. She negotiated with one publishing house the price o f  U S $ 6 0 0  for the print job. 
One w eek  later, w hen she actually wanted to collect the printed journal, she was 
informed that the print job  had not been done yet and that it w ould  cost n ow  U S $1 ,500  to 
get it done. She w ent to another publishing house and negotiated a price o f  U S$900 . The 
journal w as printed 6 w eeks after the contractual agreed tim e on paper far below  the 
quality agreed upon. The journal has now  a contract with a Turkish publisher. The author
can think o f  m any other exam ples.
97 The indicated state share does not include the SO C AR  contribution.
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Table 4-15 provides the investment, production, profit and total net foreign 
exchange inflow projection o f the AIOC Consortium Production Sharing Contract. 
The projected total investment amounts to US$7.5 billion over 15 years with first 
crude oil exports expected in 1997 (cf. IMF 1995: 77). The second phase of the 
project involving the development of new fields is dependent on the pre­
commitment o f a main pipeline route. Total net foreign exchange inflows from the 
AIOC Consortium Production Sharing Contract will until 2006 be below US$2 
billion and until 2015 around US$2 billion. There are other production sharing 
contracts in the pipeline.
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Table 4-14: Joint Ventures in Azerbaijan according to country of foreign 
partner (April 1994)
Country o f foreign 
partner
Number of 
Joint 
Ventures
Fixed 
Investment 
(USS mill.)
Azeri share 
(USS mill.)
Foreign 
share 
(USS mill.)
Afghanistan 5 0.012 0.0039 0.0090
Austria 8 0.588 0.3380 0.2509
Belgium 1 0.010 0.0000 0.0100
Belarus 2 0.003 0.0000 0.0033
Bulgaria 4 0.038 0.0101 0.0283
Canada 1 0.006 0.0032 0.0032
China 6 0.446 0.2245 0.221
Cyprus 5 0.181 0.0815 0.0797
Czechoslovakia 4 11.154 5.6882 5.4660
Denmark 1 0.000 0.0002 0.0003
Egypt 1 0.010 0.0000 0.0100
France 4 ' 0.260 0.1062 0.1541
Georgia 2 0.002 0.0002 0.0022
Germany 21 1.114 0.6546 0.4594
Hungary I 0.010 0.0000 0.0100
India J 14.152 7.0759 7.0767
Iran 148 2.653 0.9666 1.6866
Ireland 1 0.003 0.0008 0.0026
Israel 6 5.916 3.0073 2.9094
Italy 1 0.015 0.0000 0.0153
Kazakhstan 1 0.000 0.0002 0.0004
Korea 1 0.001 0.0000 0.0016
Latvia 2 0.001 0.0005. 0.0007
Lithuania 2 0.060 0.0000 0.0501
Libya J 0.077 0.0523 0.0248
Malta 2 0.056 0.0287 0.0275
Moldova 1 0.002 0.0000 0.0021
Netherlands J 0.009 0.0032 0.0066
Norway 2 0.001 0.0004 0.005
Pakistan 2 0.029 0.0140 0.0151
Poland 3 0.018 0.0075 0.0103
Russia 65 1.120 0.2903 0.8304
Saudi Arabia 1 0.070 0.0351 0.0351
Spain 2 0.029 0.0206 0.0094
Sweden nJ 0.065 0.0330 0.0271
Switzerland 15 0.363 0.1133 0.2898
Syria 1 0.006 0.0000 0.0066
Turkey 329 108.057 54.1430 53.9140
Ukraine 11 9.014 0.0015 0.0103
United Arab 
Emirates
6 0.221 0.0763 0.1448
United Kingdom 11 0.239 0.1410 0.0978
USA 38 9.171 1.4883 7.6834
Uzbekistan 1 0.008 0.0000 0.0083
Total 730 156.168 74.6207 81.5482
Source: AME
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4.3 The existing enterprise forms and current governance
As discussed above, in the debate about privatisation in PCPEs de facto property
no
rights and the problem of insider control is widely neglected. It is generally 
assumed that the state holds the control rights o f its enterprises. However, 
problems o f insider control and spontaneous privatisation have shown, that an 
understanding o f existing property rights given by law or through informal 
conventions and customs is vital for the discussion on privatisation and enterprise 
reform. An assessment o f existing property rights is central when effects and the 
process o f changes in property rights are examined." Existing enterprise forms 
and current governance give important clues on the current position of 
stakeholders in the contracting process.
In the Soviet command economy, enterprise control was imposed through 
a highly centralised administrative structure. Besides intentional politically based 
discretion on the budget constraint of enterprises, the control deficiencies o f the 
centralised, hierarchical Soviet system provided much scope for soft budget 
constraints to arise.100 In 1980 the industrial sector was managed by 35 branch 
ministries (24 all-union and 11 union-republic) which held the de facto property 
rights o f the industries (Schroeder 1992: 222, 224). Only so-called "local" industry 
(producing goods o f local significance, e.g., household goods) were directly 
controlled by exclusive republic-level ministries (Bahry 1991: 218). Throughout 
the 1980s several attempts at reform were made under Gorbachev aimed at 
altering the role o f the central ministries, by consolidating ministries, reducing 
their staff, and introducing new over-arching Bureaux to oversee activities of 
groups of related ministries. However, inconsistent and contradictory reforms in 
the industrial sector led to ever larger industrial concentration and weakening of
98 For a m ore detailed d iscussion  o f  insider control, see section 2 .1 .2  and 2.3 .
"  For a theoretical analysis o f  contracting for property rights, see  section  2.1. For an 
analysis o f  the process in Azerbaijan, see  chapter seven.
100 The enterprise-control problem s o f  the classical centrally planned econom y are w ell 
docum ented in the literature. See for exam ple, H ewett (1988 ), H ohm ann (1981), Kosta 
(1984 ) and W ineicki (1988).
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central control (Schroeder 1992: 233). 101 By the beginning o f the 1990s the highly 
centralised mechanism o f enterprise control had gradually disintegrated leaving 
state organs powerless and individual managers with omnipotent rights o f control. 
By 1991 there had been four enterprise forms in Azerbaijan, discussed below:
(1) state enterprises (i.e. state companies, concerns, and production unions, also 
known as associations);
(2) co-operatives (of producer and consumer type);
(3) lease enterprises; and
(4) commercial enterprises (i.e. joint ventures and small enterprises).
Table 4-16 gives details on the distribution of employment between different 
forms of enterprises. Table 4-17 presents the number and sizes o f different forms 
of enterprises.
Table 4-16: Distribution of employment by form of enterprise in Azerbaijan: 
1991-1993 (000s)
1991 1992 1993
T o ta l em p lo y m e n t 289 8 274 3 2 6 8 0
S ta te  e n terp r ise s 1529.3 1128.2 1081
P u b lic  in s t itu tio n s 28 2 5 .2 2 7
C o lle c tiv e  farm s 33 2 .2 380.1 3 6 0
C o -o p e ra tiv es 167.9 130 .9 137
P r o d u ce r  c o -o p . 82 .5 49 .3 55
C o n su m er  c o -o p . 85 .4 81 ,6 82
J o in t-s to ck  c o m p a n ie s 11.2 * *
L eased  en te r p r ise s * 92 95
J o in t  V en tu r es * 2.3 3
P r iv a te  e n terp r ise s 3 4 0 .5 356.1 3 5 8
P r iv a te  farm s 2.3 3
S erv ice s 3 4 0 .5 3 5 0 .8 3 5 0
O th ers 3 5
* no data available. 
Source: A M E
Table 4-17: Number of enterprises according to form (December 1994)
E n terp r ise  fo rm N u m b e r  o f  en terp r ise s P e r  u n it
re g is tered fu n c tio n in g a v er a g e a v e r a g e
n u m b er  o f tu rn o v er
em p lo y e es (U S S *)
S m all en terp r ise s 2 4 .2 5 6 11,391 11 1249
C o -o p e ra tiv es 3 ,5 5 4 1,730 10 576
L eased  e n terp r ise s 804 718 96 4 5 7 3 2
J o in t  v en tu res 730 236 2 6 2 1 5 9 5
* U SS 1 =  A z M 4 1 8 2  
Source: A SSC ; ow n ca lcu la tion s.
101 For an account o f  this period particularly under G orbachev, see  A usland (1991), 
Gregory and Stuart (1994: 227-344 , 1995: 47-92), Jeffries (1992: 3 1 -3 9 ), H ew ett (1988), 
N ove (1989: 3 7 9 -3 8 9 ), Radygin (1995: 7-19, 27-32), and Schroeder (1 9 9 2 ).
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(1) State en ter prises
The all Union law ‘on the State Enterprise (Association)’ adopted in July 1987 
and amended in 1989 showed the way to branch ministries and their republican 
departments for securing omnipotent control rights over ‘their ow n’ enterprises by 
changing their legal forms into state companies, concerns, associations, etc., also 
referred to as ‘nomenklatura-bureaucratic privatisation’102 (Radygin 1995: 28).103 
Immediately after independence o f Azerbaijan this process was completed on a 
republican level, transforming republican departments o f all Union branch 
ministries into some kind o f holding company. Nearly all enterprises or industrial 
units respectively are organised under either state holding companies, concerns, or 
production unions, also referred to as associations. There are 50 such 
organisations covering nearly all production spheres of Azerbaijan (see Table 4- 
18).
All these holdings are subordinated to the CMA. However they hold 
reportedly de facto property rights over their enterprises. As former nomenklatura 
members, managers o f these holding companies are reportedly well entrenched 
into patronage networks of the political elite and often themselves hold political 
posts, e.g. are members of parliament. Accordingly, governance mechanisms of 
and within these holding structures are blurred, with management and control 
from the centre not well defined. De jure the governance structure has been 
determined by the old all Union legislation ‘on the State Enterprise (Association)
10^" Radygin (1995: 28) describes the process of nomenklatura-bureaucratic privatisation 
as follows:
The basic forms found in this type o f privatisation are as follows:
a) ‘incorporation’ o f  the branch o f industry with the controlling block o f  shares of 
enterprises being in the hands o f the ministry;
b) ‘concemisation’ o f the branch of industry: what happens in this case is that the 
ministry is transformed into a concern with the delegation o f  rights to it in the area 
o f  the management o f the state property;
c) creation o f a sectoral association (which is similar to a concern);
d) delegation o f  rights to manage state property, including the rights o f managing 
state-controlled blocks o f shares;
e) incorporation o f large enterprises, retaining controlling o f  shares in the hands o f  
the ministry and some other measures.
103 For an account of the effects of all Union law ‘on the State Enterprise (Association)’, 
see Frydman et al. (1993b: 18-19; 22-23), Gregory and Stuart (1995: 58-59), Jeffries 
(1992: 32-34), Radygin (1995: 27-29), and Schroeder (1992: 224-226).
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until the new legislation was finally introduced in November 1994. However, the 
new legislation only makes reference to the governance structure of joint stock 
companies (see Table 4-22). The old legislation had given significant powers to 
the general meeting o f the labour collective, however as reported in interviews, 
labour* collectives have currently little decision power and managerial interests 
remain predominant in Azerbaijan. The relationship between single managers and 
the superordinated holding structures can be described as paternalistic. The 
holding structures protect their enterprises against unstable economic conditions 
and unwanted reforms and seek rents in the form of indirect subsidies (e.g. cheap 
credits, inputs etc.). The managers of the holding structures, here termed as an 
industrial bureaucracy, appear besides enterprise insiders (dominated by 
managers) as another stake holder in the contracting process.104
104 See also section 7.2.
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(2) Co-operatives
According to Table 4-17 there have been 3,554 co-operatives registered in 1994, 
of which 1,730 were actually functioning and operating on a very small scale. Co­
operatives accounted for 6% of total employment (167,900 employees) in 1991, 
which fell to 5% (137,000 employees) in 1993 (see Table 4-16).
51 % o f all employees working in the co-operative sector were employed in 
so-called consumer co-operatives. In 1993 the latter accounted for 60% of 
employment in co-operatives (see Table 4-16). Consumer co-operatives had 
already been a familial* feature in Soviet times. They were limited to agriculture 
and consumer services, however, little resembling co-operatives in the profit and 
decision power-sharing sense (cf. Frydman et al. 1993b: 26). The formation of 
producer co-operatives was only allowed in the late 1980s by the all Union law 
‘on Co-operatives’, enacted in June 1988, and amended in 1989 and 1990 
(Frydman et al. 1993b: 26). Producer co-operatives were reportedly mainly 
established within state enteiprises making use o f their assets and inputs, and can 
be regarded as a form o f spontaneous privatisation (cf. Radygin 1995: 10). The all 
Union law ‘on Co-operatives’ which was still in force in 1994 in Azerbaijan, 
made governance provisions involving a general meeting o f members, with a one- 
person-one-vote rule regardless of contributions, deciding upon all major 
questions (e.g. election of executive body, charter amendments, etc.) (Frydman et 
al. 1993b: 26-27). However, producer co-operatives in Azerbaijan reportedly 
resemble far more the classical owner-manager firm. However, producer co­
operatives in Azerbaijan employed only two percent of the total workforce in 1993 
and are, therefore, o f little significance (see Table 4-16).
(3) Lease enterprises
Lease enterprises are another development of the late 1980s and early 1990 and 
constitutes the most popular form o f insider privatisation (Radygin 1995: 11). 
Leases were reportedly nearly always assigned to insiders and the respective 
enterprises are mostly operating within the framework of the subordinated holding 
structure. There have been 804 registered leased enteiprises in 1994 of which 718
193
were functioning (see Table 4-17). Leased enteiprises are significantly bigger than 
co-operatives with an average of 94 employees (see Table 4-17).
(4) Commercial enterprises
There are presently three kind of commercial enterprises operating in Azerbaijan: 
(1) small private enteiprises (mostly in the trade and service sector), (2) joint stock 
companies, and (3) joint ventures. Small enterprises had already been promoted in 
the Soviet period (cf. Schroeder 1992: 223). There has been considerable thought 
directed towards the promotion of small and medium sized enterprises by the 
policy makers in Azerbaijan. In 1992 the National Small Enterprise Support Fund 
was set up under the State Committee on Anti-monopoly Policy and Support for 
Entrepreneurship.107 In January 1993 a ‘State Programme on the Development of 
Entrepreneurship in Azerbaijan’ was passed by parliament. However, small 
enterprise development is a difficult process under the given institutional 
inadequacies. In 1994 there have been 24,256 registered small enteiprises of 
which only 11,391 were operating (see Table 4-17). Sixty percent o f functioning 
small enterprises have been operating in the trade sector (see Table 4-19).
Table 4-19: Functioning small enterprises according to branches (December 
1994)___________________ ______________________________________________
Branch Number of enterprises Percentage share
Industry 1,594 14
Agriculture 797 7
Construction 912 8
Trade 6,835 60
Other branches 1,253 11
Total 11,391 100
Source: ASSC
Table 4-20 presents the volume of production of important goods in small 
enterprises. Small enterprises have a significant market share in the production of 
reinforced concrete, textiles, and wine.
Table 4-21 displays the list o f joint stock companies registered in 1994. 
Most joint stock companies were established before independence. The majority 
are owned by state enterprises or directly by nomenklatura members and are
107 See A R D A S S K K  (1994  a, b, c, d).
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engaged in trade and services (see Table 4-21). The existing joint ventures are 
only small operations run by their immediate owners and bear no resemblance to 
western jo int stock companies. New legislation on joint stock companies was only 
passed in July 1994 and has been in force since November o f the same year (see 
Table 4-22).
Table 4-20: Production of important goods in small enterprises
(December 1994) _________________________________ __________________
G o o d U n it o f  
m ea su rem en t
P ro d u c tio n P e r c e n ta g e  o f  to ta l 
p ro d u ctio n
O il equipm ent U S $** 3211 0.4
Cem ent tons 12,500 3.2
Stone-bricks thous. Units 90 0 *
Bricks thous. Units 4 0 0 0.9
A shlar-bricks thous. sqm 2 3 .8 6.4
R einforced concrete thous. m 3 6 0 0 34 .6
Sanitary ceram ics thous. units 4 0 0 1.3
Paint tons 3 5 4 *
Footw ear thous. units 56 1.9
Knitted fabric thous. units 50 0.3
H osiery thous. units 98 0.5
Jackets units 7 ,3 4 8 2 9 .2
C lothing thous. units 56 3 3 .8
M eat tons 1,180 15
Sausages tons 179 5.7
Tins o f  fo o d thous. units 1 ,664 1.2
W ine thous. decilitres 2 53 2 2 .2
* no data availab le
* * U S $  1 =  A z M 4 1 8 2  
Source: A S S C ; ow n calculations.
Table 4-21: Joint-stock companies in Azerbaijan in 1994
Name Description
1. lnsan
2. Inter-A rt-Prakson
3. J. & A . K orporasiya
4. Tliran
5. Khilsar
6. A zerb. M aliyyti Shirked
7. A zerb, Investisiya  Shirketi
S. EnerzhigurashdYrma
9. A u d it-B rok-S erv is
10. A zerbayjan Stlnaye Tichardt Evi
11. A V V A -K ed r
12. K aspian
13. B irzhalararaslj B roker IttifagT
14. BakV-M os-A udit
15. A Z .C T K  Ticharat Evi
16. A zer-B eyt
17. E leks B ir liy i
18. S ov in
19. K habSr-Servis
20 . A zsilik o l
21. A rzy
22. Fantaziya K om m ersiya
23. Y en ilik
24. A R K O
25. KQral
26. A zerenerzh im an ziltik in ti
27. AzgOr
28 . R A R
29. A zerbaychan-SpU tnik
30 . R estllog lil Istehs. KorporasiyasY
31 . B akssj
32 . Tajir-Tijardt Evi
33. S him ali A zdrbayjan
34, Azdrbdlvanm etaltijardttdjhizat
35 . Inform atika E lm i-T ek hn ik i K om pleksi
36. Inje LTD
37. A zn eftm ash
38. Kenje
39. 1 V M
40. Shiifa
41 . N erm in e
42 . FD S
43 . Taleh Isieh sa l-K om m ersiya  FirmasY
44 . A T R A
45 . S parkm eng-Star
4 6 . E h ersh itek h yen ilesh d irm e
47. B E K S
48. FO R T -Info-lnk.
49 . Karshi ln tem esh n al Import End Export Ink. BakY
50. Elm ar-Garant
51. A N S
52. E L S -A Z A L -E xp ress
53. Elm arbank
54. Kh&zri
55. H idrokhtlsiisitik in ti
56. A R A N S
57. R tlztlbank
58. A zintilr
59 . lnshan
60. A rkha
61. Azerb. H aig  B irsh asi
62. A tash
63. Shdrg-Gdrb
64. A zlitbalkan
65. Tiirkan KorporasiyasY
66. A zturkm etal
67. C avalan FirmasY
Trade.
S c ien tific  research, sc ie n tific -tec h n ic a l projects.
Trade.
Trade.
C onstruction  and Transport eq u ip m en t m anufacturer. 
Financial services.
Financial services.
Technical installations and repairs.
C om m erce.
C om m erce, brokerage.
C om m erce.
Trade.
Trade.
Legal serv ices and trade,
Trade.
Tourism ,
C arpets, tex tiles , sh oes, and construction  material production. 
Trade and technical serv ices.
Printing and p ub lishing.
M etal p rocessin g  and trade.
Trade,
C onstruction m aterials, tech n ica l serv ices, and tourism . 
C om m erce.
C onstruction and refurbishm ent.
M arketing, trade, and tourism .
C om m erce and con stru ction  m aterials.
C onstruction.
Trade.
T ourism ,
C om m erce and con stru ction  m aterials.
Insurance.
Trade.
C om m erce and tech n ica l serv ices .
Trade.
S cien tific-tech n ica l con su ltin g .
C om m erce, construction  and refurbishm ent.
Trade, com m erce and m a ch in e parts production.
Trade and tourism .
C om m erce.
Commerce.
C om m erce, construction  and refurbishm ent.
C om m erce.
C om m erce.
C om m erce, trade, and refurbishm ent,
Trade.
C om m erce and sad d le  m aker.
Trade and C onstruction.
C om m erce, m arketing and exh ib ition  organisers.
Trade and m arketing.
Insurance.
C om m erce and freight forwarder.
Transport, com m erce and con stru ction  m aterial production. 
B anking,
Trade and banking.
U nknow n.
U nknow n.
U nknow n.
U nknow n.
U nknow n.
U nknow n.
U nknow n.
U nknow n.
U nknow n.
U nknow n,
U nknow n,
U nknow n.
U nknow n.
Source: S uprem e S o v ie t  o f  A zerbaijan; and author's in vestigations.
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4 A  Legal framework for economic activity
The legal framework provides the formal rules for economic activity and its 
formation is a vital part o f the institutional preconditions for an effective market 
environment. Particularly for the newly emerging private and quasi-private sector, 
and hence successful formal privatisation, legal rules must be in place to minimise 
market failure and to alleviate the uncertainty in long-term investment. However, 
first experiences in PCPEs have shown that the bare adoption of laws does not 
guarantee their de facto use (cf. EBRD 1995: 101-117).108 Thus the emphasis 
purely on the drafting and adoption of legislation is not adequate, as inaccessible 
and poorly administered and enforced rules are ineffective.109
Table 4-22 provides an evaluation of the status of major legislation for
economic activity in Azerbaijan.
The legal framework has to be assessed on three levels:
1. the drafting and accessibility of laws, i.e. whether laws are clear and
predictable, whether they are suitable for the local context, and whether they 
are widely disseminated;
2 . effective administration of laws, i.e. clear allocation o f  responsibilities to 
different executive organs (e.g. police, prosecution services, tax inspectorate 
etc.), effective co-ordination between them, and sufficient funding;
1 OS M ost consultants w ho w ere appointed to assess the legal environm ent in Azerbaijan
concentrated on w hether important laws existed and rarely checked w hether they w ere de
facto im plem ented.
1 0 9
International organisations often tried to assist the legislature by p aying expensive  
foreign consultants to support the preparation o f  laws. B esid es problem s arising from  
lack o f  know ledge o f  given  institutions in the host country, there have been extrem e 
language problem s in the n ew ly  independent states o f  the FSU . L aw s are drafted in the 
new  offic ia l languages o f  the respective countries w hilst there are no international 
lawyers w ho actually com m and these languages, particularly the legal term inology. 
There are hardly any sp ecia list legal translators for these languages, on ly  for Russian. 
The majority o f  the population cannot com prehend legal term inology. A zeri Turkish can 
at least be understood with a know ledge o f  Turkey Turkish. Legal term inology is derived 
from Farzi and Arabic and is very sim ilar to the Turkey Turkish usage. H ow ever Kazakh, 
U sbek and other Turkik languages can only be com prehended on a very basic level.
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3 . effective judicial enforcement of laws, i.e. well funded and financially and 
politically independent judiciary, which effectively incorporates new 
legislation.110
As indicated in Table 4-22 the Azeri legal framework embodies grave 
deficiencies on all three assessment levels. Concerning the first level, there is 
considerable uncertainty whether old all Union legislation is still in force in cases 
where new Republican legislation is less comprehensive. Further, uncertainty 
arises as wide discretion is granted to the president, the prime minister, and the 
ministers to modify rules without prior consultation by way o f executive decree. 
Moreover draft laws are hardly made public. Thus various stakeholders (e.g. 
administrative agencies, courts) have no opportunity to include their comments.
Concerning the second assessment level, laws are not effectively 
administered as there is neither a clear demarcation o f responsibilities between the 
various arms o f the executive (e.g. police, prosecution services, tax inspectorate 
etc.) nor an effective co-ordination between them. The executive bodies are all 
poorly funded, regarding both personnel and infrastructure. There are reportedly 
power struggles between different executive bodies to gain more control over 
certain responsibilities (e.g. tax collection) as these grant higher informal income. 
The different executive bodies seem to be preoccupied with informal income 
generation.
Concerning the third assessment level, the judiciary is poorly funded, 
which critically reduces effective judicial enforcement o f laws. However, it is still 
too early to assess the judicial enforcement of laws as there is no track record of 
judicial decisions in business disputes etc. So far the co-ordination between the 
courts and executive bodies like the police and the prosecution services is 
reportedly poor.
110 T hese criteria are also  used by EBRD (1995: 101-107) for the evaluation o f  how  
conducive the legal fram ework is to foster investment.
Ta
bl
e 
4-
22
: 
St
at
us
 o
f 
leg
isl
at
io
n 
on 
ec
on
om
ic 
ac
tiv
ity
 
(F
eb
ru
ar
y 
19
95
)
G
C
CJ
c
P
<L>
X>
Oc
X!
C
0
3P
JS
-CJ
cd
*
GCP
O
X33X
P «G pP
E X3O
O
O
(X,
in£
&
PG
G
Oo
a  cO qj
X  p 
G  5 
§  to
G^  G 
P Oto '+3 2u  .5
« ’H
o  oI
O TJg c G CO
cobo
°3 ‘G !bb
w “  w
2 - 8  rt Ci t
P  , P  cr
<D to
P p  .
o tK S^  ^  COft-. •—
x  w) p
o p
o
j v  to
G  G  
G
OP o 
•—> <+-. 
G  o
cu
CO CJ
-t—■ • — t-G "P to3 -S x: o  p  b  
o  x  o
~ -  c2to to ^  
p  P £•>
co p  c  <30 o Gt  -o oO C •he is .s
co
p
cr
OJZ
E
EoU
co
Gs ^P P
p2 0 G CXp
’S 0p c £X O P \£3 G c0
c Jo
*aa
cd c 2  O
QJ
g  o
fc
p  X  J3
2 pb  p
G P0 0 o -Q
P
cd 0^  
oj cd
cd u_ cj 
’ O (4-,
J* » ‘H
p
. .  o
, 2  to
o  p  
G w '£ «
C «
P  to 
Xi P 
P •"
-a
^  -SJ
5 * 
—  >6 0  p 0 0o
p
a ,
cx
<
?- b
O co 
OJO P
G >
£
_p
Xcx
pco
OOf-
Qn
— P
S Q
. 2  p
3 I 1
‘413 co 
co ^  
C <K
8 |  
^ p
P "±3 
•G ^  
to >? G -G
2
-O O
P x>.£; c b p 2 —t-
2  g  p  +-*
s »
G ‘S 
P -o
*+- E0 o
p  ib  to T*.3 c 
E -8
1 E
"p ”2w> .5
CL»
X! ^  +3 Q
4-T 1
2 c
CO O 
Q, ‘P  
CX JO
<  CO
'5 b
P T3 
_P T3
o- £  8
C to to G3
G
G  M U
co ^  *^ 3 • cd .J2 tb Ofi
p  tU •p
p p
12o
JGH
^  .£ 2  JS c 
o .2 
w b  
p  b  
-O- -  co 
Co o
& pc
g s
0
to
”co CJ
‘m  -a
£  5  & cx to £p
g  ^
S c
P CJ) 
i—i c
^ b 
^  2 
H  T3
CO 2 8 * 
t o  "ttC
S su
b
G
O
O
’>oco‘c
D
"p
!2o
p
b  t2c
p
E G_  O 
U)
ou. 
CX 
O 
G 
P 
t-
P 
P
g-TD 
to p  
G
5  P 
T3 '+3 
p  p
& -a
p b  
p *>
2  p"
vT *423
£  g
GJ ^
CU o
s gIX G
> 2 • r  p
p
E
+-. to
<L> Pb  CO
P 3
t o  S
2  -G -
w -G ^P > P
C -  o
p  co t—1
P I  &u J5 aj
'o  cJ3 P O&i) a  u
' C G 0  3 ’*”* 
. C 
OP P 
> C!<
£ o 
O* o
co -a  
P CJ
p
3
T3
[>
.Ex-o
p
P X. X!
- I-S
a> . _
o  £  G
*2 w °1 
rt 'co -o 
* 0  P p  
P -O G 
G (n CG 
O b  P 
'G G T3 c 2 ,
P ST O
E -8 e
co P P
<  .S p
.5 co
G 3  to rn P ^
G
x  .2O
2  ‘E
G ^  
O ^
co p; 
qj -G
•G 2 P 
.£3 C
Be 00 CJ) C  
C -G
•B G ■
co 1+3
'r \  0  Q  "O
J3  3
p § s* ^  U-iifl ^
irr ** «^  c T3
3  o  3w *_rj .ti
■E , p  S
c 2  a .  T3 
o  c
-  u  « ,
i>< B 1p _G
u  o  - 2  
. 2  X.
B  G o 
<+-. ,SP C
■G
G
P
CJ)
G
X
E
o
o
G
P
~o
G
P
C
O
os_
X
P
P
-o
G
P
P
1—,tofc
G
<+-.
O
P
■P P
P
X
O G  G toa  g  
cp p
0 0
G
G
C
P
X
O n
O n
g
Q
X)
E
p
CJ
p
Q
3
-W
CO
I
tb
pUd
Q
C G
.2 .2
5  ^  '4^jto ^ to S 
C co G to
o  '5b o  ‘5b
Z  S  2 : Ja
c
o
p  J 2
C co
o  '5bZ to
W)
_p
p
£
_p
CO
'5b
a
c  CO ^
O M P ^  to ^
& 
p
Ml
P
J
O
U
p
G
O
>
U
pG
O
. 2
d
up
E
E
o
U
S c  c 0 
■S U
x
o
CO
c
UJ
■3
E
3
U
<
,1 tJ£ c
tap
CJ tjn 
C
00 •
£  c
3  3
— O
>> O
M «
g  3
<tf QJ
VI
^  Go g
O  0  
«  .£  -J T3
3
XJ 0 
Cd ■;Td C *
& 323
o
c u
cd o> c C/l+-« ocd o
G C
c r a>
nri o CJ
n> X>
a cd XJ
U5 n a t/>
cl> <d JU <u
T3 t*-* x:
G a > a)
a> o
cd
(d cd
JD , 1 w 00
O C n»n
T5 On b:
id ON nrl XJT-~« cd cd
CJ U 
C  C
3
o
X)
3
c/l
**=* iP  
- 3
K  o  
. a>
B -i*\
O J 3  
£  S
c
'M s .  S
I S "o o &0
c j  t i  ©S- S £2
R  >-
e  «  £■« d J 3  
£  c  e
H  3  c j
OG
00
C
.2
cd
oo
0X)
QJ
m
on
op
ol
y
ef
fe
ct
iv
e.
Se
e 
ab
ov
e.
£
£
©
U
3  3
ST «
3  3
£2 £
3  ■£  QJ 3c  cr
CJ CJ 
L i L«
^  £> 
£  3
c  a
w . IX 33© fa±S w 
«  CL
£r> o -° 
+-. "OC  CJ
«  to 
£  ~  CJ '—'
b0 cn 
3  ©
s so >
3  CJ3  <U
QJ XJ
3  00 uJ CJ
3  QJ
3  XCCL 3CL .52
C/0 X) CJ <U
CJ) c/j
©  3
QJ o o
oo OO oo oo
2  J5
© CJ
S! 011?
© 3
QJ 3
00 (2 3  M-l
CJ QJ
P- a  o
QJ
o  Cl 
X  C l  c  
QJ 3  CJ
3  3
<U
C .© *3 
■© «3 TJ
£ 5 
« E
Q  3
‘O  <N
3 -  g!
CN 
OSi- .£
—  C J o
Os
-  «8 Z -
I  o  S
G  X>_2r> "3 £
3  QJ ©  -5J-
^  E g os
CiO
£
CJ
2 :
OJD
QJ
. J
> L-
3  £— c
> s  LU
g  c  
CL o £ y  o  
U
o
LO w
E=
3CL
£
o
U
x
CD
l b  L-.
3 3  O
&  ~  cr Q CL
co Cd
>o
X>
cO
<d
cd
CO
<d 2  on 3
■3 . 2" 
•■—11L— T3 
O  E  
ID 3  on 10 
KJ <D
t :  3
O  CO
■ p  2lo b
CD ’— 1 
- G  CD
’*-■ - E
s cn
«  2  
on a  c  0 
' C  £
cd C L
2  O  «2 2
r9  <d 
b >  X )
b  S  
§  2
2  w
o 0 C C 
c o  2  
c o
CD
o  _
C2/ "o 
„ c
CO 03
1) CD
£  slZ -3 H  { _
2  CD3 O 
O CO
0 0. 2  s
ID  b  O
6 J0  O  * 1CO JS 2  
E CD g
3  b  • “S J§ ■?
b w o.O JC cb^  W> to 
IO p i5 O  U-« o u« a>
S c 
«  o
C L  •*—« ^  +-1 9* o  r a  ^
> 55 X> 
2  O  - o  
PU tJ 5  
O  P<— ! C/32 . x  — «+-.
o  . . .
• ■ __ CO
CD 3  c/5
o  t o
<D
c/>
CO U
fli
x  2
0 J2t  Eb  co1  •£ 
10
r -
b  e
CO
> ^  -a  o  l  2  &0 ,0 o  
p  2  
2  £  o
O  to ^
f r ' s  £
X
o
i n
CD
C
<Dx>
X)
ID
>
o
L -
CL
CL
CO
e
o
e
x
c
CO
o
co
2  e
E £T
co c
■*-> e  
b  3  2 - c  
E p* -  CD
c/3 „  CD
^ y\ xO  *■; c
(Db  O  co CO 
• r  l  u. > 3  <D
0 5  x3-i O  cr Q .  O  - 3
- E  CO
O  C
b °CL co 
O CD 
E CL
on B
CO <D
3  co
on —
CD Oon 3
S  "co 
x  'on
CD P
CO CD
CO CO
CL CD
P  ' oO 3rS rr»
2  g3 O
S  ^?  o
2 2
X I
B
X
B
co
3 
a
2  
3
CL
c/T 
C
.2 H
cd
CO
* B  CD
cO coKn ■ r™1
E E
x
E
CO
t :
o
C lCL
3
X
ECO
B
o
on
2
on
B
t s
oClCla
CO
LVon _  
o  &
£ I
2  qj
B
2  32  co 
B
«  . 2cd n  
co co
■C .S3
&  g  2  S)
c  b
CD o
1_ ✓—I.
1 3  CO . 2  CD 
CD C  
CD O
O _
2  . 2  
^  2
g  £
-C  L— 
^  &
w  rn LO 23 E 
o  g  
c  o  
• 2  ,co o >
b  2
O  CL 
CL “  
x  co
p
£ p - n  
.E H
B  b
o  o
Cl
on
B
CO O
cO 3  
- E  >3 
CL co
E 2
CD
b  O
CO L. 
LO 2
l b  
3  CD 
S ’ "co2 3 i2 cr 
c  p3 2,<1 ra
o
c .
O X  
X  P  
CO x  
c(U
<N
Ov
Os
£*
cO
2  E
O  CO
x -
o s
O s
X )
£
CD
>
o
2
IN
O s
O s
CL
<
B?  E &3 •“ CO
^  o  5
s  c  Ico x
X  cO
3  & *3
2* T0‘ CD CO
X  2J £2 2: O s q  OS
c B B C_o .2 O O
~co CO is
CO l o CO t o
'on 'on 'on 'on
CO — 0 JD _a j3
L-l & >CO CD CD CD CD
<s> X 2
ona>
-J
B
on
o
tJL,
on
B
B
c0ffl
3CD
b  id X  L« 
c o  , o
£ tS
—. X )
b  CD
'5 ,  ■£
cO X
2  gp
•S MX  ™
a  c o
ID>-, jm 
t i  cO CD X 
33 — Cl X
'b  £
x  *b
C L-. CO o
3 CD 
CD
D O  j ;C X  .
I £ 1X) co co CD X 
' JO  COX  ^3  .ECO X +-!
. CD LO
(3 0 “<D P CD
——' i—t
O  Cl 3
X>
3
CL
O
2
'on_cd
on
c
X
coOrtcn •D
bou
c o
o EO *o
<> CO
P X ra C *J 3
O
U
on
°  £  
• 2  1
c  bCD CO £■ *“Q
<5 e
x  S
ID 0) co co
3
c r
xc
X
c3
c
o
on
3
on
JH
co
'53
*3
X
o
Xo
X)
13c
o
xot_
CL
X
X
on
o .o
xc3
xco
U
£
o
•■— i
oh
CD4-*3L.
. "3
£  ‘P ?S p
« e*
0 ^  8  2  . c  cd
U1 M sW V5 , 1  1) (D wl-( ^  cdClO txD UhO O PL- I -  Q ,
Cl cl, o
on 
tc  
. 'oh 
cx  3 
o  JS 
o  p  
on . *
L_ X
c o o
O +J L_
2  -S2 oCD —1 CD 
C l  3  o  
O  O 3  
CN '*■' Op O to
5  X ) >-. 
2  3  X5
£  . 2  L -
X  X  tP
S Cl2  CL XS < Q
on
e
‘onc
£
O
CJ
C.
O X13 P 3 X
ca
*  £  
Q  3
xOs
Os
fr3
3
§*-“?
X
Pa  a w
CL o  OSil) 3  Oc
&9 3  —
on onc c
X Xc c0 pCL CL
X)
£
CD
CD
on on 
c  , g  
X  X
c  e
CD CD CL CL
<N
O s  > - ,  
O s  *g
O 2
C -O
3  CD
x  Cl
O s
Os
X)
£
CD
P
CD
Q
<NOs
(N o s  cn 
Os i—• Os 
Os I- o s  
*—  (D —
& * §  &  
3  g  §
3 ^ 3
CN
Os
O
31+-I
3L-J
CO
c
o
2:
c c0 0'X rf“ 1 r"i3 g 3tn C  co
on 0 on_p ;z ju
C C
c  .2 .2 o *-■ *-• x  JS J23  CO !/)
.52 on 'oh 
on .2  J>
2  £  *  O O P
X X X
c C  C e c  c  c n
0 O  O 0 0 0 0 0
3 3 3 P3 3 3 3
to CO CO co CO CO CO CO
on on on on on on on onCD CD O 0 CD D D D
& & & £ & £ £ &CD O D CD O D D CD1 1 2  X 2 X X X 2
on0
-J
onx
E>,_o
Cl
E
cu
2 > be
CL <D 
L. CO
E .. 3 X
on o
3 C
e x
O 3U <
O  . 2  Cl
c  to  E  
O x o  
X  O P 
_3 CL 1™
Sb §  l2
CD o c
E D
o
£ o  
3 U 
i i  x  3 cCJ 3‘l ►b 
on <
o
U
xc
X
o
* s  J  I  
& 5 ■§<  co 2
cd  
§ &
O  lo CD
*■' cd c  
g  CL W  
3
H
.p  3
o
CL
*T3
o  .p
3  ll ,x; CL X
on *a -g  p    >Lp  b  3  X  'rr OJ  n > UQ O £
CX
OJO
CX
■a
cr
cx13
CX
CN
Cucx
"O
Cu
cr
T3
cx
C X
O s CN 
O s  O s 
— < O s — T3
f~i m o
O 3  Cid  OJO 43 _ o
O 3  p  u
O  <1 is Cu
■o <->
08 " d
CX
cu cu
oooo 0J) OJO
o ooOJO o  OJO os, z  Ji z
T3
CX *CJ
U Z 00 03
203
4.5 The financial infrastructure
Azerbaijan is still in the early stages of the development of sound banking institutions. 
The legal foundations for a two-tier banking system were only laid in August 1992 
with the law ‘On the National Bank in the Republic of Azerbaijan’ and the law ‘On 
Banks and Banking Activity in the Republic of Azerbaijan’ (see Table 4-22). In 1994 
the banking system in Azerbaijan consisted of the Azeri National Bank (ANB), four 
specialised state banks (Agroprombank, Promivestbank, Amantbank (formerly 
Sberbank), and the International Bank (formerly Vneshekonombank)), five banks with 
foreign participation (Turkey and Russia), one branch of a foreign bank (Milli Iran 
Bank), and 149 commercial banks (see Table 4-23).111 Until 1995 there have been 
considerable difficulties with domestic and interstate interbank settlements. Domestic 
commercial banks used to settle their payments directly between themselves through 
mutual accounts, mostly held at Prominvestbank or Agroprombank, respectively (cf. 
IMF 1995: 18). The latter settled their claims between each other only once a year, 
extending credits automatically to each other. Interstate settlements were complicated 
with the break down o f the all Union settlement system in 1992. Payments between 
states of the FSU relied on interstate agreements often, however, without providing 
clear clearance mechanisms (cf. IMF 1994: 19).
Table 4-23: The banking system of Azerbaijan (July 1994)
Type o f  bank Number o f Authorised capital
banks (million rouble)
A zeri N ation a l B a n k 1
S p ec ia lised  sta te  b ank s 4 7 4 8 2
com prising:
Agroprom bank (A gricultural Production Bank) 1 2 8 6 3 .3
Prom investbank (Industrial Investm ent Bank) 1 3911
A m antbank (S av in gs B an k , form erly Sberbank) 1 3 9 0 .3
International Bank (form eriy  V neshekonom bank) 1 3 17
C om m ercia l banks 155 2 6 4 2 8 .8
including:
A zakbank 1 118 .6
Banks with foreign  participation  (Turkey, R ussia) 5 9 6 3 .4
Branch o f  foreign bank (M illi Iran Bank) 1 118 .6
Source: AM E
111 The information o f  the fo llow in g  section is based on the author’s transcripts o f  interviews 
with AM E, AM F, and bank staff.
11
" The settlem ent system  used w as m odelled after the former all U nion  paym ent system  
named after its Russian acronym  M FO (IM F 1995: 18).
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The ANB, empowered with central bank and commercial bank supervision 
functions, was created in February 1992 through the merger of the Azeri branch of the 
USSR Gosbank and parts of the Agroprombank and the Prominvestbank. However, 
until 1995 the ANB had obtained little independence and enforcement power. First, its 
monetary policy had to be approved by parliament. Second, international reserves 
have been directly managed by the government, first in several foreign exchange 
funds and since April 1994 in the Consolidated Foreign Exchange Fund, comprising 
the currency stabilisation fund. Third, ANB had little control over the four specialised 
state banks, which had not even been subject to reserve requirements until January 
1994. Fourth, supervisory functions were flawed by inadequate prudential regulations 
and lack of both human resources and administrative measures (see Table 4-24). Fifth, 
government agencies have been able to draw upon unlimited credit lines (cf. IMF 
1995: 18).
Table 4-24: Prudential regulations for the banking system (May 1994)
R eg u la tio n C o n te n t E n fo r c e m e n t
M in im u m  a u th o r ised  ca p ita l 
req u irem en t
•  A zM  100 m illion  for new  banks (equalled  
U S $ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0  in M ay 1994).
•  A zM  30  m illion  for ex istin g  banks 
(equalled  U S $ 3 0 ,0 0 0  in M ay 1994).
H igh com p liance.
R eserv e  req u irem en ts •  12% A zM  deposits.
•  5% foreign currency deposits.
•  To be held at the A N B .
Low  com p liance.
C ap ita l a d eq u a c y  ra tio •  8% Low  com pliance.
M in im u m  a sse ts -to -lia b ilit ie s  
ratio
•  50%  for a m aturity up to one m onth.
•  30%  for a m aturity betw een on e and s ix  
m onths.
•  20%  for a m aturity betw een six  and tw elve  
m onths.
Low  com pliance.
L im its  on  la r g e  ex p o su res •  M axim um  risk exposure to a sin gle  
borrower m ay not exceed  50%  o f  a bank’s 
ow n funds.
•  N o  total large exposures portfolio limit.
Low  com p liance.
L im its on  eq u ity  in v estm en ts •  A bank’s investm ent in the capital o f  non-  
ftnancial enterprises is lim ited  to an 
am ount equal to 10% o f  the bank’s ow n  
equity.
L ow  com p liance.
C la ss ifica tio n  o f  n o n -p er fo rm in g  
asse ts
•  N on e , due to lack  o f  accoun tin g standards. -
Source: Author’s transcripts o f interviews with batik employees.
Monetary policy in 1993 and 1994 was dominated by fiscal debt financing and 
indirectly subsidising state enterprises through credits at negative interest granted by 
the specialised state banks (cf. IMF 1993, 1994, 1995). Until 1995 bank credit was 
still granted administratively, setting interest rates on a case-by-case basis. 
Throughout 1993 and 1994 deposits were often non-convertible due to shortage of 
banknotes.
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The specialised state banks had been until December 1991 regional branches 
of their corresponding all Union state banks, supervised by the all Union Gosbank. As 
such they had little decision making power and were merely implementers o f central 
directives and, in case o f the Sberbank, depositories of private savings. After 
independence these formerly regional branches had taken up full bank functions, but 
they continued operating in their old fields. The International Bank has almost a 
monopoly on dealing with foreign currency transactions. The Amantbank (formerly 
Sberbank) is concentrating on household deposits. The Agroprombank and 
Prominvestbank remained closely linked with state enterprises or their holding 
structures respectively, to which they are the major lenders with little incentive to 
impose hard budget constraints. According to the IMF (1995: 18) both banks had de 
facto unrestricted access to central bank credit. In 1994 all specialised state banks 
accounted for more than 80% of total lending and deposit activities (cf. IMF 1995: 
17).
The first commercial banks were already set up in Soviet times under licences 
from the former all Union Gosbank and the largest, the Azakbank, was established in 
March 1991 as a joint stock company with 50% private capital participation. The 
majority of the 155 commercial banks are operating on a very small scale and are set 
up by state enterprises. In 1994 all commercial banks accounted for less than 20% of 
total lending and deposit activities (cf. IMF 1995; 17).
By 1994 there have been no active investment funds and no Stock Exchange. 
The only non-bank financial institutions operating have been the so-called charity 
organisations which offered interest rates on household deposits up to 30% per month 
and provision of cheap imported goods for their ‘members’.113 These organisations 
profited from inflation which, before the AzM was fixed against the US$, was 
reflected in a constant fall o f AzM against US$. They converted their AzM deposits 
into US$ with which they financed their informal imports of food and cheap consumer 
goods mainly from Turkey, Iran, FSU states and Dubai. According to IMF (1995: 21), 
at the end of 1994, households held nearly as much in deposits at these institutions as 
in the entire banking sector. Many people in Baku sold their entire possessions in 
order to invest in these organisations and lived off their interest payments. However,
113 The m ost w id ely  known charity organisation has been the Vagifbank.
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the charity organisations crashed after the AzM was fixed against the US$, and they 
became unable to pay these huge interests, with all the investors losing their 
investments.
4.6 The limitations o f government
Most PCPEs are left with seemingly insurmountable legacies which improve only 
gradually: weak states dependent on their patronage networks for survival; political 
parties and organisations that are unrepresentative and lacking a mass popular base; 
industrial sectors characterised through monopolies, excess capacities, low 
profitability, environmental pollution, and increasing technological obsolescence; 
inefficient and wasteful agricultural production; overcrowded and to a great deal 
obsolete bureaucratic structures; etc. Political and economic reforms are not merely 
required to maintain the status quo, but to stop the free fall of the economies and 
prevent political chaos.
The role o f the state in these transitional economies is to set and enforce a far- 
reaching reform agenda aimed at overcoming the institutional inadequacies and at 
realising massive industrial restructuring. However, this requires traditionally weak 
states to challenge powerful interest groups on which they rely for their survival.
Historically, states have used political ideologies in order to win over various 
interest groups to follow their objectives. At the beginning of the transition period 
these superordinated goals have been the establishment of a market economy often 
paired with nationalist sentiments. However, five years on, the allure o f the market 
system has faded.
Azerbaijan like many other newly independent states o f the FSU has not 
embarked upon the path o f transition by choice. There has not been a mass movement, 
as in Poland and the GDR, actively pursuing systemic changes. The pursuit of 
political independence from Russia and the defence of the Azeri territory against 
Armenian/Russian attacks only gained relatively short-lived mass support. However, 
political power struggles of the past years and the defeat in the Karabagh war have 
caused political apathy and wide disillusionment in the population. The relative 
political stability under President Aliev is only maintained through massive 
concessions to the old nomenklatura. As mentioned above, the last years have
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witnessed a decay o f the state apparatus allowing ministries and other executive 
organs to be developed into little thiefedoms pursuing their informal income 
generation. The dominance of the old nomenklatura in the political and economic 
arena has remained unchallenged. Section 4.3 has shown that the nomenklatura has 
understood the role o f safeguards against unwanted changes by creating and 
maintaining huge holding companies.
Any reform proposals in Azerbaijan have to take into account that the very 
groups whose interests are challenged through reform programmes conducive to 
enhanced static and dynamic efficiency, are those on whom the state relies for 
survival. And reforms have to be carried out by officials whose own jobs and sources 
of rent extraction are at stake.
Concluding remarks
To summarise: the evaluation o f the institutional background has revealed very 
unfavourable conditions for privatisation. First, the political setting is characterised by 
internal power struggles, decay of the state apparatus with corruption becoming a 
pervasive phenomenon, and the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. President Aliev has 
contrived to introduce some internal stability and negotiate a cease-fire. However, in 
order to guarantee long-term political stability, ( 1) constitutional changes are urgently 
needed, (2) the public administration requires thorough restructuring according to the 
new needs of the economy, and (3) the cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabagh including the 
related displaced persons issue need a more permanent solution. On all three points 
little progress has been made so far.
Second, the economy has been in a free fall for the past five years with the gap 
between petroleum related activities and other industrial activities widening ever 
more. Large parts o f the industrial capacity have ceased production and are exposed to 
asset stripping and decay. A massive restructuring effort has to be made in order to 
revive industrial production.
Third, the industrial structure is highly concentrated with nearly all enterprises 
or industrial units, respectively, organised under 50 state holding companies, 
concerns, or production unions, also referred to as associations. Corporate governance
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is characterised by pervasive insider control paired with ill-defined paternalistic 
relations between individual enterprises and their superior quasi-holding structures.
Fourth, the legal framework embodies grave deficiencies regarding the 
drafting and accessibility, effective administration and judicial enforcement o f laws.
Fifth, banking institutions are still in the early stages o f development, and 
there are no active non-bank financial institutions nor security markets and 
instruments.
Sixth, the agenda setting power of the state in the reform process is very 
limited, due to its extreme dependence on its patronage networks for survival.
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5. Plans and realities of privatisation in Azerbaijan  
Introduction
In chapter four, a critical assessment has been made o f the institutional 
background to privatisation in Azerbaijan. This chapter is concerned with an 
overall evaluation of the proposed approach to, and process of, Azeri privatisation.
Azerbaijan was one of the last republics of the FSU to adopt a law on the 
privatisation o f SOEs. The privatisation legislation consists o f the main 
privatisation law, the implementation of which requires the formulation and 
adoption o f annual privatisation programmes. The latter are prepared by the 
ASPC, the body responsible for privatisation. A draft for the first of such 
programmes was submitted in March 1993. However, it failed to obtain 
parliamentary approval. A revised draft programme was submitted to parliament 
on 28 April 1994 by the President. However, it too had failed to gain approval by 
the end o f the field study period.
Privatisation in other sectors has been also slow. In the agricultural sector, 
privatisation and general reform will be determined by the law ‘On the Principles 
of Agrarian Reform5 and the law ‘On Sovkhoz and Kolkhoz Reform’, which had 
not yet been passed by January 1995. The land code passed in November 1991 
never came into effect because of lack of legislation supporting its 
implementation. As preparatory work for the land reform, the State Land 
Committee was entrusted with the preparation of an inventory o f all agricultural 
units. The work had not been completed by January 1995. The new laws ‘On the 
Principles o f Agrarian Reform’ and ‘On Sovkhoz and Kolkhoz’ had been in 
preparation for almost three years. Even if they are eventually passed, additional 
legislation has to be prepared, clarifying the mechanisms o f implementation, 
regulation and control.
A law regulating the privatisation of housing was passed by the end of 
1993. Ownership o f houses was transferred free of charge to their registered 
occupants. Further, the majority of the 7,000 strong taxi-cab fleet was privatised 
by presidential decree in m id-1994. Officially, prices were to range from 30,000 to
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150,000 (US$75 to 370 according to the market exchange rate in May 1994).1 
Half of the official revenue raised went to the state budget and half to the former 
Ministry o f Road-Transport which has converted itself into a ‘concern’ and still 
holds some taxis, a bus and truck fleet and garages all over the country.
Three sources of evidence were collected during the field visits between 
December 1993 and February 1995 for the following chapter. First, a review of the 
relevant laws and other relevant documents collected in the ministries and 
privatisation committee, such as the draft programmes and guidelines for 
valuation, was carried out. All the documents were reviewed in the original Azeri 
language as, for most documents, there are no translations available or, where 
there are, they are not accurate and might lead to misinterpretations,2 Second, 
extensive personal interviews were conducted with personnel o f the privatisation 
agency, the council o f ministries, ministries and other institutions, presidential 
advisers, enterprise managers, workers’ councils and trade union representatives, 
academics and journalists. The third source was the observational protocols made 
during the field study. Again, most of the information o f the following chapter is 
based, if  not otherwise stated, on the author’s fieldwork protocols and transcripts 
of interviews with the management and employees o f plants, and various 
institutions.
Section one presents a brief history of the early moves toward privatisation 
in the Soviet period and the first months of independence o f Azerbaijan. The two 
following sections scrutinise in detail the key provisions o f the framework law for 
privatisation and the organisational prerequisites given by the privatisation 
agency. Section four* assesses the methodology on which valuation of assets is 
based in Azerbaijan. Section five examines the 1993-1994 draft privatisation 
programme focusing on the proposed methods of privatisation.
1 M a n y  ta x i d r iv e r s  rep o rted  th a t th e y  had  to  p a y  b r ib es on  to p .
'  T h e  p o l ic y  o f  th e  E B R D , IB R D  and IM F  is  th e r e fo r e  to  se n d  o u t  T u r k ish  sp e a k in g  
r e p r e se n ta t iv e s  a n d  c o n su lta n ts  to  A z er b a ija n .
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5,1 The privatisation debate and developments before 1992
The early Perestroika era laid the foundations of far-reaching changes in property 
rights resulting in insider control and spontaneous privatisation.3 Milestones in 
this period have been (1) the Law on State Enterprises, passed m id-1987, which 
intended to introduce a considerable degree of decentralisation, greater autonomy 
to state enterprise managers and more influence over enterprise affairs to worker 
collectives;4 (2) a series of laws regulating co-operatives, which legalised the 
unofficial economy of semi-legal private and co-operative enterprises; (3) and the 
decree ‘on Leasing and Lease Relations’, enacted in mid-1989, along with related acts 
and decrees, which spurred development of enterprises in which enterprise managers and 
workers could independently operate assets leased from the state.
It was only in autumn 1990 that formal privatisation was taken up in 
official economic reform proposals as a vital aspect of the transition to the market 
economy o f the USSR (c f Radygin 1995: 7-19).5 The economic reform 
programme ‘Main Trends of Stabilisation of the National Economy and Transition 
Towards a Market Economy’ adopted by the Supreme Soviet in October 1990 
presented some general notions on privatisation which were strengthened by the 
following IV. Congress of People’s Deputies o f the USSR (cf. Radygin 1995: 16). 
The ‘Programme of Joint Actions of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and the 
Government of the Sovereign Republics to Extricate the Country’s Economy from 
Crisis in Conditions of the Transition to the Market’6 signed in July 1991, 
envisaged the following measures concerning privatisation:
1. to agree in the second quarter o f 1991 at union-republic agreement level 
on the principles and functions of privatisation (section II);
2. to prepare and implement from the third quarter o f 1991 corresponding 
Union and republican programmes and regulations (sections II and VI);
F o r  a r e v ie w  o f  re fo rm  p r o p o s a ls  a n d  p o l ic ie s  d u rin g  th e  G o r b a c h e v  era , s e e  D e s a i  
( 1 9 9 2 ) ,  H e w e t t  ( 1 9 8 8 ) ,  a n d  G re g o ry  an d  S tu art ( 1 9 9 4  an d  1 9 9 5 ) .  S e e  a ls o  s e c t io n  4 .3  o f  
th is  v o lu m e .
4 T h e s e  le g a l c o n c e s s io n s  to  w o r k e r  c o l l e c t iv e s  w e r e  n e v e r  e n fo r c e d  in  p r a c tic e  ( s e e  
F ry d m a n  e t  a l. 1 9 9 3 b : 1 9 ).
5
T h e  ‘5 0 0  d a y s ’ p r o g r a m m e  p r o p o sa l o f  S h a ta lin  in c lu d e d  a  c o m p r e h e n s iv e  p r iv a tisa t io n  
p r o g a m m e.
6 See SWB 13 July 1991.
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3. to adopt a programme to dispose o f loss-making enterprises, temporarily 
suspend managers of such enterprises, the change o f management and 
turn-around, reorganisation and compulsory privatisation (section V);
4. priority in privatisation of (1) unfinished construction of production 
facilities (section V), (2) enterprises and organisations which provide 
services to the population, manufacture consumer goods, produce food or 
process agricultural raw materials and of small enterprises in industry, 
construction and transport (section VI);
5. priority given to the creation of joint-stock companies, partnerships, 
collective (people’s) enterprises and enterprises leased with the right to 
buy (section VI);
6. preferential terms for the transfer o f shares and equities to members of 
work collectives (section VI).
In June 1991 the Yavlinsky-Allison programme was put forward which outlined 
two stages o f privatisation (1991-1993 and 1994-1997) gradually to include large 
enterprises (cf. Radygin 1995: 18).7 All programmes were over-optimistic both in 
terms o f their given timetable and the feasibility of their approach and ignored the 
political and economic realities. First, they lacked a clear demarcation of rights 
and responsibilities between the centre and the individual republics, which was 
vital at the time of disintegration. Second, they did not adequately address issues 
of monopoly enterprises and increasing industrial concentration as a result of 
organisational changes.8 Third, the proliferating problem of insider control was 
completely neglected.
None of these programmes was implemented in practice. They were 
overtaken by the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent independence o f the 
republics. Debates and plans about privatisation held at the centre had little impact 
on Azerbaijan. On 30 August 1991 Azerbaijan declared its independence and the 
formal privatisation process stalled through debates in parliament. There has been 
no strong lobby for formal privatisation. Insiders who potentially have an interest
T h e  Y a v l in s k y - A l l is o n  p la n  w a s  u s e d  b y  G o r b a c h e v  a s  b a s is  fo r  d i s c u s s io n s  w ith  th e  G -
7 at th e  J u ly  1 9 9 1  S u m m it.
o
See section 4.3 o f  th is volume.
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in formal privatisation felt safer under the existing framework. The strong 
industrial bureaucracy opposed privatisation. Due to the political instability none 
of the stakeholders had an interest in the formal privatisation process 
commencing. Rather emphasis seems to have been put on asset stripping. A major 
incentive behind the reluctant drive for formal privatisation no doubt has been 
international assistance, which rated progress in privatisation as a major indicator 
for development and hence creditworthiness. The framework law for privatisation, 
although expected to be passed in April 1992, was only adopted in January 1993. 
Table 5-1 summarises the important events in the formal privatisation process in 
chronological order.
Table 5-1: Chronology of selected important events in the formal 
privatisation process in Azerbaijan
D a t e _______________ E v e n ts __________________________________________________________________________________
October 90 The economic reform programme ‘Main Trends o f Stabilisation o f the
National Economy and Transition Towards a Market Economy’ adopted by 
the Supreme Soviet.
December 1990 IV. Congress o f People’s Deputies o f the USSR  
June 1991 Yavlinsky-Allison programme
July 1991 ‘Programme o f Joint Actions of the USSR Cabinet o f  Ministers and the
Government o f the Sovereign Republics to Extricate the Country’s Economy 
from Crisis in Conditions o f  the Transition to the Market’
June 1992 ASPC is established as body responsible for privatisation.
7 January 93 The law ‘On Privatisation o f State Property in the Republic o f Azerbaijan’ is
adopted.
March 93 First draft privatisation programme is submitted to parliament by president
Elchibey; however, never approved.
28 April 94 Revised draft privatisation programme is submitted to parliament by President
Aliev.
Februaiy 95 Appointment o f Azizov Tofik Museyib oglu as new chairman o f ASPC with
__________________ rank o f  Deputy Prime Minister_____________________________________________
5.2 The legal framework ofprivatisation
The framework law for privatisation in Azerbaijan is the law ‘On Privatisation of 
State Property in the Republic of Azerbaijan’. Following a prolonged period of 
debate on several earlier versions, it was adopted by Parliament and approved by 
President Elchibey on 7 January 1993. In Table 5-2 the key provisions of the law,
214
which are discussed below, are listed with the relevant articles.9 The discussion of 
the law is more detailed as it is based on the original Azeri version, which is not 
available in an accurately translated English version.
Table 5-2: Key provisions of the main privatisation law
No. Subject m atter Article
1. Definition o f privatisation §2
2. Ob jects o f  privatisation §§4, 11, 12
Body responsible for privatisation § §3 ,9
4. Privatisation programme §10
5. Valuation §16
6. Eligible buyers §§5, 26
7. Foreign participation §8
8. Methods o f  privatisation
• Vouchers §18
• Investment funds §19
• Tenders §§7, 14, 23
• Employee buy-out §§14, 17
• Sale o f  shares §§7, 14
• Public auctions §§7, 14 ,22
• Sale o f leased property §14
9. Corporatisation §14, 15 ,24
10. Procedures for privatisation §§7, 1 4 ,2 1 ,2 2 ,2 3 ,2 5
11. State guarantees
• Employees §§7, 26
• Participants §25
Source: Law ‘On Privatisation o f State Property in the Republic o f  Azerbaijan’
(1) Definition o f privatisation
Privatisation is defined as the Transfer o f state property into private property in 
line with the present law’ (Art. 1).
‘Property5 is defined by §4 of the law ‘On Property5, passed on 9 
November 1991 still under President Mutalibov. It includes:
[ ..]  la n d , in te r n a l a n d  te rr ito r ia l w a te r s ,  c o n t in e n t a l  s h e l f ,  a ir s p a c e ,  f lo r a  
a n d  f a u n a ,  e n te r p r is e s ,  e q u ip m e n t ,  b u i ld in g s ,  s tr u c tu r e s ,  r a w  m a t e r ia ls  a n d  
o th e r  m a t e r ia ls ,  m o n e y ,  s e c u r it ie s ,  o th e r  p r o p e r t ie s  o f  in d u s tr ia l,  s o c ia l ,  
c u l tu r a l  a n d  o th e r  c h a r a c te r , p r o d u c ts  o f  i n t e l le c t u a l  a n d  c r e a t iv e  a c t iv i t y .
There are three major shortcomings of this definition. First, the law does not make 
any provision for divestment of user rights. As discussed in section 4.3, leasing
9 U n le s s  o t h e r w is e  s ta te d , a r t ic le  n u m b e rs  in th is  s e c t io n  r e fe r  to  t h o s e  o f  th e  fr a m e w o r k  
la w  fo r  p r iv a t is a t io n . T h e  q u o ta t io n s  w e r e  tra n sla ted  fro m  th e  a u th o r  in to  E n g lish .
215
has already been practised in Azerbaijan since the end o f the 1980s. A new law 
regulating leasing was only passed on 29 November 1994. Second, the law does 
not distinguish between small and large privatisation, and between privatisation of 
means o f production and other assets. Privatisation is approached with a wholesale 
attitude. Third, the concept o f privatisation is not embedded in a framework of 
enterprise restructuring and change of corporate governance.
(2) Objects o f  privatisation
The targeted objects are outlined in §4 as
all enterprises and other assets which are state property excluding
enterprises and assets the privatisation of which is prohibited.
The latter are not defined by the law. The issue o f which enterprises to 
exclude, especially in the oil industry, was fiercely debated in both parliament and 
public. According to some respondents the exclusions will often be subject to 
change. The draft privatisation programme of 1993-1994 lists enterprises which 
are not to be privatised.
The law distinguishes between three categories o f enterprises and objects 
(i.e. commercial units like shops etc.) to be privatised:
1. by decision o f ‘supreme body of state and executive power’, i.e. the 
president;
2. by decision of the body responsible for privatisation; and
3. by agreement with local authorities. Here, again, no specifications are 
made whether it has to be in accordance with rules and regulations given 
by the body responsible for privatisation or whether it can be carried out 
independently.
It is not specified which enterprises fall under the responsibility of the ‘supreme 
body o f state and executive power’, the body responsible for privatisation and/or 
the local authorities. Thus, problems of competing interests could arise. Moreover, 
the transparency o f the privatisation process is threatened as rules and regulations 
used by the body responsible for privatisation might not be followed by other 
bodies.
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Unresolved is the issue whether to exclude social facilities of enterprises 
such as recreation, education, health and creche facilities. Ideally the latter should 
be separated from production facilities and transferred to special trusts or local 
authorities. The inclusion of these facilities into an enterprise would be an 
unreasoned give-away.
(3) Body responsible fo r  privatisation
§3 and §9 designate the body controlling state property responsible for the 
implementation of privatisation and directly subordinate to the president. §9 lists 
the duties of the body responsible for privatisation:
1. preparation o f the annual privatisation programme;
2. systematic control over privatisation over all the territory o f Azerbaijan;
3. establishing a regional network, responsible for the regional 
implementation, and controlling this network;
4. assessing privatisation, which has taken place before the law became 
active and initiating the legal prosecution through court and arbitration 
tribunal where applicable;
5. other functions specified by the main law and secondary laws;
6. valuation o f enterprises and other assets;
7. determining (1) methods chosen, and (2) implementation procedures 
suiting different branches and individual enterprises and assets;
8. determining the distribution and use of privatisation proceeds.
All methodologies and other documents determining the modus operandi of the 
body controlling state property are prepared by the body itself and have to be 
approved by the president. The room for discretion o f the body is designed quite 
generously by the law. Moreover, the parliament has no influence on the operation 
of the body controlling state property.
(4) Privatisation programme
The law requires the preparation of an annual privatisation programme. It has to 
include:
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1. valuation o f the enterprises and other assets concerned;
2. timetable o f privatisation;
3. methods and terms used with individual enterprises and assets, and terms 
o f share issue, in case of joint stock companies;
4. volume o f vouchers, terms of distribution, and terms o f payment;
5. use of revenue of privatisation.
The programme has to be submitted annually to parliament by the president no 
later than 1 November. Parliament has to approve the programme no later than 20 
December (§10(2)).
As mentioned above, on 28 April 1994 President Aliev approved the 1994 
privatisation programme and submitted it to parliament. It had not been approved 
by January 1995, the end of the field study period.
(5) Valuation
The law provides that state property will be valued according to the rules 
determined by the body responsible for the privatisation (§16(1)). The ASPC has 
prepared a methodology for valuation which is discussed below (cf. ARJDAK 
1993b).
(6) Eligible buyers
According to §5, eligible buyers are:
1. the workers’ collective o f the enterprise. No specifications are given who 
is included in the workers’ collective. §21 includes pensioners who 
worked at the enterprise for more than seven years and employees who 
are on agreed leave.
2. Citizens o f Azerbaijan.
3. Legal entities, in which state ownership does not exceed 25%.
4. Foreign physical and legal persons.
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(7) Foreign participation
The law imposes no restrictions on foreign'participation (§8). It grants foreign 
partners of a joint venture an advantage, which is however not specified.
(8) Methods o f  privatisation
Methods approved include free transfer as well as sales:
(1) tenders (§§7, 14, 23),
(2) employee buy-outs (§§14, 17),
(3) sale of shares through capital market operations and public offering (§§7, 14),
(4) public auctions (§§7, 14, 22), and (5) sale of leased property to lessees (§14).
(5) §16(2) mentions leasing as another possible privatisation method. However, it 
is not considered anywhere else in the law.
Payments can be made in privatisation-vouchers which are to be distributed to 
citizens and in local currency (§§7, 18). §19 envisages the establishment of 
investment funds as intermediaries to support the conversion o f vouchers into 
enterprise shares. Private and public investment funds are to be operated under 
licence of the National Bank and hence are subordinated to the latter (§19(3)). 
§19(2) establishes that these new investment funds have to operate according to 
set rules and regulations. The latter have not been prepared yet, nor is it 
determined who is responsible for their preparation.
(9) Corporatisation
As preparatory steps for privatisation the law requires the establishment of open 
and closed (i.e. limited liability) joint-stock companies (§14(5)).10 These joint- 
stock companies can be with and without a controlling share o f the state (§15). In 
which joint-stock companies the state is going to have a controlling share and who 
is to determine the latter, is not dealt with in the law. §24(2) states that the process
10 The shares o f  an open joint-stock  com pany are publicly traded. The com pany is 
controlled by those w ho ow n the controlling packet o f  shares. Shares o f  a closed  joint- 
stock com pany are not publicly traded. Owners are directly involved  in the com panies’ 
control.
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of corporatisation is governed by appropriate legislation. Such legislation had not 
been passed by January 1995. The law ‘On Joint-Stock Companies’ was only 
adopted on 12 July 1994 and has been in force since its signing in November 
1994.
(10) Procedures fo r  privatisation
Rules and regulations concerning the initiation of privatisation (§7(3)), tenders 
(§23), auctions (§22), sales o f shares through capital market operations and public 
offering, and contracts (§25) are all to be prepared by the body responsible for 
privatisation and approved by the president. None o f these rules and regulations 
had been prepared by January 1995. There are three shortcomings o f the law 
concerning the procedures for privatisation. First, there are questions of 
responsibility for, and initiation of, the necessary restructuring prior to 
privatisation, i.e. (1) splitting up of enterprises by reducing vertical and horizontal 
integration, (2) spinning-off non-core activities, (3) partial closures, and (4) 
restating balance sheets including writing-off enterprise and inter-enterprise debt, 
are not addressed by the law. As discussed before, the latter is a prerequisite for 
ensuring efficiency.11
Second, no provisions are made concerning the future use of social and 
cultural facilities and the real estate of enterprises to be privatised. According to 
§7(4) they either can be privatised together with the enterprises or separately and 
in case no buyers can be found, they are to be transferred to the body responsible 
for privatisation.
Third, the privatisation law does not consider the broad issue of 
environmental pollution caused by existing plants and the cleaning up o f industrial 
wasteland. Inadequate rules and regulations concerning environmental protection 
during Soviet times have stored up problems for future generations even in 
supposedly environmentally safe industrial processes. There are few records on 
the extent o f the pollution, either because records were not kept, or because they
11 For a detailed  theoretical d iscussion  o f  restructuring in general and restructuring prior 
to privatisation, see  section  2 .2  and 3.4.
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were secret. Currently the monitoring and assessment of environmental damage is 
limited due to lack of personnel and equipment. The State Committee of Ecology 
and Environmental Protection (1993) made in their report a first attempt to record 
the extent of environmental damage. The way of internalisation of these external 
effects has to be decided prior to privatisation, as property rights are significantly 
affected. Renegotiating at a later date would be politically infeasible and would 
moreover cause high transaction costs.
(11) State guarantees
The law gives the following guarantees to employees. First, employees who did 
not benefit in forms of shares are granted compensation by the new owner, in case 
o f lay-offs due to restructuring or liquidation. According to §7(6) the height of the 
latter is determined by the regulations on tenders and auctions which have to be 
prepared by the body responsible for privatisation. No such regulations had been 
prepared by January 1995.
Second, §26(1) grants employees made redundant due to restructuring or 
liquidation the rights and privileges given by the legislation on redundancy due to 
restructuring and liquidation. Such legislation was not prepared by January 1995.
Third, employees of SOEs turned into joint-stock companies have the 
privilege to buy shares at face value or with a concession (§7(7)). The law does 
not determine the percentage of shares which can be bought under concession or 
at face value, nor does it determine the level of the concession.
Fourth, pensioners, who have worked in an enterprise for at least seven 
years and employees on negotiated leave enjoy the same rights on compensation 
and to buy shares at a reduced price.
Participants are granted a state certificate confirming their property rights 
for their bought or otherwise received assets by the body controlling the property 
to be privatised §25(1). This is not an adequate protection for buyers and therefore 
jeopardises the whole privatisation initiative. A law is required that gives the 
present body controlling state property the right to convey clear-, legal and 
irrevocable title to the property bought or otherwise received. Often, however, the 
body responsible for a SOE cannot be clearly identified. There are various
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competing stake holders such as the municipality and the former branch ministry 
(now mostly a holding company) to which the enterprise is subordinated. Present 
ownership structures have to be clarified. It would be easier if  the ownership title 
could be transferred by one sole agency in order to avoid or limit time-consuming 
procedures and corruption. Ideally the agency which is responsible for the 
privatisation o f the assets should also be able to transfer the ownership rights.
Table 5-3 summarises the subordinate legislation required which is 
mentioned by the privatisation law. Table 5-4 outlines further measures required 
which is not acknowledged by the law.
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Table 5-3: Subordinate legislation required by the main privatisation law
N o. S u b je c t  m a tter R esp o n s ib le  a u th o r itie s P r o g r e ss  m ad e b efo re  F e b r u a r y  
1 9 9 5
1. A nnual privatisation  program m e B od y  responsible for privatisation The A SP C  has prepared the annual 
program m e for 199 3 -1 9 9 4 , h ow ever  
it w as not approved by parliam ent.
2_ C lassifica tion  enterprises w hich  are 
exem p t from privatisation
N ot named The draft privatisation program m e o f  
1 9 9 3 -1 9 9 4  includes a list o f  such  
enterprises.
3 . C orporatisation N ot named L egisla tion  w hich  regulates this 
process had not been passed by 
January 1995. T he law  'On Joint- 
S tock  C om pan ies' has been in force  
s in ce  N ovem b er 1994.
4. C la ssifica tio n  o f  enterprises in w hich  
the state is go in g  to have a controlling  
share.
N ot named N o n e
5. C larifica tion  o f  w hich  enterprises fall 
under the resp on sib ility  o f'su p r em e  
body  o f  sla te  and ex ecu tiv e  p ow er’, 
the b od y  responsib le for privatisation, 
and/or the local authorities
N ot nam ed T h e draft privatisation program m e for 
1 9 9 3 -1 9 9 4  contains such a 
cla ss ifica tion  o f  enterprises. H ow ever, 
it can be argued that it should be dealt 
w ith  in a separate legislation .
6. Law  that g ives  the present body  
con tro llin g  state property the right to 
c o n v ey  clear, legal and irrevocable  
title  to the property' b ough t or 
oth erw ise received.
N ot named N o n e
7. C larification  o f  the present bodies  
con tro llin g  particular assets, i.e. 
ow nersh ip  structures.
N ot nam ed N o n e
S. V aluation B od y responsib le for privatisation T h e A SP C  has prepared a 
m eth od o logy  for valuation.
9. D eta ils  on  advantages the law  grants 
for foreign  partners o f  a joint venture
N o t nam ed N o n e
10. Investm ent funds N o t nam ed N o n e
11. Initiation o f  privatisation B od y responsible for privatisation N o n e
12. Tenders B od y  responsible for privatisation N o n e
13. A u ction s (in clu d in g  vou ch er-  
au ction s)
B od y  responsible for privatisation N o n e
14. S ales o f  shares through capital 
m arkets and p ub lic  offerin g
B od y responsible for privatisation N on e
15. R ules and regulations for sa le  o f  
leased  assets to lessees.
N ot nam ed N o n e
16. Standard and com p lex  contracts B od y  responsible for privatisation N on e
17. C om pensation  o f  em p loyees  m ade 
redundant in the cou rse o f  
privatisation
B od y  responsible for privatisation N o n e
18. L eg isla tion  on redundancies N o t nam ed N o n e
19. Preferential sa les to em p loyees B od y responsib le for privatisation N o n e
20. P rivatisation  vouchers B od y  responsible for privatisation N o n e
21. Im plem entation  procedures su iting  
d ifferent branches and individual 
enterprises and assets
B od y  responsib le for privatisation N o n e
22. D eterm in in g  distribution and u se o f  
the reven ue from  privatisation
B od y responsible for privatisation T h e draft privatisation program m e for 
1 9 9 3 -1 9 9 4  includes a short 
c la ss ifica tion  o f  p ossib le  revenue 
sou rces  from  privatisation. The 
reven ue is supposed  to be transferred  
in th e  state budget and used for the 
p urpose o f 's o c ia l  and econ om ic  
d evelop m en t o f  tire republic' 
(A R D A K , 1994: 27)
23 . O rganisation  o f  regional netw orks B od y responsible for privatisation N o n e  |
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Table 5-4: Further measures required for privatisation
No. Subject matter Measures to be taken Measures taken by February 
1995
1. Restructuring • Industrial policy
• Legislation on restructuring
• Programme
• Determining bodies which 
will be responsible
In 1992 the Council of Ministries 
prepared a rudimentary draft 
programme for the restructuring 
of industry. It was never 
considered.
2. Corporate governance • Company laws
• Training facilities
• Advisory centres
• The law ‘On the Enterprise’ 
determines the organisational 
and juridical forms of 
enterprises. It was adopted in 
July 1994. However, it 
contains inadequate 
provisions for corporate 
governance.
• The law ‘On the Joint-Stock 
Company’ was adopted on 12 
July 1994 and is in force 
since November 1994. It 
makes some provisions for 
corporate governance. 
However, it will take a long 
time and training until even 
these rudimentary regulations 
will be in place.
3. Liquidation • Legislation
• Determining responsible body
The law ‘On Insolvency and 
Bankruptcy’ was adopted on 22 
July 1994, however the decree of 
parliament, bringing the law into 
force had not been passed yet.
4. Leasing as a method of 
privatisation
• Rules and regulations for 
leasing procedures
• Determining bodies which 
will be responsible for these 
arrangements
Law ‘On Leasing in the Republic 
of Azerbaijan’ was adopted on 29 
November 1994.
5. New accountancy standards 
suitable to a market economy
• Rules and regulations for 
accountancy
* Determining bodies which 
will be responsible for the 
realisation and maintenance.
None
6. Environmental protection and 
clean up
• Environmental policy
• Environmental protection and 
clean up legislation (e.g. 
emission standards etc.)
• Programme for the cleaning 
up of contaminated sites
• Determining bodies which 
will be responsible for the 
implementation of 
environmental policy (e.g. 
environmental monitoring 
etc.)
• There is a State Committee of 
Ecology and Environmental 
Protection.
• The law ‘On Protection of the 
Environment’ was passed in
1992 without any effect, does 
not address most issues.
7. Social safety net * Programme to adapt present 
schemes to the new 
requirements
• Legislation
A new Employment Fund was set 
up in October 1991 and is 
administered by the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Protection,
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However, its funds are hardly 
sufficient.12
8. Capital markets • Legislation
• Regulator
The law ‘On securities and stock 
exchange’ has been passed 
November 1992. However, none 
of the required secondary 
legislation has been prepared yet.
5.3 The State Privatisation Committee
The ASPC was established as the body responsible for privatisation by 
presidential decree on 23 June 1992. Kudret Abdul Salim-Zade, according to
many interviewees rather an outsider to the political establishment, was appointed
1 ^  ■ ■as chairman. Its organisational form and modus operandi is determined by the
Presidential Decree No. 137 dated 13 August 1992. It came into force on the same 
day as the main privatisation law (7 January 1993). The tasks featured by the 
August degree are in line with those featured for the body responsible for 
privatisation in the main privatisation law, discussed above. As can be seen in / 
Figure 5-1 the ASPC comprises ten departments with 68 employees in total 
(August 1994).
Figure 5-1: Structure of the Azeri State Privatisation Committee
Chairm an
1 1
1st D eputy Deputy D eputy
M ethodology Legal Valuation R egional N etw ork
D epartm ent D epartm ent D epartm ent Departm ent
Public ity Foreign Relations A uctions and ServiceEnterprises
D epartm ent D epartm ent Corporatisation D epartm ent Departm ent
C onstruction M anufacturing Enterprises
D epartm ent '  Departm ent
Source: ASPC
The status o f the committee can be made out by observational evidence 
collected in 1994. The committee was located on one floor o f a run down office 
tower block with concrete chunks falling o ff the walls - far less prestigious than
12 S e e  a ls o  s e c t io n  4 .2 .1 .
13 T h e  a u th o r  r e c o g n is e d  th a t M r. S a lim -Z a d e  h a s  a  s tr o n g  S h e k i a c c e n t  (N o r th e r n  
P r o v in c e  o f  A z e r b a ija n ) .  T h e r e  are  tr a d it io n a lly  h a rd ly  a n y  p e o p le  fr o m  S h e k i in th e  
p o lit ic a l  e s t a b l i s h m e n t .
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any of the offices o f the obsolete old administrative bodies. Compared to 
equivalent bodies in other PCPEs and taking into account the responsibilities 
determined by the privatisation law, the committee was hopelessly understaffed. 
Some departments consisted only of one little room and were generally poorly 
furnished. The few telephone lines had to be shared between employees. The 
committee was not computerised, whereas most other administrative bodies (e.g. 
AME, AMF, CMA, Tax Inspectorate, Chief Auditor) had at least some computers 
and compiled data on them. There are several indicators for the lack of authority 
and competence o f the committee. First, the committee was set up under President 
Elchibey. Many interviewees suggested that it would be highly unlikely that 
privatisation would be carried out by an institution not set up by President Aliev 
himself.
Second, all the information compiled for the draft privatisation programme 
was collected from the ASPC, the CMA, the AME, and the former branch 
ministries turned into concerns. The valuation of the enterprises was based on the 
questionnaire filled out by the enterprises. The staff o f the ASPC had hardly been 
to any of the enterprises in person. An inventory o f the enterprises was not 
planned by the staff. The employees of the ASPC considered that to be the task of 
the relevant departments of the CMA, the AME, and the relevant concern. As 
discussed in chapter three, the valuation of assets is also o f interest for bodies 
responsible for industrial policy. For the latter, the assessment o f the ‘political 
value’ o f medium and large sized enterprises is of importance to counter post­
privatisation rent-seeking activities by the new owners. Moreover, as the valuation 
of enterprises is a rather politically sensitive issue, it should be carried out with a 
maximum of transparency. Thus, the involvement o f different bodies is welcome. 
However, all the institutions involved in the Azeri context, except for the ASPC, 
consist of nomenklatura members, who are close to the insiders o f the enterprises. 
It can be expected that any decision or action carried out by these institutions is 
biased towards insiders. The ASPC as a new institution should lessen this bias. 
However, it is questionable, whether the ASPC can impose any decisions and 
steps independently of these powerful institutions.
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Third, regional structures, whose establishment is politically very sensitive 
due to powerful interest groups 011 regional level, have hardly been formed. Due to 
political opposition at regional level, it will take time to organise these formations 
and procedures towards the latter should have long begun. Thus, the authority of 
the ASPC on regional level is very limited.
Fourth, staff of the ASPC on all levels were not trained in the activities 
they are expected to pursue by law. Experience of other PCPEs was not taken into 
account in a systematic way. Some o f the staff interviewed had only followed the 
privatisation process o f Russia through the Russian television channel and other 
Russian media. However, the relevance of the Russian experience for the Azeri 
context was not adequately analysed. Experience o f other PCPEs was hardly 
known.
Fifth, the wages paid to the employees of the ASPC were as low as in the 
whole public sector. They ranged between US$5 and 20 (August 1994). As 
Discussed in chapter four, this is hardly enough to cover the cost o f living. Thus, 
there is a strong incentive given to top up one’s income with corrupt activities. 
Special income incentives should be given to ASPC staff to abate corruption.
5.4 Valuation o f assets
The methodology for the valuation of assets was prepared by the ASPC 
(cf. ARDAK 1993b).14 All valuations are to be based on the net book value, i.e. 
the difference between the value of assets and liabilities derived from the balance 
sheets. The net book value is supposed to be index-linked, with the price index 
being calculated annually by the ASSC (ARDAK 1993b: 3). The net book values 
can be adjusted through the data of an inventoiy, which according to information 
from the CMA will involve the estimation of replacement and reproduction value 
of fixed and current assets. The ASPC can conduct inventories if  doubts over a 
valuation arise (ARDAK 1993b: 3). However, there has been no decree passed 
which would make an inventoiy obligatory, nor do there seem to be plans to do so.
14 For a discussion of the main issues of valuation in the context of privatisation in 
PCPEs, see Section 3.2.
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There have also been no guidelines to conduct these inventories. As mentioned 
above, it is very difficult to assess the replacement or even liquidation value 
without any points o f reference which would be available in a developed market 
economy.15
The valuation methodology distinguishes between (1) assets in the material 
production sphere and (2) assets in the non-material production sphere. The sales 
price (S) of an enterprises is separately calculated in these two categories as 
analysed below.
(1) Valuation o f assets in the material production sphere
The net book value is adjusted using the criteria listed in Table 5-5 and analysed 
in more detail below. The sales price is derived through:
S = R + R ( P  + C + X  + T - E )
Table 5-5: Additional valuation criteria for assets in the material production 
sphere
1. Return on total equity coefficient (P)
2. Local content coefficient (Q
2>. Export market coefficient (AO
4. Transport link coefficient (T)
5. Environmental pollution coefficient (£)
1. Return on total equity coefficient (P)
The first additional valuation criteria is return on total equity:
YP =  -  *  0.2
P Return on total equity coefficient
Y Profit36 o f previous year
<f> Fixed assets
The influence on the sales price is rather small with an increase o f maximally 20% 
of the net book value. Most enterprises, however, can be expected to have a
15 As mentioned in section 3.2, original prices were widely distorted.
16 The valuation methodology of the ASPC does not specify whether ‘profit5 refers to 
before or after tax profit.
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negative return on equity. Considering the massive restructuring requirements, 
return on equity is a weak indicator for the future potential o f enterprises.
2. Local content coefficient (C)
Local content increases the value considerably as can be seen in Table 5-6. 
Considering the de facto blockade of rail and other roads from Russia to 
Azerbaijan due to the on-going conflict in Chechenia, and the general problems of 
trade between the republics of the former FSU, the use o f local content is an 
advantage for the short-term development potential o f an enterprise.
Table 5-6: Local content coefficient (C)
C L oca l co n ten t (% )
1. 0 .8 100
2. 0 .6 >  75 and < 100
3. 0 .4 >  50 and <75
Source: (ARDAK 1993b: 6)
3. Export market coefficient (X)
As can be seen in Table 5-7, all enterprises, regardless o f whether they have 
domestic or export markets have a 60% mark-up of their net book value, which is 
rather arbitrary. Enteiprises with export markets, as the methodology states, have 
an additional mark up of 20%. Existing export markets are an indicator for the 
potential o f an enterprise. However, the market share has also to be considered. 
The production o f most enterprises has decreased so dramatically that former 
export markets might have been lost in the meantime.
Table 5-7: Export market coefficient (A)
X Export market
0.8 yes
0.6 no
Source: (ARDAK 1993b: 6)
4. Transport link coefficient (I)
Existing transport links raise the value of an enterprise and should be considered 
in a valuation. However, the specification of over- and underground transport link
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refers more to passenger transport than goods transport, which is more essential to 
the enterprise (see Table 5-8). The distance to a port and transport to a port, road 
conditions etc. could also be considered. As such, the categories given are 
insufficiently specified. Moreover, depending on the size o f an enterprise a rise of 
80% of the net book value for a special railway link could be unreasonable.
Table 5-8: Transport link coefficient (7)
T K in d  o f  tra n sp o rt lin k
1. 0 .4 over-ground transport link
2. 0 .4 underground transport link
3. 0 .8 specia l railway link
Source: (A R D A K  1993b: 6)
5. Environmental pollution coefficient (E)
The environmental pollution coefficient reduces the sales price as can be seen 
from the sales price formula and Table 5-9. However, the responsibility for 
potential environmental liabilities is unresolved. Neither are potential clean up 
requirements and new emission standards settled. Potential clean up costs could 
go into billions o f US$. The categories of large and small pollution are also far too 
general. The extent and kind of pollution has to be more clearly specified and 
considered accordingly.
Table 5-9: Environmental pollution coefficient (E)
E E x ten d  o f  en v iro n m en ta l p o llu tio n  ca u sed  b y  
p ro d u ctio n
1. 0 .4 large
2. 0.2 sm all
Source: (A R D A K  1993b: 6)
(2) Valuation o f assets in the non-material production sphere
The sales price o f assets in the non-material production sphere, i.e. service sector, 
is calculated a s :17
17 As stated before, the focu s o f  this work is the privatisation o f  large and medium sized  
enterprises. The assets in the non-material production sphere com prise m ostly small 
enterprises o f  the service sector. H ow ever, to gain a total picture o f  the valuation  
m ethods and the general attitude taken the valuation o f  these assets is briefly discussed.
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5 = R + R(L + B + F +  K + /+  H)
As Table 5-10 and the details below show, the criteria for the non-material 
production sphere are more elaborate than for the material production sphere. 
However, one has to keep in mind that these so-called ‘businesses’ are often only 
commercially used premises or which have such potential.
Table 5-10: Additional valuation criteria for assets in the non-material 
production sphere
1. Location coefficient (L)
2. Activity coefficient (B)
J. Customer frequency coefficient (F)
4. Special features coefficient (K)
5. Sanitary facilities coefficient (I)
6. Ceiling height coefficient (H)
1. Location coefficient (L)
The location is o f immense importance especially for the non-material production 
sphere. However, the categories listed in Table 5-11 are far too general. There are 
enormous differences between locations within Baku for example. Location 
should also be considered in the material-production sphere.
Table 5-11: Location coefficient (.L)
L Location
1. 2 city
2. 1.5 regional centre
3. 1.2 village in non-mountainous area and regional centre 
in mountainous area
4. 0 village in mountainous areal—L:-----Lz  -----l-V“a5,
Source: (ARDAK 1993: 7)
2. Branch coefficient (A)
The branch in which a business operates, even if in most cases it will change, is 
also an important indicator of earning potential. The categories listed in Table 5- 
12 are again too general and were set up rather arbitrarily, judging from interviews 
with ASPC staff. Hotels are rated as more valuable, as they generate hard currency 
from foreign business travellers. However, this might be the case in Baku, but is
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unlikely in Kuba or Barda. Ideally there would have to be separate valuation 
criteria for each line o f business and commercially used premises.
Table 5-12: Branch coefficient (B)
B Branch
1. 2.5 hotel
2. 2 transport, trade and catering
3. 1.5 renovation , communication and research and development
4. 1 health, sports, culture and disabled services
Source: (ARDAK 1993b: 7)
3. Customer frequency coefficient (F)
This is an additional ‘location’ criterion (see Table 5-13). A shop in a heavily 
frequented area should be o f more value than of a little frequented area. However, 
the mark up o f 70% o f the net book value of all businesses in the non-material 
production sphere is unjustified.
Table 5-13: Customer frequency coefficient (F)
F Customer frequency
1. 1.5 heavy frequented (e.g. kolkhoz market, trade centres, railway and bus 
stations)
2. 0.7 little frequented
Source: (ARDAK 1993b: 7)
4. Special features coefficient (K)
The ‘special features’ criterion is another indicator for the location o f the business. 
The categories displayed in Table 5-14 are more important for some branches than 
for others. Thus, for some branches this criterion could be unjustified. Besides, for 
many businesses, a basement location could be more attractive than a first floor 
location, as they could be more readily accessible. A basement location means for 
many areas in Baku that the water and gas pressure might suffice to guarantee 
supplies for the whole day.
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Table 5-14: Special features coefficient (A)
K Special features
1. 0.8 free standing building
2. 0.6 first floor location
3. 0.4 second floor location
4. 0.2 basement location
5. 0.1 cellar location
Source: (ARDAK 1993b: 6)
5. Sanitary facilities coefficient (I)
It is not very clear why the price of premises without sanitary facilities is still 
marked up by 20% (see Table 5-15).
Table 5-15: Sanitary facilities coefficient (7)
/ Sanitary facilities
1. 0.8 water supply, canalisation, water heater, district heating system
2. 0.6 water supply, sewage, district heating system
3. 0.4 water, canalisation
4. 0.2 no facilities
Source: (ARDAIC 1993b: 6)
6. Ceiling height coefficient (H)
This is again a criterion which has only significance for a few businesses. It is 
questionable whether it should be generally applied (see Table 5-16).
Table 5-16: Ceiling height coefficient (H)
Ha Height of ceiling
1. 0.6 more than 3 m
2. 0.4 between 2 m and 3 m
3. 0.2 less than 2 m
Source: (ARDAK 1993b: 6)
As discussed above, valuation in the context o f PCPEs should have three aims: (1) 
to assist the allocation of scarce investment resources, (2) to guide future 
industrial policy, and (3) to bolster against asset striping.18 These are therefore the 
benchmarks against which the valuation method has to be measured. It might be 
desirable that the valuation is carried out as ‘objectively’ and transparently as 
possible. However, all the objective elements o f valuation, e.g. historical financial
18 See section 3.2 for a m ore detailed discussion.
statements and points o f reference given by the capital market, are only 
occasionally available and are widely distorted in PCPEs. Thus, the use of 
subjective elements, which no doubt are used in any valuation, are not only 
unavoidable, but also necessary in the transition period of PCPEs. The chosen 
valuation method and the way it is carried out do not fulfil any o f the above aims. 
First, as discussed above, the net book value does not adequately reflect the 
potential of a business. In the case of Azerbaijan, like most other PCPEs, the book 
value is moreover widely distorted. These deficiencies are not alleviated by the 
additional criteria used, as these are too rough and ready. Most interviewees 
expected an under-valuation o f assets.19 The value o f most assets has to be newly 
estimated in the form of a broad inventory. This inventory is particularly, 
necessary, as it is unknown how much of the fixed and current assets are still 
actually present and, if  present, operational.
Second, in this ‘inventory campaign’ it should be decided which 
enterprises will have to be liquidated and which have future potential. Enterprises 
to be liquidated should be dealt with separately. The liquidation value of these can 
be assessed. Assets with ‘political value’ should also be dealt with separately.20
Third, the future potential of most enterprises should be assessed on the 
basis of a business plan, evaluating potential product lines, markets, required 
capital expenditures and timing, organisational restructuring including the 
institution o f inventory and administrative controls, etc. These business plans 
could also assist potential investors in their decisions.
There are a number of other unresolved issues with the approach taken. 
First, there are no special criteria for the valuation of the land the enterprises are 
built on and surrounded by. Land is mentioned as a fixed asset by the valuation 
methodology (cf. ARDAK 1993b: 2). However, in the absence o f land registration 
laws and institutions many ownership disputes could arise. The acquisition of real 
estate is a motive for many potential buyers. Thus it is an important issue whether 
the premises o f enterprises are on prime location or remote, whether they are 
immediately available for construction purposes, etc.
19 However, most respondents expect also that bribes have to be paid on the side.
{^1 See section 3.2 for the discussion o f ‘political value’.
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Second, another unresolved issue is the dealing with, and valuation of, 
social facilities of enterprises such as club houses, recreation, education, health 
and creche facilities. There have to be separate valuation criteria and guidelines 
for these.
Third, potential environmental liabilities are hardly considered. Clean up 
costs can be expected to be quite considerable for some industrial sites. Thus, a 
sound evaluation o f the environmental damage has to be made. The question of 
responsibility for liabilities has to be solved.
Fourth, after the housing privatisation, medium and large enterprises were 
left with a kind of freeholder possession of former employees’ quarters. The legal 
basis for these is still very uncertain. At the moment, the enterprises are liable for 
major structural repairs of those houses in which the flats are in the meantime 
private. These liabilities have also to be considered. In the long-run it can be 
expected that the new owners will try to avoid these responsibilities. Again, a 
legal clarification o f duties and rights is required.
Fifth, the additional criteria used are mostly too unspecified and are only of 
significance for some lines of business. This makes the whole valuation rather 
arbitrary. It is inappropriate to value all enterprises under the same set o f general 
criteria.
5.5 The 1994 draft privatisation programm e
5.5.1 The scope of privatisation envisaged in the draft 
programme
The 1994 draft privatisation programme was prepared in accordance with 
the main privatisation law. As mentioned above, it was approved by the president 
on 28 April 1994. However, it failed to be adopted by parliament by January 1995, 
the end of the field study period. The privatisation programme deals exclusively
235
with the enterprises and commercial units (e.g. shops, restaurants, workshops).21 
The programme covers 1994 and is intended to determine objectives, tasks and 
methods o f this first stage as well as setting the basis for the following years.
The 1994 draft programme is a revised version o f the 1993 programme 
which was rejected by parliament. The most frequently mentioned reasons for the 
rejection o f the 1993 programme were the intensifying o f the Karabagh conflict 
and the coup against Elchibey and subsequent change o f the president. Within 
parliament the debate was centred in both years around problems o f valuation and 
whether non-profitable enterprises should be privatised first. The discussions were 
fuelled with the fear o f manipulation of asset values by insiders and eventually an 
under-priced sell-out o f state assets. The differences between the 1993 and 1994 
programmes are only cosmetic, and there are no changes in scope and methods (cf. 
ARDAK 1993). Thus only the latter will be discussed here in more detail.
The 1994 draft programme proposes the eventual privatisation of 54.4% of 
all state enterprises and objects employing 38.1% of the total workforce (see Table 
5-19). The programme aims to privatise 66.1% of enterprises in material 
production employing 64% of the workforce in the respective branches and 53% 
in non-material production employing 9.7% of the workforce (see Table 5-19). 
Privatisation is intended to be carried out in three stages (see Table 5-17). The first 
stage (1994-1995) targets small privatisation and is the main concern of the draft 
programme. Table 5-18 shows the classification o f enterprise sizes in different 
branches. For 1994 only 4.1% of all enterprises employing 2.3% of the workforce 
were targeted, which can be understood as a compromise with forces against 
formal privatisation.
As mentioned above, the privatisation of the housing stock is guided by the Law ‘On 
the Privatisation of Housing’ passed in 1993. Land privatisation will be based on the law 
‘On the Principles of Agrarian Reform’ and the law ‘On Sovkhoz and Kolkhoz Reform’ 
once they are passed and enforced.
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Table 5-17: Stages of the privatisation process envisaged by the draft 
programme of 1994
S ta g e P ro p o se d  p er io d M ea su re D escr ip tio n
1. 1 9 9 4 -1 9 9 5 Sm all privatisation •  shops, w orkshops, sm all industrial 
enterprises, catering and service outlets
• non-profitab le enterprises
•  unfin ished construction projects
2. 1 9 9 6 -1998 Privatisation o f  m edium  
to large enterprises
3. after 1998 Large privatisation
Source: ASPC
Table 5-18: Classification of enterprise sizes according to number of 
employees
Branch 'Small* ‘Medium * 'Large *
Industry 50 51-300 > 3 0 0
Transport 15 16-75 > 7 5
Construction 25 2 6 -1 5 0 > 1 5 0
Trade 10 11-50 > 5 0
Services 10 11-50 > 5 0
Source: A SP C
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Table 5-20 presents the key provisions with their relevant articles o f the 
1994 draft privatisation programme evaluated below. The discussion o f the 
programme is again more detailed as it is based on the original Azeri version, 
which is not available in English.
Table 5-20: Key provisions of the 1994 draft privatisation programme
No. Subject matter Article
1. Categories o f enterprises and assets
1. those which are exempt from privatisation;
2. those which are to be privatised by decision o f
§1
either Parliament or President;
3. those which are to be privatised by decision o f  
the ASPC;
§2.1
4. those which are to be privatised with agreement 
of the local authorities;
§2.2
5. those which are liable to obligatory 
privatisation.
§2.3
§2.4
2. Registration o f SOEs, inventory and valuation §3
3. Regional organisation and implementation o f  
privatisation
§8
4. Privatisation loans §9
5. Foreign participation §6
6. Information dissemination and Public relations §11
7. Social protection during the privatisation process §10
8. Distribution and use privatisation proceeds §7
9. Corporatisation §4.4
10. Privatisation in the different branches o f the economy 
1. Material production
• Industry §12.1.1
• Agro-industrial complex and food 
processing
§12.1.2
• Construction §12.1.3
• Unfinished construction 
2. Non-material production
§12.1.4
• Trade, public and personal services §12.1.5
• Transport and Communication §12.1.6
• Other services §12.1.7
11. Methods o f privatisation
• Tenders §4.3
• Employee buy-out §4.2
• Sale o f  shares §4.4
• Public auctions §4.3
• Sale o f leased property §4.1
• Voucher Programme §5
12. Timetable and procedures for privatisation §13
Source: ARDAK (1994)
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(1) Categories o f enterprises and assets
One of the most heavily discussed issues in parliament was the list of enterprises 
which were to be exempt from privatisation or need to special permission. The 
draft privatisation programme distinguishes between five categories of enterprises 
and assets:
1. those which are exempt from privatisation (see Table 5-21);
2. those which are to be privatised by decision of either Parliament or President, 
comprising mainly enterprises involved in the processing or production of 
strategically goods (see Table 5-22);
3. those which are to be privatised by decision of the ASPC (see Table 5-23);
4. those which are to be privatised with agreement o f the local authorities (see 
Table 5-24); and
5. those which are liable to obligatory privatisation (see Table 5-25).
Heavy debate evolved around the obligatory privatisation o f non-profitable 
enterprises. It was feared that insiders might claim their enterprises to be 
unprofitable in order to acquire them more cheaply and easily. As before in the 
main privatisation law, there is no clear demarcation o f responsibilities between 
the bodies evolved: are different levels going to initiate privatisation themselves 
and what role will the ASPC have in this process? Another major deficiency 
which appeal's throughout the programme is that the enteiprises are not seen in the 
context o f their holding companies. A programme which does not effectively 
address the issue o f industrial concentration described in section 4.3, is bound to 
be blocked by the industrial bureaucracy.
240
Table 5-21: Enterprises and assets exempt from privatisation
1. Natural resources, forestry, resources in the Caspian sea, air space, and territorial waters.
2. Preserved natural areas.
-»J. Historical and cultural heritage, museums, archives and libraries, including their premises and 
buildings, their property and goods.
4. Gold and hard currency fund, jeweller)' fund, social protection fund, and other funds outside 
the state budget.
5. National bank, saving-banks, currency, bonds and other state securities.
6. Ministries o f defence, national security and internal affairs, and their property and resources.
7. Institutions and organisations, financed by the state budget and those occupied with the social 
welfare o f the population: large health institutions, fundamental science institutions, education 
bodies, secondary schools, telecommunication utilities with significance for the state, special 
health sanatoriums, boarding-schools, orphanages, creche facilities, nursery homes, hospitals 
and sanatoriums for the disabled, for psychiatric treatment, sexually transmitted diseases, and 
alcoholism, and .epidemic isolation hospitals.
8. Geological, cartographic, geodesic, and meteorological organisations and institutions dealing 
with the environment and environmental protection.
9. Epidemiological centres, veterinary, forestry and plant protection services.
10. Medical science and education institutions.
U . Patent, standards and measuring organisations, and institutions, and car-testing services.
12. Pipeline maintenance organisations and systems.
13. Water-supply and irrigation systems and their maintenance.
14. State broadcasting company and state information and telegraph agencies.
15. Metro and public motorways and their maintenance.
16. Enterprises producing state honour medals and decorations.
17. Enterprises producing, processing and/or storing narcotic and poisonous substances.
18. Maritime port facilities, marine training facilities, merchant fleet, hydrographical 
organisations, maritime rescue, cleaning, repair and technology facilities, and maritime 
supervisor)' body.
19. Industrial and domestic waste-disposal units and depots, solid and liquid radioactive waste, 
contaminated meat and animal disposal units.
20. Prisons and special detention units.
21. Infrastructure and utilities o f cities and districts (i.e. electricity, heating, gas, and water supply 
systems, sewerage system, and street lightening), and their maintenance.
22. Assets and operations o f the gas industry of republican and regional importance.
23. Cemeteries.
Source: ARDAK (1994: 4-6)
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Table 5-22: Enterprises and assets privatised by decision of either Parliament 
or President
1. Enterprises and assets with defence character, producing and processing strategic goods and 
resources, and subordinate scientific institutes, projects, and organisations.
2. Civil defence institutions and assets, and mobilisation authorities.
nJ . Refrigerated and other storage facilities for state and mobilisation reserves.
4. State animal husbandry farms.
5. Cotton-cleaning plants.
6. Tea-processing and -packaging plants.
7. Alcoholic beverages and tobacco production and processing plants.
8. Extractive industry (except plants for local raw materials).
9. Enterprises and assets processing rare and precious metals and stones.
10. Enterprises and amalgamations o f the fuel, energy and petrochemical industries (except for 
construction and industrial construction operators and supervisory body) and oil fields with 
significance for the republic.
11. Commercial banks (except for private commercial banks).
12. Railways, aviation, sea transport and telecommunication systems and networks (except for the press 
network).
13. Social and cultural institutions (i.e. public health, education, sport, and cultural facilities), special 
hostels and creche facilities which are not exempt from privatisation (except for those on the 
balance sheets o f enterprises, amalgamations and organisations).
14. Universities and secondaiy schools, research facilities, except for those exempt from privatisation.
15. Organisations concerned with foreign economic and trade relations.
16. Printing and publishing enterprises.
17. Spa facilities and sanatoriums.
Source: ARDAK (1994: 6-8)
Table 5-23: Enterprises and assets privatised by the decision of the ASPC
1. Medium and large sized enterprises not exempt from privatisation or under the authority of either 
parliament or president.
2. Assets and property not used any longer due to reduction in armed forces.
j. Inland waterway transport businesses.
4. International, inter-city and inter-regional goods transport, service stations and depots.
5. Large enterprises o f the agro-industrial complex.
6. Food processing industry and enterprises supporting the agricultural sector.
7. Selection and hybrid centres, stud-farms, horse race tracks, seed testing authorities, agricultural 
laboratories for testing crops, precious and rare fish fanns, and special sovkhozes (only with the 
consent o f  the concerned authorities).
8. Enterprises and assets producing medical equipment, materials and pharmaceutics (except for those 
exempt from privatisation).
9. Enterprises and assets producing food for children.
10. Mobilisation resources (at the time o f privatisation, mobilisation resources will be separated from 
other assets o f  enterprises).
11. Petrol and oil selling operations (e.g. filling stations).
12. Handicraft and art workshops.
Source: ARDAK (1994: 8-9)
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Table 5-24: Enterprises and assets privatised with agreement of the local 
authorities
1. All goods transport facilities (except for those privatised from the ASPC), lorry and truck 
maintenance services.
2. Inter-city and -region passenger transport (except for taxis).
3. Small and medium sized agricultural enterprises.
4. Baths and laundries.
5. Party (wedding etc.) parlours.
6. Waste processing plants.
7. Chemists (provided they are regulated by the state).
8. Local health, education, culture and sports facilities (except those exempt from privatisation).
Source: ARDAK (1994: 9-10)
Table 5-25: Enterprises and assets liable to obligatory privatisation
1. Enterprises o f wholesale and retail trade, kiosks, catering and other service outlets.
2. Trade, service, transport and construction enterprises and assets, set up with means o f the state 
budget, or different state organisations and enterprises, and belong to ‘Azeritifak’ and its local 
organisations.
3. Very small, small and medium sized enterprises o f the material production sphere.
4. Non-profitable enterprises (except for those exempt from privatisation or privatised on decision of 
either Parliament or President).
5. Taxi and car hire facilities, their depots, and maintenance facilities
6. Small car repair and maintenance facilities.
7. Unfinished construction projects.
Source: ARDAK (1994: 10-11)
(2) Registration o f SOEs, inventory and valuation
The programme intends to register all enterprises with all performance indicators. 
It also requests inventories to be carried out in all enterprises. However, the 
programme involves a number of bodies in the inventory process without setting a 
framework in which responsibilities are clearly demarcated and which ensures 
effective co-ordination o f efforts. The valuation is to be carried out by a special 
commission authorised by the ASPC on the basis of accounting data provided by 
the enterprises and the methodology discussed above. By January 1995 the process 
of inventories and valuation was far from completed by and had hardly even begun.
(3) Regional organisation and implementation o f privatisation
Regional structures of the ASPC are made responsible for the preparation and 
implementation of privatisation. As discussed above, the setting up of regional
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networks o f the ASPC had proved to be far more difficult than anticipated by the 
policy planners.
(4) Privatisation loans
The programme relies upon the privatisation being credit financed. However, no 
special loans are made available. Thus privatisation vitally depends on the weak 
banking system in Azerbaijan.
(5) Foreign participation
■Involvement o f foreign investors is particularly requested by the programme for 
the following groups o f enterprises:
• unfinished construction;
• enterprises whose production has declined due to input shortages and lack of 
investments;
• enterprises processing food and other agricultural products;
• enterprises producing construction materials.
In the above mentioned enterprises foreigners can purchase shares except 
for preferred shares o f the labour collective. However, foreign investors are not 
granted preferential conditions.
Special licences are required for foreigners investing in enterprises which 
are primarily engaged in research and development tasks, converted enterprises 
previously belonging to the defence sector, and monopoly enterprises in petrol and 
energy-related sectors. By January 1995 no regulations and preparations were 
made for these special licences.
For the formation o f joint ventures special permission has to be obtained. 
The programme does not mention any regulations concerning this permission. 
Regulations determining the procedures and criteria for pennission have not yet 
been prepared. Uncertainty may arise for foreign investors as wide discretion is 
granted to the ASPC and other executive bodies not specified to restrict and 
condition the size of the share held by foreigners. Parliament has to give its 
permission for foreigners to acquire the controlling stock of shares of an
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enterprise, with no references made to the size of the enterprise. Very small 
enterprises would be also effected by this regulation which is bound to create 
unnecessary bureaucratic obstacles to foreign investment.
(6) Information dissemination and Public relations
The draft programme intends to facilitate widespread information and publicity 
work for privatisation. However, the minimum notification period of one month 
prior to an auction or requests for tender is far too short to initiate the desired 
degree of competition.
(7) Social protection during the privatisation process
The draft programme presumes that privatisation and expected restructuring is 
going to reduce at least temporarily the living standard o f the population as a 
whole and particularly those living in areas around privatised enterprises. Thus, 
the latter are supposed to be advantaged in the privatisation process. However, the 
programme does not specify in which way this will be. Moreover, the programme 
refers to a comprehensive social protection programme which is supposed to be 
implemented to alleviate hardship caused by privatisation and expected 
subsequent restructuring. In January 1995 the latter had still not been set up.
(8) Distribution and use of privatisation proceeds
Various sources of privatisation proceeds are listed by the draft programme, e.g. 
entrance tickets for auctions. However, neither mechanisms of collection nor of 
distribution are adequately considered.
(9) Corporatisation
The draft privatisation programme understands corporatisation as a form of 
privatisation rather than as organisational reform. Medium and large sized 
enterprises can be transformed into partnerships or open and closed joint-stock 
companies on the suggestion of the privatisation commission and with approval of
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the corresponding organs.22 The labour collective has to agree to this 
transformation with a three-quarter majority. In certain cases which are not 
specified, small enterprises can be transformed into partnerships or joint-stock 
companies. However this requires an approval o f the entire labour collective. The 
process o f corporatisation is carried out concurrently with the sale of shares to the 
labour collective and on the stock market, as described below. The ASPC is going 
to act as promoter of the companies. The share volume and the amount o f shares 
obtained by the labour collective is to be determined either by the promoter or the 
labour collective. There are no regulations proposed in case of disagreement 
between these two bodies.
The processes o f corporatisation and reorganisation should be carried out 
independently from and prior to privatisation.23 Corporatisation and reorganisation 
of enterprises in Azerbaijan cannot be done without resolving present corporate 
governance issues, i.e. unbundling the quasi-holding structures. The draft 
programme hardly deals with this vital issue and totally underestimates time and 
resources needed for such a politically brisant task.24 In the timetable a few 
months are reserved for this undertaking (see Table 5-29). In order to prevent the 
existing quasi-holding companies from privatising their entire structures via 
corporatisation, the latter is prohibited by the draft programme.
(10) Privatisation in the different branches o f the economy
Table 5-26 discusses the proposed privatisation in different branches in more 
detail. To summarise: the proposed privatisation in industry prioritises small and 
medium sized enterprises in the light and wood industry both of which are
11
"  It is assum ed, that the privatisation com m ission refers to the com m ission  set up by the
ASPC for the valuation o f  enterprises and that approval is on ly  necessary for the
enterprises listed in Table 5-22, Table 5-23, Table 5-24, and Table 5-25. T hese questions
could not be resolved  in interviews with ASPC em ployees.
See section  2 .1 .22  for a more detailed discussion o f  the relevance o f  corporatisation in
PCPEs.
Another explanation is that the issue o f  unbundling o f  the quasi-holding structures is
too p olitically  brisant for the ASPC.
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insignificant in Azerbaijan.25 This indicates a compromise with the powerful 
industrial bureaucracy: only the production union Azarmesha, the Khalg uctin 
mallar’ state concern and Azarmebelsanaye state concern are immediately affected 
by the programme. Moreover, the majority of enterprises scheduled for 
privatisation are in the provinces, where the control o f these quasi-holding 
structures is reduced or even has ceased completely. However, the industrial 
bureaucracy might oppose the privatisation of unfinished enterprise sites and 
objects, as their informal property rights over these assets would be affected 
depending on the form of privatisation.
Enterprises scheduled for privatisation in the agro-industrial sector are also 
mainly in the provinces. In some cases formal and informal income of local 
authorities could be effected by privatisation.26 It will also depend on the role 
assigned to local authorities in the privatisation. It is questionable whether the 
local authorities will accept newly established regional structures of the ASPC to 
operate in what they claim as their domain.
The enterprises scheduled for privatisation in construction and production 
o f construction materials are more attractive for their real estate than for their 
businesses. Ministries and local authorities, that these refurbishment departments 
are subordinated to, might oppose relinquishing control and possible informal 
income sources.
In the trade and services sector, formal and informal property rights of the 
local authorities are affected by the scheduled privatisation. Local authorities
25 Here the Azeri classifications are used. ‘Industry’ com prises all industrial enterprises 
except for production o f  animal products, manufacture o f  food  products and beverages, 
and manufacture o f  construction materials.
26 The agro-industrial com plex com prises the production o f  animal products and 
manufacture o f  food products and beverages.
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might lose significant formal and informal income sources in this process. 
Similarly the privatisation of the automobile service workshops of the production 
union ‘Avotmotoservic’ has repercussions on formal and informal income streams 
of the latter.
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5.5.2 M ethods of privatisation suggested in the draft programme
There are six methods o f privatisation suggested by the draft programme, which 
are discussed below in more detail. Table 5-27 summarises the evaluation of the 
methods within the framework given in chapter 3.
(1) Public auctions and tenders
The draft programme states that auctions are carried out according to the 
guidelines ‘on the sale of state assets through public auctions’ and tenders with 
their respective guidelines, both of which have not yet been prepared. Mainly 
small and medium sized enterprises are intended to be sold through auctions or 
tenders. Assets of liquidated or bankrupt enterprises and o f those whose 
performance has not been satisfactory over the past two years and unfinished 
construction sites are also to be sold either through public auctions or tenders. In 
case the labour collective is participating in an auction or tender it should 
constitute at least one third of the employees. The latter have to pay only one 
quarter o f the sales price in the auction and can pay the rest in instalments over the 
period of one to three years.
In case of public auctions, the distribution criterion is the highest price. 
There is no reference made how the floor reservation price is calculated. This has 
to be included in the guidelines.
As discussed in 3.4.4 depending on the size o f the enterprise auctions have 
high transaction costs.
There are two forms of tenders proposed: (1) commercial competitive 
tenders and (2) non-commercial competitive tenders. In the first variant, besides 
the price, other criteria are considered: (1) ecological safety, (2) economic 
competence and preparation of the buyer, (3) business profile and maintenance of 
functions o f the enterprise, (4) maintenance of employment level, and (5) other 
criteria (not specified by the programme).
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The second variant is used for enterprises and unfinished construction sites 
which require investments. Distribution criteria are: (1) investment project, (2) 
other criteria (not specified by the programme). The paid price is irrelevant as 
criterion.
As discussed in section 3.4.1 the transaction costs o f competitive tendering 
are relatively high due to the essential requirement for competent and honest 
administrators and a well functioning legal framework with speedy means of 
contract enforcement. However, if  contractual obligations can be enforced, this 
method could ensure the initial stages of restructuring, especially in case of 
unfinished construction sites and bankrupt enterprises.
(2) Labour collective buy-outs
According to the draft programme, labour collectives which are interested in the 
purchase of their enterprises will be advantaged regardless of the method of 
privatisation. Two-thirds of the collective has to agree to the buy-out. The buy-out 
can take place in an non-divisible and individualised-share transfer of the 
ownership rights to the labour collective.27 The labour collective buy-out is 
regulated by the respective guidelines. The latter have not been prepared yet. In 
case of other potential buyers the ASPC determines the method of privatisation. 
The privileges of the labour collective are determined by the ASPC, taking 
account of the location, business line, technical and economic indicators, number 
of employees, and the expertise of the labour collective. However, there are no 
rules and regulations for the latter and there is a danger that they will be dealt with 
arbitrarily. The only privilege stated in the draft programme is that the labour 
collective has to pay only 50% of the purchase price immediately (which is 
regarded as a non-refundable pledge) and the rest in inflation-adjusted instalments. 
After privatisation the labour collective can freely choose an organisational form 
and the line of business of its enterprise.
See also section  3.3 .2  for a d iscussion o f  non-divisib le and individualised-share 
transfer.
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Members o f the labour collective who did not acquire any ownership rights 
have to be paid out twelve times the minimum wage as compensation. These 
disadvantaged workers will also receive other advantages according to the draft 
programme. However, the latter are not defined.
Point 4.2.3 and point 12.6 of the draft privatisation programme suggest 
that the individual enterprise units or plants can be only privatised on their own 
and not together with their superstructure, i.e. state concerns, etc. It is not defined 
who is going to initiate and control the process of unbundeling o f the enterprise 
structures and there are no rules and regulations for this vital process.28 The latter 
would imply a significant reduction if  not abolition of the present quasi-holding 
structures. However this tendency is contradicted by point 12.5 which allows the 
transformation of the existing quasi-holding structures into holding companies in 
order to maintain the vertical integration o f these enterprise complexes. There are 
no rules and regulations provided for the establishment o f holding companies.
With this privatisation method a complex contract can be set up 
conditioning initial steps o f restructuring, employment guarantees etc. 
Administrative costs will be higher, as negotiation, information and monitoring 
costs rise with a complex contract. However, costs will not be as high as with 
competitive tendering as there is a limited number of bidders (one for each 
enterprise). Labour collective buy-outs have relatively low transaction costs and 
offer significant advantages to other privatisation methods in terms of governance, 
restructuring and curbing of patronage networks.
(3) Privatisation through corporatisation and sale to labour collective and 
capital markets
Table 5-28 presents the three proposed forms in which shares can be sold. In all 
these sale forms, as a ‘first stage’, individual members of the labour collective 
are not allowed to obtain more than 10% of shares at face value.
28 As can be seen in Table 5-29 the draft programme assigns the enterprises, their 
superstructures and the enterprise registration authorities for implementation.
29 It is not specified what the following steps will be.
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In scheme two and three the labour collective would obtain the controlling
TOblock o f shares and resembles an ESOP. The individual worker would control 
his/her enterprise indirectly as shareholder in shareholder meetings. Whether the 
labour collective can curb short-sighted and opportunistic behaviour and dislodge 
possible incompetent and dishonest managers will depend on its strength and 
unity, and, on how far the new governance form o f a joint-stock company can be 
established. The latter is again dependent on the overall institutional settings, 
particularly the soundness of the legal framework. The labour force in Azerbaijan 
is weak and fragmented, and there is no precedent in the governance form of a 
joint-stock company. There is the danger that relatively unrestricted insider control 
will be the outcome. However, as discussed in section 3.3.2, if  this privatisation 
takes place at a plant level, insiders would be separated from the industrial 
bureaucracy and their patronage networks, i.e. the managers of state enterprises, 
state concerns, etc.
The first scheme would maintain the status quo. However, it depends on 
the reorganisation of the enterprises and the willingness and the strength of the 
executive whether the state can resume control over its enterprises. It is under the 
discretion o f the ASPC over which enterprises the state is going to hold a 
controlling share.
All three schemes assume a functioning share market which is not existent 
in Azerbaijan. Shares obtained by the labour collective and those remaining as 
state property can only be sold after two years and then preferably to members of 
the labour collective. This blockage period would avoid initial fragmentation of 
ownership and support the commitment required in the restructuring period.31 In 
case of joint-stock companies of the closed type, the labour collective has to pay 
initially only 50% of their shares. The rest can be paid within a year. All three 
schemes have relatively low transaction costs and have also the advantage that a 
corporate governance system is set up with the privatisation.
3 0  • *See section  3 .3 .2  for a detailed d iscussion o f  ESOPs.
31 See section  3 .3 .2  for the discussion o f  the advantages o f  transparency in ownership  
and control.
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Table 5-28: Proposed share sale forms
Share sold to the labour 
collective
Shares held by the state Share sold on share market
1 A maximum o f 49% o f the 
shares is sold to the labour 
collective at face value.
51% and unsold shares are 
held by the state. Dividends 
are transferred to the 
employment fund.
Shares which could not be 
sold to the labour collective 
are sold on the share market at 
market prices.
2 A maximum o f 51% o f the 
shares is sold to the labour 
collective at face value.
Unsold shares are transferred 
to the State Development 
Fund.
49% of shares are sold on the 
share market at market prices.
3 51% o f shares is sold to the 
labour collective at face value. 
Remaining shares are sold at 
double face value,
Shares not sold to the labour 
collective are sold on the 
share market.
Source; ARDAK (1994: 20).
(4) The privatisation o f lease enterprises
According to the draft programme, enterprises which are leased can be bought by 
their leaseholders. In case of the labour collective being the leaseholder, the latter 
will be granted the advantage of easy sale terms, which are however not closely 
defined. There are restrictions on the privatisation of leased out assets which are 
integrated into the overall production process of an enterprise or plant. However, 
the latter are not specified. Enterprises which are privatised after the privatisation 
programme has started have not the same advantages. Leasing is not understood as 
divestment of user rights and subsequently not seen as a privatisation method. 
New legislation on leasing was only passed in November 1994 and required 
supporting legislation, schemes and rules are still missing.32
The sale o f leased enterprises to their leaseholders causes relatively low 
transaction costs, as administrative and realignment costs are low. The economic 
competence o f the leaseholders can also expected to be high. However, there 
might be public criticism as most leaseholders were reportedly members of the 
nomenklatura.
32 See also section 4.4.
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(5) The voucherprogramme
The draft programme also envisages a mass privatisation programme in form of 
free distribution of dematerialised privatisation vouchers or 'shares' as termed in 
Azerbaijan, in which 42% of all assets scheduled for privatisation should be 
privatised.33 The goal for the voucher scheme programme is an equal starting 
point for the entire population.34 This gesture of equity can be understood as a 
strategy to sell broad privatisation. Considering the value of each share, the 
upkeep o f insider control due to wide dispersion of ownership, and the prevalent 
disparity o f wealth, the voucher scheme hardly leads to an equal stalling point in 
practice. Every citizen is allocated a special privatisation account in a savings 
bank with AzM4000 (equalling US$4 in June 1994).35 In order to prevent 
speculation, the privatisation vouchers are not transferable, can only be used for 
privatisation purposes, and cannot be paid out in cash. In a labour collective buy­
out up to 50% of the price can be paid in vouchers. State and private investment 
funds are expected to be established in which citizens can invest their vouchers. 
So far, no regulations nor regulating bodies have been established for such funds. 
Thus the protection of shareholders of newly emerging investment funds is 
doubtful.
The level o f transaction costs of this free transfer scheme can be expected 
to be very high as discussed in section 3.3.3. This will be particularly the case in 
Azerbaijan with its practically non-existent capital markets, fragmentary legal 
framework and weak law enforcement agencies. As mentioned above, the voucher 
privatisation scheme can be expected to reinforce insider control and will hardly 
initiate industrial restructuring.
33 See section  3.3 .3  for an extensive d iscussion o f  theoretical and em pirical issues o f  
voucher privatisation schem es.
34 For an evaluation o f  the equity argument, see section 2 .4  in this volum e.
35 The value o f  each voucher is calculated as follow s: the total value o f  state assets in 
Azerbaijan (excep t for land, state housing and S ovkhozes) am ounted to AzM  103.8 
billion (in prices o f  I January 1993). 63 to 65 percent o f  these assets are scheduled for 
privatisation o f  w hich 42%  are to be privatised through the voucher schem e (equalling  
28.1%  o f  total state assets), am ounting to A zM  4000 per person.
256
(6) Insiders ’ benefits
It is important to note, that managers are not at all mentioned in the draft 
programme. Only the labour collective is referred to. In all privatisation methods 
except for the voucher scheme which is based on investment funds the position of 
the labour collective towards insiders is significantly strengthened by the 
programme. However, it can hardly be expected that insiders are going to lose the 
upper hand. First, in the foreseeable future there are only small and medium sized 
enterprises of the light and wood industry and the agro-industrial complex 
scheduled for privatisation. In the first year this will only affect enterprises in the 
provinces, which have often ceased production and are in many cases heavily 
dismantled. The other group of enterprises prioritised are enterprises which are 
bankrupt and due to be liquidated. In all these priority groups significant 
investments are required which hardly will be forthcoming from the labour 
collectives. Illiquid capital markets and the fragile banking system are also 
unlikely to secure these investments. Second, as discussed above, even if the 
process o f corporatisation is initiated, it is unlikely that it will be able to limit 
insider control. Third, as shown above, the voucher scheme which is to affect 42% 
of all state assets scheduled for privatisation is also unlikely to challenge insider 
control.
5.5.3 The proposed timetable of privatisation
Table 5-29 presents the very ambitious timetable o f the 1994 draft privatisation 
programme. None of the set objectives has been achieved. Due to both resistance 
by the industrial bureaucracy and the disorganised approach it was not possible to 
conduct a full inventory of all enterprises. Equally the process o f unbundling the 
enteiprises o f their quasi-holding structures has not even been seriously attempted. 
The ASPC was not able to set up its regional networks due to regional resistance 
and lack o f resources.
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Concluding remarks
To summarise: the privatisation process has been so far pursued with limited 
political commitment. First, the legal framework of privatisation reveals many 
deficiencies. From the textual perspective, the main privatisation law requires 
clarification across a number o f matters. Subordinate legislation referred to in the 
main privatisation law is often even not in draft stage. A privatisation programme 
has not yet been passed by parliament. The latter requires textual clarification in 
significant areas, as well as additional rules and regulations (e.g. regulations on 
auctions etc.). It appears as if  both the framework law and the draft privatisation 
programme were purposely held vague in order to allow room for free 
interpretation once the programme is passed. Moreover, there seems to be fear that 
the more definite the programme is the less likely it will be to get it approved.
Second, major policy steps which have to precede the privatisation process 
(e.g. a social plan to mitigate undue hardship, adequate provisions for corporate 
governance, etc.) have not been taken yet.
Third, the ASPC appears as a body with little power, which hardly can 
impose any decisions and steps without the consent o f powerful interest groups, 
e.g. insiders including the industrial bureaucracy and local authorities. So far they 
were not even able to conduct a registration and full inventory nor establish its 
own regional structures. However, through the privatisation programme they 
would have considerable discretion in decisions such as which privatisation 
method is going to be used, favourable payment modes for buyers, and tender 
conditions, etc. This discretion is open, to abuse. Thus one can understand that 
existing institutions, e.g. ministries and local authorities, feel themselves 
challenged by the establishment o f a new authority and a competitor for scarce 
informal income.
The assessment of the draft privatisation programme promises little impact 
on both static and dynamic efficiency of significant enterprises. Moreover, the 
programme will hardly set an end to the long battle over the distribution of 
property rights over the enterprises. First, the planned voucher programme 
including the envisaged investment funds and privatisation through capital market
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operations and auctions does not encourage conditions favourable to effective 
corporate governance and the initiation o f industrial restructuring. A capital 
market and its institutions would still have to be established and are prone to be 
subjected to manipulation and outright fraud.36
Second, privatisation through corporatisation makes favourable provisions 
for the labour collective. However, due to the poor financial institutions and the 
non-existence o f capital markets it will be very difficult for the labour collectives 
to raise the funds to buy the controlling stock of their enterprises, let alone to carry 
out the necessary investments for restructuring. Moreover, considering the 
condition o f most labour collectives, there is the danger that relatively unrestricted 
insider control will be the outcome o f this way o f privatisation.
Third, the enterprises in the industrial sector scheduled for privatisation in 
the foreseeable future are all insignificant for the economy. In case of the 
scheduled small scale privatisation, most businesses concerned (e.g. shops, 
kiosks) are already run privately with a formal or informal lease arrangement with 
the local authority concerned. Thus there will be little impact on the economic 
performance o f these businesses and the only change will be the formal and 
informal arrangements between the authorities and the leaseholders. At the most, 
it will have an effect on the real estate market, as many businesses intend to sell 
their shops. Most o f this small scale privatisation should therefore not be dealt 
with as ‘enterprise privatisation’ but rather as a matter of commercial property 
sale.
On the whole, the assessment of the plans and realities o f privatisation 
shows little political commitment for the latter in Azerbaijan. Why is it that the 
privatisation process is so cumbersome in Azerbaijan? After all privatisation is the 
only official approach taken towards restructuring. The assessment of survey and 
interview material in the next chapter tries to shed some light on this question.
36 See also chapter 3.
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6. Privatisation in Azerbaijan: Attitudes, perceptions and
expectations 
Introduction
The survey and interview material presented here has been designed to provide 
empirical evidence concerning attitudes, perceptions, and expectations towards 
privatisation in Azerbaijan. The assessment of popular attitudes are important as 
they influence the climate that either upholds or hampers the process. Moreover, 
ultimately the implementation of privatisation will depend on the willingness and 
ability o f parts o f the public to participate in the new structures.
The analysis is based on a public opinion survey on privatisation 
conducted for the internal use o f the ASPC and extensive open-ended interviews 
with stakeholders in the privatisation process conducted by the author during field 
visits between December 1993 and February 1995. The affiliations of the 
interviewees is documented in Table 6-25. The main themes covered in the 
interviews and by the survey are listed in Table 6-1 and presented below.1
Expanding the data sources is done in the spirit o f Bulmer (1993 a: 10): 
*[..] different [research] methods are complementary to each other rather than in 
competition [..]’ Qualitative data - often anecdotal and impressionistic - sheds 
light on the complex political and economic context and intricate patterns of 
political and economic interaction. A strong advantage o f the sample survey is its 
generalisability.
The public opinion survey on privatisation o f the Publicity Department of 
the ASPC was conducted in June 1994. The author advised Ms Yavi, the manager 
o f the publicity department, on the design of the survey.3 The population from
1 In the fo llo w in g  sections, participants o f  the survey are referred to as respondents, 
participants o f  the author’s interviews as interview ees.
2 For a more detailed  discussion o f  the problems and m erits o f  sam ple surveys see, for 
exam ple, Bulm er (1993b), Stacey (1969), Stycos (1993), and Zarkovich (1993).
T he survey w as carried out by the Public Opinion Research Institute o f  the Supreme 
C ouncil on b eh a lf o f  the ASPC.
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which the sample was drawn is based on the working population o f the district of 
Baku. The sample was selected randomly using the following criteria for 
stratification. Respondents were to be proportionally distributed between different 
employment places (i.e. scientific institutions, factories, transport, trade and 
service sector) and age. Altogether the 800 respondents were questioned in 30 
randomly chosen locations.
Table 6-1: Main themes of the interviews
Interview theme
1. Accessibility o f information
2. Attitude towards privatisation
3. Attitude towards privatisation of enterprise
employees
4. Attitude towards speed of privatisation
5. Attitude towards methods of privatisation
6. Attitude towards participation of foreigners
7. Attitude towards corporatisation
8. Ownership potential
9. Perceived obstacles to privatisation
10. Expected ‘winners’ of privatisation
11. Expected results o f privatisation
12. Expected personal consequences
13. Perceived legitimacy of privatisation
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Table 6-2: Affiliation o f interviewees
A ffilia tio n N u m b er
Presidential apparatus 1
Parliam ent n
C ouncil o f  M inistries 4
M inistry o f  E con om ics 6
M inistry o f  Finance •>
Privatisation C om m ittee 8
A n ti-m on opoly  and Entrepreneur Support 
C om m ittee
1
T ax inspectorate 2
C oncerns 6
Enterprises 21
Trade U nion 5
Cham ber o f  C om m erce and Industry 1
Banks oJ
A cadem ia 5
Journalists 9
T o ta l 78
6.1 The findings
(1) Accessibility o f information
There has been a serious lack of information on the proposed privatisation 
programme. Only 20% of the respondents regarded the information dissemination 
as sufficient (see Figure 6-1). 33.9% of the respondents required basic information 
and 33.4% specific information (e.g. time schedule, auctions, employee benefits 
etc.).
Whilst quite a few interviewees had relative good knowledge of 
technicalities o f privatisation (e.g. auctions, competitive tenders, valuation ,etc.), 
the majority had little knowledge and understanding o f the theoretical 
underpinnings o f privatisation and broader concepts o f industrial restructuring and 
corporate governance. The theoretical concepts supporting the superiority of 
private ownership and the discussion on privatisation in other PCPEs and in the 
international literature was unknown even to academics.
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Most o f the interviewees did not have up-to-date information on the draft 
privatisation programme, although they could be regarded as stakeholders in a 
possible privatisation process. Employees of the AME, AMF, trade unions, and 
banks were not consulted on the draft of the programme. There was a need of 
information in specialised issues like the setting up o f investment funds, 
corporatisation, and benefits of employees. However, it seemed that the official 
privatisation process was nowhere a priority concern.
There was hardly any experience of other countries made public. Most of 
the interviewees had followed the Russian privatisation process and were familiar 
with the issues of the Russian voucher privatisation scheme, auctions, competitive 
tendering, MBO and ESOP schemes, corporatisation, and investment funds. 
However, they had little knowledge of the privatisation process in Kazakhstan or 
other FSU republics and PCPEs. There was however also resistance to being 
pigeonholed as ‘PCPE’ and there was doubt over how far the experiences of other 
countries could be transferred to the Azeri context. In particular, comparisons to 
Central Asian newly independent states were approached with some local 
chauvinism, i.e. Azerbaijan is regarded as less backward than these countries.
Figure 6-1: Availability of information
0.8 %
37.4 %
141.8%
2 0 %
4 no response
3 too little
2 incomplete
10 20 30 40 % 50
□  1 enough
Source: Survey o f  the Publicity Department o f  the ASPC
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Figure 6-2: Demand for information of respondents
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Source: Survey o f the Publicity Department o f the ASPC
(2) Attitude towards privatisation
The survey results show that the population is divided on the question of 
privatisation with 39% proponents and 34.2% opponents (see Figure 6-3). 
However, the high number o f ‘undecided’ also indicates that privatisation is for a 
significant part o f the population not regarded as an issue o f importance. It has to 
be noted that the result could have been different if the question had been divided 
between small and large privatisations. There is a large group of small business 
people who expect some advantages through the privatisation of shops, little 
workshops, etc. However, there seems to be far less support for the privatisation 
of large enterprises as reflected in Figure 6-4.
Many o f the interviewees were in favour o f some form of privatisation. 
However, they did not believe that large scale privatisation, as carried out in 
Russia, would begin in the foreseeable future. There was great reluctance over 
mass privatisation, because it was feared it could disturb the relative political 
stability. It was believed that the broad public is still devastated by the events of 
recent years: the Karabagh conflict, the break up of the Soviet Union, the debacle 
with the AzPF. The majority of the population was not regarded as prepared for 
the privatisation process as it symbolised a definite break with the past. Moreover, 
the fixation on the issue of privatisation was regarded as inadequate particularly in 
respect o f large enterprises.
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Many interviewees, most eminently in enterprises and concerns, were 
highly suspicious o f the ASPC, which was regarded as the establishment of 
another central authority and thus another corrupt bureaucratic hurdle for 
economic activity. The existing bureaucracy was already regarded as enough. 
They had little faith in the expertise of the ASPC on the industries concerned and 
would have rather seen experts deal with the issue. Moreover, power struggles 
between competing bureaucracies and the ASPC would further paralyse any 
development.
Many distinguished between the privatisation o f small enterprises (e.g. 
shops, workshops, restaurants, hairdressers) and large enterprises. They 
emphasised that these processes had to be carried out separately as different 
stakeholders were involved. Some even thought that these two types of 
privatisation were combined in order to gain popular support. This view is 
supported by the results of the survey concerning the speed o f privatisation: 50.1% 
of the respondents favour privatisation in separate stages (see Figure 6-5).
Some interviewees suggested that none of the influential stakeholders had 
enough power to influence the privatisation process openly in their favour; thus 
they would rather stall it. The powerful interest groups (e.g. state companies, 
bureaucracy) were regarded to favour informal arrangements.
A few interviewees, mainly academics, did not agree with the ‘wholesale’ 
character of the mass privatisation programmes. They would rather like 
privatisation to be carried out selectively and embedded in a broad industrial 
restructuring programme. They regarded the privatisation of large enterprises as 
not feasible as the required funds for investments could not be raised privately. 
None o f the inteiviewees of enterprises and concerns had any clear ideas on how 
their respective industries should be restructured after privatisation.
Privatisation was hardly regarded as an instrument for the establishment of 
better enterprise control mechanisms and the initiation o f industrial restructuring. 
It was considered by its supporters as an unquestioned necessity on the path to a 
market economy and the break with the old Soviet economic system. Many saw 
privatisation as a means to adapt the de facto property rights structure to the de 
jure structure. They emphasised that privatisation would often be perceived as the
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official sanctioning of long-term theft by nomenklatura and insiders. Thus, there 
would be a psychological barrier to accept this seemingly final verdict. The 
minority regarded it as measure to reduce the influence of the former 
nomenklatura, which was in any case regarded as impossible. The threat of 
privatisation was also seen as a means of the ruling elite to discipline other 
powerful interest groups.
Some interviewees even rated privatisation as mere internationally 
demanded prerequisite for gaining acceptance and support and therefore opposed 
it. Now that Azerbaijan had finally gained independence it should struggle for 
self-determination instead of giving in to international demands. After all, 
foreigners had their own agendas and had little interest in the future and well­
being of the Azeris.
Many interviewees described the present ownership situation as a kind of 
stalemate from which no progress would be possible. Thus, measures had to be 
taken one way or another to clear the uncertainty over the future of the enterprises 
and create a situation in which restructuring is possible. However, the majority 
saw little significance in the official privatisation process. Many reckoned the 
process would be carried out more on an informal basis.
Figure 6-3: Attitude towards privatisation of respondents
P 1.3 %
■  4 no response
25.5%
■  3 undecided
34.2 %
■  2 negative
39%
□  1 positive
40
Source: Survey o f  the Publicity Department o f  the ASPC
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(3) Attitude towards privatisation o f enterprise employees
The survey indicated vast resistance of employees against the privatisation of their 
enterprises (see Figure 6-4). Most employees seem to distrust the proposed labour 
collective friendly privatisation schemes.
Some interviewees suggested differences between various branches and 
enterprises could be expected. They expected that employees o f small enterprises 
would be more prepared for privatisation than those o f large enterprises. However, 
it would depend on other factors, most eminently the recent official and unofficial 
performance of an enterprise. They reckoned that many employees often hung on 
even to their unpaid jobs, with the hope of reward after the recovery of the 
economy. This reward could be jeopardised through privatisation.
Interviewees with trade unionist revealed that hardly any labour collectives 
speculated with a labour collective buy out. None o f the labour collectives had 
developed their own reform concepts and programmes which could be 
implemented in their enterprises. The whole labour movement is poorly organised 
and fragmented. The old trade union structures have not been able to transform 
themselves into a forceful power.
Figure 6-4: Attitude towards privatisation of enterprise employing
respondent
■  3 undecided
■  2 against
^  ED 1 in favour 
50
Source: Survey o f the Publicity Department o f the ASPC 
(4) Attitude towards speed o f privatisation
As mentioned above the majority of respondents favoured a privatisation in 
separate stages (see Figure 6-5). 17.1% are in favour o f immediate comprehensive
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privatisation which indicates a plea for fundamental change. Again, the large 
percentage o f ‘don’t know’ indicates that the issue o f privatisation is not 
considered important by a significant section of the population. Most frequent 
responses under the rubric ‘other’ were that experiences of other countries should 
be considered and that small enterprises of the service sector should be privatised 
first. Some interviewees in favour of privatisation thought that a delay would 
prolongue the uncertainty over the future of the enterprises and would intensify 
the power struggle between different stakeholders.
The lack of preparation of accompanying measures was widely criticised, 
particularly the lack o f an adequate social plan to mitigate undue hardship and the 
inappropriate measures taken for the valuation of the assets. It was generally 
agreed by proponents that any acceleration of privatisation should not be carried 
out at the expense of preparation. Opponents of privatisation also criticised the 
lack of overall sectoral plans and strategies.
Figure 6-5 : Attitude towards speed of privatisation
6.4 % 15 other
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24.4 % 13 don’t know
17.1 % 2 in favour of 
immediate broad 
privatisation
50.5 %
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Source: Survey o f the Publicity Department o f the ASPC 
(5) Attitude towards methods o f privatisation
Auctions were slightly more favoured than competitive tenders in the sale of small 
enterprises (see Figure 6-6). Most respondents were worried about the
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transparency o f tenders, and regarded them as more prone to corruption. The 
interviews also reflected this sentiment. Other opinions were mostly disagreement 
with sale or that lower income groups should be considered more.
Most interviewees took political feasibility as the main criterion for their 
evaluation of privatisation methods. However, the majority favoured the sale or 
give-away to the labour collectives as the most legitimate and promising method. 
The latter would match the inherent Soviet mentality more and was understood as 
the legitimate successor of the centrally planning regime. Corporatisation and 
subsequent sale and give-away of shares were regarded as the most politically 
feasible method as explained below. The majority o f interviewees had no clear 
preferences concerning small enterprises.
Figure 6-6: Attitude towards auctions in comparison to competitive tenders 
in the sale of small enterprises
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Source: Survey o f the Publicity Department o f the ASPC
(6) Attitude towards participation o f foreigners
The result o f the survey show that opinion on foreign participation in privatisation 
is very divided in Azerbaijan (see Figure 6-7). 41.3% percent o f respondents were 
against foreign participation and 33.6% in favour. However, the high number of 
undecided respondents indicates an ongoing debate. Most of the proponents
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emphasised the employment and transfer of technology foreign involvement 
would bring. Others who welcomed foreign participation would still like Azeris to 
be favoured in the privatisation process. Some stressed that sales to foreigners 
should be restricted to enterprises without strategic importance.
The attitude o f the interviewees towards foreign participation was 
overwhelmingly positive. Foreigners including the Azeri expatriate community 
could revive the economy and would moreover not be exposed to the same 
institutional constraints as domestic investors, i.e. corruption and bureaucratic 
obstacles. It was generally agreed that foreigners should be attracted through 
favourable terms to branches and enterprises in which Azerbaijan lacked expertise 
and investment capacity. There was some sentiment that small enterprises should 
be kept a domain o f domestic investors. However, the majority overestimated the 
extent o f foreign participation. They expected outside investors and supranational 
credits to take a leading role in the restructuring o f the entire economy including 
sectors outside the petrol-related industries. Most hoped that foreigners would buy 
up to one third of all medium and large sized enterprises, despite their knowledge 
of the current dearth of foreign investment. Sale o f enterprises to foreigners was 
regarded as independent from the general privatisation programme and it could be 
initiated in case-by-case negotiations.
Figure 6-7: Attitude towards participation of foreigners
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Source: Survey o f  the Publicity Department o f  the ASPC
271
(7) Attitude towards corporatisation
The survey showed a polarisation in attitudes towards corporatisation: 42.8% were 
against whilst 37.7% in favour and with 18.1% there was a relative high number 
of undecided (see Figure 6-8). This result was also reflected in the estimation of 
the opinion trends by the interviewees.
Some journalists suggested that joint stock companies had a negative 
image as people suspected that their formation was a pretext to preserve old 
property rights structures. They expected that corporatisation would even increase 
the present principal-agent problems, as it would offer little by way of control 
mechanisms. Shareholder meetings were regarded as a poor means of control, as 
shareholders and investment funds would not pose a credible threat. The latter 
would be hardly experienced and familiar enough with the commercial, financial 
and managerial aspects of the complex organisations,4 particularly, as it could be 
expected that the now quasi-holding companies would transform themselves into 
joint stock companies. Moreover, all these entities are de facto monopoly 
producers, which required additional attention. Corporatisation would have little 
effect on inherent inefficiencies. More far-reaching organisational restructuring 
would be needed.
Particularly young interviewees regarded share ownership and the stock 
exchange as a prerequisite of modem capitalism. For them it was almost a 
question o f national pride to have such institutions which symbolised to them the 
final stages o f economic development.
Some interviewees were suspicious of the emergence of the security 
markets and instruments which would follow corporatisation. They thought that 
most small investors were mainly attracted by the windfall gains that these new 
institutions would make possible. This short-sighted speculative behaviour was 
not regarded as a sound basis to come out the general economic crisis. The stock 
exchange and investment funds were compared with the charity organisations 
mentioned in section 4.5.
4 Another aspect m entioned for minority shareholders w as that there would be cultural 
and soc io log ica l barriers in opposing powerful previous nomenklatura members.
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The majority did not see corporatisation as an effective means of 
increasing the discipline of managers However, corporatisation and the 
subsequent sale and give away of shares was generally regarded as the only 
political feasible method of privatisation of medium and large sized enterprises, as 
in case of initial wide dispersion of shares public protest would be limited without 
upsetting the status quo o f insiders and the industrial bureaucracy.
Figure 6-8: Attitude towards corporatisation
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Source: Survey o f the Publicity Department o f the ASPC
(8) Ownership potential
The result o f the survey reflects the polarised wealth distribution in Azerbaijan 
(see Figure 6-9). Whilst 65.3% of the respondents saw no possibility for 
themselves to participate in the privatisation process, due to lack of financial 
resources, 2.6 percent saw themselves as able to buy an enterprise. Between these 
two extremes only 5.5% expected to buy a small enterprise and 16.4% could only 
imagine being able to buy shares preferably in enterprises in which they work.
The interviewees assessed the ownership potential o f the population as in 
the survey. Many interviewees estimated the ownership potential of former 
nomenklatura members and nouveau riche to meet some o f the needs of the 
required investments. However, political and institutional constraints would 
prevent them from becoming more active. The proposed amnesty to Azeris who 
are willing to repatriate their illegally acquired funds, and hence legalise their theft 
retrospectively, was welcomed as it was hoped it would bring more stability and
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vital reinvestments. It was expected to be a long process until these groups would 
engage in production.
Figure 6-9: Self-assessed ownership potential of respondents
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Figure 6-10: Perceived obstacles to privatisation
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(9) Perceived obstacles to privatisation
The results o f the survey were also reflected in the interviews (see Figure 6-10). 
32% made the opposition of various interest groups responsible for the halt in
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privatisation; this was also the impression of most interviewees. Most 
interviewees believed that the ruling power had no real interest in the privatisation 
process partially because they feared the opposition o f powerful interest groups. 
Some believed that the ruling elite would fear interest groups gaining power 
through privatisation. In the survey only 13% of respondents saw the lack of 
interest o f the ruling power as a major factor. The local authorities were identified 
as the significant power against small privatisation. The industrial bureaucracy 
often paired with insiders, i.e. managers of the quasi-holding structures, were 
regarded as the main driving force against the planned privatisation of medium 
and large enterprises.
26.3% saw the opposition of society as a main obstacle. And 21.8% saw 
inadequate information on privatisation as a reason. Figure 6-1 and Figure 6-2 
confirm the lack of information on privatisation. So far there has been no 
organised pubic protest against privatisation. Considering the prevailing apathy 
and resignation over politics, the broad public has presently little influence on the 
decision makers.
Other opinions o f the respondents (6.7%) were: (1) that the discussion over 
privatisation was not adequate until the liberation o f occupied territories; (2) that a 
comprehensive industrial policy programme is needed in which privatisation could 
be embedded; and (3) that privatisation to the labour collectives would be a way 
of avoiding obstacles to privatisation. The reference to the occupied territories was 
also made by many interviewees. As mentioned before, many interviewees did not 
see privatisation in the context of industrial restructuring. However, they saw the 
reduction o f the uncertainty concerning the future property rights arrangements of 
the enterprises as a precondition for new investments. However, they did not 
believe that the required investments in large enterprises could be raised privately. 
They regarded the state as too weak to carry out an industrial policy programme 
successfully.
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(10) Expected ‘winners * o f privatisation
The majority of the respondents believed a few rich people and mafia groups to be 
the ‘winners’ o f privatisation (see Figure 6-11). 12.4% assumed the bureaucracy 
to profit from privatisation. This is very likely because o f the expected corruption 
in the process. 13.4% saw the state profiting from privatisation, presumably 
because o f the privatisation proceeds. Only 13.7% believed that the majority of the 
population would also have some benefits from privatisation and 9.1% presumed 
this for the whole population.
Most interviewees expected only a minority to benefit directly from 
privatisation. However, the latter was regarded as unavoidable sooner or later. 
Privatisation proceeds were regarded as insignificant. Some implied that informal 
payments to bureaucrats involved in privatisation could be expected to be high.
Figure 6-11: Expected ‘winners’ of privatisation
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5 Here it is d ifficu lt to assum e a universal demarcation o f  the term ‘m afia’
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(11) Expected results o f privatisation
The following answers were given most often in the open-ended question of 
which results the respondents expected from privatisation:
• mass protest, famine, beggars, terror, crimes;
• emergence of the classes of ‘have’ and ‘have not';
• anarchy, corruption, nepotism;
• problems will arise, (1) if there is no law on social protection and a 
provision of a social safety network; (2) if there is no proper legal 
framework for privatisation and if implementation mechanisms are not 
adequately prepared; and (3) if information is not easily accessible;
• first the lost territory should be liberated back, then privatisation can 
start;
• large percentage of population has no understanding of privatisation 
and its implications;
• the emerging struggle over wealth of mafia groups and various other 
interest groups will further paralyse economic recovery;
• money can ruin people, injustice will take its course.
There was a wide range of answers on the question o f how far privatisation 
would affect political stability. Similar to the survey respondents, some 
interviewees were worried that the privatisation process could disturb the present 
relative political stability. They feared that once it began it could escalate into a 
fierce struggle over resources. Others believed that unless the outcome of 
privatisation would be predetermined with the approval o f the different powerful 
stakeholders, it could not begin and hence there could not be any unexpected 
political conflicts. Few implied that the real distributional struggle had already 
been settled and it was only a matter of lack o f interest o f the ruling elite that the 
official privatisation had not started yet.
Concerning the economic situation, most did not expect further 
deterioration due to privatisation. However, significant changes in the 
organisational structure of enterprises and the initiation o f industrial restructuring 
were not awaited either. The majority of interviewees expected the process of 
change to take a long time. It was often assumed that small scale privatisation 
would have more positive effects by introducing some dynamics.
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(12) Expected personal consequences
In comparison to the overall evaluation of expected outcomes o f privatisation, the 
majority o f respondents did not have any expectations concerning their personal 
consequences (22.3%) or expected no effects (34.2%) (see Figure 6-12). Most 
interviewees also expected little effect of privatisation on the majority of the 
population. After all, most enterprises were already now not working and only 
sporadically paying wages. However, in the long run they expected the 
employment structure to change and predicted lay-offs in the public administration 
as well as in industry. For employees of the trade and services sector they 
predicted an improvement. These views were also reflected in the survey: 25.3% 
expected their situation to worsen and 18% foresaw an improvement of their 
situation.
Some interviewees stressed the psychological threshold concerning 
privatisation, as the latter would symbolise the ultimate break with the past.
Figure 6-12: Expected consequences on respondent’s personal life
0.2 % ■  5 no response
22.3 %
■  4 don't know
34.2 %
■  3 no effects
25.3 ■  2 worsening
□ 1
improvement
30 40
Source: Survey o f  the Publicity Department o f  the ASPC
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(13) Perceived legitimacy o f privatisation
Many interviewees were in favour of a referendum on privatisation as such a 
significant step would have to be legitimised. This view was shared by 30.2% of 
the respondents.
The majority predicted that a referendum would not make any difference to 
large parts o f the population who were resigned to having no faith in the state. 
This was also reflected in the survey results: 29.3% regarded a referendum on 
privatisation as unimportant and 22.9% were indifferent (see Figure 6-13).
Similarly some were even against a referendum: first, because they 
suspected that it was impossible to conduct a fair referendum; second, because 
they believed that large parts of the population had no information to form an 
opinion on privatisation, and, third, because they regarded it more as an issue of 
the labour collectives to decide.
Figure 6-13: Attitude towards a referendum on privatisation
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Concluding remarks
Both survey results and interviews revealed a rather divided attitude towards 
privatisation. There was more acceptance for small scale privatisation than large 
scale privatisation. Little impact on enterprise performance was expected from the 
latter and its implementation was hardly believed to be in the foreseeable future. 
The majority o f respondents believed privatisation would either have no or
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worsening personal consequences. The overall consequences of privatisation were 
predicted to be grim.
It is important to note that none of the interviewees saw privatisation as a 
means to initiate fundamental restructuring and establishing effective corporate 
governance structures. Privatisation proponents saw it as a means to reduce the 
uncertainty over the enterprises and make ‘a new start* possible. However, whilst 
some of the required investments could be covered by the mostly illegitimate 
wealth o f some rich, hardly any interviewee saw any major investments from the 
private sector forthcoming. Others saw the existence o f share markets and share- 
ownership as prerequisites of modem capitalism and thus a necessity for any 
developed country.
In both the survey results and the interviews the distrust of the state and 
resignation over politics in general was striking. Policies and new institutions like 
the ASPC are viewed with suspicion and suspected o f hidden opportunistic 
intentions. Quite a few regarded the whole privatisation process as being already 
informally completed.
Many respondents of the survey chose the option ‘don’t know’ and 
‘undecided’ as their answer on many questions, which indicates widespread 
uncertainty and indifference about the privatisation issue. This indifference may 
reflect the universal resignation over politics and the slow and tentative progress 
in privatisation. This was also displayed in the interviews in which the majority 
did not expect large scale privatisation in the foreseeable future.
Many interviewees hinted at ongoing power struggles over public assets 
and ultimately resources with which the privatisation process is intrinsically 
intertwined. The intervention of various interest groups was mentioned as the 
main obstacle for the privatisation process. The next chapter looks at this 
underlying power struggle over property rights more closely.
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7. The political economy of privatisation in Azerbaijan
Introduction
In previous chapters the institutional background and the privatisation process 
itself have been illuminated. Incorporating the previous analysis, this last chapter 
evaluates the privatisation process within the framework of institutional change 
based on Libecap (1993), which has been adapted and extended to suit the 
context of privatisation issues in PCPEs.1
The question raised is, why is it that the existing property rights structure 
cannot easily be replaced with one which is more conducive to economic 
recovery as some proponents o f privatisation would suggest? The answer lies 
with the bargaining parties involved, the range of institutional options the latter 
are facing, and the complexity of factors influencing the calculation of private 
expected gains from alternative institutional forms. As discussed before, 
contracting for property rights is an extremely complex process and it is hardly 
possible to calculate the net gains of all institutional options for eveiy single 
contracting party. However, in the following, tendencies o f the contracting 
process are pinpointed by the identification o f the contracting parties and the 
general factors which influence an agreement to the adjustment o f the property 
rights structure.
The first section analyses the key players in the Azeri contracting process, 
followed by an evaluation of factors influencing the likelihood of agreement on 
institutional change. In the final section the actual process of contracting for 
property rights in Azerbaijan is evaluated in the light o f the analysis of the 
previous chapters.
1 See section 2.3 for a detailed account o f  the fram ework o f  institutional change.
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7.1 The key players
In the context o f Azerbaijan seven categories o f interest groups can be isolated 
which play a significant role in the bargaining process for institutional change. 
The categories, defined below, are (1) industrial bureaucrats, (2) insiders, (3) 
nouveau riche, (4) politicians, (5) bureaucrats, (6) workers, and (7) foreign 
organisations. This categorisation certainly simplifies the situation as these 
groups are often not so rigid. For example, one cannot draw a clear line between 
politicians, insiders, and bureaucrats, as captains of industry are part of the 
political elite and as such hold important political positions. Nouveau riche have 
often emerged from the political establishment or have good contacts to, and 
working relationships with, insiders through family relations or otherwise. 
Patronage networks and other forms of coalitions consist of members from all 
these different groups.
(1) Industrial bureaucrats
As described above, already in the Perestroika period, branch ministries and their 
republican subdivisions gained significantly in power and unchallenged control 
over their industries. This process was continued in Azerbaijan after 
independence, when former republican branch ministries and republican 
subdivisions o f all Union branch ministries altered their legal status into that of 
concerns and associations (i.e. groups of affiliated companies).3 As stated above, 
nearly the entire production sphere is organised into fifty such quasi-holding 
companies. The upper echelons o f these superstructures, i.e. management of 
concerns and associations are here defined as industrial bureaucracy. Previously 
in this volume this group has been subsumed under the label o f ‘insiders’; in the 
analysis o f the contracting process, a more differentiated view has to be taken. As 
described below, there is a potential conflict of interest between the industrial 
bureaucracy and insiders aspiring for a higher share o f the mostly informal 
residual o f their enteiprises. However, such conflicts have been rather minor, as
2 For a more detailed discussion  o f  the role o f  patronage networks in PCPEs, see section  
2 . 1 .
3 See section  4.3, for details on this developm ent in Azerbaijan.
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both groups are closely intertwined through patronage networks. The size of the 
industries is also relative smaller than in Russia and other PCPEs and they are 
almost entirely geographically concentrated around the capital Baku, which 
simplifies control through the industrial bureaucracy. Thus, the industrial 
bureaucracy in Azerbaijan has captured de facto controlling rights of their 
enterprises, and their interests are strongly represented in coiporate strategic 
decision-making. They represent vested interests with significant bargaining 
power. Due to their well-established ties to the political establishment via 
patronage networks, the industrial bureaucracy has a relative advantage in 
political lobbying with other contracting parties.
(2) Insiders
The term ‘insiders’ refers here to managers o f SOEs at plant level. The rigid but 
informal power structures in Azerbaijan reinforce the dependency of insiders on 
the industrial bureaucracy. The latter grant protection against unwanted reforms 
and provide scarce resources. Insiders are -a very heterogeneous group in terms of 
political and economic power. They include managers o f the oil industry, 
investment-starved light industry, etc. Their bargaining power depends on several 
factors, most importantly on the size o f the enterprise, its potential viability, the 
significance o f the goods produced for the economy, and the managers’ links to 
the wider establishment. Managers of the oil industry, for example, are more 
influential as their enterprises mostly have a constant cash flow. Managers of 
potentially viable enterprises might have a stronger incentive to accept 
institutional change than those who depend wholly on rent-seeking activities. 
There is a fierce competition between all insiders for scarce state resources.
(3) Nouveau riche
The term nouveau riche describes here those economic actors who gathered 
considerable wealth mostly through illegal activities and mainly in trade and, to a
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little extent, financial services,4 but who are not directly affiliated to insiders. 
The so called ‘AliVerjf (Buyer-sellers) profited from the disintegration o f the 
Soviet Union and other Comecon states and their control mechanisms and are 
involved in activities from trading in imported consumer goods to trading in state 
assets (e.g. metals and other resources) obtained at low prices, etc. Many also 
specialised in the buying and selling of household goods, valuables, and flats of 
Russians and others ethnic minorities emigrating and others who lost out in the 
transition. These trade activities are carried out largely and on a very small scale, 
i.e. on the so-called ‘ant principle’. These nouveau riche have accumulated 
significant financial means in a relatively short time, and are potential investors 
for industry.6 However, they have little experience in industrial production. 
Moreover because o f given institutional deficiencies, they have so far not 
articulated any strong interest in long-term high investment projects.
(4) Politicians
Despite the high turnover of newly foimded political parties and politicians in 
Azerbaijan the political system is still predominated by the old Nomenklatura. 
The majority o f politicians have previously served together in the Communist 
Party or the Komsomol organisation. Moreover, most politicians started out 
during the Aliev reign (1969-1982) and are therefore well entrenched in old 
patronage networks. As anywhere else, politicians in Azerbaijan are seeking to 
maximise votes and other forms of political support. Thus, they are receptive to 
influential and potentially influential interest groups. Vested interests are very 
likely to have the upper hand in political lobbying due to their resources and 
established networks. Thus, there is a strong incentive for politicians to maintain
4 Financial services include more established banking as w ell as loan sharks and the so  
called ‘charity saving organisations’ w hich took on household savings, against 
extrem ely high m onthly interest-pay outs and provision o f  imported consum er goods 
and food  stuff. See also section 4.5.
5 ‘A nt princip le’ in Azeri refers to those traders w ho drive to R ussia or Turkey with 
their Ladas or little lorries and fill them up with goods or fly  on a charter flight to Dubai 
and bring back m ost o f  their merchandise as hand luggage.
6 Even in S oviet tim es there had been ‘AliverjY’, i.e. traders. Trading however, was not 
soc ia lly  accepted and therefore hidden. M any o f  the traders hold considerable 
accum ulated wealth from S oviet tim es and thus could  be regarded as ‘v ieux  riche’.
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the status quo (cf. Libecap 1993: 17). However, due to the severe uncertainty, a 
forward-looking politician certainly cannot ignore newly emerging interest 
groups, and they will carefully try to balance out competing demands. According 
to the shifts in relative political strength, new political coalitions accommodating 
wider interests are likely to emerge. At this point, one has to emphasise that 
politicians’ positions in Azerbaijan often rest on very fragile alliances due to 
weak judiciary and executive powers. Every politician is permanently sitting on 
an ejection seat. Thus even if he/she has the best intentions, he/she has to give in, 
to a certain extent, to the pressures of powerful vested interests for their own 
survival.
(5) Bureaucrats
‘Bureaucrats’ are part of the establishment and, like politicians, there has been a 
remarkable continuity from the Soviet era. However, their positions are less 
touched by political change, as they are not directly at the forefront of politics - 
politicians might come and go but policemen and tax inspectors will stay.
Due to the systemic changes in Azerbaijan, the old administrative 
structure does not match the requirements o f the newly arising market 
environment. The functions of large parts of the administration are obsolete. For 
instance, a Ministry of Material Resources seems to have little function outside a 
planning environment. Often functions are also duplicated if  not even triplicated 
on various levels o f political apparatus.7 Official wages cannot secure the 
accustomed living standard under ‘Realsozialismus’ and are even too little to 
survive. Most administrations have formally and informally found themselves 
new functions and new sources of income, as state resources were more and 
more withdrawn. They have often developed parasitic relationships both to 
insiders and nouveau riche. However, parts o f the bureaucracy are under constant 
threat o f being laid off. Despite the numbers of bureaucrats, there is a lack of 
staff skilled and experienced in the new requirements of the changing 
environment (e.g. new investment appraisal, project management, budgeting, 
accounting methods, etc.). Instead of reforming or abolishing old bureaucratic
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structures, it is sometimes easier to establish new structures, e.g. instead of 
reforming the Ministry of Economics, the ASPC and the AAESC were set up. 
These new structures challenge income sources o f old administrative bodies.
Bureaucrats are again a very heterogeneous group with varying political 
influence. Often they are competing over spheres of influence, i.e. sources of 
corrupt income, as in, for example, the authority to issue export licenses, etc. On 
the whole, the interest of large parts of the bureaucracy lies in maintaining the 
status quo. However, the newly emerging ASPC and parts of the other 
administrative bodies might be in favour o f privatisation as it would provide 
them with short-term informal income.
(6) Workers
Workers have been the clear losers of the transition period. They have been 
stripped o f all their privileges, e.g. job security, extensive benefits in kind and 
social services. Their influence on institutional change varies between different 
industrial branches, but is continuously decreasing. The trade union movement in 
Azerbaijan has not caught up with the new requirements o f the transition period, 
if not to say the dramatic economic decline has left it paralysed.8 The old official 
trade unions and their leaders have often been well-integrated or absorbed into 
the political establishment and are, therefore, captured by insider interests. Due 
to the economic crisis, unionisation levels have often declined and the union 
movement has become increasingly fragmented. There is a desperate lack of 
viable reform concepts on which the labour movement could develop 
programmes. On the whole, workers are very weak players for the foreseeable 
future. The tendency is for them to support insiders.
(7) Foreign organisations
The classification ‘foreign organisations’ comprises foreign investors as well as 
international and supranational organisations (e.g. IMF and IBRD). Although
7 S ee section 5.1 for an account o f  the situation o f  the state apparatus in Azerbaijan.
8 A sim ilar account is given for the situation o f  the labour m ovem ent in Russia, see  
Kagarlitsky (1995b ) and M andel (1995a and b). For an account o f  Poland, see  
S ylw estrow icz (1995).
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foreign investments have been rather meagre except for the oil extracting 
industry in Azerbaijan, a large part o f the domestic contracting parties are eager 
to obtain foreign involvement.
Due to the expected oil boom, Azerbaijan constitutes a potentially viable 
market for foreign economic agents. Hence foreign investors are mainly 
interested in foreign trade liberalisation, foreign investment laws that secure their 
investments and repatriation of profits, and ‘political stability’ in the sense that 
their investments are not threatened by nationalisation and their trade and 
production interests are protected. They are ready for all sorts o f coalitions with 
domestic interest groups.
International and supranational organisations promote their structural 
reform, macro-economic stabilisation and foreign trade liberalisation packages.9 
These austere policy prescriptions are spurred in Azerbaijan by stabilisation 
funds, soft credits, and other financial incentives. The funds provided may often 
be insignificant for the overall economy, and its agents. However, they are 
noteworthy enough for bureaucrats and politicians. Often the author could 
witness the sheer excitement and the explosion o f report writing in almost the 
whole administration of Azerbaijan on the announcement of the visit o f an IMF 
or World Bank mission. Long awaited legal reform packages were announced, to 
be passed at any minute. And formal privatisation, which is taken by these 
supranational organisations as the touchstone for a successful reform process, 
was proclaimed to be taking place tomorrow. Once the visit was over things 
cooled down again. However, the immense influence on economic policies by 
supranational organisations is undeniable;
9 Structural reform is m ostly concentrated on setting up an adequate legal framework, 
and financial infrastructure and privatisation. Often privatisation is alm ost used as a 
synonym  for enterprise restructuring. M acro-econom ic stabilisation programmes 
com prise m ainly monetary policy  (i.e. credit controls), tight fisca l p o licy  (reduction o f  
budget deficits), im position o f  strict w age controls, price liberalisation, and exchange 
rate as nom inal anchor (fixed  exchange rate, com bined w ith import liberalisation) (cf. 
M arer/Zecchini 1991).
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7.2 Factors influencing the likelihood o f  agreement on 
institutional change
Countless factors influence each individual contracting process for institutional 
change. There will be a lot o f country specific factors, as well as factors specific 
to certain contracting parties. Likewise, the institutional arrangements in different 
PCPEs vary wildly. In the following only the important common factors are 
discussed which are also relevant for Azerbaijan (see Table 7-1).
Table 7-1: Factors influencing the likelihood of agreement on institutional 
change
Factor
1. Uncertainty
2. Imperfect and asymmetric information
J . The heterogeneity o f  the contracting parties
4. The relative bargaining power o f each contracting party
5. Time and precedent
(1) Uncertainty
Due to the volatile political and economic environment in Azerbaijan there is 
deep uncertainty about future development. Uncertainty can in that sense be 
understood also as a function of the degree of institutional development, i.e. 
mainly the relation o f informal rights arrangements to formal ones and in how far 
the political system, the legal framework including its enforcement mechanisms, 
and the financial infrastructure have developed.10 As detailed above, informal 
rights arrangements dominate the institutional setting in Azerbaijan. The 
prevailing uncertainty has a paralysing effect on all contracting parties and 
increasingly underpins the status quo. It led to widespread short-term thinking 
which is not very conducive to institutional change.
(2) Imperfect and asymmetric information
It cannot be expected that the contracting parties have the entire information 
necessary to calculate their net gains from institutional change at their disposal. 
Accordingly, they will be not aware of all institutional options. For instance,
10 See chapter 4 for an assessm ent o f  the institutional fram ew ork in Azerbaijan.
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often the only alternative to the restructuring of an enterprise is its liquidation. 
This might not always be clear to all parties involved. Insiders will have an 
information advantage concerning their enterprises relative to other contracting 
parties. Likewise, bureaucrats will have an information advantage on public 
policy measures, e.g. on enterprise subsidies etc. Due to information problems of 
some contracting parlies, outright deception can be used to underpin one’s 
position, e.g. the value o f assets can be underestimated, benefits can be granted 
which are never intended to be paid out etc. (cf. Libecap 1993: 24). The high 
degree of outright deception on all political levels resulted in far-reaching 
distrust o f the entire population, which is a major obstacle to institutional change. 
The degree o f availability of information and the degree o f asymmetry of 
information are an important factor influencing the outcome o f contracting.
(3) The heterogeneity o f the contracting parties
The heterogeneity of the contracting parties was already discussed above. It 
depends mainly on differences in wealth and status of its members, differences in 
the level of information, and political experience (cf. Libecap 1993: 22-23). 
There is a great heterogeneity within and between contracting parties in 
Azerbaijan. For example, a manager in the oil industry has more reserves than 
one in light industry; Aliev who has been previously KGB chief in Azerbaijan 
and then Party Secretary for fourteen years knows intimately the strengths and 
weaknesses of every other politician. The greater the heterogeneity of contracting 
parties the more difficult it will be to come to an agreement on institutional 
change, and the more likely it will be that the contracting process will be stalled.
(4) The relative bargaining power o f each contracting party
The bargaining power of each contracting party depends on its resources and its 
contacts and networks.11 The better the bar-gaining power, the more weight the
11 T h e  e m p h a s is  sh o u ld  b e  h e r e  o n  th e  r e s o u r c e s . H o w e v e r , it  is  im p o r ta n t to  n o te  th at  
b u ild in g  up  th e  n e c e s s a r y  a l lia n c e s  an d  c o a lit io n s  o f  w h ic h  c o n tr a c t in g  c o n s is t s  w i l l  
ta k e  t im e . T h u s , in th e  sh o rt-term , p a r tie s  w ith  th e  b e s t  c o n ta c ts  an d  n e tw o r k s  w i l l  h a v e  
an a d v a n ta g e .
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interests o f contracting parties will bear. However, in the long term the positions 
in bargaining power are quite fragile, due to the volatile environment.
(5) Time and precedent
Libecap (1993: 6-7) points out that time and precedent have important roles in 
contracting:
Precedents set expectations among the various parties for successful 
institutional change [i.e. changes in governance structures that promote 
economic growth]. If the political and economic systems are reasonably 
open to new entrants and there is a history of routine adjustments in 
property rights, then institutional change to meet specific economic 
problems is more likely... On the other hand, in less open societies where 
the status quo has been maintained by influential parties, new external 
market conditions will not bring the same expectations for institutional 
change. Depending on the size of the market pressures, the lack of 
expectations for change will limit the expected returns from forming 
interest groups within established political structures to lobby for new 
property rights structures.
In Azerbaijan, as in many other PCPEs, the expectations for institutional change 
were swiftly disillusioned and proposals of progressive groups were heavily 
constrained or defeated by vested interests. There are rather negative precedents 
of institutional change, e.g. corruption and asset stripping, which are not very 
conducive to positive momentum. However, the development of a suitable legal 
framework and a record of positive precedence, e.g. the successful restructuring 
and changes in corporate governance structure of enterprises, is very important 
for the contracting process. Successftil institutional change is, therefore, also 
dependent on whether a PCPE has already a record of such progress. As chapter 
4 showed, Azerbaijan’s track record in positive institutional change is very 
limited.
73 Contracting for property rights in Azerbaijan
As discussed before, the institution background o f privatisation is very 
unfavourable. With the decay of the administrative structure the informalisation 
of economic and social relations has increased dramatically. For example, whilst 
formally the enterprises are under the control of the state, de facto insider control
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is prevalent; officially a bureaucrat or politician receives his/her wage, de facto 
the official wage is only a crumb in relation to his/her informal earnings. 
Informal arrangements and power struggles also exist in more stable economies 
but they are far more concealed. As in other PCPEs the gap between officially 
proclaimed objectives of policies and actions and de facto objectives of the key 
players has widened so far that these discrepancies become too obvious. 
Attitudes and perceptions of key players and the broader population have adapted 
accordingly. This is reflected in the far-reaching distrust o f officially declared 
intentions. For example, some interviewees as well as ordinary taxi drivers on the 
street asked on their opinion on the ASPC suspected the latter to be primarily 
interested in informal income generation by abusing their discretionary powers; 
although the officially declared policy line is privatisation, 13% of the 
respondents and also quite a few interviewees made the lack of interest in 
privatisation o f the ruling elite responsible for the stalling o f the privatisation 
process. The assessment of the contracting process in Azerbaijan has primarily to 
concentrate on the de facto objectives of the key players.'
Considering this power constellation in Azerbaijan, it is hardly to be 
expected that insiders and industrial bureaucracy will easily agree to a property 
rights constellation which would weaken their position. Parts of the industrial 
bureaucracy might be interested in legalising their informal ownership rights on 
their enterprises. However, due to the given uncertainty and imperfect and 
asymmetric information on both the viability o f their enterprises and future 
industrial and public policy measures, their calculable gain is limited. Most 
enterprises are in need of fundamental restructuring involving major investments. 
Serious restructuring in terms of downsizing and streamlining would also erode 
their very power base, e.g. there is a significant difference between an enterprise 
of five thousand workers and one with five hundred. Moreover, once the more or 
less comfortable institutional arrangements with all the other contracting parties 
are disturbed in a formal privatisation process, parts o f the insiders might 
demand a bigger share in residual income and the nouveau riche might try to get 
a stake in the industry. Short-term strategies of asset stripping and rent-seeking 
are thus more feasible for the majority of the industrial bureaucracy. This
291
position is also taken by insiders. Some o f the latter might be interested in 
freeing themselves from their interfering superstructure, i.e. the industrial 
bureaucracy, in the form of insider privatisation. However, due to the 
institutional deficiencies in Azerbaijan, it would be hard for them to operate 
without their protective, well-connected industrial bureaucracy as an ally. The 
draft privatisation programme would have little effect on the majority of the 
industrial bureaucracy, other than the almost non-existent wood processing 
industry and small enterprises in light industry, most o f which are in the 
provinces. Nonetheless, the beginning of the official privatisation process would 
set precedents and would strengthen new and old bureaucracies interfering with 
industry. Even if very vaguely dealt with, the programme envisages the 
unbundling o f the conglomerations, although at the same time it suggests the 
establishment o f holding companies and the maintenance o f the vertically 
integrated industrial structures. However, all these propositions are too vague to 
build on. As for insiders, the programme does not explicitly mention any 
advantages for them, only for the labour collectives. The latter are too weak and 
unorganised and most eminently lack the necessary funds to benefit from the 
programme.
Which position over privatisation do other contracting parties take then? 
First, the nouveau riche are potential competitors for control rights in industry. 
However, again, profound uncertainty and asymmetric and imperfect information 
on the viability o f enterprises decreases their incentives. The nouveau riche could 
have a major interest in the small scale privatisation o f the draft privatisation 
programme, which should be rather termed sale of commercial properties. Small 
scale privatisation of shops and little service entities has already been carried out 
either through lease arrangements or sales by the local authorities and other 
authorities, often through informal arrangements. It is questionable, whether the 
nouveau riche would have a great advantage in acquiring such properties within a 
formal privatisation campaign.
Second, politicians, as stated above, are very much interested in 
maintaining the status quo and even those with true reform intentions are 
doomed to fail due to the weak judiciary and executive powers and the overall
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constellation o f power. Moreover, most politicians would resist any restructuring 
o f property rights which would give the industrial bureaucracy or any other 
contracting party significantly more power. As discussed above, it is highly 
unlikely that the huge industrial conglomerates will be unbundled. However, if 
the control of these industries would fall entirely in the hands of the industrial 
bureaucracy the latter would be a challenge to the political sphere.
Third, the majority of bureaucrats like politicians are very much 
interested in maintaining the status quo. Major changes in the present property 
rights would disturb their parasitic relationships to the other contracting parties. 
Moreover, in the long term, it could also initiate a major restructuring of the 
public administration. As mentioned above, the 1994 draft privatisation 
programme would increase the power and thus the informal earning potential of 
the ASPC significantly. The latter can be understood as the major ‘winner’ of the 
privatisation process within the bureaucracy. The small scale privatisation would 
reduce the power of the local authorities over shopkeepers and small services. It 
can be assumed that the privatisation programme was held purposely vague 
regarding the demarcation of responsibilities between different authorities in 
order to gain support amongst the various parts o f the bureaucracy, as the 
involved authorities can be certain of short-term informal earnings.
Fourth, as stated above, a major driving force behind privatisation is 
foreign organisations which regard formal privatisation as a significant measure 
o f institutional development. The funds provided by these organisations give 
some politicians and bureaucrats an incentive to engage in the promotion of the 
privatisation process, even if  only by giving lip service.
Concluding remarks
The evaluation o f the contracting process in Azerbaijan shows that the outcome 
of proposed institutional change will have little resemblance with the initial 
concept. Even policy programmes initiated with the purest intentions have to 
consider (a) the alterations due to the contracting process, and (b) its interaction 
with the de facto system. Thus the final programme can only be a compromise 
between different contracting parties, and the implementation is going to be
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influenced by informal determinants. Moreover, due to latent political instability 
and the weakness o f the state, the very powerful interest groups, which 
privatisation should seek to defeat, are those on whom the state relies for 
survival. And the privatisation process has to be carried out mostly by self- 
seeking bureaucrats whose only interest are their own rent extraction.
Accordingly, institutional reforms are still in the initial stages. However, 
one glimpse o f hope is given by continuously changing power constellations 
resulting from changing bargaining positions. With most o f the productive 
capacity not running and the increasing decay o f the state apparatus it is only a 
matter of time before the power base o f large parts o f the industrial bureaucracy 
will be eroded.
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CONCLUSION
The conclusion o f the research can be summarised in seven points. First, the 
analysis o f enterprise efficiency in PCPEs has come to the conclusion that the 
question o f formal ownership is rarely central. However, under the circumstances 
of deeply entrenched rent-seeking, privatisation can be a tool either to involve 
insiders constructively in the establishment of sound corporate governance 
structures or, ideally, to effectively exclude them completely.
Second, the success o f privatisation in PCPE’s depends on various factors, 
most eminently, (1) the evolution of institutional preconditions, i.e. the 
development o f the political, legal, and financial frameworks and other 
fundamental institutions of a market environment; (2) the question of the power of 
the state, i.e. is it a strong state, with agenda-setting power, or a weak state, 
susceptible to the counter-productive rent-seeking activities o f insiders; (3) the 
proposed methods o f privatisation; (4) the process o f contracting for property 
rights. Whilst these conclusions might have been anticipated by those conversant 
with various recent developments in the economic theory o f institutions, they are 
given more specific analytical and empirical content during the course o f this 
thesis and as elaborated in brief in the following conclusions.
Third, a factor frequently underestimated by the advocates of privatisation 
in PCPEs, is that the very same powerful interest groups, which privatisation 
should seek to defeat, are those on whom the state relies for survival. Insider 
control exists to a different degree in all PCPEs, but its importance is often 
enhanced by the state’s . weakness and political instability. Moreover, the 
bureaucrats involved in the privatisation process are frequently self-seeking, so 
that their primary interest is in their personal rent extraction.
Fourth, the chosen method of privatisation is a key factor. Chapter 3 has 
drawn up a transaction cost framework in which methods can be assessed. The 
free transfer of enterprises to employees approach, followed by ESOP/MBO, 
competitive tendering and leasing arrangements, promises most success in the 
given framework. Voucher privatisation schemes have been evaluated as negative 
for static and dynamic efficiency. However, it has to be noted that the suitability
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of the method o f privatisation also depends on the kind o f enterprise. As 
mentioned before, factors like size, factor specificity and other enterprise and 
sector specific factors play a great role.
Fifth, the point of departure in Azerbaijan delineated in this thesis is very 
bleak. To summarise: first, the Azeri economy has suffered cumulative decline in 
real GDP o f 60% in 1990-1994, with most o f its industries either not working or 
operating at a fraction of their capacity. Second, the industrial sector is 
characterised by monopolies and generally high concentration, insider control, 
excess capacity, low profitability, environmental pollution, increasing 
technological obsolescence, and a largely obsolescent capital stock due to lack of 
investments and maintenance and also far-reaching asset stripping. As the power 
constellations have not allowed a thorough inventory of the enterprises as 
envisaged for years, nobody knows even to what extent the production facilities 
are still recoverable. Third, the bureaucratic structures are overcrowded and, to a 
great extent, obsolete. The steady decay of these structures, together with a legal 
framework which is barely developed to deal with the new requirements, has led 
to a perverse degree of ‘informalisation5 of all economic and social relations; to 
the extent that large sections of the bureaucracy are in practice engaged in 
informal income generation. Fourth, political parties and organisations are 
unrepresentative and lack a mass popular base. And, finally, the state is weak and 
dependent on patronage networks for survival. The tasks faced by political and 
economic reforms are more pervasive than experienced in most industrialised 
countries after World War II. It is only to the remarkable capacity of the Azeris to 
adapt and survive that widespread famine and political turmoil have not broken 
out.
Taken together, these empirical and historical features are unique to 
Azerbaijan, just as other countries exhibit specific characteristics of their own. 
Much o f the theoretical and policy literature, in this light, has been shown to be 
sorely inadequate. This is not simply because it neglects these specific and 
contingent factors but because it effectively precludes them. This is a major 
conclusion o f the thesis that has been demonstrated in theoretical and empirical 
detail. By the same token, it provides an invaluable salutary lesson for future
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research and for would-be policy makers, especially those armed with the notion 
of privatisation (and the market) as a panacea for PCPEs - an ideological posture 
that has demonstratively proved disastrous in practice.
Sixth, it is therefore hardly surprising that the decision to cany out formal 
privatisation and hence change property rights institutions - the key to the 
distribution o f wealth and political power - has immediately stalled within a 
complex contracting process. Although, and maybe also because, the draft 
privatisation programme was such a compromise, it has hardly touched the 
position o f the industrial bureaucracy and most insiders, and it has not gained 
major support by any key player. The question was posed whether the envisaged 
privatisation programme is a viable way to enhance enterprise efficiency under the 
given economic and institutional circumstances. After all, the privatisation process 
has, to a large extent, crowded out any other form o f industrial recovery 
programmes. There are hardly any steps taken towards industrial restructuring 
except in the petroleum industry, and there only because of major foreign 
involvement.
Ultimately, it has to be concluded that rather than engaging in ambitious 
and fruitless mass privatisation programmes, it is advisable for Azeri policy 
makers to concentrate on the tasks of industrial restructuring on a sectoral and 
enterprise level using other industrial policy instruments concerning large 
enterprises. Privatisation can be used here on a case-to-case basis. Most of the 
‘small scale’ privatisation resembles more the sale o f commercial properties and 
should be dealt with separately. Whether, however, internal and external 
influences are liable to abandon the panacea o f privatisation for more constructive 
and realistic policies for institutional reform and industrial restructuring is another 
matter over which there can be little optimism.
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